NEW TRANSCULTURALISMS, 1400–1800

## **Jesuit and English Experiences at the Mughal Court, c. 1580–1615**

**joÃo vicente melo**

### New Transculturalisms, 1400–1800

Series Editors

Ann Rosalind Jones, Department of Comparative Literature, Smith College, Northampton, MA, USA Jyotsna G. Singh, Department of English, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA Mihoko Suzuki, Center for the Humanities, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA

This series, now published by Palgrave Macmillan, presents studies of early modern contacts and exchanges among the states, polities, cultures, religions, and entrepreneurial organizations of Europe; Asia, including the Levant and East India/Indies; Africa; and the Americas. Books in *New Transculturalisms* will continue to investigate diverse figures, such as travelers, merchants, cultural inventors—explorers, mapmakers, artists, craftsmen, and writers—as they operated in political, mercantile, sexual, affective, and linguistic economies. We encourage authors to reflect on their own methodologies in relation to issues and theories relevant to the study of transculturalism, translation, and transnationalism.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/15712 João Vicente Melo

# Jesuit and English Experiences at the Mughal Court, c. 1580–1615

João Vicente Melo Pablo de Olavide University Seville, Spain

European Research Council

Research for this publication was supported by the ERC-TIDE project (www.tideproject.uk). This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 681884)

New Transculturalisms, 1400–1800 ISBN 978-3-030-96587-7 ISBN 978-3-030-96588-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96588-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2022. This book is an open access publication.

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Cover image: "P. Hieronymvs Xaveris vande Societeÿt Iesv, ende Neve vanden H. Franc: Xavervs disputeert inde teghenwordicheÿt vanden Coninck van Mogor, met de Mahometaenen end overtuÿht se", engraving by Abraham Van Diepenbeeck. It shows Jerome Xavier in an interfaith debate with Akbar. The image was published in Cornelius Hazart's *Kerckelycke historie van de Gheheele wereldt namelyck vande voorgaende ende teghenwoordighe Eeuwe beschreven door den Eerw*, 4 vols. (Antwerpen, 1667–1671). Courtesy of the Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal

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### Acknowledgements

This book was written in different places. At Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, where this book project began, special words of gratitude are due to Joan-Pau Rubiés, Alexandre Coello de la Rosa, Manel Ollé, Daniele Cozzoli, and Claudia Contente. While at the University of Liverpool, I am indebted to Nandini Das and Harald Braun for their encouragement and insights. Both at Liverpool and Oxford, the camaraderie of Haig Z. Smith, Lauren Working, Tom Roberts and Emily Stevenson will always be remembered. Words would not be enough to thank Margarida for her companionship, patience, and love. Rita made all worthwhile. And Mica helped to make things more enjoyable. I am thankful to Palgrave for having accepted this work for publication, especially to Sam Stocker and to the three series editors—Ann Rosalind Jones, Jyotsna G. Singh, and Mihoko Suzuki—who received the proposal with great interest and enthusiasm. Maurice Whitehead, Ana Saéz Hidalgo, and Berta Cano Echevarría made the research trips to Rome and Valladolid much more enjoyable. Last but not least, a special word of gratitude to Michael French and Vittorio Mattioli for their impeccable proofreading. This research received funding from the European Research Council-funded TIDE project (Travel, Transculturality, and Identity in England, 1550—1700) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (Grant Agreement No. 681884).

### Contents


### Abbreviations


### Introduction

This book aims to reconstruct and examine one episode of Anglo-Iberian diplomatic rivalry: the clash between the Portuguese-sponsored Jesuit missionaries and the agents of the English East India Company (EIC) at the Mughal court between 1580 and 1615. This chronological delimitation comprises the launch of the first Jesuit mission to Akbar's court in 1580 and the preparation of the English royal embassy led by Sir Thomas Roe to negotiate the concession of trading privileges to the EIC. These 35 years encompass not only the extension of the conflict between the Iberian crowns and England into Asia, but also the consolidation of the Mughal Empire. The clash between the Ignatian *padres* and the servants of the Honourable Company was not a mere extension of Anglo-Iberian rivalry into South Asia, but also a conflict instigated and exploited by the Mughal authorities in the pursuit of specific commercial, geopolitical and ideological agendas.

The interactions between Mughals and the *firangis* (Europeans) from the Iberian Peninsula and the British Isles occurred during a crucial moment of the evolution of the Mughal polity. Throughout the 1560s and 1570s, Akbar initiated a long period of territorial expansion, fiscal centralism and restructuring of the Mughal nobility. The annexation of Gujarat (1572–1573) and Bengal (1574–1576) offered access to the maritime routes of the Western Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022

J. V. Melo, *Jesuit and English Experiences at the Mughal Court, c. 1580–1615*, New Transculturalisms, 1400–1800, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96588-4\_1

to what was originally a landlocked empire. This new maritime dimension altered the geopolitical concerns of the Mughal Empire. Besides the need to protect the main ports of the empire, the Mughal authorities had to deal with the maritime journeys of the Indian pilgrims to Mecca, suppress the activities of pirates and stimulate Mughal maritime trade. Overseas trade also became an important source of revenue for the imperial treasury, as well as a channel to acquire exotic or rare commodities, stimulating the involvement of the imperial family and the Mughal elites in commercial and shipping ventures. The incorporation of Gujarat and Bengal also prompted Akbar to develop an imperial ideology based on notions of universal rule and divinely sanctioned kingship—a project continued by his successors, Jahangir ('the World Seizer') and Shahjahan ('the Lord of the World').<sup>1</sup>

It was in Gujarat that the Mughals had their first encounters with the Portuguese. Following the capture of Ahmedabad, on 13 December 1572 Akbar sent a *firman* (imperial decree) to the captain of the Portuguese port of Diu requesting the *khutba*, the public sermon performed at the Friday prayers, to be read in the name of the Mughal *padshah* (emperor) at the local mosques and the Mughal currency to be adopted in Diu. This *firman* inaugurated an intense exchange through a myriad of formal and informal channels between the Portuguese and the Mughal authorities.

For the Portuguese, the Mughal presence in Gujarat, Bengal and the subsequent expansionist campaigns in the Deccan posed a serious threat not only to the Portuguese-held ports of Daman and Diu but also to the hinterland of Goa. The survival of the *Estado da Índia* relied thus on establishing some sort of entente with the *Mogor*, as the Mughal polity was known in Portuguese sources. For the Mughals, the *Estado da Índia* was another regional polity. Albeit not posing the same threat as the Safavids, Uzbeks or the Deccani sultanates, the Portuguese constituted an obstacle to the development of the maritime dimension acquired by the Mughal Empire after the annexation of Gujarat and Bengal. Mughal maritime ambitions, however, stumbled on the *cartazes*, the naval passports imposed by the *Estado da Índia*, which supported the Portuguese claims to a monopoly over the 'Seas of India'. The intrusive and violent

<sup>1</sup> See for example Ebba Koch, "How the Mughal P¯adsh¯ahs Referenced Iran in Their Visual Construction of Universal Rule" in *Universal Empire: A Comparative Approach To Imperial Culture and Representation in Eurasian History* eds. Peter Fibiger Bang and Dariusz Kołodziejczyk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 194–209.

nature of the *cartaz*, as well as its association with the Portuguese claims to the lordship of the 'Seas of India', was therefore regarded by the Mughals as a serious obstacle to the development of a maritime policy and an attack to the image of the Mughal emperor as the lord of Hindustan.2

Akbar's invitation to the Society of Jesus to send a mission to his court had thus a double aim: to establish a channel of communication with the Portuguese authorities at Goa and to enhance the notions of Mughal universal sovereignty by adding new elements that could simultaneously reinforce the cosmopolitan dimension of the imperial court and contribute to the emperor's ideological projects. Indeed, the Jesuits could be easily integrated into the group of the 'elite *sayyids*, great *shaikhs*, eminent scholars, eminent scholars, ingenuous doctors, and agreeable courtiers of various classes', intellectuals who came from 'the various communities of Hindustan, from among the masters of excellence and perfection, and men of the sword and the pen'.3 One of the roles of the missionaries was, thus, to provide new elements from a different theological and intellectual tradition to a long and complex process of ideological construction.

As the de facto representatives of the Portuguese Crown in Mughal India, the Jesuits were frequently employed for diplomatic tasks by both sides. This ambivalent double status of the missionaries as clergymen and diplomats offered many advantages in obtaining political protection and financial support, but also exposed the Jesuit mission to the risks of a fallout between the Estado and Akbar. A rupture of Luso-Mughal relations was a constant threat to the continuity of the mission. The formation of a large local Christian community was thus a priority to safeguard at least a solid Catholic presence in Mughal India, one that could allow the Jesuits to maintain their activities under new terms. Like other missionaries who operated in Safavid Persia, China or the Ottoman Empire, the Jesuit missionaries in Mughal India had to find their

<sup>2</sup> For a brief overview of the development of the Mughal 'maritime dimension' and its impact on early Luso-Mughal relations, see Jorge Flores, *Nas margens do Hindustão: O Estado da Índia e a expansão mogol, ca. 1570–1640* (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2015), chapters 2 and 3; M. S. Renick, "Akbar's First Embassy to Goa. Its Diplomatic and Religious Aspects", *Indica,* 7:1 (1970), pp. 33–47.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted from Kinra Rajeev, "Handling Diversity with Absolute Civility: The Global Historical Legacy of Mughal S.ulh.-i Kull", *The Medieval History Journal,* 16:2 (2013), pp. 251–295.

own place in the Mughal social and political structures. This involved a constant negotiation with local agents, which involved the performance of different functions that suited the interests of different actors who had the capacity to enhance the status and agency of the missionaries. In these negotiations, the Jesuits were inevitably in a position of inferiority as supplicants who asked for protection and patronage. The pursuit of gaining acceptance by the Mughal elites forced the Jesuit missionaries to simultaneously play different roles as clergymen, scholars, diplomats, interpreters, translators and providers of artistic novelties from Europe.

Mughal maritime and commercial ambitions also shaped the exchanges with English agents. Although the first attempts made by the English authorities to establish contacts with the Mughal Empire in the early 1580s resulted in a fiasco, the fierce reaction of the *Estado da Índia* to the arrival of the EIC in Gujarat in 1608 was duly noted by the Mughals. The English arrived in Surat during a moment of intensification of Luso-Mughal diplomatic exchanges that generated some expectations at the Mughal court regarding a suitable solution to ease the restraints on Mughal shipping imposed by the *cartaz* system. In an attempt to pressure the Portuguese authorities, Jahangir briefly toyed with the idea of conceding trading privileges to the EIC. Unlike the Portuguese, who were represented by the Jesuit missionaries, the English were a new group of *firangis* who posed no direct threat or obstacle to Mughal interests and were willing to accept Mughal primacy. As a newcomer to the South Asian commercial and geopolitical arena, the EIC recognised its dependence on Mughal imperial sovereignty to develop its activities. The main goal was to secure a stable presence in the South Asian mercantile systems, preferably with a similar arrangement to the capitulations granted by the Ottoman authorities to English merchants in 1583. The first Anglo-Mughal exchanges were thus shaped by an English acknowledgement of Mughal primacy in South Asia, which made the company's emissaries appear as supplicants from a minor, subordinated polity, contrasting with the more uncompromising postures of the *Estado da Índia*'s officials.4 The English, especially after the debacle of the *Estado*'s armadas against the EIC fleets in 1612, emerged thus in Mughal eyes as a suitable instrument to disturb the Portuguese exploits in South Asia.

<sup>4</sup> Michael H. Fisher, "Diplomacy in India, 1526–1858" in *Britain's Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, c.1550–1850* eds. H. V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke, and John G. Reid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 251.

Besides their utility to Mughal diplomatic strategies, the presence of English merchants could be used to develop Mughal overseas trade and enhance the cosmopolitan discourse of Mughal imperial ideology. Indeed, the EIC servants at the Mughal court could be easily identified as part of the group of 'captains of commerce' (*malik al-tujjar*) described by Chandar Bhan as integral elements who contributed to the prosperity and prestige of the Mughal Empire. As the other 'captains of commerce' from places such as the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, China, Central Asia and Southeast Asia, the English facilitated the arrival of exotic commodities and connections with the international market. These profitable exchanges allowed the overseas merchants to disseminate the image of the Mughal Empire as a benevolent cosmopolitan imperial power and the centre of the world economy or, as Chandar Bhan wrote, 'the central axis of the world's turning quadrants'.5 Foreign merchants would 'carry testimonial evidence of the kindness and good name of this eternal empire in every direction and to every far corner of the world, [spreading the word] that this magnificent and majestic court is the *qibla* of the hopes of this worlds and its inhabitants'.<sup>6</sup>

Although the historiography of Anglo-Mughal relations acknowledges the disruptive effect that the Jesuit missionaries posed to the English exploits in Mughal India, the sources related to the Jesuit mission and the correspondence of the Portuguese *Estado da Índia* are rarely mentioned or taken into consideration in the narratives that explain the early years of the EIC in South Asia. In fact, the few works dedicated to the first English exploits in Mughal India, such as the contributions of Ram Chandra Prasad, Phanindranath Chakrabarty, Richmond Barbour and Ethan Carlson, tend to present a rather simplistic vision of the interactions between English agents and the Jesuits, following a rather Anglocentric perspective that often uncritically takes the ways in which the mostly anti-Iberian and anti-Catholic early English accounts described the Jesuit responses to the EIC at face value.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Ram Chandra Prasad, *Early English Travellers in India: A Study in the Travel Literature of the Elizabethan and Jacobean Periods with Particular Reference to India* (New

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in Rajeev Kinra, *Writing Self, Writing Empire: Chandar Bhan Brahman and the Cultural World of the Indo-Persian State Secretary* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2015), p. 114.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 113.

Although the Jesuit missionaries at the Mughal court generated an extensive correspondence and literary production in Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, German, Latin and Persian, the English, Dutch and French works on Mughal India written by authors such as Thomas Roe, Francisco Pelsaert and François Bernier dominated the European perceptions of the Indo-Persianate world ruled by the Timurids. Moreover, the decline of the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*, the main sponsor of the Jesuit missions in South Asia, and the ascendancy of British power in India led many scholars to underestimate or neglect the knowledge on India produced by other Europeans, as well as the processes of cultural exchange that took place between Europeans and South Asians before the British Raj. Kate Teltscher's *India Inscribed*, for example, omits Portuguese, Spanish and Italian works, and is essentially focused on Anglophone and Francophone texts.8 Even the accounts and experiences of those English travellers who visited the Mughal court before Roe, between 1580 and 1615, such as Ralph Fitch, John Mildenhall, William Hawkins, Paul Canning, Thomas Kerridge and William Edwards, have usually been neglected. In spite of being the first Englishmen to visit the Mughal court, the authors of the pre-Roe accounts are often overlooked, and seemingly considered lacking the political relevance, the smooth prose, the detailed observations and diatribes that can be found in the writings of the English ambassador. Examining English and Jesuit documents that belong to a generation of European texts on Mughal India that predated the so-called 'Roenian moment' will offer a more complex, cross-cultural and multilingual understanding of the evolution of the European perceptions of India, as well as the evolution of the early modern European perceptions of the Mughal Empire during a period when the European colonial projects were unable to match the military and economic power enjoyed by the Ottomans, Persians and Mughals.

Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980); Phanindranath Chakrabarty, *Anglo-Mughal Commercial Relations, 1583–1717* (Calcutta: O.P.S. Publishers, 1983); Richmond Barbour, *Before Orientalism: London's Theatre of the East, 1576–1626* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Richmond Barbour, "Power and Distant Display: Early English Ambassadors in Moghul India", *Huntington Library Quarterly* 61:3–4 (1998), pp. 343–368; Ethan Carlson, "Power, Presents, and Persuasion: Early English Diplomacy with Mughal India", *Emory Endeavors in History,* IV (2019), pp. 7–25.

<sup>8</sup> Kate Teltscher, *India Inscribed: European and British Writing on India, 1600–1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Chapter 2 describes and analyses the first Jesuit mission to the Mughal court (1580–1583) and the early diplomatic contacts between the Mughal Empire and the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*. This chapter will focus on the evolution of the top-down strategy of the Jesuit missionaries, and the problems that this approach posed to the success of the missionaries.

Chapter 3 explores the evolution of the Mughal and Portuguese geopolitical strategies that paved the way for the second (1591–1592) and third (1595–1775) Jesuit missions to the Mughal court. This chapter also analyses the reactions of the members of the second mission to Akbar's religious policies and millenarian positions, as well as the diplomatic activities and proselytising strategies of the third Jesuit mission initiated in 1595. This chapter focuses on the top-down strategy implemented by Jerónimo Xavier and the popular mission developed by Manoel Pinheiro in Lahore. Special attention is given to the roles played by the missionaries and their converts and patrons in the empire's social, political and economic life, as well as the capacity of the Jesuit missionaries to reach different social groups.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to the presence at the Mughal court of a selfproclaimed English envoy, John Mildenhall, between 1603 and 1606. By revisiting Mildenhall's experiences at the Mughal court and his clashes with the Jesuit missionaries, through a comparison of the accounts written by the Englishman and Father Jerónimo Xavier, this chapter examines the role of non-state actors in the processes and practices of diplomatic cross-cultural negotiations or exchanges, and reviews the early stages of the triangular relations and rivalries between Portuguese, English and Mughals during the seventeenth century.

Chapter 5 analyses the Mughal and Jesuit reactions to the presence of William Hawkins, the first emissary from the EIC to the Mughal court. Besides focusing on Hawkins' attempts to be integrated into the Mughal courtly apparatus as a 'Mughalised' *firangi* and his role in Jahangir's diplomatic manoeuvres to pressure the *Estado da Índia*, the chapter will also compare and contrast the two accounts on the Mughal court produced by Hawkins and Jerónimo Xavier.

Chapter 6 is dedicated to the evolution of the English strategies visà-vis the Mughal Empire following the 'embassies' of Paul Canning, Thomas Kerridge and William Edwards, which took place between 1613 and 1615. This chapter reassesses the activities of these three envoys and their attempts to surpass the apparent Jesuit influence at the Mughal court. The evolution of the EIC's diplomatic manoeuvres will be juxtaposed with the Jesuit efforts to secure a channel of communication between the Mughal court and the *Estado da Índia* during the Luso-Mughal crisis of 1613–1615.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

CHAPTER 2

### Meeting a New Constantine

On 13 December 1572, after capturing Ahmedabad and forcing the abdication of Sultan Muzaffar Shah III, the Mughal emperor, Jalal-ud-Din Muhammad Akbar, sent a *firman* to the captain of the Portuguese fort of Diu, Aires Teles. The *firman* contained two requests. The first was that like elsewhere in Gujarat, the *khutba* should be read at the Diu mosques in the name of Akbar. The other request made by Akbar was that Mughal currency should also be adopted in the city. Although these requests were an obvious attempt to impose symbols of Mughal sovereignty on a territory controlled by another power, Aires Teles adopted a pragmatic attitude and advised the viceroy at Goa to accept the demands made by Akbar. In his letter to the viceroy, Aires Teles mentioned that after consulting the Muslim community of Diu, he concluded that reading the *khutba* in Akbar's name was a mere formality, a ritual gesture that confirmed that the Mughal emperor had replaced the sultan of Gujarat. Regarding the adoption of Mughal currency, the captain of Diu believed that it would be advantageous to the city. Mughal silver and gold coins were of a much higher quality than the coins of the sultanate of Gujarat that were circulating, which were frequently false.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jorge Flores and António Vasconcelos de Saldanha, *The Firangis in the Mughal Chancellery: Portuguese Copies of Akbar's Documents, 1572–1604* (New Delhi: Embassy of Portugal, 2003), p. 44.

© The Author(s) 2022

J. V. Melo, *Jesuit and English Experiences at the Mughal Court, c. 1580–1615*, New Transculturalisms, 1400–1800, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96588-4\_2

9

The proximity of Mughal troops to the Portuguese cities of Daman, Diu and Bassein caused some apprehension in Goa. Fears of a possible Mughal invasion prompted Viceroy D. António de Noronha to travel to Daman, where he met a Mughal envoy with all the required solemnity and grandeur. This contact paved the way to a Portuguese legation led by António Cabral, who was received by Akbar in Surat in March 1573.2 The talks between both sides resulted in a *firman* issued on 18 March 1573, which confirmed the 'peace and friendship' between Portuguese and Mughals. The document was extremely favourable to the *Estado da Índia*: it confirmed Portuguese control over Daman and promised Mughal collaboration in the Portuguese activities against the Malabar pirates and merchants.<sup>3</sup> As a gesture of goodwill, the Portuguese granted an annual free *cartaz* to the Mughal emperor, making ships exempt from duties from Surat to Mecca.4 The Mughal acceptance of the *cartaz* system could be therefore interpreted as a tacit recognition by Akbar of the Portuguese monopoly of the sea trade of Gujarat and Hindustan, a position that, although pragmatic, damaged the emperor's dignity and claims to universal rule.<sup>5</sup>

From a Mughal perspective, the *firman* allowed Akbar to temporise with the Portuguese as well as safeguard the imperial patronage of the hajj. It is interesting that the *Akbarnama* omits the concession of an annual free *cartaz* to the Mughal emperor and prefers to present the meeting between Akbar and the Portuguese ambassador as an encounter of a minor potentate with a great imperial power. Abu'l Fazl included António Cabral's meeting with Akbar in the *Akbarnama* as an illustrative episode of the successful extension of Mughal imperial authority over the different communities established in Gujarat. Abu'l Fazl describes the meeting as an act of subservience of 'a large number of Christians came from the port of Goa and its neighbourhood to the foot of the sublime throne and [who] were rewarded by the bliss of an interview

<sup>2</sup> António Vasconcelos de Saldanha*, Iustum Imperium: Dos Tratados como Fundamento do Império Português no Oriente* (Lisbon: ISCSP, 2005), p. 665.

<sup>3</sup> Flores and Saldanha, *The firangis in the Mughal chancellery*, p. 45; M.N. Pearson, *Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: The Response to the Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1976), p. 83.

<sup>4</sup> Diogo do Couto, *Da Asia*, Década IX (Lisbon, 1786), p. 85.

<sup>5</sup> M.N. Pearson, *Merchants and Rulers*, p. 84.

(*mulazamat*)'.<sup>6</sup> Cabral and his entourage performed the *kornish*, a ceremonial greeting in which the saluter placed the palm of his right hand on his forehead and then bowed his head to express his deference and willingness to perform any service for the emperor. After performing their ritual submission to the emperor, the Portuguese delegation presented 'many of the rarities of their country' to a pleased Akbar. Indeed, the account included in the *Akbarnama* suggests that Cabral was sent to confirm the *Estado*'s recognition of its subaltern position vis-à-vis the Mughal polity. As Abu'l Fazl noted, the inquiries made by Akbar about 'the wonders of Portugal and the manners and customs of Europe' were both instigated by his 'desire of knowledge' and part of a strategy that sought to express Mughal goodwill towards Goa as a 'means of civilising this savage race'.7 In other words, the diplomatic contacts between Akbar and the *Estado da Índia* sought to find a solution that would integrate the Portuguese into the new *Pax Mogolica* established in Gujarat.

For the *Estado da Índia*, Cabral's embassy was an important manoeuvre to safeguard Portuguese commercial interests and its naval monopoly in Gujarat. The Portuguese chronicler Diogo do Couto described the embassy as an important diplomatic manouvre that sought to preserve the *Estado*'s ports in the region, Daman and Diu, and confirm the privileges enjoyed by Portuguese merchants in Gujarat. Couto included a full translation of the *firman* signed by Akbar in the *Década Nona da Ásia* and stated that 'some believed that the Estado was discredited by this *firman* due to the great presumption used by this barbarian [Akbar], and there were doubts if it should be accepted or not, or if it should be adopted a strategy of dissimulation'.8 Besides securing the *Estado*'s interests in Gujarat, Cabral's embassy also sought to assess the strategic aims and military capacity of the Mughal emperor. This intention was duly noted by Abu'l Fazl, who mentioned that when the Portuguese embassy 'saw the majesty of the imperial power, and had become cognisant of the large size of the army, and of the extent of the

<sup>6</sup> Abu'l Fazl, *The Akbarnama of Abu'l Fazl*, vol. III, ed. and trans. H. Beveridge (Kolkata: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 2000), p. 37.

<sup>8</sup> Diogo do Couto, *Da Asia*, Década IX, p. 84.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

siege-train, they represented themselves as ambassadors and performed the *kornish*'.<sup>9</sup>

Two years after his rendezvous with António Cabral, Akbar sent an embassy to Goa. The *Akbarnama* presents the embassy led by Haji Habibullah as a continuation of the contacts initiated by the Portuguese in Surat which confirmed the status of 'governors of the European ports' as 'shakers of the chain of supplication'. If Abu'l Fazl described Haji Habibullah's embassy as part of a process of Portuguese subordination to Mughal sovereignty, Diogo do Couto described the first Mughal embassy to visit Goa as a mere visit of courtesy that aimed to maintain the communication between the *Estado* and Akbar. The Portuguese authorities, however, considered the presence of Haji Habibullah as a sensitive matter of state. Viceroy D. António de Noronha sought to impress the Mughal ambassador with elaborate and lavish displays of Portuguese hospitality and wealth. A group of 'old and wealthy noblemen' (*alguns Fidalgos velhos e ricos*) offered a series of sumptuous banquets 'with all the delights that India could offer' to the ambassador.<sup>10</sup> According to Diogo do Couto, each of these banquets had an estimated cost of 1,000 *cruzados*.

Besides the apparent intention to force the Portuguese authorities to recognise their subaltern position vis-à-vis the Mughal polity, the embassy had another aim: to acquire European commodities for the emperor's collection. Impressed by the gifts given by Cabral in 1573, Akbar wished to acquire more 'curiosities and rarities of the skilled craftsmen of that country'. Haji Habibullah was also accompanied by a group of 'clever craftsmen' of Mughal origin who would learn European techniques in Goa and introduced them at the Mughal court.11 Mughal emissaries dispatched to foreign courts often received similar instructions, but the frequent references made in the *Akbarnama* to the commodities and technical novelties of the *firangis* suggest that Akbar wanted to have access to the same technological apparatus as the *Estado*.

Haji Habibullah returned to Fatehpur in 1577 and received the honour of a well-choreographed imperial audience conceived as a symbolic demonstration of the universal rule of the Mughal emperor, which

<sup>9</sup> Abu'l Fazl, *The Akbarnama*., p. 37.

<sup>10</sup> Couto, *Da Asia*, IX, p. 137.

<sup>11</sup> Abu'l Fazl, *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p. 207.

included a parade of 'a large number of persons dressed up as Christians and playing European drums and clarions' and an exhibition of 'the choice articles of that territory [Goa]'.12 The emperor was particularly pleased with the newly acquired skills of the Mughal craftsmen who went to Goa to learn European techniques, but it was the Goan musicians brought by the ambassador that caught the attention of Akbar and his courtiers. 'The musicians of that territory', wrote Abu'l Fazl, 'breathed fascination with the instruments of their country, especially with the organ'. The music from Goa was a complete novelty at the Mughal court, a sensorial experience in which 'ear and eye were delighted, and so was the mind'.13 In his *Muntakhabu't-Tawarikh*, Badaoni also recorded the impact caused by the organ brought from Goa, 'one of the wonders of creation'. Akbar was so impressed with the organ that 'the Europeans kept coming at every moment in red and yellow colours, and went from one extravagance to another'.14 It is interesting to note that while Abu'l Fazl describes the display of the rarities from Goa and Europe as a triumph of Akbar's imperial power, a kind of symbolic tribute from the *firangi* to the Mughal ruler, Badaoni suggests that the impression caused by the organ and other 'extravangances' brought by Haji Habibullah exposed a technological gap between the Mughals and the Europeans.

Coinciding with Haji Habibullah's return from Goa, Akbar had another encounter with a Portuguese official, Pedro Tavares, the captain of Satgaon, one of the informal Portuguese settlements, or *bandéis*, in the Bay of Bengal. Described by Sebastian Manrique as 'a fellow from the city of Goa, an important person and well-versed in politics and state matters',<sup>15</sup> Tavares was a prominent figure of an informal community of Portuguese settlers and merchants who took advantage of the turmoil caused by the Mughal-Afghan conflict in Bengal. Without a solid presence of the Mughal authorities in the region, the merchants of the Portuguese *bandéis* (a derivation of *bandar*, the Persian word for port) often escaped Mughal taxation. After Akbar's successful campaigns, the *bandéis* were no longer able to maintain their irregular situation and Tavares emerged as a

<sup>14</sup> Al Badadoni, *Muntakhabu ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, ed. and trans. W.H. Lowe (Kolkata: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1884), p. 299.

<sup>15</sup> Sebastian Manrique, *Itinerario de las missiones Orientales* (Rome, 1649), p. 13.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 322.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 322–323.

privileged interlocutor with whom the Mughals could negotiate the status of Satgaon and other informal Portuguese settlements. Tavares arrived in Fatehpur Sikri integrated in a retinue from Bengal who went to the Mughal court to pay vassalage to Akbar and present a gift of Bengali rarities.<sup>16</sup> Little is known about the time Tavares spent in Fatehpur Sikri, but he seemed to have manoeuvred successfully at the Mughal court. Francisco de Sousa, in his *Oriente Conquistado*, presents the Portuguese captain as Akbar's favourite (*valido*)<sup>17</sup> and Abu'l Fazl identifies Tavares as Part¯ab 'T¯ar Feringi, 'one of the officials of the merchants of the ports of Bengal, [who] had the bliss of an audience' and added that Tavares and his wife, Nash¯urna, 'found favour in the testing eyes of the world-lord [Akbar]'.18

Pedro Tavares was not the only interlocutor between the *bandéis* and the Mughals. Two Portuguese Jesuits sent by the bishop of Cochin to the Portuguese settlements in Bengal in 1576, António Vaz and Pedro Dias, caught the attention of the Mughal authorities for their regular efforts to persuade the *bandéis* to accept Akbar's fiscal authority. According to Francisco de Sousa, the two Jesuit missionaries refused to confess and absolve the Portuguese merchants who had not paid their taxes. Fearing an eventual punitive reaction from the Mughal authorities towards the *bandéis*, António Vaz approached Pedro Tavares to negotiate a general pardon with Akbar, which would be obtained in 1579.19 In a long letter to the Jesuit College of Coimbra reporting the activities of the Province of Goa, including some 'happy news from the Mughal', Duarte Sande mentioned that Akbar's interest in the Jesuits arose after receiving reports that the missionaries advised the Portuguese communities of Bengal to 'repay the taxes they stole to the king of the land', and after learning this the emperor considered the Jesuits to be 'men of justice and reason'.<sup>20</sup>

During the negotiations with Tavares, Akbar made several inquiries about the Jesuits and the possibility of receiving a group of missionaries

<sup>16</sup> Abu'l Fazl, *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p. 349.

<sup>17</sup> Francisco de Sousa, *Oriente conquistado a Jesu Christo pelos padres da Companhia de Jesus da Provincia de Goa*, vol. II (Lisbon, 1710), p. 148.

<sup>18</sup> Abu'l Fazl, *Akbarnama*, vol. III, p. 351.

<sup>19</sup> Francisco de Sousa, *Oriente Conquistado*, p. 148.

<sup>20</sup> Doc. 90, "Duarte de Sande to the Coimbra College, Goa, 7 November 1579", *Documenta Indica*, vol. XI, ed. Joseph Wicki (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 1970), p. 677. Hereafter *DI* .

at his court to discuss Christianity. Tavares suggested inviting Gil Eanes Pereira, the Jesuit priest responsible for the Satgaon parish. After being contacted by Isma'il Quli Khan, the brother of the governor of Bengal, Husain Quli Beg, Pereira received a *firman* inviting him to Fatehpur Sikri, where Akbar 'was looking forward to meet a man of whom everyone had good words'.<sup>21</sup> In a letter to the bishop of Goa, Henrique Távora, Pereira mentioned that, following a request to bring books on 'holy things' to the emperor, he chose an illustrated *Vita Christi*, which he presented to Isma'il Qulin Khan with 'great deference' (*muito acatamento*) and impressed the Mughal official, who 'kissed all the images, and put the book on his head'.22 After arriving at Fatehpur, the Jesuit wrote another letter to Henrique Távora reporting his meeting with Akbar. Pereira arrived at the Mughal court escorted by five Mughal horsemen, 'sent by the king for my guard and service', and two of his parishioners—an unnamed Portuguese settler described by the Jesuit as 'a friend of mine' and João Garcês, an Armenian based in Satgaon who 'came against his will as an interpreter' (*contra sua vontade pera falar a lingua*).23 Pereira's account of the treatment and honours given by Akbar to him suggest that he was received more in the manner of a diplomatic agent than a religious figure. Indeed, the Jesuit mentions that the emperor 'received me with great honour and he is always doing this to me, and in a way that amazes his own people'.24Pereira informed Henrique Távora that he registered all his experiences at the Mughal court in a notebook (*caderno*), which is now lost, and where the Jesuit noted 'everything that happened in every day and night'.<sup>25</sup>

According to Pereira, Akbar summoned him to 'know through me some things that had confused him'. The emperor was curious about Christianity and asked the Jesuit to explain the fundamental principles of Christian doctrine and the theological differences between Christianity and Islam to him. Pereira initially believed that his presence was related to

<sup>21</sup> Doc. 48, "Gil Eanes Pereira to Henrique de Távora, Satgaon, December 1589/January 1579", *DI* , vol. XI, p. 426.

<sup>23</sup> Doc. 80, "Gil Eanes Pereira to Henrique de Távora, Fatehpur Sikri, 5 June 1579", *DI* , vol. XI, p. 595.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 424.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

the negotiations between Tavares and the Mughal authorities concerning the status of the Portuguese *bandéis* in Bengal, but following his meetings with Akbar he realised that 'the king is not happy or satisfied with his religion, and one night he had publicly stated [this] to his Muslim priests [*cacizes* ]'.26 The emperor also asked Pereira to teach him Portuguese and write 'new books' on Christianity in Persian. Although Pereira wrote a now-lost catechism based on Bartolomé Carranza's *Comentarios sobre el catecismo Cristiano* (1558), he advised Akbar to write to Goa requesting 'scholarly priests who would teach and show him the Holy Scriptures'. The Jesuit believed that he was not sufficiently 'learned' to serve Akbar's religious policy and that his prolonged absence from Satgaon could have damaging effects on the Portuguese community.<sup>27</sup>

Akbar, as Pereira explained to Távora, 'wishes to converse with the padres and the Portuguese'. The presence of the vicar of Satgaon at Fatehpur Sikri was thus both an attempt to establish a channel of communication with the *Estado da Índia* and to obtain new ideological sources for the emperor's religious policy. Pereira, however, was a low-ranking Jesuit secular priest responsible for a parish in an informal Portuguese settlement and whose utility for both Mughals and Portuguese resided in his capacity to influence the population of Satgaon. Akbar's overtures towards the Portuguese Crown and the Catholic Church required an official mission approved by the Archbishop of Goa, fully supported by the *Estado da Índia*, and composed of well-trained missionaries with good connections with the Jesuit and Portuguese authorities.

I

In September 1579, a second Mughal embassy arrived at Goa. Identified by the Portuguese sources as Ebadolá ('Abdullah), the ambassador carried with him a letter from Emperor Akbar to the viceroy and another to the 'Chief Fathers of the Order of St Paul'. The two letters requested permission to send 'two learned priests' to the Mughal court, as well as

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp. 596–597. <sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp. 597–598. 'the principal books of the Law and the Gospel', to teach and discuss with Akbar 'the Law and what is most perfect in it'.28

'Abdullah's embassy was a sensible matter for the *Estado da Índia*. The Mughal annexation of Gujarat and Bengal had the potential to disrupt the commercial and geopolitical interests of the Portuguese Crown in these two regions. The incorporation of the strategic ports of Surat and Khambhat made Gujarat a key element for Mughal trade and geopolitics. The Gujarati ports were a gateway that allowed the empire to access the maritime routes that linked the subcontinent with the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Swahili Coast. Mughal maritime ambitions, however, stumbled on the *cartazes*. The intrusive and violent nature of the *cartaz*, as well as its association with the Portuguese claims to the lordship of the 'Seas of India', were therefore regarded by the Mughals as a serious obstacle to the development of a maritime policy and an attack to the image of the Mughal emperor as the lord of Hindustan.

From a Portuguese perspective, a Mughal presence in Gujarat represented a serious threat to Daman and Diu. As the Jesuit Duarte de Sande explained to the members of the Jesuit College of Coimbra, the Mughal annexation of Gujarat and Bengal, the 'gems of India', not only changed the balance of power in South Asia but also placed Akbar's troops dangerously close to Daman and Diu and the informal settlements across the Bay of Bengal. Although Akbar seemed to allow the presence of Portuguese merchants in Bengal and 'did not hinder [their] commerce', Diu and Daman were two strategic objectives of the Mughals in Gujarat. Indeed, in Goa reports circulated that the last-minute reinforcement of the Portuguese garrison of Daman, after the fall of Surat to Mughal hands, forced Akbar to abandon his initial plans to conquer the city.<sup>29</sup>

In spite of Akbar's overtures towards the *Estado da Índia*, the Mughal interest in Daman and Diu remained intact. At the same time that 'Abdullah was in Goa, the *jâgîr* (land grant) of Bharuch, Qutb al-Din Muhammad Khan, received instructions to prepare 'an army to capture the European ports'.<sup>30</sup> As Abu'l Fazl explained in the *Akbarnama*, Akbar

<sup>28</sup> Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo (ANTT), "Farman to the Jesuits of Goa", December 1578, Armário Jesuítico, Livro 28, ff. 88v–89.

<sup>29</sup> Doc. 90, "Duarte de Sande to the Coimbra College, Goa, 7 November 1579", *DI* , vol. XI, p. 676.

<sup>30</sup> Abu'l Fazl, *The Akbarnama*, p. 409.

wanted to ensure the control of the totality of Gujarat and 'remove the Firangis who were a stumbling-block in the way of the pilgrims to the Hij¯az'.<sup>31</sup> The *casus belli* given by Abu'l Fazl should be analysed bearing in mind the internal pressures faced by Akbar from the Sunni orthodox factions. One of the leading figures of the Sunni orthodox, Mullah 'Abdullah Sultanpuri, who received from Humayun the title of 'Makhdum ul-Mulk', the 'most respected of the state', issued a fatwa that excused Mughal Muslims from the hajj. According to Badaoni, the decree was motivated by the fact that pilgrims from Hindustan were exposed to attacks from Shi'ite Safavids if they travelled by land, and if they opted to travel by sea faced the risk of suffering 'indignities from the Portuguese, whose passports had pictures of Mary and Jesus (peace be upon Him) stamped on them'.<sup>32</sup>

Despite his growing interest in heterodox religious experiments, between 1579 and 1580 Akbar still sought to cement his prestige as a leading figure of the Islamic world. In September 1579, the emperor forced a group of Mughal theologians, including 'Abdullah Sultanpuri, to sign a *mahzar* (decree) that declared Akbar as *Padshah-i Islam*, the Emperor of Islam, a title that allowed the Mughal ruler to compete with the Ottoman sultans, who, after the conquest of the Mamluk sultanate of Cairo, claimed the superior status of Khalifa. The *mahzar* had two other aims. One was to guarantee that the emperor was able to control and manipulate the symbolic and institutional resources that supported the moral authority of the Muslim clergy. The other was to surround the figure of the emperor with divine qualities to enhance his imperial sovereignty. Indeed, the edict issued in 1579 paved the way to a long process in which Akbar sought to expand his authority over the clergy of the different religious groups of Mughal India. Abu'l Fazl's *Akbarnama* celebrated the 1579 decree as one of the greatest triumphs of Akbar's reign, a moment which confirmed him as 'commander-in-chief of the spiritual world'.33 Indeed, the declaration signed by the mullahs recognised the emperor as the supreme authority in religious matters, making the *mahzar* an extremely useful instrument to force the Sunni

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 410.

<sup>33</sup> Abu'l Fazl, *Akbarnama*, p. 394.

<sup>32</sup> Badaoni, *Muntakhabu ut-Tawarikh*, vol. II, p. 206.

orthodox mullahs and other political actors to accept the emperor's political projects.34

Indeed, the *mahzar* of 1579 was part of a series of reforms promoted by Akbar, which included the restructuration of the *mansabdari* system in 1574. The changes implemented by the emperor to the system allowed the establishment of a classification of all officers into definitive categories, which was an attempt to define the organisation of the ruling elites, harmonise the empire's administration and secure the centralisation of Mughal imperial power.35 The 1570s were a period of increasing fiscal centralism and restructuring of the Timurid nobility, which affected the privileges of the traditional Turani elites, the nobles of Central Asian origin.

As *Padshah-i Islam*, Akbar was a protector of the hajj, and the recurrent interferences from the Portuguese in the pilgrimage routes had the potential to undermine the emperor's pretensions of leading the Islamic world. At the same time, the conquest of Gujarat offered Akbar a new maritime dimension to his empire, and the Mughal aspirations in the Indian Ocean had in the Portuguese a serious obstacle. The instructions given to Qutb al-Din Muhammad Khan were a clear indication of an intention to cement Mughal power in Gujarat, enhance the emperor's prestige and appease the dissatisfied Sunni orthodox factions by removing the *firangi* from Daman and Diu.

The Portuguese informal settlements in Bengal were also another subject that concerned the Mughal authorities. As in Gujarat, Mughal authority across Bengal was still not consolidated. Although the *Estado da Índia* had no formal presence in the region, the network of Portuguese informal settlements known as *bandéis* in Bengal constituted a potential obstacle to the affirmation of Mughal sovereignty. Portuguese private traders frequently took advantage of the instability of Bengal to evade

<sup>34</sup> Arnulf Camps, *Jerome Xavier, S. J., and the Muslims of the Mogul Empire* (Schöneck-Beckenried: Nouvelle Revue de Science, 1957), p. 53; A. Azfar Moin, *The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 139–145.

<sup>35</sup> M. Athar Ali, *Mughal India: Studies in polity, ideas, society and culture* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 62; Jos Gommans, *Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and Highroads to Empire 1500–1700* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 85; John F. Richards, *The Mughal Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 59–68.

Mughal taxation. The *bandéis* were also home to Portuguese and Indo-Portuguese renegades who offered their services as mercenaries or operated as pirates.<sup>36</sup> The control of the *bandéis* or their formal submission to Mughal sovereignty thus constituted an important démarche to ensure the stability of a province worryingly depicted by the *Akbarnama* as the 'House of Turbulence' (*Bulgha Khana*).37

The invitation made to the Jesuits was thus an attempt to evaluate the intentions of the *Estado da Índia* vis-à-vis the Mughal Empire. Despite the tensions caused by the hajj and the Portuguese ports in Gujarat, Goa offered Akbar a window to Europe and the possibility to forge a partnership with the Christian foes of the Ottoman sultan. Unlike the Safavid rulers, Akbar's rivalry with the Sublime Porte was not motivated by military and commercial concerns but fuelled by a dispute for prestige and symbolic power. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Iberian monarchy would not only enhance Akbar's prestige but also suggest that the Mughal ruler was able to interfere in the same European political theatre as the Ottoman sultan.

The Jesuit mission to *Mogor* was thus, to paraphrase Alan Strathern, an example of 'theological diplomacy', where a non-European non-Christian ruler invited the Portuguese authorities to dispatch Catholic missionaries as a pretext to establish a channel of communication or stimulate trade.38 The Portuguese also welcomed and encouraged these overtures. The Iberian systems of royal patronage of missionary and ecclesiastical structures in Africa, Asia and the Americas (the Portuguese *Padroado Real*, and the Spanish *Patronato Real*), ensured the financial and political dependence of the religious orders operating across the Iberian colonial spaces. Missionary activities in areas outside formal Portuguese or Spanish jurisdiction were thus often articulated with the commercial and political goals defined in Goa, Manila, Lisbon or Madrid. Besides their proselytising undertakings, the clergymen (*religiosos*) were expected to perform other tasks such as facilitating contacts between Iberian and local

<sup>36</sup> Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700: A Political and Economic History* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), p. 135; George Winius, "The 'Shadow Empire' of Goa in the Bay of Bengal", *Itinerario* 7:2 (1983), pp. 83–101.

<sup>38</sup> Alan Strathern, "Catholic Missions and Local Rulers in Sub-Saharan Africa" in *A Companion to Early Modern Catholic Global Missions* ed. Ronnie Po-chia Hsia (Leiden: Brill, 2018), p. 153 (151–180).

<sup>37</sup> Abu'l Fazl, *Akbarnama*, p. 427.

officials; supporting and monitoring the activities of Iberian traders; and gathering all sorts of relevant information on local social, political and economic structures. Such employment of clergymen in diplomatic affairs had been a common practice in the European diplomatic repertoire since the consolidation of Christianity in the early medieval period. The prestige of the Church, the transnational networks of the religious orders and their advanced scholarly education made prelates and other ecclesiastics particularly apt to serve as formal or informal diplomatic agents.39

The presence of missionaries sponsored by the *Padroado Real* at African or Asian courtly centres in places such as Benin, Mutapa, Ethiopia, Persia and Japan also allowed the Portuguese Crown to overcome the financial and logistical restraints related to resident embassies or the dispatch of a royal ambassador. Besides avoiding the costs of official diplomatic missions, missionaries were also freed from the necessity to affirm the prominence of the Iberian monarchies and thus able to participate in rituals that stressed the superiority of their hosts—avoiding potentially damaging conflicts over status. In other words, in a similar fashion to other non-state diplomatic agents, missionaries were able to do things that were forbidden to official diplomats, offering a flexibility that made them ideal to initiate exchanges or maintain a fluid channel of communication between different actors.40 The Spanish authorities at Manila, for example, explored the non-official status of Franciscan friars to establish contacts with the new Japanese regime established by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and also employed Jesuit missionaries as diplomatic agents during their exchanges with the Sultanate of Magindanao.<sup>41</sup>

Luís de Ataíde treated 'Abdullah's embassy with extreme care. Matteo Ricci, who witnessed the public entry of the Mughal ambassador into

<sup>39</sup> Isabella Lazzarini, *Communication and Conflict: Italian Diplomacy in the Early Renaissance, 1350–1520* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 134–135.

<sup>40</sup> Christian Windler, "Between convent and court life: Missionaries in Isfahan and New Julfa" in *Catholic Missionaries in Early Modern Asia: Patterns of Localization* eds. Nadine Amsler, Andreea Badea, Bernard Heyberger and Christian Windler (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020), pp. 15–30.

<sup>41</sup> Alexandre Coello de la Rosa, "Diplomáticos y mártires jesuitas en la corte de Kudarat (Mindanao, Siglo XVII)", *Espacio Tiempo y Forma,* 33 (2020), pp. 323–346; Birgit Tremml-Werner, "Friend or Foe? Intercultural Diplomacy Between Momoyama Japan and the Spanish Philippines in the 1590*s*" in *Sea Rovers, Silver, and Samurai*: *Maritime East Asia in Global History, 1550–1700* ed. Tonio Andrade and Xing Hang (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2016), pp. 65–85.

Goa, mentioned that the viceroy welcomed the ambassador 'with all the possible hospitality, as when it happens with the viceregal entry'.<sup>42</sup> The pomp surrounding 'Abdullah's reception in Goa was a calculated symbolic gesture that aimed to reduce tensions with the Mughal authorities and secure the establishment of more frequent contacts between both sides. The careful approach followed by Ataíde also sought to use 'Abdullah's presence to gather more information about Akbar and his empire. During his meetings with the ambassador, the viceroy and other officials asked him about Akbar and his empire. Until the 1570s, the Mughal Empire was relatively unknown to the Portuguese. There was some information regarding the existence of an originally Central Asian potentate, usually associated with the figure of Timurid or Tamarlane, that was successfully expanding into Northern India. However, the distance separating the first Mughal territories from the *Estado da Índia* made the Timurids a minor concern for the Portuguese authorities. The rapid conquest of Gujarat and Bengal, and their proximity to the Estado's borders and interference in crucial regions for Portuguese interests, revealed that it was necessary to know this potentially hostile power.

The information provided by 'Abdullah was duly compiled and systematised in a brief text comprising the main cities under Mughal rule, the number of tributary rulers and chieftains subdued by Akbar, the number of soldiers, horses and elephants of the Mughal army, as well as the variety of animals in the imperial menagerie.43 The contents of 'Abdullah's condensed account reveal the interest of the *Estado da Índia* in assessing the military and economic capacity of the Mughal Empire. As the concluding lines of the text suggest, the Portuguese officials and the Jesuits were truly impressed*:* 'although they seem incredible, we believe them to be true' (*quanquam incredibilia videantur, vera tamen esse*

<sup>42</sup> Doc. 117, "Matteo Ricci to Manuel Góis, Cochin, 18 January 1580", *DI* , vol. XI, p. 839.

<sup>43</sup> This list survived in the Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (Armário Jesuítico, Livro 28) as an appendix to the original manuscript of a letter from Pedro Tavares to Ruy Vicente: ANTT, Armário Jesuítico, Livro 28, "Copia de hum capitulo de huma carta de Pero Tavares, capitão-mor de Satagão nos reinos de Bengala, que escreveo da corte do GramMogor ao Pe Provincial da Companhia de Jesus da India", f. 89. These two documents are also available in Volume XI of the *Documenta Indica*: Doc. 49, "Pedro Tavres to Rodrigo Vicente", Fatephur Sikri, December 1578, *DI* , vol. XI, p. 429.

*creduntur*).<sup>44</sup> The need to obtain similar detailed and credible data on the political, military and economic organisation of Mughal India would influence subsequent Portuguese and Jesuit accounts such as the texts produced by Antoni de Montserrat on Akbar's court, Jerónimo Xavier on Jahangir's court and household, and António Botelho during Shah Jahan's reign.<sup>45</sup>

Akbar's request for 'two learned priests' led the viceroy to consult the Archbishop of Goa and the bishops of Cochin and Malacca, the main religious authorities of the *Estado da Índia*. On 10 November 1579, after reflecting on 'a matter of such quality and importance', the prelates of India decided to give their support to send a mission to the Mughal court. In the proclamation that provided approval for the mission, the Archbishop of Goa, D. Fr. Henrique de Távora e Brito, stated that the success of this 'saintly enterprise' (*santa empresa*) would mean that 'the glory of God will have in Asia a new Constantine for the total ruin of the sect of Mohammad' (*tem a gloria de Deos nelle em Asia outro Constantino pera total ruina da seita de Mafamede*).46 Such optimism not only derived from Akbar's *firman* requesting the presence of Jesuit missionaries, but also from a series of rumours circulating in Goa about Akbar's imminent conversion. The Mughal emperor was apparently devoted to the Virgin Mary—a rumour also stimulated by the behaviour of 'Abdullah's embassy—and that he sent a mullah into exile for insulting the Virgin. Montserrat says that Akbar's envoy was very knowledgeable of 'the things of Our Lord' (*las cozas de N. Señor*) and had a special affection for the Jesuits, regarding them as 'holy men' (*diece a todos en reputacion de santos*).47 There were also stories that Akbar was particularly fond

<sup>44</sup> ANTT, Armário Jesuítico, Livro 28, "Copia de hum capitulo de huma carta de Pero Tavares, capitão-mor de Satagão nos reinos de Bengala, que escreveo da corte do GramMogor ao Pe Provincial da Companhia de Jesus da India", f. 89.

<sup>45</sup> On the data collected and analysed by Jerónimo Xavier, see Jorge Flores, "Introduction" in *The Mughal Padshah: A Jesuit Treatise on Emperor Jahangir's Court and Household* ed. and trans. Jorge Flores (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 3–84.

<sup>46</sup> Doc. 91, "Praelatorum Orientis lusitani votum de suscipienda a Iesuitis missione ab imperatore Akbar petita, 10 November 1579", *DI* , vol. XI, p. 681.

<sup>47</sup> Doc. 89, "Antoni de Montserrat to Everard Mercurian, 26 October 1579", *DI* , vol. XI, p. 650.

of European garments, encouraging his courtiers to dress according to European fashion.<sup>48</sup>

The *firman* and these rumours contributed thus to the perception that Akbar was somehow, to paraphrase Sanjay Subrahmanyam, a Prester John in the making, an Asian ruler ready to embrace Christianity and to join the Portuguese efforts to reduce the Islamic presence in the subcontinent.49 However, if the mission failed, as the archbishop noted, the missionaries would become martyrs and win 'eternal glory'. The death of Catholic missionaries under the patronage of the Portuguese Crown would also allow the *Estado da Índia* to wage war against Akbar, 'punishing him as a rebel of the Gospel and a bad host of his ministers and false to his own word and the law of the people, and conquering his ports, lands and ships'.<sup>50</sup> The mission had therefore the advantage of the potential conversion of a powerful Muslim ruler, if successful, or of offering a justifiable *casus belli* to the Portuguese in an eventual conflict against the Mughals. If the missionaries became hostages, the archbishop hoped that the *Estado* would rescue them 'according to what charity and reason say, and if it can be comfortably met'.51 Archbishop Távora e Brito's proclamation conceived of the Jesuit mission to the Mughal court as a spiritual enterprise with immediate and direct political implications. In order words, for the archbishop the mission was also a diplomatic exercise of the *Estado da Índia* that made the Portuguese authorities ultimately responsible for the safety of the missionaries.

After the approval of the mission to the *Mogor*, the Jesuit provincial appointed three missionaries: Rodolfo Acquaviva, Antoni de Montserrat and Francisco Henriques. Rodolfo Acquaviva, the son of the Duke of Atri and nephew of Claudio Acquaviva, the General of the Society of Jesus, had an impeccable aristocratic pedigree that made him a suitable choice to head a mission that targeted a prince in a courtly environment. Francisco Henriques was a Persian convert and a Jesuit novice from Hormuz. Probably due to his status as a convert and a novice, Henriques is often presented as a mere translator or interpreter. However, Ruy Vicente's

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., pp. 648–650.

<sup>49</sup> Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Mughals and Franks: Explorations in Connected* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 68.

<sup>50</sup> Doc. 91, "Praelatorum Orientis lusitani votum de suscipienda a Iesuitis missione", *DI* , vol. XI, p. 681.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

decision to appoint an ethnic Persian novice was both pragmatic and symbolic. Henriques' apparent proficiency in Persian made him a trustworthy interpreter and his ethnic background suggested that he could win the sympathy of Akbar's Persian courtiers.

Antoni de Montserrat was not the first choice to join the mission. The first name chosen by Ruy Vicente was Manoel Teixeira, but the poor health of this Portuguese Jesuit led many to believe that he would die during the journey from Goa to Fatehpur. The second name to be considered was that of João de Mesquita, another Portuguese, but, according to Matteo Ricci, 'for some unknown reason' the provincial ultimately decided not to appoint him.<sup>52</sup> It is probable that Ruy Vicente's indecision concerning the composition of the mission was related to the nationality of its members. The presence of a Portuguese Jesuit would facilitate regular communication between the mission and the *Estado*, but it could also be regarded by the Mughals with some suspicion. Although the connections between the Jesuit missionaries and the Portuguese authorities were notorious, the presence of a Portuguese national would attach the activities of Jesuits to the ups and downs of Luso-Mughal relations and reduce the capacity of the missionaries to act as neutral agents and gain the trust of the Mughal courtiers. Antoni Montserrat, a Catalan educated in Lisbon and Coimbra who served as a tutor at the Portuguese royal court, emerged as a solution to the need to appoint someone who would have the approval of the *Estado*.

The names of the three missionaries selected by Ruy Vicente were fully approved by Luís de Ataíde. Before the departure of the three missionaries to Fatehpur Sikri, the viceroy had a meeting with Rodolfo Acquaviva. The rendezvous was a public statement of the *Estado*'s support for the 'great enterprise', as well as a reminder to Rodolfo and his companions that their mission was not just a religious project. Besides converting a new Constantine, the Jesuits had the delicate task of promoting Portuguese interests at the Mughal court. One of the main functions of the missionaries was to facilitate communication between the *Estado* and Akbar, as well as gather relevant knowledge about the Mughal polity. Indeed, between 1580 and 1583, the three Jesuits were the eyes and ears of the *Estado da Índia* in *Mogor*.

<sup>52</sup> Doc. 117, "Matteo Ricci to Manuel Góis, Cochin, 18 January 1580", *DI* , vol. XI, p. 841.

After the meeting between Luís de Ataíde and Rodolfo Acquaviva, the three missionaries joined Abdullah and his entourage in Daman. On 17 November 1579, they initiated a long journey towards Fatehpur Sikri. In the words of Francisco Henriques, it was a mostly 'uneventful voyage' (*no caminho não se offereco cousa que de notar*), with the exception of the illness suffered by Antoni Montserrat, who was forced to stay some days in Narwar, and the conversations with 'some mullahs we met'.<sup>53</sup> On 28 February 1580, Acquaviva and Henriques arrived discreetly at Fatehphur. Following Akbar's instructions, the two missionaries avoided contact with other courtiers and the local Portuguese who resided at the Mughal capital. On the following day, they met the emperor, who received them 'with much love and joy'.<sup>54</sup>

One week later, on 4 March, a recovering Montserrat arrived at the Mughal court. Akbar met the Catalan missionary upon his arrival. In a gesture of courtesy, the emperor dispatched one of his personal physicians to treat Montserrat. In one letter to Ruy Vicente, Montserrat identifies the physician as a Persian named Hakim Ali, 'a man with much authority' who apparently was 'fond of our religion, although he conceals this in public'.55 In another letter to the provincial, the Catalan Jesuit mentioned that an impressed Akbar praised him for his efforts to learn Persian during the journey from Daman to Fathepur.56

These remarks on the emperor's apparent friendliness towards Montserrat and the other missionaries prompted an initial perception of the Mughal court as a promising mission field and a potential ally of the united Iberian crowns. The first letters and reports dispatched by the three missionaries, written mostly between April and July 1580, presented an encouraging scenario that suggested that Akbar was apparently on the verge of embracing Christianity. The three missionaries reported to Ruy Vicente that the emperor wanted to learn 'the mysteries of the Holy Trinity and how God has a son who became a man, because he has some

<sup>53</sup> Doc. 1, "Francisco Henriques to Lourenço Peres, Fatehpur Sikri, 6 April 1580", *DI* , vol. XII, ed. Josef Wicki (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 1972), p. 4. <sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Doc. 3, "Excerpts from Rodolfo Acquaviva, Antoni de Montserrat, Francisco Henriques, Fatehpur Sikri, 29 April 1580", *DI* , vol. XII, p. 17.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

troubles in understanding these two things'.57 Akbar's interest in Christianity was such that he told the Jesuits that he 'wished [for] Christians and Churches in his lands, like the Turk has in his lands, and since there are gentiles who have their temples and ceremonies, no one would be surprised with that'.<sup>58</sup>

These promising words suggested that the emperor sought to use the presence of the Jesuit missionaries to attract Portuguese and other Christians to settle in Mughal India. The reference to the Ottoman Empire was not a mere passing example, but a strong indication that Akbar wanted to ensure that his empire had the same cosmopolitan makeup and universal claims as the Sublime Porte. Some elements of the construction of Mughal universal rule were immediately noticed by the members of the Jesuit mission. In a letter to Everard Mercurian, Rodolfo Acquaviva mentioned that Akbar was 'a friend of all nations, particularly of the Christians' (*amico di tutte le natione, ma particularmente delli Christiani*).<sup>59</sup> As Abu'l Fazl explained in the *Akbarnama*, the emperor's goodwill towards 'all nations' was an expression of imperial sovereignty that allowed Akbar to exercise his authority over all mankind:

as it has been our disposition from the beginning of our attaining discretion to this day not to pay attention to differences of religion and variety of manners and to regard the tribes of mankind as the servants of God, we have endeavoured to regulate mankind in general.<sup>60</sup>

Aware of Akbar's expansionist ambitions, and recently acquainted with the universalistic aspirations of Mughal kingship and imperial ideology, Acquaviva and Montserrat insinuated that the emperor's conversion could prompt the extension of the Mughal Empire, suggesting that 'the zeal to expand the faith will make you conquer new states'.61

<sup>57</sup> Doc. 5, "Rodolfo Acquaviva, Antoni de Montserrat, Francisco Henriques to Ruy Vicente, Agra, 13 July 1580", *DI* , vol. XII, p. 33.

<sup>59</sup> Doc. 6, "Rodolfo Acquaviva to Everdard Mercurian, Fatehpur Sikri, 18 July 1580", *DI* , vol. XII, p. 46.

<sup>60</sup> Abu'l Fazl, *The Akbarnama*, vol. III, p. 1011.

<sup>61</sup> Doc. 5, "Rodolfo Acquaviva, Antoni de Montserrat, Francisco Henriques to Ruy Vicente, Agra, 13 July 1580", *DI* , vol. XII, p. 38.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

In another letter to the captain of Daman, the three missionaries presented Akbar as 'a friend of the King of Portugal, and despite all the kings of India, he only regards as a king His Majesty Sebastian I, of whom he is very fond'.<sup>62</sup> Indeed, Akbar is presented as a protector of the Portuguese diaspora in South Asia:

He is very fond of the Portuguese who live here and rewards them, and he wants more to come. He gives to them houses; and to those who want to leave, he allows them to go, offering them horses and guards and a *firman* to allow them to travel at ease until they reach our lands, and, according to the quality of their person, he also gives them money to support their travels.<sup>63</sup>

Akbar, however, adopted an ambiguous attitude towards the possibility of converting to Christianity. During his meetings with the Jesuits, the emperor often questioned all the theological arguments. The Jesuit missionaries were particularly troubled by his determination to understand the mysteries of the Gospels, especially the Holy Trinity, through logical reasoning and not by an act of faith. As Rodolfo Acquaviva explained to Ruy Vicente, although Akbar was 'displeased with his religion and mullahs, and considers his religion to be false', the emperor had problems in accepting 'the main articles of our faith, the trinity, the resurrection, the passion and death of Our Lord'.<sup>64</sup> Another problem was the emperor's curiosity and desire to witness miracles. This desire led Akbar to plot a challenge involving the Jesuits and one mullah disliked by the emperor to walk into fire holding the Bible and the Qur'an.65

As Archbishop Távora e Brito mentioned in the proclamation that launched the mission, the Jesuits sent to the Mughal court had the task of making Akbar a new Constantine. The emperor and his inner circle were the main targets of the mission. Throughout their days at

<sup>62</sup> Doc. 3, "Excerpts from Rodolfo Acquaviva, Antoni de Montserrat, Francisco Henriques, Fatehpur Sikri, 29 April 1580", *DI* , vol. XII, p. 23.

<sup>63</sup> Doc. 1, "Francisco Henriques to Lourenço Peres, Fatehpur Sikri, 6 April 1580", *DI* , vol. XII, pp. 5–6.

<sup>64</sup> Doc. 7, "Rodolfo Acquaviva to Ruy Vicente, Fatehpur Sikri, 20 July 1580", *DI* , vol. XII, p. 54.

<sup>65</sup> Doc. 6, "Rodolfo Acquaviva to Everdard Mercurian, Fatehpur Sikri, 18 July 1580", *DI* , vol. XII, p. 50.

the Mughal court, the three *padres* would follow a top-down strategy, a modus operandi adopted repeatedly by other Jesuit missions at courtly milieux. This approach had been theorised by Ignatius Loyola when the Jesuits embarked on their first mission to Ethiopia. In his instructions to the missionaries destined for the lands of the Prester John, Ignatius asked them 'to obtain a familiarity' with the ruler and develop a relationship of friendship 'through all honest means'.<sup>66</sup> Once the missionaries had gained the emperor's trust and favour, they were supposed to explain to him that his salvation was only possible through the Catholic faith. The Jesuits should also target the grandees with the same 'exercises'.<sup>67</sup> After persuading the local elites, the Jesuits would target local scholars and theologians in an attempt to persuade them to 'accept the Catholic truths'.<sup>68</sup> During their contacts with the literati, the missionaries would seek to ensure that the local intellectual and religious elites were not forced 'to abandon things that they esteem'.69 After convincing the political, intellectual and religious elites, the Jesuits were supposed to encourage the masses to adhere to Catholicism.70

Initially, the members of the first Jesuit mission, due to the language barrier and their lack of knowledge of the social and religious subtleties of the Mughal Empire, participated only in the religious debates organised by Akbar. The discussions with Muslim, Hindu and Jain theologians, however, gradually introduced the missionaries to the complex political and religious reality of Akbar's reign. The letters of Antoni de Montserrat and Rodolfo Acquaviva reveal the increasing antagonism between the emperor and the Sunni orthodox mullahs, and the existence of an influential group of heterodox courtiers led by Abu'l Fazl that was close to Akbar and sympathetic to the Jesuits.

Despite all the problems posed by the language barrier and the complex Mughal political scenario, Akbar made the Jesuits a part of a select group of courtiers who had the notable function of reading works

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> "Minuta delle istruzioni che S. Ignazio diede ai suoi missionari d'Etiopia," in *Notizia e saggi di opere e documenti inediti riguardanti la storia di Etiopia durante i secoli XVI, XVII e XVIII. Rerum ethiopicarum Scriptores Occidentales Inediti a Saeculo XVI Ad XIX*, vol. I, ed. Camillo Beccari (Roma: Casa Editrice, 1903), p. 240.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 242.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

on religion and history to the emperor—an important part of the daily life of the Mughal court. Besides reading these works, the missionaries were often charged by the emperor with drafting letters destined for Goa, as well as reading the correspondence from the *Estado da Índia*. The proximity to Akbar's inner circle allowed the Jesuits to contact a range of relevant courtiers and officials, exploring other opportunities to use their faculties in the service of the Mughal elite. Indeed, the Jesuit missionaries could be easily integrated into the group of the 'elite sayyids, great shaikhs, eminent scholars, eminent scholars, ingenuous doctors, and agreeable courtiers of various classes', intellectuals who came from 'the various communities of Hindustan, from among the masters of excellence and perfection, and men of the sword and the pen'.71

The meetings between Akbar and the Jesuits were not exclusively dedicated to religious matters. The missionaries were asked to talk about Portuguese and European history or explain the imagery and themes of the works of art they brought from Goa. Among the books, engravings and printing carried by the missionaries were works by Philippe Galle, an engraving of Dürer's *Small Passion* and *Virgin and Child*, a retable of Our Lady, a copy of *Saint Luke Madonna*, a copy of Abraham Ortelius' atlas *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* and a first edition of the Polyglot Bible by Pieter van der Bocht. The images of title pages of the latter volume—two allegorical compositions evoking Philip II as a personification of *Pietas Regia* and *Pietatis Concordiae*, or in other words an exaltation of the Iberian Habsburg monarch as a pious universal ruler who sought the union of different peoples72—exposed new possibilities to enhance the iconographical and allegorical repertoire associated with Mughal imperial authority to Akbar and his successors. European Christian art recurred to Biblical metaphors and symbols that were easily recognisable to an educated Islamicate audience, and very similar to the allegorical motifs

<sup>71</sup> Quoted from Kinra Rajeev, "Handling Diversity with Absolute Civility: The Global Historical Legacy of Mughal S.ulh.-i Kull", *The Medieval History Journal* 16:2 (2013), pp. 253–254 (251–295).

<sup>72</sup> See Ebba Koch, "Being like Jesus and Mary" in *Transcultural Imaginations of the Sacred* eds. Margit Kern and Klaus Krüger (Leiden: Wilhelm Fink, 2019), pp. 199–200.

explored by Mughal imperial art.73 The links between Catholic iconography and Indo-Persian Islamicate symbols of power suited the efforts made by Akbar and his successors—in particular Jahangir and Shah Jahan—to govern an empire based on universal rule and divinely sanctioned kingship.<sup>74</sup> Besides, as Ebba Koch noted, European Christian art also provided a neutral medium that allowed the mobilisation of Hindu and Muslim artistic traditions to develop a new heterogenous visual language that could be attractive to different sections of the Mughal population.75

Akbar's relation with the missionaries would suddenly change after the emperor received reports that confirmed the success of the rebellious movement initiated in 1579 by Baba Khan Qaqshal and Ma'sum Khan Kabuli in Bengal and Bihar. The revolt was a reaction to the reforms on the *mansabdari* system and the fiscal system. These transformations, which were intended to affirm the emperor's authority in Bengal, were rapidly perceived as an attempt to reduce the political autonomy of the local elites. The situation in the region became increasingly serious grave after the rebels conquered Tanda and executed the Mughal governor.76

After overthrowing the main representative of Akbar's authority in Bengal, the rebels decreed that the *khutba* should be read in the name of Mirza Muhammad Hakim, the ruler of Kabul and the half-brother of the Mughal emperor. The acclamation of Mirza Muhammad Hakim as the leader of the Bengali Muslims was a powerful symbolic gesture. It should be analysed while bearing in mind the growing discontent of the traditional Timurid elites of Central Asian origin vis-à-vis Akbar's religious and cultural policies, which favoured the integration of Hindus, Hindustani Muslims and Shi'ite Persians in the upper echelons of the imperial apparatus.<sup>77</sup> For many discontented Timurid officials, clergymen

<sup>73</sup> Gauvin Alexander Bailey, *The Jesuits and the Grand Mogul: Renaissance Art at the Imperial Court of India, 1580–1630* (Washington, DC: Freer Gallery of Art, Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, Smithsonian Institution, 1998), pp. 11–12.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ebba Koch, "Being like Jesus and Mary", pp. 199–200.

<sup>76</sup> Richard M. Eaton, *The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204–1760* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 145.

<sup>77</sup> Munis D. Faruqui, "The Forgotten Prince: Mirza Hakim and the Formation of the Mughal Empire in India", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 48:4 (2005), p. 503.

and courtiers, the religious orthodoxy of the ruler of Kabul and his strict observance of the customs of the Chaghatais (*tura-i Chaghatai*: the traditional code of legal and moral conduct followed by the Central Asian Turco-Mongol tribes) made Mirza Muhammad Hakim an attractive alternative to Akbar.78

Acquaviva, Montserrat and Henriques were aware of the dangers posed by the Bengal revolt. A joint report dated 13 July 1580 alerted them that the news from Bengal and the religious overtones behind the rebellion would force the emperor to change his behaviour towards the Jesuits. The report mentioned that 'persistent rumours that the king does not believe in his religion and shows affection towards ours' circulated in Bengal.79 For almost a month, Akbar avoided meeting the Jesuits. Whenever the missionaries visited the emperor, 'he did not make the demonstrations of kindness he usually did towards us, nor did he speak with us or the other Portuguese'.<sup>80</sup> In a letter to Ruy Vicente, Rodolfo Acquaviva mentioned that Akbar's sudden coldness towards the *padres* was a consequence of 'the opposition of his own kin (…) and even his mother, wives and friends upset him and, besides, he has to face those who want to harm him with rebellions, like the rebels of Bengals'.81 The intrigues of the court and the success of the rebels 'scared the emperor' (*lhe põem medo*) and led him to distance himself from the Jesuits.82 In another letter to Ruy Vicente, Montserrat interpreted Akbar's behaviour as an act of dissimulation to avoid the hostility of the orthodox mullahs and the traditional Timurid elites.<sup>83</sup> The emperor expected an imminent revolt and refused 'to leave the court because he fears to face the king of Kabul, his brother, whom he suspects is allied to the rebels'.84

Although the emperor seemed to keep a calculated distance towards the Jesuits, the missionaries requested a *firman* allowing all Mughal

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 501.

<sup>79</sup> Doc. 5, "Rodolfo Acquaviva, Antoni de Montserrat, Francisco Henriques to Ruy Vicente, Agra, 13 July 1580", *DI* , vol. XII, p. 42.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Doc. 7, "Rodolfo Acquaviva to Ruy Vicente, Fatehpur Sikri, 20 July 1580", *DI* , vol. XII, p. 55.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>83</sup> Doc. 8, "Antoni de Montserrat to Ruy Vicente, Fatehpur Sikri, 9 September 1580", *DI* , vol. XII, p. 70.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 71.

subjects who converted from Christianity to Islam to return to their original religion. Akbar accepted the petition, but a *firman* was not issued. According to Montserrat, the emperor wanted to avoid the opposition of some courtly factions but entrusted the *padres* with the freedom to reconvert former Christian, guaranteeing that anyone who obstructed Jesuit proselytising would be punished.<sup>85</sup>

This positive overture led the missionaries to present three more requests. which, in Montserrat's own words would allow the Jesuits 'to serve and speak with His Highness more often and without scandalising his people'.<sup>86</sup> The first request was to grant a permit to contribute to the distribution of money to the poor to the missionaries by organising an inventory of poor families. The second sought to vest the Jesuits with the capacity to work as intermediaries between the emperor and 'the Mughals who come from afar to request favours'. The third request was permission to teach Portuguese to the princes. The three requests suggest that the Jesuits wanted to implement a conversion strategy based on public charitable works, political lobbying and cultural propaganda that aimed, at the same time, to construct a prestigious image of the Society of Jesus in the Mughal Empire. Although Akbar approved the three requests, he was only enthusiastic about the third. Indeed, Montserrat says that the emperor said yes to the other two requests 'with little warmth', while the third 'was welcomed with signs of much contentment'.87

Probably due to his previous experience as a tutor at the Portuguese court and experience in the Jesuit educational system, Montserrat was entrusted with the task of teaching Portuguese to Prince Murad. For the Jesuits, Akbar's decision to have one of his sons educated by the *padres* was an encouraging sign that suggested that the missionaries would soon have the possibility to influence the local ruling elites. Besides, Montserrat's appointment also had the welcome advantage of increasing his status within the court, transforming him from an agent associated to a foreign power into an integrated member of the Mughal imperial and courtly apparatus. Although, as Munis. D. Faruqui noted, it was not expected that tutors would play a pivotal role in the political career of a prince, the Portuguese lessons given by Montserrat to Murad could

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. <sup>86</sup> Ibid., p. 72. <sup>87</sup> Ibid.

have been a political tool.88 Indeed, Mughal emperors usually favoured the appointment of tutors who could offer useful forms of knowledge to boost the political chances of the princes.89 Besides Montserrat 's past as a courtly tutor and vice-rector in Lisbon, his proximity to the Portuguese authorities at Goa made him an interesting choice who could not only offer access to a new idiom and new forms of knowledge to Murad, but also enhance his political prospects by facilitating possible future contacts with relevant figures of the *Estado da Índia*.

Albeit initially presented by the Jesuits as an important achievement, the positive perception of the future of the mission prompted by Montserrat's appointment changed rapidly. In a report to Everard Mercurian, Rodolfo Acquaviva stated that the missionaries believed that the emperor's positive reaction to their requests was nothing more than 'dissimulations'.90 The growing tensions between Akbar and Mirza Muhammad Hakim were apparently the reason behind the demonstrations of goodwill towards the Jesuits. Akbar was preparing a punitive campaign against Mirza Muhammad, who had attempted an invasion of Mughal territories in 1581. The sympathetic gestures towards the *padres* were apparently intended to ensure that the *Estado da Índia* would not be involved in a conflict, which would have the potential to drag other regional powers. As Rodolfo Acquaviva's explained to Mercurian, the emperor 'knew that his brother would launch a war against him (…) and to make his shoulders safe, he tried to ensure Portuguese [neutrality] by suggesting that he was fond of our religion'.91

After one year at the Mughal court, the Jesuits were still unable to understand if Akbar was 'a friend or foe of the King of Portugal'.<sup>92</sup> There were reasons to believe that a war between the Mughals and the Portuguese *Estado da Índia* could be imminent. Akbar was presenting himself as the 'greatest king of all' and announced that he did not accept the Portuguese claim of lordship of the seas, 'which forces his ships to pay

<sup>88</sup> Munis D. Faruqui, *Princes of the Mughal Empire, 1504–1719* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 81.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 147.

<sup>90</sup> Doc. 51, "Rodolfo Acquaviva to Everard Mercurian, Fatehpur Sikri, 30 July 1581", *DI* , vol. XII, p. 292.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

taxes in the ports of the King of Portugal'.93 Despite the growing hostility towards Goa, Rodolfo mentioned that Akbar and his mother granted several favours to the missionaries, but such acts of generosity were again perceived as part of a strategy of dissimulation. The emperor apparently wanted 'to gain credit' in the eyes of the Jesuits and the *Estado da Índia*, in order to avoid any suspicion of his real intentions.94 Indeed, Akbar's interest in Christianity was a subterfuge that he also used to manipulate other religious groups at the court. As Rodolfo Acquaviva explained to Everard Mercurian, the religious beliefs of the emperor intrigued many in the court:

There are many opinions about the king among this people, some think that he is a Christian, others think that he is a Hindu (*gentio*), others says that he is a Muslim, and there are some who, after some more consideration, say that he is neither Christian, Gentile nor Moor.<sup>95</sup>

The lack of progress of the missionaries led the provincial to summon Francisco Henriques back to Goa to present a report on the mission to Ruy Vicente and other members of the Jesuit hierarchy in India. The provincial's decision seemed to have been motivated by a concern about the absence of conversions and assess the utility of the mission.

Coinciding with Henriques' departure to Goa, Akbar instructed Antoni de Montserrat to join the Mughal expedition as Prince Murad's tutor. Initially, the emperor had no intention to take the Jesuits on the expedition to Afghan, probably fearing that Montserrat and Acquaviva would report back to Goa all sorts of information related to the organisation and modus operandi of the Mughal armies. However, the presence of the Catalan Jesuit was also that of a valuable mediator between the Mughal emperor and the *Estado da Índia*. The Portuguese were following the conflict between Akbar and his half-brother with interest, and the instability of Hindustan could entice the *Estado* to take advantage and expand its influence in Gujarat. Montserrat could thus be used to allow Akbar to assess the intentions of the Portuguese authorities regarding a conflict that had the potential to attract other regional powers with interests in Afghanistan such as the Uzbeks and Safavid Persia.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. 293. <sup>94</sup> Ibid. <sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 292.

The time spent by Montserrat at the Mughal camp during the Afghan campaign offered the Catalan missionary a rare opportunity to observe Akbar closely and gather different sorts of intelligence on the territories and military capacity of his empire. This experience would also allow Montserrat to develop considerable knowledge on the geography on the northern territories of Mughal India and Afghanistan—two regions that the Portuguese lacked enough information.

Montserrat's writings should therefore be analysed with the role played by several Jesuit missionaries as political actors who actively participated in the European expansionist strategies in India in mind. The topics covered by the two texts written by Montserrat represented a rare collection of information that corresponded to the interests of the Portuguese authorities in India, and probably helped viceroys and other senior officials to delineate their strategies regarding the Great Mughal. Deliberately or not, the *Relaçam* and the *Commentarius* were useful instruments for the commercial, diplomatic, and military interests of the Portuguese Crown in India. The geographical information gathered by Montserrat could be used, for example, to help Portuguese merchants to participate in the Mughal trade routes or reach the main markets of Akbar's empire.

#### III

After returning from Afghanistan, Akbar met Rodolfo Acquaviva to discuss the possibility of sending an embassy to Philip II formed by two Mughal emissaries and Antoni Montserrat. The Italian Jesuit reported to Rome that the emperor wanted to sign a treaty with the Crown of Portugal that would promote the establishment of a Portuguese community in the Mughal Empire, since Akbar wished for 'many Portuguese to inhabit his lands'. The emperor's plans could offer a new impetus to the Jesuit mission. Rodolfo Acquaviva believed that if there were a significant or influential Christian community in the empire, Akbar would be more comfortable with embracing Christianity: 'if there are many Christian in these lands, it would be easier for him to take a decision in religious matters'.<sup>96</sup>

While Akbar initiated the arrangements to send an embassy to the Iberian Peninsula, Qutb al-Din Khan attacked Daman. An anonymous

<sup>96</sup> Doc. 106, "Rodolfo Acquaviva to Claudio Acquaviva, Fatehpur Sikri, 25 April 1582", *DI* , vol. XII, p. 583.

Jesuit report, the *Novas que vierão da India Oriental no anno de 1582*, mentions that the Mughal officials marched towards Daman with 'many horsemen, several marksmen, elephants and artillery'.<sup>97</sup> The Mughal army had the collaboration of the Choutia, the *rei vizinho* of Daman, who besides providing logistical support also had spies monitoring the movements of the Portuguese soldiers.98 It was probably the intelligence gathered by these spies, which indicated that the Portuguese garrison was well supplied with men and arms, that led Qutb al-Din to put an end to the attack.

As Antoni Montserrat noted in his *Commentarius*, the attack was the result of a series of events that sought to pressure the Portuguese positions in Gujarat. The first episode was the open hostility of the governors of Surat and Bharuch, who 'obstinately' refused to acquire *cartazes*. The second event was the return of Gulbadan from Mecca. Immediately after setting foot in Surat, the emperor's aunt compelled the Mughal authorities to force the Portuguese to return of Butsar, the village she had ceded to the *Estado* in exchange for a *cartaz* to Hijaz. Apparently, the governor of Surat sent a 'body of cavalry' to occupy the village, but the Portuguese troops were able to deter the assault. The Butsar incident was followed by another attack against a Portuguese fleet. The incident resulted in the arrest of nine Portuguese soldiers who, according to Montserrat, were duly executed after refusing to convert to Islam. Qutb al-Din Khan's incursion against Daman emerges thus as another step in a concerted Mughal plan to launch an offensive against the *Estado*. Indeed, as Abu'l Fazl noted in the *Akbarnama*, the success of the Afghan campaign allowed Akbar to resume his plans for consolidating Mughal power in Gujarat.

When the news of the failed attack on Daman reached Acquaviva and Montserrat, the two missionaries confronted Akbar. The emperor 'swore that the war had been started without his orders or knowledge', suggesting that Qutb ald-Din Khan and Shihab al-Din, the *subadar* of Gujarat, had launched a campaign against the *Estado* on their own initiative. Akbar alleged that he was unable to act against the governors, 'because these enterprises always seemed to be undertaken in his own

<sup>97</sup> ANTT, Livro 28 de Jesuítas, ff. 162r-171v; reproduced in *Documentação para história das missões do padraado português do Oriente* ed. António da Silva Rego, vol. XII (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1996), p. 781.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

cause and for the public benefit, for the Christians were held to be the enemies of the Muslims'. Initially, the missionaries accepted the emperor's explanation. Qutb ald-Din Khan and Shihab al-Din were prominent Sunni orthodox who opposed the emperor's religious policy and sympathised with Mirza Muhammad Hakim. The anonymous author of the *Novas que vierão da India Oriental* also dissociated Akbar from the attack. Apparently, as soon as he learnt about what happened in Daman, the emperor wrote to Goa 'asking the *Estado* to do all possible harm to these captains'.<sup>99</sup>

However, the fact that Qutb ald-Din Khan and Shihab al-Din obeyed Akbar's command to retreat with 'immediate promptness' convinced both Acquaviva and Montserrat that the emperor ordered the attack. These suspicions were in line with reports from Portuguese spies on a secret Mughal plan to attack Diu. The *Novas que vierão da India Oriental* mentioned that the plan consisted in 'introducing in a secret and dissimulated manner many Mughal people in Diu, so that one day they could rise against the city's garrison'.<sup>100</sup> Montserrat added more details in the *Commentarius*, revealing that Akbar sent 'a great multitude of weapons to be brought among bales of cotton' to Diu.<sup>101</sup>

The Mughal movements along the borders with Daman and Diu suggested that, in Montserrat's words, Akbar 'was fomenting war in a clandestine manner'.102 The emperor's ambiguous behaviour suggested that he was playing a double game. His tacit support for the attacks sought to satisfy the Sunni orthodox factions. At the same time, by suggesting that the attacks were the work of disaffected, untamed and politically powerful Mughal officials, and inviting the Estado to act against them, the emperor sought to use the Portuguese to undermine the ambitions of potential rebels.103

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Antoni de Montserrat, *The Commentary of Father Monserrate S.J. on his Journey to the Court of Akbar* ed. and trans. S.N. Banerjee and John S. Hoyland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1922), p. 170.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., p. 170.

<sup>103</sup> Jorge Flores, *Unwanted Neighbours: The Mughals, the Portuguese, and Their Frontier Zones* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 87; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Mughals and Franks*, pp. 62–68; M.N. Pearson, *Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: The Response to*

Despite Akbar's 'delusive and fraudulent' behaviour vis-à-vis Daman, Acquaviva and Montserrat mentioned that after the Afghan campaign he demonstrated a 'fresh zeal' in learning about Christianity. The emperor asked the two Jesuits to contact the provincial to send another missionary. The desired profile was someone fluent in Persian and Portuguese, preferably a former Muslim converted to Catholicism and 'well-versed' in both religions.<sup>104</sup> Such a description is reminiscent of the profile of Francisco Henriques, the Persian-born Jesuit who had been recalled to Goa. Although Henriques was far from being fluent in Persian—indeed, one of the reasons for his return to Goa was his inability to work as a reliable interpreter—Akbar seemed to have appreciated the effort made by the Jesuits to present a missionary related to the Persianate world of the Mughal court. In fact, his proposal stressed the need to find interlocutors with adequate linguistic skills and theological knowledge to serve the emperor's diplomatic and religious projects.

This 'fresh zeal' seemed also to have encouraged Akbar's to hasten the arrangements related to the embassy to Philip II and the Pope. The emperor's 'fresh zeal' and his revigorated interest to establish direct contact with Philip II coincided with the arrival of an Ottoman embassy to Fatehpur in the spring of 1582. The emissaries from the Sublime Porte sought to persuade Akbar to accept a proposal to join the Ottomans in an anti-Habsburg alliance stretching from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. The Ottoman grand vizier, Koja Sinan Pasha, advocated a greater Ottoman interference in the Indian Ocean to thwart Portuguese interests in the region. The view from Istanbul was that the Portuguese *Estado da Índia* posed a serious military and commercial challenge. In 1581, an Ottoman fleet commanded by Mir Ali Beg raided the Portuguese fort of Muscat.105 This successful attack encouraged Koja Sinan to launch a diplomatic offensive in South and Southeast Asia to form an anti-Portuguese alliance.106 As the ruler of an expanding Islamic power

*the Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 57–60.

<sup>104</sup> Montserrat, *Commentary*, pp. 171–172.

<sup>105</sup> See for example Svat Soucek, "The Portuguese and the Turks in the Persian Gulf" in *Revisiting Hormuz: Portuguese Interactions in the Persian Gulf in the Early Modern Period* eds. Dejanirah Couto and Rui Manuel Loureiro (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2008), pp. 29–56.

<sup>106</sup> Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 158–159.

opposed to the Portuguese monopoly of the seas of Hindustan, Akbar emerged as a potential partner.

However, the reception of the Ottoman envoys at the Mughal court was rather turbulent. To the surprise of the Jesuits and many courtiers, Akbar neglected the Mughal diplomatic protocol and was deliberately hostile to the envoys from the Great Turk. As Montserrat recalled in the *Commentarius*, the Ottoman embassy 'went up in smoke'. The leading emissary was arrested and sent to Lahore, while the rest of his entourage managed to escape discreetly. For the Catalan Jesuit, Akbar's hostile treatment of the Ottoman delegation was a reaction to the arrogance displayed by the envoys' proposal 'to persuade him to wage war against the king of Spain and Portugal'.107 Montserrat's explanation sought to demonstrate Akbar's sympathy towards the Iberian Crowns, notwithstanding the tensions prompted by the Mughal attempts to remove the Portuguese positions in Gujarat. Although Montserrat's account of the Ottoman embassy should be considered as an attempt to validate the importance of a Jesuit presence in Mughal India and stress Akbar's importance to Iberian geopolitical interests, the perception of the Catalan missionary on Mughal animosity towards the Sublime Porte was far from being incorrect.

In the same way that the Portuguese and ports in the Indian Ocean deterred the development of the new maritime ambitions of the Mughal empire, the presence of another competitor with significant naval resources such as the Ottomans had the potential to hinder the incipient Mughal naval efforts. At the same time, an alliance between Ottomans and Mughals would contradict Akbar's pretence to be the leading ruler of the Islamic world, a claim that deliberately challenged the symbolic power of the Ottoman sultans as caliphs. Besides these eventual damages to the maritime and symbolic policies pursued by the Mughal emperor, the presence of envoys from a rival Islamic ruler who adopted the title of Caliph and Protector of the Holy Cities and championed Sunni orthodoxy were highly suspicious. As the conflict with Mirza Hakim and the growing tensions with the Uzbek rulers demonstrated, Mughal Sunni orthodox officials and courtiers were receptive to overtures from other Islamic rulers. Suspicions of an Ottoman attempt to disturb the Mughal court or incite a rebellion were probably another reason for Akbar's hostile treatment.

Against this backdrop of imminent Ottoman interference in the region, Akbar accelerated the preparation of an embassy to the Iberian Peninsula. The prospect of Turkish fleets in the Indian Ocean made the *Estado da Índia* a suitable partner to ensure a balanced distribution of power in the seas of Hindustan. An alliance or the prospect of a partnership between Philip II and Akbar had the potential to dissuade the Sublime Porte from pursuing expansionist ambitions in South Asia. Apart from negotiating an alliance, the main goal of the embassy was to introduce Akbar to the European diplomatic theatre. After meeting Philip II, the envoys would travel to Rome to greet the Pope and discuss the continuity of the Jesuit mission at the Mughal court.

The concern in enhancing the image of the Mughal emperor in Europe (*Firangistan*) is patent in the letter that the embassy would present to Philip II. The text carefully drafted by Abu'l Fazl is an illuminating piece of Akbari imperial ideology. Generically addressed to the 'wise men of the Franks' (*Danayan-i-Farang*)108—a vague form of address probably related to eventual doubts regarding the evolution of the political crisis that led to the acclamation of Philip II as king of Portugal in 1581—the letter asked the Iberian monarch to send the Mughal court a learned missionary or scholar with the capacity to teach Christian doctrine in Persian, as well as copies of the Gospels, the Psalms and the Pentateuch, preferably translated into Arabic and Persian. Apart from this request, Akbar's missive stated the emperor's desire 'to strengthen our friendship and confirming our union'.109

One of the most interesting aspects of this document is how Akbar expresses his ideology and political project through allegories, symbolic images and metaphors that set out an idea of Mughal superiority and universal rule. At the same time, however, Akbar does not make any claim to supreme authority over the king of Spain and addresses Philip II as an equal ('a recipient of divine illumination') and a fellow member of the universal family of world rulers, 'the exalted tribe of princes'.110

<sup>108</sup> Translation from Edward Rehatsek, "A Letter of the Emperor Akbar Asking for the Christian Scriptures", *The Indian Antiquary*, 16 (1887), pp. 135–39. According to Edward Maclagan, there are other versions of the letter addressed to the 'Ruler of the Europeans' (*farmariwa-i-Farang*) (see Edward Maclagan, *The Jesuits and the Great Mogul* [London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1932], p. 37).

<sup>109</sup> Edward Rehatsek, "A Letter of the Emperor Akbar Asking for the Christian Scriptures", p. 137.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., p. 136.

As Ebba Koch has argued, the letter to Philip II reveals that for the Mughal emperor it was the social and political position of a ruler that was relevant, instead of his religion, ethnicity or cultural background—an idea that allowed the Mughals to share different ideologies, symbols and identities.<sup>111</sup>

Besides Antoni de Montserrat, Akbar appointed two Mughal courtiers: Saiyid Muzaffar, a Turani nobleman close to the Sunni orthodox faction who opposed the overtures vis-à-vis the Portuguese; and 'Abdullah, the courtier who led the 1579 Mughal embassy to Goa. The composition of the embassy—a missionary sponsored by the Portuguese Crown (Montserrat), an envoy familiar with the Portuguese authorities ('Abdullah), and a courtier close to the orthodox factions (Muzaffar) sought to aggregate different sensibilities and interests. Montserrat's presence guaranteed that both Akbar and the Iberian authorities would have a reliable mediator. 'Abdullah already had some experience in dealing Portuguese officials, ensuring thus that Akbar's interests would not be completely dependent on Montserrat's exploits. The appointment of Saiyid Muzaffar sought to assure the orthodox Sunni that any dealings with the *firangis* would not result in the subordination of an Islamic power such as the Mughal Empire.

As Montserrat mentioned in the *Commentarius*, the embassy faced several delays. Saiyid Muzaffar was reticent to join it. The apparent strong opposition from the Sunni orthodox factions to the emperor's overtures to Philip II were probably behind his unwillingness to travel to Goa. The ambassador feared that Akbar conceived of his appointment as part of a plot to punish him for his association with Shah Mansur, one of the supporters of Mirza Hakim. When the three envoys arrived at Surat in August 1582, Saiyid Muzaffar abandoned the embassy and became an exile in the Deccani sultanates. The reason for the desertion, according to Montserrat, was a sealed letter carried by the Jesuit that should only be opened by Qutbuddin Khan, the governor of Surat. Saiyid Muzaffar believed that the letter had instructions to execute him. Before reaching Surat, he tried to persuade 'Abdullah to murder Montserrat and take refuge in the Deccan. The refusal of the other ambassador forced

<sup>111</sup> Ebba Koch, "How the Mughal P¯adsh¯ahs Referenced Iran in Their Visual Construction of Universal Rule" in *Universal Empire: A Comparative Approach to Imperial Culture and Representation in Eurasian History* eds. Peter Fibiger Bang and Dariusz Kolodziejczyk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 198.

Muzaffar to meet Qutbuddin Khan in secret. Confronted with the governor's refusal to murder the Jesuit missionary and thwart the embassy, Muzaffar abandoned Surat. The need to end the Portuguese blockade was at the time Qutbuddin Khan's priority. The murder or arrest of an intermediary close to the *Estado da Índia* and sponsored by the Mughal emperor would not only aggravate the situation it would also constitute a serious threat to Qutbuddin Khan's position.112

The Mughal embassy was received in Goa with some caution. Besides the tensions with the Mughal authorities, the beginning of Philip II's reign as king of Portugal caused some agitation in the *Estado da Índia*. As in metropolitan Portugal, in Goa the change of regime generated fears of a progressive 'Castilianisation' of all echelons of the colonial apparatus. Amid these concerns, the newly appointed viceroy, Dom Francisco de Mascarenhas, was entrusted by Philip II with the mission of ensuring a smooth transition and had ample powers to persuade potential opponents of the new monarch with generous symbolic and financial rewards.<sup>113</sup> However, Akbar's embassy to Iberia and Rome, due to its geopolitical relevance and diplomatic symbolism, posed an unexpected challenge for Mascarenhas. The importance of the embassy required the viceroy to delineate a coherent strategy with Philip II vis-à-vis the reception of the Mughal ambassadors and the matters to be negotiated. In order to gain enough time, Montserrat and 'Abdullah's departure to Lisbon was delayed for the following year. The argument presented by Mascarenhas was that the only ship ready to set sail was small and overcrowded, lacking the dignity deserved by Akbar.<sup>114</sup>

Twelve months later, as Montserrat sarcastically noted, the Mughal embassy 'was entirely abandoned and delivered over to eternal oblivion'.115 In 1583, the former sultan of Gujarat, Muzaffar Khan, launched a rebellion against Mughal rule.<sup>116</sup> The rebellion would demand much of

<sup>112</sup> Montserrat, *Commentary*, pp. 185–186.

<sup>113</sup> Diogo do Couto, *Década Décima*, Pt. 1 (Lisbon, 1788), pp. 472–480; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Political Economy of Commerce: Southern India, 1500–1600* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 218–220.

<sup>114</sup> Montserrat, *Commentary*, p. 191.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p. 191.

<sup>116</sup> Richard Maxwell Eaton, *The Sufis of Bijapur, 1300–1700: Social Roles of Sufis in Medieval India* (Princeton: Princenton University Press, 1978), p. 72; Jorge Flores, *Nas margens do Hindustão*, pp. 141–143.

Akbar's military and diplomatic efforts between 1583 and 1584, making the negotiations with Philip II a minor concern for Akbar's foreign policy. The instability in Gujarat was seen by the *Estado* as an opportunity. The Portuguese authorities rapidly adopted an ambiguous and pragmatic approach. The viceroy had discreet contacts with Muzaffar Khan, promising to support the rebellion against Mughal rule. At the same time, the *Estado* offered to help the widow and children of Qutbuddin Khan, who died while trying to stop the advance of the rebels.<sup>117</sup>

Montserrat remained in Goa, leaving Rodolfo Acquaviva as the only missionary operating at the Mughal court. The growing disappointment regarding the lack of progress of the Mughal mission led the Jesuit hierarchy to cancel the mission. Although the provincial, Ruy Vicente, considered that the mission was a 'serious business of great importance', the attack against Daman and the frequent skirmishes between Portuguese and Mughals in Surat suggested that Akbar's intentions were dubious and the embassy an attempt to gain more time before opening hostilities with the *Estado*. Based on the reports and letters of the missionaries, Ruy Vicente believed that he had 'clear evidence' that Akbar's interest in the Jesuit was only motivated by 'reasons of state, in order to be able to negotiate his businesses with the viceroy'.<sup>118</sup> Unsure of the intentions of the emperor, Ruy Vicente ordered the return of Rodolfo Acquaviva. After several letters from the provincial addressed to Akbar requesting the return to Goa of Rodolfo Acquaviva, the remaining missionary at the Mughal court, and his release, the emperor decided in 1583 to sign a *firman* allowing the return of the Italian missionary to the *Estado*, but asked the provincial to send Acquaviva back together with other missionaries, 'with the least possible delay', to resume the mission. The *firman* also mentioned that Akbar 'said many things by word of mouth' to Rodolfo Acquaviva that should be communicated to the provincial and which were 'to be well considered'.<sup>119</sup>

#### <sup>117</sup> Flores, *Unwanted Neighbours*, p. 81.

<sup>118</sup> ANTT, Livro 28, Jesuitas, "Novas que vierão da Índia Oriental no anno de 1582", fls. 167–171; Doc. 86, "Novas que vierão da Índia Oriental no anno de 1582" in *Documentação para a história das missões do padroado português do oriente*, vol. 12 ed. António da Silva Rego (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1996), p. 796.

<sup>119</sup> Jorge Flores and António Vasconcelos de Saldanha, *The Firangis in the Mughal Chancellery*, p. 70.

IV

Upon his return to Goa in 1582, Montserrat drafted a brief report on Akbar and the Mughal Empire. Dated 26 November 1582, the *Relaçam do Equebar, Rey dos Mogores* (An account on Akbar, King of the Mughals) included information on Akbar's policies and personality, a condensed overview of Mughal military practices, a short description of the organisation of the imperial court and administrative apparatus, as well as a summarised description of the main cities of the empire. The contents of the *Relaçam* suggest that this text was not only destined for the Jesuit hierarchy but above all for the Portuguese Crown. The report presented by Montserrat is very similar to the dispatches sent by Portuguese diplomatic agents and officials scattered across Asia and could be easily compared to the structure and aims of the *relazioni* produced by Venetian ambassadors.<sup>120</sup> Like the diplomatic reports sent to the *Serenissima*, Montserrat presented the Portuguese officials and Jesuit superiors in Goa with a concise but thorough description of the political, military, social and economic conditions of an expansionist power deemed by the Portuguese authorities as a potential threat to the *Estado da Índia*. Indeed, it is striking that the *Relaçam* does not mention the proselytising activities of Montserrat, Acquaviva or Henriques, focusing essentially on the emperor and his court and armies. The data provided by Montserrat sought thus to assist both the Jesuit hierarchy and the Portuguese authorities to define their strategies vis-à-vis the Mughal Empire. The *Relaçam* identifies, for example, the main courtiers and describes how Akbar worked and the procedures of the Mughal administration, allowing the Portuguese officials to have an idea of how the Mughal polity operated in their administrative and diplomatic dealings, as well as identify relevant actors in the court and administration.

Most of the information provided by Montserrat looked at two key events of 1581 and 1582. The first was Akbar's campaign in Afghanistan. The other, the difficulties faced by the Mughal authorities in suppressing the rebellions in Gujarat and Bengal, two strategic regions for the economic and geopolitical interests of the *Estado da Índia*. These rebellions, as Montserrat suggested, were not only caused by the rejection of Mughal rule by the populations of two recently annexed territories,

<sup>120</sup> See for example Filippo de Vivo, *Information and Communication in Venice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

but also instigated by the apparent opposition of some members of the imperial elite to Akbar's religious policies and interest in Christianity.

The *Relaçam* was particularly concerned in exposing Akbar's power and wealth. Mughal India is presented as a vast territory rich in natural resources and well-connected with the main trade routes of Asia. Akbar's fiscal machinery was thus able to extract 'large revenues' from commodities produced in the Mughal provinces or imported from abroad. These included, as Montserrat briefly listed, 'many drugs, spices, precious stones, all kinds of metals, pearls, perfumes, cloths, carpets, embroideries, velvets, cotton-cloths, and many horses from Persia and Tartary'.121

Montserrat also identified the *mansabdari* system as a key element of the economic apparatus of the Mughal empire, as well as an instrument that affirmed the emperor's authority. Although the *Relaçam* does not dwell much on the organisational features of the system, Montserrat presents the *mansabdars* as a sort of leasing system that allowed the emperor both to control the local elites, by reinforcing their financial dependence on the emperor, and ensure the presence of the imperial apparatus at different regional and local levels. Another important element of Mughal economic and political power was the subjugation of several South Asian rulers who became tributary clients or were absorbed by the Mughal polity. The *Relaçam* highlights, for example, that at the Mughal court there were 'twenty gentile vassal chieftains (*regulos*), some of them great lords like the king of Calicut, not to mention others who are not in the court and pay tributes'.122

The social divisions of the Mughal urban landscape are also mentioned by Montserrat:

the houses of the Moors, especially those of the wealthy and honoured, are very beautiful inside and have many pools and gardens, and the Brahmins and other wealthy gentiles also have good houses. The common people (*gente popular*) live in houses made from mud, huts (*palhassas*), and indeed if one sees one [Mughal] city there is little to see in the others.<sup>123</sup>

Regarding the ethnic and religious diversity of the empire, Montserrat mentions that the court and the administration were formed by several

<sup>121</sup> ANTT, Armário Jesuítico, liv. 28, "Relação do Equebar, Rey dos Mogores", f. 84v. <sup>122</sup> Ibid., f. 82r. <sup>123</sup> Ibid.

groups and that Akbar trusted in the loyalty and efficiency of the 'Hindustani and gentiles', and it was thanks to the involvement of the Hindu elites in the imperial administration and courtly life that the Hindus did not rebel against the emperor.124

This *Relaçam do Equebar* served as the seed of the *Commentarius* and was the first detailed European account on the Mughal Empire based on first-hand observation. Montserrat's report would also influence other works on the empire of the Great Mughal. In 1597, the Italian Jesuit Giovanni Battista Peruschi published the *Informatione del regno et stato del Gran Re di Mogor*, a work that was largely based on Montserrat's *Relaçam do Equebar.* Peruschi re-organised the work of the Catalan Jesuit and added letters from the members of the second and the third mission to it. French translations of the *Informatione* were published in Besançon in 1597 and Paris in 1598. In the same year, German and Latin translations would also be published in Mainz. Amador Rebelo referred to the materials used by Peruschi for his collection of missionary letters, the *Compendio de algumas cartas* (1598). Four years later, in 1601, Luis de Guzmán used Montserrat's *Relaçam*, as well as the correspondence of the three missions to *Mogor*, in his *Historia de las missiones*.

Montserrat's *Relaçam* was not only the main reference for Peruschi and Guzmán: it seemed to serve as a model for other important texts produced by subsequent missionaries stationed at the Mughal court. Other reports, such as Jerónimo Xavier's *Tratado da Corte e Caza de Jamguir Paxá* or António Botelho's *Relação das Cousas Mais Notáveis que observei no Reino do Gran Mogol*, followed the model of Montserrat's work. Like the *Relaçam*, these were detailed surveys of the imperial family and household, the organisation of the court, the political rituals surrounding the emperors and the economic organisation of the empire, as well as its military structures. These were also works produced during critical moments in Luso-Mughal relations. Xavier's *Tratado* was written between 1609 and 1611 while Philip III planned to send a Portuguese royal embassy to the Mughal court and Jahangir prepared a Mughal embassy to Goa. Botelho's *Relação*, a lengthy and detailed account of the Mughal Empire during the final years of Shah Jahan's reign, coincided with a period of increasing tension between Agra and Goa that was aggravated by the Mughal expansionist campaigns in the Deccan.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., f. 84r.

Like the *Relaçam do Equebar*, the *Commentarius* drew upon the 'rough and casual notes' written down by Montserrat during his days at the Mughal court.125 According to Montserrat, the Jesuit provincial of Goa, Ruy Vicente, entrusted him with 'the task of committing to writing everything that happened both during the journey and while we were staying with the king'. For two and a half years, Montserrat dutifully recorded the day-to-day events of the mission, as well as everything related to the Mughal world, which included, in his own words, the 'the rivers, cities and countries which we saw; the custom, temples and religious usages of their inhabitants'.<sup>126</sup> The *Commentarius* is thus presented as a faithful account of a missionary's personal experiences and observations based on a specific Jesuit methodology. It was a work that, following Polanco's directives, sought to provide valid information about the geography, nature, socioeconomic life, political structures and religious beliefs of the populations of Mughal India.

One of the most valuable aspects of the *Commentarius* was the fact that Montserrat wanted to offer his readers important information about a territory that was not under Portuguese or European control. The Mughal Empire, like the Ottoman and Vijayangara empires, was a civilised, independent and threatening non-Christian society that due to its geo-strategic position and economic and military relevance needed to be studied in order to understand its development. In order to face Akbar and his empire, it was necessary to study its political rituals, the social, military and economic organisation of the empire and its religious and cultural life. It was also important to identify the main political actors, the intrigues of the court, the different factions and those who had access to the emperor's inner circle. Hence the interest revealed by Montserrat in the figure of Akbar and the meticulous accounts of the main Mughal cities, not to mention the detailed descriptions of the military practices of the Mughal army during the Afghan campaign. In this way, the *Commentarius* should be analysed bearing in mind the role played by several Jesuit missionaries as political actors who actively participated in the European expansionist strategies in India.

<sup>125</sup> Montserrat, *Commentary*, p. xvi. <sup>126</sup> Ibid.

As the main target of the mission, it is not surprising that Akbar emerges as the key character of the *Commentarius.* Montserrat was particularly interested in describing his intellectual curiosity, religious doubts, political intelligence and military prowess. Despite the failure to convert the emperor, the *Commentarius* presents Akbar in a rather favourable light as someone close to the ideal type of thumanist ruler, although tainted by his religion. There was probably a genuine affection between the Jesuits and the emperor. Montserrat mentions several times that Akbar was very affectionate towards the three missionaries, and that the emperor's friendship often saved their lives.<sup>127</sup>

According to the *Commentarius*, Akbar was very close to the ideal type of a good monarch. His physical features were a notorious mark of royal dignity. According to Montserrat, Akbar had 'stature' and 'a type of countenance well-fitted to his royal dignity'.128 Besides his 'great majesty' and good looks, Akbar used his body as a political statement based on the mixture of Muslim, Hindu, Persian, Central Asian and even European features. His hairstyle, according to Montserrat, was 'a concession to Indian usages', which was intended 'to please his Indian subjects'.129Montserrat mentions that unlike the orthodox Muslims, who followed an austere dress code, Akbar wore silks embroidered with gold and was also fond of European fashion.130 Despite being illiterate, the Mughal emperor possessed considerable intellectual ability and was an enthusiastic patron of the arts and letters, a characteristic that made Akbar similar to European monarchs.<sup>131</sup> Montserrat also highlights that Akbar was available to have audiences with all his subjects:

For he creates an opportunity almost every day for any of the common people or of the nobles to see him and converse with him; and he endeavours to show himself pleasant-spoken and affable rather than severe toward all who come to speak with him.132

<sup>127</sup> See for example the story of how Montserrat survived a plot against him in Surat: ibid., pp. 188–189.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., p. 196.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., p. 197.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., p. 199.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., pp. 201–202.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., p. 197.

The *Commentarius* was also interested in the diplomatic policy of the Mughal emperor. Instead of describing the ritual reception of foreigner ambassadors or the diplomatic protocol adopted by the Mughal authorities, Montserrat mentions that Akbar received foreigners and strangers in a very different manner to how he treated his own countrymen and subordinates'.<sup>133</sup> The Mughal emperor was particularly kind and generous to foreign ambassadors or rulers who had been deposed and sought exile 'and appeal[ed] to him for protection'.<sup>134</sup> Akbar often offered these rulers logistical, financial and military support under the condition they 'shall employ only his own weights and measures and money coined by him'.135 Diplomacy is therefore presented as another instrument used by the Mughal Empire to extend its political and military control of the subcontinent. The strategy of supporting minor potentates or exiled rulers to create a network of vassals was not unknown for the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*, which followed a similar approach. If minor potentates were received with generosity and treated with benevolence, the other main regional powers that competed with the Mughal Empire or threatened its interests had a more cautious and even hostile reception. To illustrate this case, Montserrat uses the example of one envoy from the Ottoman governor of Yemen who 'vanished in a cloud of smoke'.<sup>136</sup>

Akbar was also praised for personally supervising the administration of justice throughout the empire. The Catalan Jesuit meticulously described the emperor's personal involvement in the execution of justice, noting he was 'most stern with offenders against the public faith', punishing with extreme violence crimes of adultery and debauchery.137 The inclusion of information regarding how Akbar executed justice was intended to echo the Biblical tradition of the ideal monarch as someone who should 'love justice and hates evil' (Psalm 45, v. 6). The zeal with which the Mughal emperor executed justice, his benevolence towards minor rulers and his interest in maintaining harmony between the different ethnic and religious groups of his empire were attitudes that could be easily supported by the scholastic and humanist mirror of princes. For example, Giovanni

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., p. 204. <sup>134</sup> Ibid. <sup>135</sup> Ibid. <sup>136</sup> Ibid. <sup>137</sup> Ibid., p. 209. Pontano's vision that the ideal prince would be able to 'uphold peace among his subjects and a well-balanced government'<sup>138</sup> could be easily illustrated by the portrait of Akbar presented by the *Commentarius*. The portrait made by Montserrat is also close to the Erasmian conception of the ideal Christian prince or monarch as a paterfamilias who governs his kingdom like a family, guaranteeing that his subjects are able to live together in harmony through good administration, kindness and protection.139 By portraying Akbar according to the concepts related to the ideal type of a Christian ruler, Montserrat was able to suggest that the conversion of the emperor was possible, since he possessed the virtuous qualities of a Christian prince.

Akbar's Timurid genealogy is another important element in Montserrat's perception of the Mughal emperor. The links between Akbar and Timur were often explored by imperial propaganda. Timur was a figure whose political charisma derived not only from his expansionist feats, but also from a careful and pragmatic construction of an imperial identity that successfully combined diverse symbolic elements from the Turco-Mongol and Persianate worlds.<sup>140</sup> The artistic and literary patronage developed by Timur's heirs would also cement Timurid prestige, establishing an imperial and cultural repertoire that would be claimed or manipulated by subsequent Islamic powers such as the Ottomans, the Uzbeks and the Safavids, besides the Mughals.141 Akbar, like his predecessors Babur and Humayun, referred to his Timurid ancestry to reinforce his imperial authority, legitimise expansionist claims and bolster his prestige across a Eurasian Islamicate arena in which cultural and political models that often originated from Timurid practices circulated.<sup>142</sup> Throughout his reign, Akbar constantly exploited his links to Timur. The imperial seal, for example, evoked the Timurid genealogy of the Mughal

<sup>138</sup> Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics: Renaissance Virtues*, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 136–137.

<sup>139</sup> Colin MacLachlan, *Spain's Empire in the New World: The Role of Ideas in Institutional and Social Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 6.

<sup>140</sup> Lisa Balabanlilar, *Imperial Identity in the Mughal Empire: Memory and Dynasty Politics in Early Modern South and Central Asia* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), p. 38.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>142</sup> See, for example, Gagan D.S. Sood, "Circulation and Exchange in Islamicate Eurasia: A Regional Approach to the Early Modern World", *Past & Present,* 212:1 (2011), pp. 113–162.

imperial family, a legitimating strategy continued by Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb.143 Akbar also commissioned works such as the *Chinguiznama* and the *Timurnama* to establish a direct connection between him and the figures of Genghis Khan and Timur.144 These ancestral links are also repeatedly emphasised by other works of Akbari propaganda such as Abu'l Fazl's *Akbarnama* or the *Tarikh-i-Alfi*, a collective work that chronicled the history of the first Islamic millennium.

This political and intellectual context seems to have influenced Montserrat's perception of Akbar. The final pages of the *Commentarius* are dedicated to the emperor's genealogical line and, following the Akbari propaganda, trace the origins of the Mughal imperial family to Timur and Genghis Khan. Montserrat tends to present these pages as part of his effort to update or extend the existing European knowledge on Central and South Asia. It should also be noted Timur was a historical figure explored by European plays and chronicles often based on imprecise information.145 However, albeit the apparent intention to 'correct, elucidate, and conciliate', Montserrat's foray into the genealogical past of the Mughal imperial family echoed Akbar's efforts to affirm his imperial authority through an appropriation of Timurid and Mongol attributes. The final pages of the *Commentarius* can thus be regarded as a sort of byproduct of Mughal imperial propaganda destined for European eyes.

Montserrat's more positive image of Akbar contrasted with Alessandro Valignano's views of South Asian rulers as 'tyrants', or princes and lords 'who rule many lands and many peoples, and who could kill their vassals and do whatever they want with them', rulers whose actions were motivated by the lack of 'any law and conscience', forcing their subjects to live in poverty.<sup>146</sup> This negative depiction of South Asian rulers was related to the frustrations of the Jesuits in converting Gentiles and Moors, as

<sup>143</sup> Stephen Frederic Dale, "The Legacy of the Timurids", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* 8:1 (1998), p. 46.

<sup>144</sup> Lisa Balabanlilar, "Lords of the Auspicious Conjunction: Turco-Mongol Imperial Identity on the Subcontinent", *Journal of World History,* 18:1 (2007), p. 7.

<sup>145</sup> See, for example, Marcus Milwright, "So despicable a Vessel: Representations of Tamerlane in Printed Books of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", *Muqarnas,* 23:1 (2006), pp. 317–344.

<sup>146</sup> Alessandro Valignano, "Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en las Indias Orientales diuidida en dos partes" in *Monumenta Xaveriana* ed. Mariano Lecina (Madrid, 1899), p. 22.

well as the dissimilarities between European and Indian culture. Valignano, an Italian aristocrat, educated at the prestigious University of Padua and well connected to the European political and religious elites, was due to his social background, senior position at the Society of Jesus and distance towards the South Asian elites (especially when compared with his contacts with Japanese and Chinese societies)—more inclined to have a negative view of South Asian rulers than Montserrat, a member of the Catalan lower nobility who did not have a sophisticated academic background and who have developed a close rapport with the Mughal elites. Indeed, the positive qualities of Akbar, and their apparent resemblance to the ideal type of a Christian prince, were probably a reflection of the personal sympathy that Montserrat had for the Mughal emperor.

However, Montserrat did not reject Valignano's vision of South Asian rulers as tyrants entirely. Despite his physical and intellectual qualities, the fact that Akbar was a Muslim ruler forced Montserrat to admit the emperor's virtues lacked 'the lustre of the True Faith'.147 Islam was a factor that impeded Akbar from reaching a true state of perfection. For the Catalan missionary, the Mughal emperor, as other Muslim rulers, was inclined towards Machiavellian attitudes, something Montserrat claimed the experience of the Jesuits at the Mughal court confirmed. The experience of the missionaries suggested that 'no reliance must be put on the oath of a Musulman, since Muhammad himself teaches that it is lawful to swear falsely to an enemy'.<sup>148</sup>

The experience of the Jesuit missionaries as mediators between the *Estado* and Akbar had revealed that the emperor's overtures towards Philip II were part of a dissimulative strategy, or in Montserrat's own words 'a hypocritical and malicious pretence'.<sup>149</sup> As an example of the malice of the emperor, Montserrat reveals that the Mughal attack against the Portuguese port of Daman was planned by Akbar, although he had denied any kind of involvement when he spoke with the Jesuit missionaries.150 It was also suggested that the presence of the Jesuit missionaries at the Mughal court was not motivated by religious purposes but rather by Akbar's desire to promote his image in Europe. Indeed, after the

 Montserrat, *Commentary*, p. 197. Ibid., p. 171. <sup>149</sup> Ibid. Ibid, pp. 166–171.

missionaries presented their congratulations for the emperor's successful campaign in Afghanistan, Akbar was particularly pleased since 'being very greedy of glory, he hoped […] his fame would reach Spain'.151

Although Montserrat did not possess a comprehensive knowledge of warfare, his embedment with Akbar's army during the Afghan campaign allowed him to collect interesting information on the Mughal military's modus operandi. The information presented by the Catalan Jesuit had an obvious interest for the Portuguese authorities. The Mughal conquest of Gujarat and the Deccan was perceived by the *Estado da Índia* as a high risk to the integrity of its territories. An eventual Mughal attack against port cities such as Daman, Diu or Chaul was a very plausible scenario, and to impede the success of a Mughal incursion into Portuguese dominions it was necessary to gather all sorts of intelligence regarding the Mughal military machine.

According to the *Commentarius*, for the Afghan campaign Akbar was able to mobilise 50,000 cavalry units, 500 fighting elephants and camels, and a 'countless number of infantry'.<sup>152</sup> This large and powerful army operated in a highly disciplined fashion.Another important characteristic of the Mughal military machine was its multi-ethnic composition. Montserrat presents Akbar's army as a multinational corps formed by Persians, Turkmen, Chagatais, Uzbeks, Pashtuns, Gujuratis, Rajputs, Pathans and Baloch. Besides reflecting the diversity of the Mughal Empire, this multinational element allowed the Mughals to draw upon different military practices that characterised the different ethnic groups. The fact that Akbar was able to arrange a large and highly skilled army that represented all the peoples who lived in his empire, as the *Commentarius* observed, was the reason 'why no one dared raise a hand against Akbar, or to contrive his death, even though he was reckoned an infamous outlaw by the Musalmans'.153 The ethnic and religious diversity of the Mughal army is presented by Montserrat as one of the main reasons for the authority and power of Akbar, as well as an essential element in the social and political stability of the Mughal Empire. The use of elephants and camels by the Mughals in their military activities impressed

<sup>151</sup> Ibid, p. 154. <sup>152</sup> Ibid, p. 83. <sup>153</sup> Ibid.

the Catalan Jesuit. For several pages, the *Commentarius* praises the intelligence of elephants and their obedience and capacity to execute many functions, stating that 'they are ready to do anything that they are told by their keepers'.<sup>154</sup>

Apart from the use of more or less exotic animals, Montserrat highlights the fact that the Mughal military capacity relied on a complex system of vassalage. The *mansabdari* system is briefly described by the *Commentarius* as an administrative and military system in which the emperor took 'great care in the assignment of territories to grant to each noble a district large enough to enable him to maintain due state and dignity, and to support properly his share of military forces'.155Montserrat was particularly concerned with exposing the fragilities of the system. Although Akbar was the lord of all the territories of his empire, and the commander-in-chief of the imperial army, the *Commentarius* noted that 'most of the troops have their own generals and officers, to whom they are attached (…) by a hereditary allegiance'.156 The hereditary allegiances of the soldiers and the military power of the *mansabdaris* became thus a factor of political instability that offered 'plentiful occasions and opportunities for conspiracies and treason'.157 To reduce the risk of treasonable acts, and ensure the activities of the *mansabdaris* were always monitored, the high-rankings members of the judicial and administrative apparatus were appointed by the emperor himself.158Montserrat's observations and brief comments on the *mansabdari* system were of considerable interest for the *Estado da Índia*, since they suggested that the Portuguese authorities could explore this intricate and complex system of vassalage.

Following a similar approach to the accounts written by merchants, which were essentially concerned with describing goods, markets and trade routes, Montserrat mentions the merchandises and crafts available in the main Mughal cities in some detail, as well as the trade routes that linked the Mughal markets to those of other regions, especially that

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., p. 85. <sup>155</sup> Ibid., p. 89. <sup>156</sup> Ibid., p. 90. <sup>157</sup> Ibid. <sup>158</sup> Ibid.

of Central Asia (a market of great interest to the Portuguese but little explored by them).

Although a product of the textual and record-keeping practices developed by the Jesuits, Montserrat wrote an account that was intended to reach a readership beyond the Society of Jesus: a work that targeted a vast audience of European scholars who were humanist cosmographers often armchair ones—interested in the geography and natural history of Asia. The *Commentarius*, however, was never published or sent to Lisbon, Madrid or Rome. The work was only discovered in 1906 by the Reverend W.K. Firminger, while he was exploring the rare books collection of the library of St Paul's Cathedral in Calcutta.<sup>159</sup> The Latin text was edited by Henry Hosten and published in 1914 by the Asiatic Society of Bengal.160 The reasons for the disappearance of Montserrat's opus are unknown. The most plausible explanation for the strange disappearance of this text resides in the fact that when Montserrat concluded the *Commentarius* in 1591, the Mughal Empire was no longer an attractive mission field for the Society of Jesus. The frustration caused by the Mughal mission contrasted with the success of the Jesuit missions in China and, especially, Japan—two cases that contributed to the growing prestige and reputation of the Jesuits as the leading religious order of the Counter-Reformation. Against this backdrop, the *Commentarius* lost its propaganda value and became the chronicle of a disappointment, although its main aim was to produce an account that would support the activities developed by the first mission and highlight the geopolitical importance of the Mughal Empire for the Portuguese Crown and the Catholic Church. Indeed, Montserrat attempted to refute the perception of the first mission as a failure. By writing a more comprehensive account of the Mughal Empire, Montserrat sought to present a new narrative that highlighted some achievements in what was a difficult mission field. In this way, it is possible to relate the production of the *Commentarius* to the attempts made by the Portuguese authorities to compel the Society of Jesus to resume the *Mogor* mission, due to the important role previously played

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., p. xiii.

<sup>160</sup> H. Hosten as "Mongolicae Legationis Commentarius or The First Jesuit Mission to Akbar", *Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal,* 3:9 (1914), pp. 513–704.

by the missionaries as intermediaries between Goa and the Great Mughal. Indeed, in 1591, after several instances of pressure from the *Estado da Índia* and Akbar, the Society of Jesus would organise a second mission.

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### New Attempts

The end of the first Jesuit mission in 1583 forced the brief absence of another European voice and set of eyes at the Mughal court. As the correspondence of Antoni de Montserrat and Rodolfo Acquaviva revealed, the Jesuit missionaries were keen observers of Timurid courtly politics and foreign policy, who carefully registered the rumours, manoeuvres and all sorts of news involving Akbar, his courtiers and the foreign emissaries who visited the court.

The end of the first Jesuit mission also represented a serious setback to the *Estado da Índia*, who lost a valuable source of information. Between 1583 and the early 1590s, the information received by the Portuguese viceroys at Goa about the Great Mughal was scarce and rather unreliable: an amalgam of rumours and second-hand information that reached Goa, Daman, Diu and Hormuz through merchants, travellers, diplomats and other itinerant individuals.1 Portuguese officials often treated this information with care and sought to cross-check different news items (*noticias*) from Mughal territories to have a better perception.

The interregnum on Luso-Mughal exchanges prompted by the end of the first Jesuit mission had more causes than the apparent lack of interest from the Society of Jesus. After 1583, Akbar's immediate concerns lay

<sup>1</sup> Jorge Flores, *Nas margens do Hindustão,* p. 165.

© The Author(s) 2022

J. V. Melo, *Jesuit and English Experiences at the Mughal Court, c. 1580–1615*, New Transculturalisms, 1400–1800, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96588-4\_3

59

in the political convulsion troubling Safavid Persia, the expansion of the Uzbek Empire and the turmoil in Afghanistan. The disappearance of Mirza Hakim allowed the Uzbek ruler of the Khanate of Bukhara, Abdullah Khan, to interfere in a key region for the khanate's expansionist ambitions following the conquests of Transoxiana in 1583 and Badakhshan in 1584, two events that approximated the borders of Akbar's and Abdullah's empires. The proximity between the rulers of Bukhara and Kabul, who exchanged embassies between 1579 and 1581, the years that preceded Mirza Hakim's rebellion against Akbar, generated apprehension in the Mughal court and contributed to a widespread perception of an imminent conflict between Mughals and Uzbeks over 'Kabulistan'. As Abu'l Fazl noted in the *Akbarnama*, after the announcement of Mirza Hakim's death, the Afghan soldiers 'were wickedly thinking that they would become wanderers in the desert of failure and would go to Turan'.2 At the same time, the activities of the Roshaniyya, a religious movement founded by Bayazid Ansari, a self-proclaimed *Mehdi* who attracted the Afghan tribes discontented with Mughal rule and Akbar's religious policy, reinforced the Mughal concerns over Afghanistan and eventual Uzbek support to the guerrilla-like activities of the Roshaniyya.<sup>3</sup>

Abdullah Khan's shadow also fell over Safavid Persia. In 1578, the Uzbek ruler launched a successful expedition into the Safavid territory of Khorasan. In the same year, the Ottomans attacked the Safavid territories in Georgia and the Caspian Sea. The devasting effects of the conflicts with the Uzbeks and the Ottomans further weakened the fourth Safavid shah, Mohammad Khodabanda, a ruler troubled by health issues that affected his eyesight and by the violent infighting and factionalism of his court. The fragility of the Safavids was a matter of concern for the Mughals. Persia offered the Mughals an appealing, sophisticated literary and political culture that had a profound influence on the construction of the Mughal state apparatus and the formation of its intellectual elites. Akbar's court attracted many Persian scholars, literati, clergymen, bureaucrats and military men who migrated to Hindustan to escape from the

<sup>2</sup> Turan is a term of Persian origin used to identify a geographical area encompassing modern-day Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and northern parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

<sup>3</sup> Munis D. Faruqui, "The Forgotten Prince: Mirza Hakim and the Formation of the Mughal Empire in India", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 48:4 (2005), pp. 498–500.

instability afflicting the Safavids and contributed to the Persianisation of the Mughal court and state.

Safavid Persia was not only a cultural reference for the Mughals, but also a key geopolitical power whose strategic position between the Middle East, Central Asia and Hindustan both served and threatened Mughal interests. The Safavids were an important barrier between the territories of the Great Mughal and the Ottoman sultan, as well as a real obstacle to Abdullah Khan's ambitions to expand Uzbek rule along Central Asia. At the same time, the Safavids were interested in consolidating their presence in Afghanistan following Humayun's concession of Kandahar to Shah Tahmasp in exchange for Safavid military support. In spite of the Safavid presence in Kandahar being seen as a serious threat to the Mughal control of Kabulistan, the eventual collapse of Safavid Persia would pave the way to a long and unpredictable regional crisis with the potential to cause a clash between Ottomans, Uzbeks and Mughals.

Despite the problems of reliability of the available information, the *Estado da Índia* was aware of the tensions between Mughals and Uzbeks, the instability in Afghanistan, and the transfer of the court to Lahore. The rivalry between Akbar and Abdullah Khan was of particular interest to the *Estado* and Philip II. The rise of Shah Abbas was seen in the Iberian Peninsula as an opportunity to restore the old plans of forming an anti-Ottoman alliance with the Safavids. Despite the affirmation of Spanish authority in the Mediterranean following the Battle of Lepanto, Philip II feared a resurgence of the Great Turk in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, in 1581 an Ottoman fleet attacked the Portuguese fortress of Muscat in the Swahili Coast, and many in Goa feared that the Sublime Porte would soon turn its attention towards India.4 The rivalry between Akbar and the Great Turk was well known to the Portuguese, and an eventual conflict between an Iberian-Safavid alliance against the Ottomans would inevitably involve the Mughals.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 157–160; Giancarlo Casale, "Global Politics in the 1580*s*: One Canal, Twenty Thousand Cannibals, and an Ottoman Plot to Rule the World", *Journal of World History,* 18:3 (2007), pp. 267–296; Rui Manuel Loureiro, "Ottoman Portuguese Interactions as Reflected in Portuguese Chronicles of the Late 16th and Early 17th Centuries" in *International Turkish Sea Power History Symposium: The Indian Ocean and the Presence of the Ottoman Navy in the 16th and 17th Centuries* ed. Metin Ataç (Istanbul: Naval Training and Education Command, 2009), pp. III-3–14.

In 1590, the same year when Akbar was contacted by Shah Abbas,5 the Mughal court received the visit of Leon Grimon, a Greek Catholic subdeacon, who travelled from Goa as part of a group of Portuguese and Armenians who came to Lahore to sell 'Chinese cloths and other goods of that country'. Apparently, Grimon's original intention was to travel overland to Greece and find a caravan heading to a suitable destination in Lahore. However, according to Abu'l Fazl, the presence of a Catholic priest caught the attention of the emperor. Padre Fam¯alion, as he was known by the Mughals, spoke Persian and Turkish, and Akbar commissioned him with the task of translating Greek books into Persian. Abu'l Fazl praised Grimon for his 'abundance of sense and knowledge' and credited his translation for bringing to the court 'varieties of knowledge'.6

The presence of the Greek subdeacon was also used by Akbar to reinitiate direct contact with the *Estado da Índia* and the Jesuits. In June 1590, Grimon returned to Goa carrying letters and gifts for the viceroy and the Jesuits.7 Besides the gifts, the emperor donated 5,000 *pardaos* to the Christian poor of Goa, a donation that aimed both to charm the Goan ecclesiastical authorities and enhance the prestige of the Great Mughal among the Christian poor of Goa, most of them converts from the indigenous populations.

According to the Jesuit annual letter from Goa of 1590, the Greek priest assured the provincial that the new mission would find a favourable environment. Akbar celebrated the Feast of the Assumption of Mary with a grand ceremony that included the public display of an image brought by the members of the first Jesuit mission. The emperor also asked the main courtiers and officials to kiss the image and rewarded those who paid their homage to the Virgin Mary. Another sign of Akbar's divergence from Islam was the desacralisation of several mosques in Lahore that were now being used as stables for the Mughal cavalry. Minarets were also being destroyed with 'disdain', and an imperial edict banned the circumcision of all Muslims under the age of 15, 'to allow them to freely choose the religion they think is best'.8

<sup>5</sup> Mansura Haider, "Relations of Abdullah Khan Uzbeg with Akbar", *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 23:3–4 (1982), p. 327.

<sup>6</sup> Abu'l Fazl, *Akbarnama*, p. 874.

<sup>7</sup> Doc. 84, "Annual Letter of the Province of India (1590)", *DI* , vol. XV, eds. Joseph Wicki and John Gomes (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 1981), p. 526.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 527.

Grimon's account of what was happening in *Mogor* was nothing short of spectacular. Akbar seemed to be leading an unstoppable movement that would eradicate Islam from his empire. Indeed, the report given by the Greek subdeacon, and the way in which it is described in the annual letter of the Goan Jesuits, has an interesting echo of the early accounts of the rise of Protestantism that shocked Catholic Europe with its stories of iconoclasm and desacralisation of monasteries, abbeys and convents. Like the Protestant rulers of Germany and England, Akbar was apparently dismantling an entire religious apparatus and replacing it with a new religion. For the Jesuits and the Portuguese authorities, the news brought by Leon Grimon represented yet another opportunity to convert a new Constantine and reshape the religious and political landscape of South Asia.

As the annual letter mentions, Grimon's words and Akbar's request for a second mission caused 'much joy and consolation and sparked a fervour [such] that even the seculars want to join the mission'.9 Among the secular Jesuits who wished to go to Lahore was Gil Eanes Pereira, who was visiting Goa when Grimon arrived. Pereira asked the provincial to join the mission, evoking the fact that, ten years early earlier, he was the first Jesuit to visit the Mughal court and one of the responsible for Akbar's interest in Catholicism, but this request proved unsuccessful.10 The provincial decided to send three missionaries: Duarte Leitão, a Portuguese who served as Rector of the College of Malacca; Cristóbal de la Vega, a Castilian who was the superior of the House of Daman; and Estevão Ribeiro, a Portuguese coadjutor brother. Unlike the composition of the first mission, which included a Spaniard (although one with strong links to the Portuguese Crown), an Italian and a Persian convert, the second mission was formed only by Iberians and had a clear Portuguese majority.

The three missionaries arrived at Lahore in January 1591, but by the end of the year they abandoned their mission field. The first months were encouraging. The annual letter from Goa of 30 November 1591 reported that the missionaries had opened a school for 30 boys from the Mughal courtly elite, including one of the emperor's sons and a nephew. Akbar

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 528. <sup>10</sup> Ibid.

treated the Jesuits with 'love, respect and affability' (*amor, respecto y affabilidad*), but the three missionaries had no opportunity to speak in private with the emperor and awaited 'a good moment to speak with the king about religious matters, but he is always surrounded by his captains, and he only speaks with them, and it is not easy to find a convenient time'.11

A few months later, to the surprise of Pedro Martins, the provincial, both Leitão De la Vega requested their immediate return to Goa, stating that Akbar wanted to use the Jesuits to create 'a new sect' instead of converting to Christianity. Vega travelled to Goa to persuade the provincial to cancel the mission. Martins reported the problems with the Mughal mission to Claudio Acquaviva and stressed his determination to maintain the mission 'with generosity and hope'. Evoking the account given by Leon Grimon, the provincial highlighted the apparent religious revolution occurring in the Mughal Empire, where Akbar had ordered the destruction of 40 mosques and revealed himself to be 'affectionate to Christian things'.12 For the provincial, there was a problem of managing expectations for the Mughal mission. While the missionaries expected an almost immediate conversion of the emperor, but Akbar's decision to convert was 'such a big thing that cannot be done with the speed the Fathers wanted'.<sup>13</sup> Duarte Leitão and Estevão Ribeiro received orders to remain at Lahore and await further instructions on how the missionaries should act.

After sending his report to Rome, Martins pressured De la Vega to return to *Mogor*, but his efforts to maintain the mission were suddenly ruined when Leitão and Ribeiro returned to Goa without warning. Martins blamed Vega and Leitão for the debacle of the second mission to the Mughal court. He divided the two Jesuits and punished them with appointments to the missions of Salsete. Duarte Leitão died in mysterious circumstances shortly after returning to Goa. Jerónimo Xavier, the future leader of the third mission, mentioned to one of his correspondents in Spain, the Andalusian Jesuit Francisco de Benavides, that there

<sup>11</sup> Doc. 102, "Annual Letter of the Province of India, Goa, 30 November 1591", *DI* , vol. XV, p. 645.

<sup>12</sup> Doc. 108, "Pedro Martins to Claudio Acquaviva, Goa 7 December 1591", *DI* , vol. XV, p. 740.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

were rumours that Leitão was poisoned by someone from 'the church of the Christendom [parish] where he resided'.<sup>14</sup>

The sudden end of the mission was a potential embarrassment to the Society of Jesus. The fact that two missionaries decided to abandon a mission field without the approval of the provincial suggested the inability of the Jesuit hierarchy to impose its authority. Indeed, the Portuguese Jesuit Jorge Gomes noted to Claudio Acquaviva that the failure of the second mission to *Mogor* had 'discredited a little' the Society of Jesus in the eyes of the Goan population and especially the Crown. The announcement of the mission had generated an enthusiasm across different sectors of Goan society and was fully supported by the *Estado da Índia*. The sudden return of Vega, Leitão and Ribeiro, as Gomes noted, frustrated everyone in Goa and Lahore:

The three missionaries left Goa with much applause from the Viceroy, the noblemen and other lay people, as well as the prelates and clergymen, who had with pleasure offered to do this mission for the Viceroy. Everyone was in suspense, desiring greatly to receive the good news they expected, but then, after just few months, against all expectations, they returned without any order or permit, against the will of the Mughal himself, who only allowed them to leave after they had sworn on a missal that they would return.15

Gomes' words highlighted the fact that the mission of *Mogor* was not only a religious affair but also an important diplomatic enterprise. The missionaries were expected not only to convert Akbar, but to ensure fluid, direct and stable communication between the emperor and the *Estado da Índia*. One of the most problematic aspects of De la Vega and Leitão's behaviour was precisely that they neglected the diplomatic dimension of the mission, putting at risk the relations between Akbar and Goa. The hasty end of the second mission put into question the ability of the Jesuits to deal with complex mission fields where the geopolitical interests of the Iberian Crowns were at stake. In addition, the sudden end of the Mughal mission threatened the continuity of the *Estado*'s support

<sup>15</sup> Doc. 129, "Fr. J. Gomes S. J., to Fr. Cl. Acouaviva S. J., Goa, November 16 1594", *DI* , vol. XVI, p. 825.

<sup>14</sup> Doc. 49, "Jeronimo Xavier to Francisco de Benavides, Goa, 12 November 1593", *DI* , vol. XVI (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 1984), p. 257.

for other Jesuit enterprises in relevant mission fields where Lisbon and Madrid had vested interests such as Ethiopia, China and Japan. Alessandro Valignano, who believed that the most promising mission fields of Japan and China should be the priorities of the Society of Jesus, bitterly noted to Claudio Acquaviva that the failure of the second mission corroborated his negative perception of the potential of the Mughal court: 'in my judgment, the mission of *Mogor* should be avoided, because we already have experience of what the Mughal [Akbar] wanted'.<sup>16</sup>

The second mission also generated considerable expectation in Europe. On 14 August 1591, the Jesuit provincial of Sicily, Bartolomeo Ricci, reported with some enthusiasm the arrival at Messina of an Armenian named Antonio Giorgio, who spent a year in Mughal lands and carried letters from the Portuguese governor of Goa, Manoel de Sousa Coutinho, and had news of a new Jesuit mission to the Mughal court. Antonio Giorgio told Ricci that in December 1589 that Antoni de Montserrat and Francisco Henriques had been summoned again by Akbar, probably confounding the departure of the Catalan missionary to Ethiopia with the second mission to *Mogor*. The Great Mughal was apparently on the verge of converting his empire to Christianity. According to the Armenian, the emperor's sons, Salim, the future emperor Jahangir and Daniyal, had been baptised, and many at the Mughal court had seen Akbar and the princes listening to Mass. The news of the imminent conversion of the Timurid ruler and the baptism of his heirs was spectacular. Even more spectacular was the news that Akbar had ordered the destruction of 60 mosques across his dominions. Antonio Giorgio also mentioned that four more Jesuit missionaries would be soon sent to Lahore, mentioning the names of Gomes Vaz, who was a serious candidate to be part of the mission, and one Luis Leitão, probably a confusion with Duarte Leitão.<sup>17</sup>

Antonio Giorgio, however, did not carry with him any letter from the Jesuits to confirm his account, but only a copy destined to Philip II of a letter from Akbar addressed to the Portuguese governor, Manoel de Sousa Coutinho.<sup>18</sup> The Armenian, however, seemed to be regarded as a reliable informer. Antonio Giorgio, or António Jorge as he was known

<sup>16</sup> Doc. 50, "Alessandro Valignano to Claudio Acquaviva, Macao, 15 November 1593", *DI* , vol. XVI, pp. 270–271.

<sup>17</sup> Doc. 92, "Bartolomeo Ricci to Claudio Acquaviva, Messina, 14 August 1591", *DI* , vol. XV, pp. 604–605.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

to the Portuguese and Spanish authorities, was employed by the *Estado da Índia* as a spy and courier.<sup>19</sup> His task was to carry the *Estado*'s correspondence along the overland route between Goa and the Mediterranean, and to collect all sorts of information as he travelled through Mughal India, Persia and the Levant. The Armenian's account was, indeed, full of imprecisions and confusions with parallel events such as the second Jesuit mission to Ethiopia formed by Antoni de Montserrat and Pedro Paez, inconstancies that were common in the information provided by peripatetic individuals who, like Antonio Giorgio, made a living as gatherers of rumours and raw intelligence.

The news of the second mission undertaken by António Jorge also reached Madrid in February 1592. An anonymous report attributed to the provincial of Toledo, Gonzalo Dávila, mentioned the account given by the Armenian upon his arrival at Messina and Leon Grimon's visit to Goa—who apparently was accompanied by António Jorge/Antonio Giorgio himself—and the departure of four missionaries to Lahore. The Madrid report highlighted that Akbar's imminent conversion was 'causing the fear of all Mahometans and Gentiles, who are now frightened with the power of such a great king whose state includes forty-six kingdoms with great populations and riches, with many bellicose people'. To stress the importance of the conversion of the Great Mughal even more, and probably drawing from the writings of Antoni de Montserrat, the author of the Madrid report reminded that Akbar had at his disposal '300,000 horses and 12,000 elephants'. What was at stake thus was not only the conversion of a ruler, but the entire conversion of an extraordinary military power. As the anonymous report concluded, 'if [Akbar] becomes a Christian, as is expected, and allied with us, great progress could be achieved without fearing anyone'.<sup>20</sup> An Iberian-Mughal alliance instigated by a shared Catholic faith would inevitably change the political landscape of Europe and Asia dramatically, allowing the execution of some of the

<sup>19</sup> In 1602, Antonio Giorgio/António Jorge petitioned Philip III to give the post of clerk of the Customs House of Ormuz to his son-in-law as a reward for his services as a spy and imprisonment for seven years. See "Consulta do arménio de nação, António Jorge, 21 de Agosto de 1602", *Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa*, No 14, 1960, p. 47. For more on the career of Antonio Giorgio/António Jorge, see: Gennaro Varriale, "El Armenio de Goa: Espía o charlatán", *Archivo de la Frontera: Clásicos Mínimos*, www. archivodelafrontera.com [Accessed on 18 November 2020].

<sup>20</sup> Doc. 121, "An Anonymous Relation on Akbar, Emperor of the Moghals, Madrid, February 1592", *DI* , vol. XV, p. 779.

most extravagant projects conceived in Lisbon and Madrid concerning the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, the conquest of China or the eradication of the Protestant powers and their ambitious colonial projects.

The frustrated expectations caused by the second mission led Cristóbal de la Vega to write a long letter to Claudio Acquaviva explaining the reasons that had led him and Duarte Leitão to put an end to said mission. De La Vega reminded the general that in 1590 he had asked to return to Europe 'due to suffering many melancholic humours during four consecutive years exposed to the heat [of India]'. The tropical climate of South Asia inclined De la Vega to the 'natural passions' and only after being finally acclimatised to India he realised his 'error', pleading for Acquaviva's 'pardon and penitence'.21

De la Vega's letter was a summary of another set of letters that the Spanish missionary had previously written to Acquaviva and that were lost on their way from Goa to Rome. The missive addressed to Acquaviva sought to provide a clear explanation for the decision of the members of the second mission to *Mogor* to abandon Akbar's court. According to De la Vega, after a long deliberation, Duarte Leitão, the superior of the mission, opted to end the mission due to the many obstacles posed by Akbar's behaviour and religious policies. The Mughal emperor was not on the verge of becoming a new Constantine, as many hoped in Goa and Rome, but planning to establish a new religion:

It was such the proudness of this barbarian that he acts as a prophet and a legislator, claiming that the law of Mohammed is over and that the world is now without a true law, and that it is necessary to have another prophet to institute a new one, and that he, among everyone else, is the more qualified to do this. And as such, he is publicly adored as a prophet with such insolent praises that many times I heard people calling him God in public.22

Akbar was being worshipped as a saint. He received gifts and alms 'with pleasure' from his subjects in exchange for blessings and miracles. A new calendar was also introduced, as well as a series of new practices—'fasting and abstinences'—and wedding ceremonies. The innovations introduced

<sup>21</sup> Doc. 71, "Fr. Cristobal de la Vega to Claudio Acquaviva Chaúl, December 2 1593", *DI* , vol. XVI, pp. 479–480.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 480–481.

by Akbar were said to be 'scandalising the Moors, because he disfavours the Law of Mohammed to impose his own law'. One of the features of the cult developed by the emperor that was particularly shocking for the more orthodox Muslims was the adoration of the sun. Leitão and De la Vega rapidly became aware that the Sunni orthodox associated the arrival of the Jesuits, and the enthusiastic welcome that Akbar gave them, with the religious 'novelties'.<sup>23</sup>

The scandal caused by the emperor's religious innovations and his reluctance to speak with the Jesuits, in private, about Christianity instigated Duarte Leitão to consider the end of the mission. According to De la Vega, the three missionaries 'clearly understood that he [Akbar] had called [them] to sanction the institution of his new religion with [their] presence and that of other priests from false sects who were already with him'.<sup>24</sup> Leitão, De la Vega and Ribeiro believed that they had been manipulated and their prolonged presence at the Mughal court would be used to validate the establishment of a new religious cult that went against Christian doctrine. The three Jesuits were aware that the mission was not only a religious enterprise and served 'other goals in the interest of honour and the treasury'—a tacit recognition of the utility of the missionaries as intermediaries between the Iberian Crowns and the Mughal polity. However, confronted with the 'general scandal' provoked by Akbar's religious policy and their eventual negative effects on the sociopolitical stability of the Mughal Empire and the reputation of the Society of Jesus, Leitão instructed De la Vega and Ribeiro to leave Lahore.

The three missionaries were privileged witnesses of the zenith of a long process of transformation of the ideological and social structures of Akbar's reign that took shape after the *mahzar* of 1579, a crucial moment that allowed the emperor to affirm himself as a universal ruler and the main spiritual authority of the empire. Akbar's universalistic pretensions were deeply tied with the religious and ethnic diversity of Mughal India, the development of the *mansabdar* system and the dynastical and international prestige of the Mughals vis-à-vis the other leading Islamic powers, the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia.

As John F. Richards noted, the *mansabdar* system allowed Akbar to achieve two goals. It ensured the military and administrative control of

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 481. <sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 482. the territories under Mughal rule and simultaneously created a balance between the frequently hostile traditional Timurid Islamic elites of Central Asian origin, and the new elite groups formed by Shi'as from Persia, Rajputs, Indo-Muslims, Hindus or Jains.25 The Mughal nobility became thus, to use Iqtidar Alam Khan's words, a 'composite ruling group'.26 The diversity of the Mughal elite led Akbar, together with his chief ideologue, Abu'l Fazl, to develop an imperial ideology that sought to mix Timurid traditions with elements taken from the Persian and Hindustani political and religious cultures. The heterodoxy of the Akbari ideology sought to attract and incorporate subjects from diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds through the principle of *sulh-i kul* or absolute peace between the different religious and ethnic groups of the empire. In the *Akbarnama*, Abu'l Fazl summarised this principle as an essential part of good government and kingship:

As in the rules of sovereignty and the religion of humanity, concord is preferable to opposition and peace better than war. In particular, as it has been our disposition since we attained discretion to this day not to pay attention to differences of religion and variety of manners and to regard the tribes of mankind as the servants of God, we have endeavoured to regulate mankind in general.27

Akbar's policy of *sulh-i kul* sought to attract and incorporate subjects from diverse backgrounds, while affirming the figure of the emperor as the ultimate political and religious authority.<sup>28</sup> The construction of the *mansabdar* system and the development of the *sulh-i kul* policy were thus followed by the development of an imperial ideology manifested by a series of symbolic acts that consecrated Akbar not only as the head of the Mughal polity but as a 'paramount spiritual authority'.29 The symbiosis between the temporal and spiritual sovereignty of the emperor was reflected in the development of a specific ritual idiom that included

<sup>25</sup> John F. Richards, *The Mughal Empire*, pp. 127–128.

<sup>27</sup> Abu'l Fazl *Akbarnama*, vol. III, pp. 1008–1014.

<sup>28</sup> Iqtidar Alam Khan, "Akbar's Personality Traits and World Outlook", p. 91.

<sup>29</sup> John F. Richards, *The Mughal Empire*, p. 129.

<sup>26</sup> Iqtidar Alam Khan, "Akbar's Personality Traits and World Outlook—A Critical Appraisal" in *Akbar and his India* ed. Irfan Habib (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 79.

rituals inspired by the fire symbolism performed in Persia and Rajput, as well as the establishment of acts of symbolic subordination to the emperor influenced by the Sufi master (*pîr*) and disciple (*murid*) relationship.30 The latter were particularly favoured by Akbar, who, as John F. Richards has observed, regarded discipleship as a useful instrument to establish powerful emotional ties that could create 'a sense of direct personal obligation to the emperor' and thus form 'an exceptionally loyal and reliable cadre of noblemen'.<sup>31</sup>

Cristóbal de la Vega was not completely wrong when he wrote that Akbar acted as a 'prophet and a legislator'—a clear reference to the affirmation of the emperor's temporal and spiritual authority. The Castilian missionary and his companions arrived at Lahore at the precise moment when the Akbari ideology and its ritual apparatus reached their maturity. The powers granted by the *mahzar* of 1579 encouraged Akbar to become a 'bricoleur extraordinaire', to borrow Azfar Moin's words,32 who used his supreme authority in religious matters to manipulate different religious beliefs and imaginaries to enhance his power across diverse religious and ethnic groups. At the same time, the 1590s were also the years when the main imperial chronicles such as the *Akbarnama* were produced and cemented the figure of the *padshah* as a universal ruler and integral feature of the Mughal political and ritual idioms. The members of the second mission were thus privileged (and bewildered) witnesses of the complex process of affirmation of a distinctive Mughal imperial power and political identity. Indeed, De la Vega's mention of Akbar being 'publicly adored' reflects not only the success of the Akbari ideological project at the court but also beyond the gates of the imperial palaces. The expectations generated by Akbar's apparent rejection of Islam and interest in Christianity shaped the Jesuit missionaries' perception of Akbar's efforts to sacralise the figure of the emperor not as an attempt to affirm his power and develop a distinctive political identity, but as a worrying sign of the creation of a new religion.

The three missionaries, having recently arrived at the Mughal court, and without sufficient knowledge of the sociopolitical structures of Mughal India, rapidly became discouraged about their role. The abrupt

<sup>30</sup> Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *From the Tagus to the Ganges*, pp. 126–127.

<sup>31</sup> John F. Richards, *The Mughal Empire* p. 129.

<sup>32</sup> Azfar Moin, *The Millenial Sovereign*, p. 146.

end of the second mission was thus a story of frustrated expectations. If De la Vega and his companions believed that their presence would incite Akbar's immediate conversion and guide the emperor in the Christianisation of his empire, Akbar expected the missionaries, as wise men from *Firangistan*, to contribute new elements to the development of his ideological project.

#### II

The short-lived second Jesuit mission to *Mogor* coincided with the Mughal annexation of lower Sindh, an event that caused some apprehension in Goa and Iberia. The control of Sindh, a strategic coastal region on the trade routes of the Persian Gulf, allowed Akbar to develop a new maritime dimension to his empire. If the conquest of Gujarat cast a shadow over the Portuguese ports of Diu and Daman, the incorporation of Sindh raised new questions about Akbar's intention to expand his empire along the Persian Gulf and conquer the strategic Portugueseheld port of Hormuz.33 At the same time, the Mughal campaigns in the Deccan positioned Akbar dangerously close to Goa and the *Província do Norte*.

These fears are patent in a letter to Viceroy Matias de Albuquerque dated 1 March 1594 and written on behalf of Philip II by Miguel de Moura, one of the members of the government junta responsible for the Viceroyalty of Portugal. The view from Madrid and Lisbon was that the Mughal campaigns in Sindh should be carefully monitored by the Portuguese officials in Goa. Philip II believed that the Mughal annexation of Sindh was 'very inconvenient for the Estado' since it confirmed that Akbar was 'growing in lands and powers (…) becoming the lord of the hinterland (*sertão*) of the coast of India'.34 It was decided that the *Estado* should thus covertly undermine the Mughal expansionist movement and incite the Deccani rulers to work together against Akbar. Indeed, Philip

<sup>33</sup> Jorge Flores, *Nas Margens do Hindustão*, p. 184.

<sup>34</sup> Doc. 140, "Philip III to Viceroy Matias de Albuquerque, Lisbon, 1 March 1594" in *Archivo Portuguez Oriental*, fasc. 3, ed. Joaquim Heliodoro da Cunha Rivara (Nova Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1861), p. 429.

II supported the viceroy's 'concern in knowing the designs and intentions of the Mughals' and his diplomatic efforts to forge a Deccani alliance.<sup>35</sup>

After the return of the Jesuit missionaries from Lahore, Matias de Albuquerque lost three valuable potential informers on the Great Mughal at the precise moment when the *Estado* needed to gather all sorts of intelligence about Akbar and his closest aides. The end of the second Jesuit mission was also a setback for the Mughals. The long history of Portuguese involvement in Deccani geopolitics suggested that the *Estado da Índia* would be willing to interfere in Akbar's plans for the region. The presence of Jesuit missionaries at the Timurid court allowed the emperor to restore a channel of direct communication with the *Estado da Índia* that would allow the Mughal authorities to more accurately assess Portuguese intentions in the Deccan. Indeed, the second Jesuit mission to *Mogor* coincided with the preparation of a series of Mughal embassies to the Deccani sultanates between 1591 and 1593, which sought to pressure the Deccani rulers to accept Akbar's authority over the region.

In 1594, Akbar sent another embassy to Goa. Both Portuguese and Mughal sources do not mention this embassy in detail, but the annual letter of the Jesuit provincial of Goa, Francisco Cabral, mentions the visit of a Mughal ambassador who, like his counterparts from Persia and Pegu, asked the viceroy for permission to visit the Jesuit College and meet the rector, who 'accepted such good intentions, and showed them the things they do; and all gained a great knowledge of the divine cult and the Christian religion'.36

The visit of the Mughal ambassador was yet another overture from Akbar to the Jesuits and the *Estado*. Indeed, Pierre du Jarric and Luis de Guzmán mention that the ambassador received a letter from the emperor persuading the archbishop and the viceroy to send more missionaries to the Mughal court.<sup>37</sup> However, the fiasco of the second mission made the Jesuit provincial, Francisco Cabral, extremely reluctant to organise another mission. Cabral explained his position to the viceroy by reminding him 'that there was so little hope that this would bear fruit

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., pp. 429–430.

<sup>36</sup> Doc. 117, "Annual Letter of the Province of India, Goa, 7 November 1594", *DI* , vol. XVI, p. 715.

<sup>37</sup> Pierre du Jarric, *Historie des Choses Plus Mémorables*, vol. 2 (Bourdeaux, 1610) p. 463; Luis de Guzmán, *Historia de las missiones que han hecho los religiosos de la Compañía de Jesus*, vol. I (Alcalá, 1601), p. 257.

because the fathers went two times there without any result',38 as he mentioned to Claudio Acquaviva. Confronted with the lack of enthusiasm of the provincial, the viceroy threatened to send a mission from another religious order, since 'there were other clergymen who were wishing and requesting it'.39 The pressure from the viceroy succeeded and Francisco Cabral called a congregation to discuss the organisation of a new mission to *Mogor*.

Matias de Albuquerque's energetic pressure and blackmail were deeply related to the need to establish regular communication and gather reliable intelligence from the Mughal court. But the viceroy's personal commitment to ensure that a new mission was sent to Lahore coincided with the worrying reports from Coge Abrãao, a man described by Philip II as 'a very reputable, practical and trustworthy Jew' who, between 1593 and 1594, was sent to Bijapur and Ahmadnagar to 'spy […] and learn the mood of those kings'. Based on his contacts with the Deccani sultans, Coge Abrãao was expected to encourage them to join forces to resist the Mughal advances, in particular, the ruler of Ahmadnagar; Matias de Albuquerque wanted to know 'if he thinks that it is more honourable and profitable to be an absolute king or the vassal of a king'.<sup>40</sup> The reports sent by the *Estado*'s were particularly worrying. Sultan Burhan II revealed to Coge Abrãao that Akbar was pressuring him to attack the *Estado*'s borders, and even showed the envoy a letter from the Mughal emperor.41 The news from Ahmadnagar recommended caution, but, above all, exposed the need to closely monitor every movement from Akbar and ensure that the *Estado da Índia* was able to regularly obtain relevant intelligence from the *Mogor*.

Matias de Albuquerque's visit to the *Província do Norte* to examine the garrisons—as well as monitor the Mughal movements in the Deccan forced the provincial to anticipate the launch of the mission.<sup>42</sup> Francisco

<sup>38</sup> Doc. 133, "Francisco Cabral to Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 20 November 1594", *DI* , vol. XVI, p. 848.

<sup>39</sup> Doc. 141, "Gomes Vaz to Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 25 November 1594", *DI* , vol. XVI, p. 890.

<sup>40</sup> Quoted in Jorge Flores, *Nas Margens do Hindustão*, p. 206.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., pp. 206–207.

<sup>42</sup> Doc. 118, "Francisco Lameira to Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 7 November 1594", *DI* , vol. XVI, p. 758.

Cabral suggested Jerónimo Xavier, Manoel Pinheiro and Bento de Góis, three names that the provincial believed would restore the prestige of the Jesuits at the Mughal court. Jerónimo Xavier was the grand-nephew of St Francis Xavier and was seen by many in the Jesuit hierarchy in Rome and Goa as a promising prospect. Indeed, as Francisco Cabral mentioned to Claudio Acquaviva, the Navarrese missionary had already been appointed for the second mission, but due to the logistical problems he was unable to travel from Cochin to Goa. Before being appointed to *Mogor*, Manoel Pinheiro was proposed for the grade of Spiritual Coadjutor for being a 'suitable, good worker, [who is] very zealous of the souls and has taken care of the Christendom with many fruits'.<sup>43</sup> Bento de Góis was presented in the catalogue of December 1594 as coadjutor 'aged 32, with good health, and six years and nine months at the Society'.<sup>44</sup>

The composition of the third mission also sought to reduce the growing tensions between Portuguese and Spanish Jesuits in Goa after the formalisation of the Iberian Union with the acclamation of Philip II of Spain as king of Portugal by the *cortes* of Tomar in 1581. The rapid rise of Jerónimo Xavier was seen by many Portuguese Jesuits as a worrying sign of a 'Castilianisation' of the Goan province. Fears of subordination of the Portuguese ecclesiastical and administrative agents vis-à-vis the Castilian subjects of Philip I of Portugal (Philip II of Spain) were common in the metropolitan and colonial territories of the Portuguese Crown. Almost fifteen years after the union of Crowns, on 10 November 1595, Alessandro Valignano complained to Claudio Acquaviva about the damaging effects of the tensions and conflicts between Portuguese and Spanish Jesuits, confessing that:

the thing that has most upset me was the bad seeds of dissension among our people, and if they grow and create roots they will cause much damage and trouble to this Province. This dissension is growing among the Portuguese and the Castilians, and may God allow that in the passing

<sup>43</sup> Doc. 155, "Catalogue of Those Proposed for the Grade of Spiritual Coadjutor, Goa, December 1594", *DI* , vol. XVI, p. 1020.

<sup>44</sup> Doc. 151, "First and Second Catalogues of the Province of India, Goa, 15 December 1594", *DI* , vol. XVI, p. 951.

of time it will not affect the other foreign nations (…) And since between Portuguese and Castilians, due to their close borders and past wars, as well as the last events related to the succession, these two nations remaine opposed (*poco amigas*), and this little union is now reaching religious matters'.45

Although Cabral hoped that the ratio of two Portuguese missionaries to one Spanish one would be well received, the appointment of Xavier as the head of the second mission to *Mogor* caused suspicions among some Portuguese Jesuits. Nuno Rodrigues, for example, besides complaining about Jerónimo Xavier's 'choleric passion' (*paixão da colera*), mentioned that he 'reveals to be very passionate (*apaixonado*) for his nation, which is something that is not well seen here and troublesome to those who have to deal with him'.<sup>46</sup> In a letter to Claudio Acquaviva, Jorge Gomes reported that Xavier was 'too fond of Castile and of those of that nation, making the Portuguese angry and scandalised, [because] he shows little consideration for the Portuguese and their things, and since he shows this in such a notorious way and they confront him, I have the impression that the Portuguese loath him (*lhe têm este asco*)'. After listing a long list of complaints about Xavier's behaviour, including his choleric outbursts and desire to be 'revered and treated with an advantageous difference by the others', Gomes accused Xavier of being excessively occupied with confessing pious women. According to the Portuguese Jesuit, Xavier was 'very inclined to them, because almost all women of importance attend the church of the Professed House and he is their confessor, and in the days when there are confessions at the church he is the last of the confessors to leave [the church]'.<sup>47</sup> Another Portuguese Jesuit, André Fernandes, also complained to Claudio Acquaviva that Jerónimo Xavier was 'spending much time in the confession of women, which is an infamy for the superiors, because until today no one did such thing like him, and he should be more careful and spend his time in other things that

<sup>45</sup> Doc. 27, "Alessandro Valignano to Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 10 November 1595", *DI* , vol. XVII, ed. Joseph Wicki (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 1988), pp. 130–132.

<sup>46</sup> Doc. 11, "Nuno Rodrigues to Miguel Rodrigues, Cochin, 29 December 1592", *DI* , vol. XVI, p. 37.

<sup>47</sup> Doc. 64, "Jorge Gomes to Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 26 November 1593", *DI* , vol. XV p. 442.

are more appropriated for his post'.48 However, Xavier was not the only Jesuit with an inclination for pious women. Valério de Parada, the rector of the Cochin College, complained to Acquaviva that in many Jesuit colleges and house there was 'a notorious lack of observance of vows and rules, a lack of respect for the superiors, in spirit and devotion, too many dealings with secular people, and worst of all, too much freedom in visiting women and pious women (*molheres e molheres devotas*)'.49

Xavier's appointment was one among many episodes of the problematic rivalry between Portuguese and Spanish Jesuits in Goa. In spite of the many critics of Francisco Cabral's decision, the fact that the Navarrese Jesuit was the grand-nephew of St Francis Xavier and possessed an interesting aristocratic background made him a suitable candidate to lead the third mission to *Mogor*.

#### III

The three Jesuits arrived in Lahore on 5 May 1595, after a long journey of 230 leagues (1,150 kilometres) that, as Xavier noted in a letter to Claudio Acquaviva, was made only 'across lands that belong to him [Akbar]'.<sup>50</sup> Before reaching Lahore, Xavier and his companions had a brief sojourn in Khambhat, where they met Prince Murad. The rendezvous between Murad and the Jesuits, as Pinheiro revealed, was not planned by the Mughals. The *firman* issued by Akbar stated that the missionaries should travel via Sindh, a condition that suggested that the emperor was aware that the Jesuits could meet Murad's camp and report on it to the Portuguese authorities in Goa. Nonetheless, Akbar's son welcomed the *padres* 'with great joy and signs of benevolence'. The prince questioned the *padres* about 'many things and many places', especially the fauna, flora and weather of Portugal, as well as the life at the court of the Austrias. Pinheiro gave a brief description of Murad's camp and army, counting 'four or five thousand horses (…) four hundred elephants, seven hundred camels, forty or fifty dromedaries, four thousand oxen, fifteen pieces of

<sup>48</sup> Doc. 67 "André Fernandes to Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 29 November 1593", *DI* , vol. XVI, p. 460.

<sup>49</sup> Doc. 96, "Valério de Parada to Claudio Acquaviva, Cochin, December 1593", *DI* , vol. XVI, p. 604.

<sup>50</sup> Doc. 19, "Jerónimo Xavier to Claudio Acquaviva, Lahore, 20 August 1595", *DI* , vol. XVI, p. 69.

artillery, (…) four cannons, and some camelotes and camis'.<sup>51</sup> As Pinheiro duly noted, Murad was charged with the mission of 'subduing the entire Deccan'. The Jesuit, however, was not particularly impressed by the prince and believed that he lacked political judgement: 'he governs with men who lack experience, and because he is soft (*brando*) and generous (*liberal*) by nature, he is always under their influence'. However, Murad's words and behaviour suggested that he was more hedonist than a dedicated Muslim. According to Pinheiro, the prince 'had little devotion for the mosques, he never frequents them, his days are dedicated to hunting and riding, and this is his life'.52

After arriving in Lahore, Akbar welcomed the Jesuits 'with much honour and love'. During this first meeting, Akbar recommended that the three missionaries should do their utmost to rapidly learn Persian to facilitate communication between them and avoid a 'third party'. Xavier reveals that to compel the missionaries to begin their Persian studies, the emperor asked Abu'l Fazl to tell them 'that if we learn Persian, a big knot that has been made would be untied'.53 In fact, the three *padres*, during their brief sojourn in Khambhat, began to have Persian lessons. In the first years of the third mission, Xavier, Pinheiro and Góis dedicated most of their time to studying Persian.

The first letters sent by the third mission to Goa and Rome reported a series of encouraging signs that suggested Akbar's inclination towards Christianity. The emperor was, in Xavier's words, 'totally departed from Muhammad' and, as reported by the members of the second mission, 'tended to be a gentile, worshipping God and the sun'.54 Many regarded Akbar as a prophet, and the emperor himself suggested that he had miraculous powers, accepting, for example, the gifts of 'many women who pray to him to give health to their children or to help them to get pregnant'.<sup>55</sup> However, Akbar seemed to have incorporated Christian elements into his religious beliefs and practices. The Mughal emperor, as Jerónimo

<sup>51</sup> Doc. 46, "Annual Letter of Francisco Cabral, Goa, 29 November 1595", *DI* , vol. XVI, p. 372.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Doc. 19, "Jerónimo Xavier to Claudio Acquaviva, Lahore, 20 August 1595", *DI* , vol. XVI p. 69.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

Xavier noted in a letter to Claudio Acquaviva, had 'images of Christ Our Lord and Our Lady of very rich and good quality that were brought from Europe'.<sup>56</sup> Akbar even participated in a Christian celebration 'on his knees, with his hands raised as if he were a Christian king'.57 On Assumption Day, he lent the missionaries his collection of Christian images and ordered the Jesuit chapel to be decorated 'with canopies and rich brocades and silks', a gesture that Xavier associated with the emperor's 'love and devotion' for the Virgin Mary.58

Akbar was not the only figure in the Timurid court who had an interest in Christianity. Prince Salim also showed 'much love' and helped the missionaries 'by negotiating with the king [Akbar] on our behalf'. The future Jahangir promised to help the Jesuits to build a church in Lahore and played a crucial role in the emperor's decision to issue a *firman* allowing the Jesuits to convert whoever wanted to become Christian.<sup>59</sup> One of the reasons for Salim's support for the Jesuits was his interest in European art. The prince commissioned the painter who accompanied the missionaries to produce an image of the Virgin Mary, and he also instructed a Mughal sculptor to make ivory copies of an image of an infant Jesus and crucifix brought by the Jesuits.60 The Mughal interest in European art was seen by Xavier as a potential avenue to persuade the Timurid elites to accept Catholic doctrine. After arriving in Lahore, many courtiers frequently requested the Jesuits to supply them with original artworks. The demand was such that Xavier asked Claudio Acquaviva 'to send good and large images of Our Lady, of the birth of Christ, etc. to give to this King and Prince, who will receive them with much love and esteem, and to also send some little images to give to some Christians and Moors, who have asked us with much affection, and send also some other little pieces'.61

Manuel Pinheiro also wrote encouraging letters from Lahore mentioning several episodes of positive contacts between the missionaries and the local population. He compared his experience in Khambhat, for

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 69. <sup>57</sup> Ibid. <sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 70. <sup>59</sup> Ibid. <sup>60</sup> Ibid. <sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 71. example, with 'walking in Évora'. The presence of Jesuit missionaries on the streets of the Gujarati city attracted a considerable number of curious passers-by who enthusiastically greeted the three missionaries. In the first annual letter of the third mission, Pinheiro mentioned that the 'men, women and children who saw us, made signs of benevolence with their eyes and mouths, saying: "*Padres*! *Padres*! There are *padres*!"'.62

The news from the Great Mughal generated a wave of enthusiasm in Goa. Francisco Cabral lauded the third mission with the expectation that it would be an imminent success. The positive attitudes of Akbar and Selim towards the missionaries, and the veneration of the local populations for the images brought from Goa, led Cabral to imagine himself 'walking along the streets of Cambay, singing the Christian doctrine and raising the flag of the Cross, without fearing any Moor or Gentile, but actually they would follow me, because of the love and respect they show towards us'.<sup>63</sup> The correspondence from the three missionaries at *Mogor* in 1596 continued to send 'good news'. As Francisco Cabral reported to the Jesuit headquarters in Rome, the letters from Lahore were very encouraging. Akbar, Selim and many Mughal noblemen treated the three Jesuits with 'much love and honour'. The activities of the missionaries were 'abundantly supported by the temporal power'. Akbar had not only sponsored the construction of a church in Agra, but also issued a 'general licence' that allowed all his subjects to convert to Christianity.<sup>64</sup>

Francisco Cabral's enthusiasm for the first steps of the third mission were based on a report written by Jerónimo Xavier that mentioned that Akbar asked the missionaries to meet him 'at carpeted place where few enter, and those who enter are the emperor's captains'.<sup>65</sup> The correspondence of the members of the third Jesuit mission often mentioned the familiarity that the emperor or other members of the Mughal ruling elite had with the missionaries. Again, the access to the most private or restricted spaces of the Mughal court granted to the Jesuit missionaries

<sup>62</sup> Doc. 46, "Annual Letter of Francisco Cabral, Goa, 29 November 1595", *DI* , vol. XVII, p. 377.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., pp. 374–375.

<sup>64</sup> Doc. 83, "Francisco Cabral to Claudio Acquavia, Goa, 17 December 1596", *DI* , vol. XVIII, ed. Joseph Wicki (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 1988), p. 697.

<sup>65</sup> Doc. 72, "Jeronimo Xavier to Francisco Cabral Lahore, 8 September 1596", *DI* , vol. XVIII, p. 550.

suggested that the *padres* enjoyed a prominent status, being regarded by Akbar and his courtiers as an integral part of the court. Besides, the ability to approach a ruler in person, especially in moments of leisure and in intimate or restricted spaces, was an indicator of prestige that suggested the possibility of becoming a protégé of the ruler or influencing his decisions.66 Indeed, as Xavier noted, the missionaries even attended the private entertainments staged for the emperor and his inner circle, 'standing on our feet as everyone, and barefoot as everyone'. Although this privileged access to Akbar's inner circle was very encouraging, there were some disadvantages. The emperor's entertainments included local artistic performances that clashed with the Jesuit moral code, such as the troubling 'women who dance', who often forced Xavier and the other missionaries 'to turn our back to them'—a behaviour that surprised Akbar, who 'find it very strange that we do not raise our eyes to a spectacle that caught the attention of the hearts and eyes of many'.67

This anecdotal episode, mentioned by Xavier to demonstrate the good moral conduct of the missionaries in a lavish and lascivious courtly environment, is both revealing of some of the initial difficulties that the missionaries had to contend with when it came to the Mughal courtly culture and *habitus*, and of the attempt of the Jesuits to act as the representatives or disseminators of a moral alternative at the Mughal court. In fact, Xavier tended to present the moral conduct of the missionaries as the main reason for their rapid rise. As Francisco Cabral was informed, Akbar often allowed the missionaries to meet him while he visited or entertained his daughters, displaying towards the Jesuits, in the words of Jerónimo Xavier, 'a trust that I do not know to whom else he would show'.68

Outside the court, the missionaries reported some encouraging progresses. Xavier reported an estimated 38 conversions, not counting the baptism of 'some Muslim women who married some Christians with whom they lived in sin and now live well'.<sup>69</sup> One of the converts was 'a Muslim who reads and writes Persian very well and worked as scribe for

<sup>66</sup> Jeroen Duindam, "The Court as a Meeting Point: Cohesion, Competition, Control" in *Prince, Pen, and Sword: Eurasian Perspectives* eds. Maaike van Berkel and Jeroen Duindam (Leiden: Brill, 2018), p. 47.

<sup>67</sup> Doc. 72, "Jeronimo Xavier to Francisco Cabral Lahore, September 8, 1596", *DI* , vol. XVIII, p. 558.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 550.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 576.

a Christian captain'.70 The other conversions highlighted by Xavier were those of 'two sons and one daughter of an Englishman, who is believed to be a heretic, and a Muslim woman'.<sup>71</sup> This Englishman was probably William Leades, the jeweller who took part in Newberry's expedition and decided to remain in Lahore after being invited by Akbar to work at the court. Although the letter to Francisco Cabral does not dwell much on the Englishman and his family, Xavier mentions that Leades' 'carelessness' in religious matters almost led to one of his sons being buried without being baptised, and that the missionaries were 'at pains to baptise his sons', suggesting that the Englishman's Protestantism made him reluctant to establish a rapport with the Jesuits.72

The presence of the *padres* and their religious rituals continued to raise the curiosity of many courtiers and commoners. During the celebrations of the Nativity of Mary, the Jesuit chapel attracted a considerable crowd. Xavier enthusiastically reported that 'there were so many men and women that the chapel was full of people till sunset'. The majority of the crowd was formed of Hindus who, in the words of Xavier, had an 'affection' for Mary and Jesus 'prostrating themselves in front of their images; and they did not get enough of kissing the image of Child Jesus'.<sup>73</sup> Many visitors covered the image with garlands (*fulas*) according to the Hindu custom of adorning images of deities with flowers as a demonstration of respect. Scenes of the Nativity of Mary were becoming increasingly frequent. With a mix of enthusiasm and surprise, Xavier asked Cabral 'to imagine, Your Reverence, a multitude of Blacks (*negros*) gathering there by the time of the Angelus whenever there is a jubilee, and the sacristan can hardly close the church, because there are so many people worshipping the images that it is a thing of awe, and may God be praised for seeing and listening to such things'.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 577. <sup>71</sup> Ibid. <sup>72</sup> Ibid. <sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 584. <sup>74</sup> Ibid.

Like Antoni Montserrat, Jerónimo Xavier focused most of his early analysis of the Mughal court on the figure of Akbar, providing detailed descriptions of the emperor's daily routine, his ideological and ritual experiments, and the ways in which Akbar dealt with the Mughal nobility. The meticulous reports written by the Navarrese missionary were intended to provide relevant information to both the Society of Jesus and the *Estado da Índia*. In the long report that Xavier wrote to Francisco Cabral in 1596, several pages are dedicated to Akbar and to how he constructed his political and symbolic authority.

According to Xavier, the emperor was an omnipresent figure who dictated the rhythms of the daily life of the court and the population of Lahore. Every morning, by sunrise, the emperor appeared in a window (*jharoka*) to show himself (*darshan*) and receive the greetings of his subjects. Xavier was particularly impressed with the crowds that gathered every day in front of the imperial palace to attend the *jharoka-i-darshan*. 'Sometimes', he wrote, 'I am perplexed when I see how this people get up so early (*madrugão*) and work for their King, making me seem to be cold in the matters of God'.75 The devotion of Akbar's subjects for their emperor was such that many of his subjects took pains to see him 'no matter if it rains spears, or if it is intolerably cold'.76 Xavier's description of the crowds attending the *jharoka-i-darshan* is that of an almost hysterical mob obsessed with seeing a glimpse of the emperor's face every morning. The cult of Akbar instigated the formation of the *darshaniyas*, or 'darsanins' (*sic*) as Xavier identified them, a dedicated group of followers who 'swore to neither eat nor drink until they seen the king's face every day'.<sup>77</sup>

Conceived as a ceremony that sought to affirm the emperor's centrality in Mughal daily life and establish a direct connection between Akbar and his subjects, the *jharoka-i-darshan* played a pivotal role in the promotion of a cult of personality that was fostered both by the emperor and his subjects. If the *darshaniyas* never failed to appear in front of the *jharoka* every morning, Akbar, as Xavier noted, 'was most punctual (*pontualissimo*) in appearing to them every day, even when he has many other things

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 545. <sup>76</sup> Ibid. <sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 546. to do, so they could eat'.78 Although Xavier used the word 'comedy'—a term that was often employed by early modern Iberians to refer to both theatrical performances and humorous spectacles—while describing the reactions of the crowd during the *jharoka-i-darshan*, the Jesuit missionary justified Akbar's commitment to the ceremony as an act of generosity from the emperor towards his more dedicated subjects, an idea that suggests that some of Xavier's early perceptions of the Timurid polity were largely influenced by the essential principles of the Akbari imperial ideology.

Despite his apparent acceptance of the ideological premises behind the emperor's symbolic power, Xavier noted that the *darshaniyas* were not a Timurid custom, but an 'invention' (*invenção*) introduced by 'some Moors who came from Persia' who caught Akbar's attention for their regular presence at the *jharoka-i-darshan*. <sup>79</sup> Impressed by their devotion, the emperor rewarded this group of Persians, and soon afterwards members of other communities imitated them. They in turn were also rewarded by Akbar for their extreme acts of devotion.<sup>80</sup> The *jharoka-idarshan* became thus a 'comedy', to borrow Xavier's preferred term, a choreographed public performance, a sort of ritualised dialogue between the emperor and his subjects where the terms in which imperial authority could be affirmed and supported by different sectors of Mughal society were both negotiated and validated.

The popular cult surrounding the image of the emperor was also furthered by the frequent visits of women who offered Akbar presents in exchange for his blessings and intervention to help their pregnancies or the children's health every Sunday morning after the *jharoka-i-darshan*. Other women brought their now healthy children or newborn babies, as well as more offerings, to show their gratitude to the emperor. After attending to all the plead and demonstrations of gratitude, Akbar offered 'some pieces of cloth' to the women.81

Again, Xavier reconfirmed the reports from Cristóbal de la Vega that revealed that Akbar worshipped the sun and embraced elements from 'heathenism' (*gentilidade*). The emperor had 'totally renounced the

<sup>78</sup> Ibid. <sup>79</sup> Ibid., p. 547. <sup>80</sup> Ibid. <sup>81</sup> Ibid., p. 549. things of Mohammed, and he even does not like the Arabic language'.82 The emperor had developed an interest for the ancient Persian cult of the sun and adopted some of its features. Every day, Akbar recited 'one thousand and forty-five names in praise for the sun' during moments of prayer that lasted for more than half an hour'.<sup>83</sup> Xavier attributed the development of this new solar cult to the influence of Abu'l Fazl, the emperor's 'master and guide', who promoted the idea that Akbar, as the 'main servant of the house of God' should praise the sun for 'the many benefits that it offers to the world'.84 The Jesuit missionary sensed that Akbar and Abu'l Fazl were attempting to incorporate the sun into the imperial symbolic repertoire. Indeed, Xavier promised Francisco Cabral that he would 'leave these particularities for next year's report, when I can give you more accurate information'.<sup>85</sup>

#### V

The rise of the Jesuits at the Mughal court coincided with the improvement of their language skills. As Jerónimo Xavier reported in 1596, the 'main and only occupation' of the missionaries was to study Persian. After one year at Lahore, their linguistic skills improved considerably and, although recognising to 'still have problems because we lack mastery of the language', the missionaries believed that they had 'less need of an interpreter'.<sup>86</sup> It was also in 1596 that the Navarrese missionary presented a selection of passages from the New Testament translated into Persian.<sup>87</sup>

The positive reception of these translations, considered to be the first work of Catholic literature in Persian, encouraged Xavier to develop a proselytising strategy that sought to engage the Mughal intellectual elites through the elaboration of treatises written in Persian that explored the Neoplatonic culture shared by Islam and Christianity.88 Jerónimo

 Ibid., p. 555. Ibid., p. 555. Ibid., p. 556. <sup>85</sup> Ibid. Ibid., p. 542. Arnulf Camps, *Studies in Asian Mission History, 1956–1998* (Leiden, 2000), p. 34.

<sup>88</sup> Gauvin Alexander Bailey, "The Truth-Showing Mirror: Jesuit Catechism and the Arts in Mughal India" in *The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1773*, vol. Xavier thus developed an 'accommodationist' approach similar to the one implemented by Alessandro Valignano in Japan and Matteo Ricci in China.<sup>89</sup> The Mughal interest in Christian theology and Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy encouraged Xavier to explore local intellectual traditions deemed as suitable to Christian doctrine and produce a series of literary works that presented a select information on Europe and Christianity. Around 1597, Jerónimo Xavier prepared two treatises, the *A'¯ın¯a-I haqq-num¯a* (*The Truth Revealing Mirror*) and the *Fuente de Vida* (*Fountain of Life*). Both works were originally written in Portuguese and then translated into Persian. The *Fuente de Vida* is a dialogue between a Jesuit, a philosopher, who personifies Akbar, and a Muslim scholar, representing the mullahs, on the differences separating Islam and Christianity.90 At the same time, the production of these works allowed the Navarrese missionary to model himself as a Mughal courtly scholar in the manner of Abu'l Fazl or Abdus Sattar, two leading Mughal intellectuals whose works and activities contributed to the centralising and religious policies of the emperor. Indeed, Xavier often collaborated with these and other Mughal intellectuals. His *Mir'at al-Quds* (*Mirror of Holiness*) and the *A'ina-yi Haqq-numa* (*Fountain of Life*) counted among the important collaboration of Abdus Sattar.<sup>91</sup>

I, ed. John W. O'Malley (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), pp. 384–385; Arnulf Camps, *Jerome Xavier and the Muslims of Mogul Empire: Controversial Works and Missionary Activity* (Shoneck-Beckenried: Nouvelle Revue de Science Missionaire, 1957), p. 97.

<sup>89</sup> Joan-Pau Rubiés, "Diálogo religioso, mediación cultural o cálculo maquiavélico? Una nueva mirada al método jesuita en Oriente, 1580–1640" in *Jesuitas en imperios de ultramar: Siglos XVI–XX* eds. Alexandre Coello de la Rosa, Javier Burrieza Sánchez and Doris Moreno (Madrid: Silex, 2012), p. 47.

<sup>90</sup> Arnulf Camps, *Studies in Asian Mission History*, p. 21.

<sup>91</sup> See *Mir'at al-quds (Mirror of Holiness): A Life of Christ for Emperor Akbar. A Commentary on Father Jerome Xavier's Text and the Miniatures of Cleveland Museum of Art, Acc. No. 2005.145*, ed. Pedro Moura Carvalho, trans. and annot. Wheeler M. Thackston (Leiden and Boston, 2012); *Fuente de Vida. Tratado Apologético dirigido al Rey Mogol de la India en 1600* (San Sebastián: Universidad de Deusto, 2007). On Xavier's Persian works, see Ángel Santos Hernández, "La obra literaria persa de un jesuita navarro: El P. Jerónimo Javier", *Estudios eclesiásticos* 29:113 (1955), pp. 233–250. Also see Arnulf Camps, *Studies in Asian Mission History*, pp. 33–45; Edward Maclagan, *The Jesuits and the Great Mughal*, pp. 203–221; Henry Hosten, "Fr. Jerome Xavier's Persian Lives of the Apostles", *Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal,* 10:2 (1914), pp. 65–84.

If the Jesuit correspondence of first two years of the third mission highlights the positive reception from the Mughal elites and populace, in 1597 a worried Jerónimo Xavier reported that Akbar asked the missionaries to inform the Portuguese viceroy of the Mughal campaign in the Deccan and of the emperor's intention to initiate a round of talks with the *Estado da Índia* after the end of the campaign. The Deccan, as Xavier noted, was the territory that would allow Akbar 'to become the lord of all India, and on its border are located Chaul, Goa and all the fortresses of the Portuguese, and he is hoping to conquer it and then deal with the Portuguese as many of his entourage are encouraging him to do'.

Xavier believed that a conflict between the Mughals and the Portuguese was imminent. The conquest of Berar and the rumours of a Mughal triumph over Ahmadnagar led Akbar to ask the Jesuits to 'write to the Viceroy about a certain business' and warned them that if the reply from Goa was unfavourable 'he would obtain it with war for the sake of his honour'. Akbar's threat coincided with his decision to order the construction of several ships, a move that in the Jesuit's opinion was a clear sign that the Mughals wanted to prepare an armada to challenge the Portuguese monopoly of the Indian Ocean.92

As Xavier noted, while he was preparing an *armada* to challenge the Portuguese, Akbar 'sought to keep us here [at the court], giving us more honours'.93 Xavier perceived these apparent gestures of favour and friendship as part of a dissimulative scheme to keep the Jesuit missionaries at the Mughal court in order to guarantee a channel of communication with the Portuguese authorities at Goa. The favourable concessions granted by the emperor to the Jesuits, such as the building of a church in Lahore, were nothing more than 'a way to keep us here imprisoned and happy' and ensure that the presence of the Jesuit missionaries, 'so the Christian merchants can keep coming and going and there is communication with the Viceroy and the Portuguese'.<sup>94</sup>

One of the honours granted by Akbar to the Jesuits was the permission obtained by Manuel Pinheiro on 7 September 1597 to open a residence and a church in Lahore. One year later, Akbar would issue a *firman*

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., pp. 832–833.

<sup>93</sup> Doc. 102, "Jerónimo Xavier to Claudio Acquaviva, Srinagar, 18 August 1597", *DI* , vol. XVIII, pp. 832–833.

granting the Jesuits permission to build a church in Khambhat. The privileges granted by the emperor confirmed the imperial approval of the proselytising activities of the *padres* and also allowed the to set up the necessary logistical bases to serve a small Christian community formed by a few native catechumens, some Europeans and Armenians scattered in Agra, Lahore, and the Gujarati ports.95

Following the directives of the Goan Provincial Councils, which imposed the obedience of all Oriental Christians (i.e. Armenians, Georgians and Syrians) to the Papacy, the reports sent from Agra and Lahore often mentioned the efforts made by the missionaries to persuade Armenians to conform to Catholicism. One of the strategies adopted by the *padres* was to allow the Armenians to use their churches and Catholic cemeteries, which made many Armenians de facto members of the Jesuit congregations. This is patent in the attitudes of Mughal officials and missionaries such as Manuel Pinheiro in perceiving the Jesuits as valid representatives of the Armenian communities. Jesuit proselytising and charitable activities often relied on donations from Armenian merchants. Although a small community, the Armenians settled in Mughal India constituted a relatively wealthy Christian group connected to a wide mercantile network, which made them potential donors and facilitators in the exchange of information between the Jesuit missionaries and their counterparts in Goa and Europe.

The Mughals also sought to take advantage of the Armenian merchants and their networks. Besides Akbar's interest in co-opting prominent members of the different ethnic and religious communities of his empire, Mughal commercial ambitions also encouraged the incorporation into the imperial apparatus of some members of the Armenian mercantile diaspora operating in Gujarat and elsewhere in Northern India. Indeed, the presence of Armenian tradesmen in Agra, Lahore and Surat was not the result of a supposed invitation from Akbar, as Mesrovb Seth argued,<sup>96</sup> but a consequence of the expansion of the Armenian trading networks based in the Persian Gulf, a process that caught the attention

<sup>95</sup> Father Felix, O.C, "Jesuit Missions in Lahore", *Journal of the Panjab Historical Society,* 5 (1916), p. 78.

<sup>96</sup> Mesrovb Seth suggested that Akbar invited Armenian merchants to settle in Mughal territories and that an Armenian church was erected in Agra in 1562. However, there is no evidence for this claim. See: Mesrovb Seth, *History of the Armenians in India from the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (London, 1897), p. 54; Sebouh David Aslanian, of some Portuguese officials and mercantile agents. Around 1512, Tomé Pires noted in his *Suma Oriental* (c. 1512–1515) the activities across Gujarat and some Southeast Asian ports of Armenians tradesmen based in Hormuz.<sup>97</sup> After the incorporation of this strategic port into the *Estado da Índia*, reports on Armenian mercantile activities in India and across the Indian Ocean became more frequent, demonstrating the gradual expansion of Armenian mercantile networks. Some of these networks became involved in the maritime commercial circuits of the *Estado da Índia*. <sup>98</sup> The Mughal annexation of Gujarat increased the involvement of Armenians in the Mughal economy. Indeed, the overland routes linking the Ottoman Empire, Safavid Persia, the Uzbek Khanate and the Mughal Empire also attracted many Armenian traders familiar with the shared commercial practices that were common, as well as the Persianate cultural and linguistic environment of the Islamic Eurasian empires.

Armenians thus offered the possibility to expand Mughal commercial links across Persia, Central Asia and the Mediterranean. This potential led to the collaboration of some prominent Armenian merchants with the Mughal polity. An illuminating example is the case of Iskandar, an Armenian merchant from Aleppo settled in Lahore whom Akbar integrated into the imperial elite. According to a 1621 report by Francesco Corsi, the emperor appreciated Iskandar's cosmopolitanism, especially his 'knowledge of various languages, in particular Portuguese, because he had been living some years as a merchant in the cities of India'.<sup>99</sup> The remark made

*From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), p. 47.

<sup>97</sup> *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires. An Account of the East, from the Red Sea to Japan, Written in Malacca and Índia in 1512–1515. And the Book of Francisco Rodrigues. Rutter of a Voyage in the Red Sea, Nautical Rules, Almanacs, and Maps, Written and Drawn in the East Before 1515*, vol. I, ed. Armando Cortesão (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944), p. 46; vol. II, pp. 265–266.

<sup>98</sup> See, for example, João Teles e Cunha, "Armenian Merchants in Portuguese Trade Networks in the Western Indian Ocean in the Early Modern Age" in *Les Arméniens dans le commerce asiatique au début de l'ère moderne* ed. Sushil Chaudhury and Kéram Kévonian (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des Aciences de l'Homme, 2007), pp. 197–252.

<sup>99</sup> ARSI, Goa 33 I–II, "Da Origem da Fundação do Collegio incoato na Cidade de Agra feita por Mirza Zulcarné, e aceitada pelo N. R. P. Geral Mutio Vitellesqi o ano 1621", f. 671v. English translation in Henry Hosten, "Mirza Zu-L-Qarnain, A Christian Grandee", *Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, vol. V (1916), p. 312.

by the Florentine missionary is quite revealing of the potential contributions expected by Akbar from Iskandar to the development of Mughal commercial and diplomatic strategies. Iskandar seemed to have served in different posts of the Mughal administration during Akbar's reign. He was not the only Armenian at the Mughal court. Akbar also appointed one Abdul Havyy to serve in the imperial harem. Iskandar would marry one of the daughters of Abdul Havyy, a matrimonial union apparently promoted by Akbar.100 After the emperor's death in 1605, Iskandar continued to be a part of the imperial inner circle. Indeed, Jahangir promoted him to the rank of 500. Iskandar's son, Mirza Zulqarnain, also known in Jesuit sources as Dom Gonçalo Mirijá, also became a prominent courtier during the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan, serving as *faujdar* (district chief) of Sambhar.101

#### VI

The privileges obtained in Lahore and Khambhat encouraged Manuel Pinheiro to invest in a 'popular mission' focusing on targets outside the Mughal court, in particular the lower strata of Mughal society. The division of the third mission into two fields, the court and the commoners, would be definitively confirmed when Akbar decided to move the court from Lahore to Agra, also in 1598. The decision to move the imperial seat was, once again, related to the Mughal expansion in the Deccan. The end of the Gujarati rebellion allowed the emperor to invest more time and resources in the Deccan campaigns. In the same way that the proximity of Lahore to Gujarat allowed Akbar to closely follow the suppression of Muzaffar Khan's uprising, Agra offered an ideal base to direct the Mughal war effort against the Deccani sultanates. For the Jesuits, the transfer came at a rather inconvenient time, at the precise moment when the works for a new church and residence in Lahore started. Moreover, the missionaries already supervised a small community of local converts, European Catholics and Armenian Christians who resided in Lahore. To avoid hampering the few but encouraging marks of progress made in the

<sup>100</sup> Jahangir, *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri or Memories of Jahangir*, vol. II, ed. Henry Beveridge and trans. Alexander Roger (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1914), p. 194.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

city, Manuel Pinheiro remained in Lahore, while Jerónimo Xavier and Bento de Góis followed Akbar to Agra.<sup>102</sup>

After arriving at Lahore in 1595, Pinheiro rapidly became fluent in Persian and Hindustani, developing a much-appreciated capacity to interact with different agents from the courtly milieu and the popular strata. Apart from his language proficiency, the Jesuit missionary seemed to have excellent interpersonal skills. The correspondence of Jerónimo Xavier and Bento de Góis often depicted Pinheiro as one of Akbar's favourites and highlighted his proximity to Prince Selim, as well as other relevant figures of the Mughal polity. Pinheiro's ability to manoeuvre within the different levels of Mughal society was duly recognised by his companions, who nicknamed him *O Mogor,* 'The Mughal'.103 The nickname reflected not only Pinheiro's ability to interact with his targets, but his continuous investment in a 'popular mission'.

Without the presence of the emperor and his courtly milieu, Pinheiro sought new popular targets and invested in a strategy of proximity with the local authorities in order to guarantee the necessary political protection for his proselytising activities. Pinheiro's investment in a popular mission was not a mere consequence of the transfer of the court to Agra. The failure of the two previous missions to produce converts was seen by the Jesuit hierarchy as an indicator that Mughal India was far from being a promising mission field, especially when compared with the at the time more successful cases of Japan and China. Although the Jesuits recognised that Christianity generated an intellectual curiosity at the Mughal court, the reports sent from Fatehpur Sikri, Lahore and Agra complained of the difficulties that many Muslims had with understanding concepts such as the Holy Trinity.104 The problem seemed not only to be caused by the complexities of Christian theology but also by a failure to define an efficient proselytising strategy. As a worried Jerónimo Xavier confessed while

<sup>102</sup> "Fr. N. Pimenta's Annual Letter on Mogor, Goa, 21 December 1599", *Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 23 (1927), p. 61.

<sup>103</sup> BL, Add. MSS 9855, "Rellação da Christandade que temos no Reino do Gram Mogol", f. 41r; Father Felix, O.C, "Jesuit Missions in Lahore", p. 84.

<sup>104</sup> Doc. 2, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o Padre Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia, (Agra, 6/09/1604)" in *Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa* (*DUP*), vol. III, ed. António da Silva Rego (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1963), p. 22.

reporting the first stages of the Agra mission, 'the Moors certainly see us as inept instruments for such hard hearts'.<sup>105</sup> This initial perception of failure would encourage Xavier to successfully promote Indo-Persian Christian literature to present Christian doctrine in an accessible and familiar way to Mughal courtiers and literati.

Confronted with difficulties in attracting the upper echelons of the Mughal polity, Pinheiro targeted other Muslim and Hindu social ranks. Christian art, charity and political networking were at the centre of a proselytising strategy that sought to make Christianity more attractive to the local populations and ensure the incorporation of the Catholic Church into Lahore's civic life. Encouraged by the positive reaction of the Muslim and Hindu populace to the images displayed by the Jesuits and their religious ceremonies, Pinheiro invested in the organisation of 'sumptuous', 'solemn' and 'beautiful' religious ceremonies during important moments of the Catholic festive calendar such as Christmas and Easter.<sup>106</sup>

Drawing upon the lost letters of Manuel Pinheiro and the correspondence of Nicolau Pimenta, Du Jarric described the baptism of the 38 converts made in Lahore between 1598 and 1599 as a public ceremony of 'great magnificence'.<sup>107</sup> Pinheiro prepared an elaborate ceremony that used various visual and auditive resources. The street crossed by the catechumens:

was decorated with green foliage and shaded with palm branches. The candidates left the house in which the Fathers lodged in an orderly procession, each one carrying a palm leaf in his hand, while those who were already Christians walked two and two on either side of the street, which was strewn with flowers. Musicians marched in front of them with drums, trumpets, clarions, flutes, and other musical instruments, on which they played till the procession reached the church.108

A large crowd of curious Hindus and Muslims stood in contrast to this 'orderly procession'. Du Jarric mentions that due to the 'great multitude' gathered in front of the church, Pinheiro 'knew not on which

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Pierre Du Jarric, *Akbar and the Jesuits* ed. and trans. C. H. Payne (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1996), p. 92.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., pp. 23–24.

side to turn, nor how to conduct the service, because of the noise and tumult'.109 The parade of the 38 catechumens escorted by a troupe of musician along a flowered street was an absolute novelty in Lahore, an unexpected event that broke the city's daily routine. Such impressive processions and spectacular displays of Christian art formed part of a strategy of visual stimulation that allowed the missionaries to integrate the Catholic festive calendar into Lahore's urban and social life. But more importantly, these ceremonies also highlighted Pinheiro's central role within the Christian community, conferring to him a charismatic aura. The Jesuit missionary awaited the catechumens at the entrance of the Jesuit church. The Azorean missionary emerged as the focal point of the ceremony. Dressed in a surplice and cope, Pinheiro stood out from the other participants. The liturgical clothes contrasted with the usual long black gown worn by the Jesuit missionaries and allowed a non-Christian audience to both understand the importance of the ceremony and identify Pinheiro as the leader of the Lahore Christians. Indeed, after arriving at the church, the 38 catechumens were conducted by Pinheiro throughout every step of the baptism rites until the end of the ceremony.110

Pinheiro used images not only to attract large crowds of curious potential converts, but also to shape the imagination of the neophytes.111 The spectacular processions, frequent display of sacred objects (relics, images) and the investment on confessions sought, as in other Jesuit mission fields, to frame the mental and physical engagement of the Lahore neophytes and Christians with the Catholic Church. By 1600, Pinheiro reported 106 conversions, a considerable number, which led the Jesuit visitor, Nicolau Pimenta, to send Francesco Corsi to aid the Portuguese missionary.112

Charity was another important element of Pinheiro's proselytising strategy. Every day the Jesuit residence in Lahore distributed alms to a 'hundred poor people' and Pinheiro often assisted in particular cases in which individuals required specific help. These charitable acts, which were a recurrent instrument of the missionary repertoire, allowed Pinheiro to establish permanent contact with the local population and identify

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Ines Zupanov, "The Pulpit Trap: Possession and Personhood in Colonial Goa", *RES: Anthropology and Esthetic*s, 65/66 (2014/2015), p. 309.

<sup>112</sup> Father Felix, O.C, "Jesuit missions in Lahore", p. 83.

potential converts. Ideally, they would be persuaded to convert through prolonged exposure to Christian doctrine and the edifying examples provided by Pinheiro or other members of the Christian community. However, the material benefits offered by Jesuit charity encouraged the appearance of 'rice Christians', a problem recognised by the Jesuit correspondence. In fact, the reports on the Lahore mission frequently mentioned a continuous effort in catechisation and confession to ensure adequate integration of converts into the Catholic ecumene. As in other mission fields, these instruments allowed Pinheiro to monitor and correct the behaviour of neophytes.

The investment in charitable acts reinforced the charismatic aura and public notoriety of Manuel Pinheiro. The relief and assistance offered by the missionary allowed him to establish clientelist relationships with those who relied on Jesuit aid. At the same time, Pinheiro's philanthropic activities were compatible with Mughal practices based on the Islamic principle of *zakat*. Charitable endowments were also one of the preferred vehicles exploited by Mughal emperors and high officials to enhance their status and influence. These similarities facilitated the integration of the Jesuit mission into local civic traditions, allowing Pinheiro to become a relevant figure in Lahore's sociopolitical landscape.

Pinheiro's investment in a popular mission focused on the lower strata of Mughal society seemed to have faced the opposition of Jerónimo Xavier. In a letter to Claudio Acquaviva dated 9 September 1602, Pinheiro mentioned that Xavier disapproved of his strategy:

The father [Jerónimo Xavier] had many concerns, but he did not say a word, because he does not like the fact that I make Christians, especially among the Gentiles (…) and for this reason this mission has been discredited in India.113

These words suggest a tension between two apparently antagonistic visions of the modus operandi that were supposed to guide the Mughal mission. Indeed, Xavier favoured the traditional Jesuit top-down approach, conceiving the emperor and the court as the only real targets of the mission. A rapid and successful Christianisation of the Mughal Empire would only be possible if the *padres* were able to convert Akbar

<sup>113</sup> ARSI, Goa 46, "Manuel Pinheiro to Claudio Acquaviva, Lahore, 9 September 1612", f. 44r.

and other relevant figures of the Mughal elite. As the head of the body politic, the emperor could establish Christianity as the official religion or encourage other relevant social or political actors to embrace Catholicism. If the emperor was reticent to convert, the conversion of relevant courtiers and officials had the potential to institute an influential Christian elite that could create the necessary political conditions for the ruler's conversion and subsequent Christianisation of Mughal India. As in other mission fields such as China, Japan and Ethiopia, the missionaries should concentrate their efforts on infiltrating non-Christian political structures and promote a conversion 'from within'.<sup>114</sup> For Xavier, Pinheiro's 'popular mission' in Lahore, in spite of its encouraging numbers of converts, threatened the success of the top-down strategy at the imperial court. As a new religion, the association of Catholicism with the lower strata of Mughal society, in particular low-caste Hindus, could reduce its attractiveness in the eyes of the Mughal elites. In 1607, Xavier complained that the majority of the Lahore converts were 'common and low people' (*gente comum e baixa*).115

Like Xavier, Pinheiro sought a conversion 'from within' but, as his comments to Claudio Acquaviva indicated, also feared that the lack of conversions could terminate the Mughal mission. With his activities in Lahore he sought to establish a native Christian community that could safeguard the continuity of the mission and, at the same time, establish the Catholic Church as an integral part of the Mughal social and political landscape. Indeed, the formation of native Christian communities, and the role of the *padres* as their spiritual leaders, allowed the missionaries to pose as domestic political actors and explore different ways to engage with the Mughal polity and its elites.

Indeed, Pinheiro's agency in Lahore was made possible by an implicit acknowledgement that the Jesuit missionaries were part of a subordinate minority—the Christian community—and an inferior polity—the Hispanic Monarchy. As non-state actors or non-official representatives of the Iberian Crowns, the *padres* had the flexibility to participate in forms of interactions that submitted them to symbols of Mughal political authority. Pinheiro's progressive 'Mughalisation' was thus part of a

<sup>115</sup> Doc. 7, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o Padre Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia, Laor, 25 de Setembro 1604", *DUP*, vol. III, p. 97.

<sup>114</sup> Ângela Barreto Xavier and Ines Zupanov, *Catholic Orientalism*, p. 148.

proselytisation strategy, also followed by the members of the first mission, that sought to reach all strata of Mughal society and form a local Christian community, but also to establish interpersonal relations with different Mughal agents who would allow the missionary to infiltrate local political structures and, if possible, convert their members.116 These affinitive social relations served mutual interests. If Pinheiro became 'Mughalised' to guarantee political protection and some degree of influence in his host society, the Mughal authorities supported his 'Mughalisation' in an attempt to integrate the Europeans and Christians living in Lahore and Gujarat into the Mughal political order. Pinheiro's ability to integrate Lahore's civic life and pose as a domestic actor allowed him to gain political agency. His language skills and direct access to Portuguese and Mughal officials allowed him to be considered as a viable mediator between the Mughal polity and a diverse Christian community formed by European Catholics (Portuguese, Spanish, Italians, Flemish, French and Germans), Armenians, Orthodox Greeks, Georgians and Syriacs. The *Kotwal*, a post often translated in the Jesuit correspondence as 'chiefjustice', appreciated Pinheiro's mediator role. Indeed, the annual letter mentioned that the *Kotwal* 'releases many people, being them Muslims, Hindu or Christians, after the petitions presented by the fathers, and he often allows them to apply justice'.117 The formal and informal concession of political and social privileges to the Lahore mission transformed the missionary into a de facto Mughal agent who oversaw a heterogenous minority. Manuel Pinheiro is thus an interesting case study as a non-state actor who, thanks to his ability to facilitate diplomatic contacts and maintain regular communication between key political actors in Goa and the Mughal court was progressively, though not completely, absorbed by the Mughal formal structures.

Pinheiro's status in Lahore was also enhanced by the role of the Jesuit church as a centre for the diffusion of European art. After its construction, the Jesuit church and residence gradually became an attraction.<sup>118</sup>

<sup>116</sup> Ines G. Županov, "Between Mogor and Salsete: Rodolfo Acquaviva's error" in *Catholic Missionaries in Early Modern Asia: Patterns of Localization* eds. Nadine Amsler, Andreea Badea, Bernard Heyberger, and Christian Windler (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020), pp. 53–57.

<sup>117</sup> Doc. 2, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o Padre Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia (Agra, 6/09/1604)", *DUP*, vol. III, p. 24.

<sup>118</sup> Father Felix, "Jesuit Missions in Lahore", p. 91.

Many Hindus and Muslims from Lahore and other surrounding towns frequently visited the Jesuit buildings to contemplate the artistic and architectural novelties from Europe brought by the missionaries. The frequent visits of non-Christians made the church a privileged meeting area for Pinheiro and different local agents, especially the members of the Mughal elite.

Pinheiro's presence and the existence of Catholic buildings allowed noblemen and high-ranking officials to emulate Akbar's patronage of religious minorities and interest in European art and letters. To mimic the emperor was, besides a suggestion of superiority or sophistication, an unequivocal expression of loyalty and adherence to the religious policy and administrative reforms implemented by Akbar. Khawaja Shamsuddin Khawafi, one of Akbar's closest aides, who served as governor of Lahore between 1598 and 1600, attended the inauguration of the new Jesuit church and frequently attended the processions and solemn masses staged by Pinheiro.119 Even a hostile governor such as Qulij Khan, a member of the Sunni orthodox faction and a supporter of a policy of open confrontation with the *Estado da Índia*, contributed to Jesuit charitable activities and frequently invited Pinheiro to theological debates in the manner of those organised by Akbar. Although Jerónimo Xavier described Qulij Khan as 'a great enemy of our Holy Law',120 he also reported that the *subadar* was personally on friendly terms with Pinheiro. Qulij Khan's wife even visited the Jesuit church to make an offer to Our Lady and a vow for the improvement of her son.121

Manuel Pinheiro also reported with enthusiasm 'the great number of clean people (*gente limpa*) who goes to the Church to see it and listen to the law of Jesus Christ'.122 The reference to clean people suggested the interest of the local elites and middle strata. Pinheiro counted among the frequent curious visitors 'Persians, Mughals, Turkmen, Uzbeks and many other nations'.<sup>123</sup> The Jesuit missionary described the visits of these

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>120</sup> Doc. 2, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o Padre Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia (Agra, 6/09/1604)", *DUP*, vol. III, p. 23.

<sup>121</sup> Edward Maclagan, *The Jesuits and the Great Mughal*, pp. 99–100.

<sup>122</sup> Doc. 2, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o Padre Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia (Agra, 6/09/1604)", *DUP*, vol. III, p. 43.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

members of the Mughal elites as 'royal retinue' (*regio acompanhamento*) that crossed the city attracting a crowd. 'It was a beautiful spectacle of people', wrote Pinheiro, 'the streets, windows, balconies, walls, etc. were full of people'.124

Pinheiro's role as the political and spiritual leader of the Lahore Christians was instigated by a series of *firmans* issued in the early 1600s, which conceded a series of privileges that allowed the Portuguese Jesuit to expand his activities. In 1601, following a petition made by Manuel Pinheiro, Akbar signed a *firman* granting imperial protection to the Jesuit church and residence at Lahore. The document allowed Pinheiro to enjoy a privileged status vis-à-vis the authorities of Lahore. Another important privilege granted by the emperor to the Lahore church was the right of asylum, allowing fugitives from justice and renegades to seek refuge in the Jesuit church.125 This act of imperial benevolence was followed by *firman* of 1602, which expanded the privileges granted in the previous year by guaranteeing the freedom of religion to all Christians living in the Mughal and ending the persecution of the Christian converts.<sup>126</sup>

Manuel Pinheiro emerges thus as a de facto superintendent or overseer of the local Christian community who, on behalf of the Mughal authorities, regulated their behaviour and ensured their obedience to the Mughal polity. It is possible that the imperial *firmans* and other privileges granted to the Jesuit missionary represented an attempt to implement something resembling the *millet* system developed by the Ottoman Empire. In Safavid Persia, more or less at the same time, Shah 'Abbas was also making similar experiments involving the Carmelite and Augustinian friars.127

The Jesuit correspondence regarded the 1602 *firman* as an important victory that formalised and defined the range of action of the missionaries. Indeed, the previous privileges conceded by Akbar to the *padres* consisted of verbal instructions and lacked the formal authority granted by a *firman* signed and sealed by the emperor. Although Akbar agreed to issue an edict confirming all the privileges granted to the Jesuits, Pinheiro

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Father Felix, "Jesuit missions in Lahore", p. 82.

<sup>126</sup> Jorge Flores and António Vasconcelos de Saldanha, *Os Firangis na Chancelaria Mogol: Cópias portuguesas de documentos de Akbar, 1572–1604* (New Delhi: Embaixada de Portugal, 2003), p. 48.

<sup>127</sup> John M. Flannery, *The Missions of the Portuguese Augustinians to Persia and Beyond (1602–1747)* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 248–249.

complained that the emperor sought to delay the signing of the document. Initially, the emperor rejected the first draft of the *firman*, arguing that its contents would annoy the Sunni orthodox and had the potential to undermine Qulij Khan's allegiance. Given the political implications of the *firman*, Akbar opted to consult with several high-ranking courtiers and officials on four different versions of the document. Pinheiro believed that the emperor's intention to obtain a general consensus from different sections of the court was a subterfuge to postpone *sine die* the signing of the *firman*. In an attempt to accelerate Akbar's deliberation, Pinheiro sought the intervention of an unnamed courtier described as 'a young man (*mancebo*) very close to the king who calls him his adoptive son and who was a former pupil of mine'.128 The *mancebo*'s good services bore results and after a few days Akbar signed the *firman*. 129

Indeed, the dates of the imperial edicts coincided with a troubled period in which the Sunni orthodox factions dissatisfied with the Akbari dispensation regrouped around Salim and supported his rebellion between 1599 and 1604. Although loyal to Akbar, Qulij Khan's alignment with the Sunni orthodox suggests that the *subadar* took advantage of the problems of the Mughal polity to implement in Lahore a programme that reverted elements of the Akbari dispensation. As Pinheiro noted in his 1605 report, the clashes with Qulij Khan coincided with the outbreak of the conflict between Akbar and Selim. The instability within the Mughal polity seemed to have encouraged the *subadar* to gain a greater autonomy from the emperor.130

At the same time, the privileges granted by the *firmans* issued between 1598 and 1602 encouraged Pinheiro and Francesco Corsi to aggressively target the Hindu community. Pinheiro reports, for example, his continuous efforts to persuade the inhabitants of a Hindu neighbourhood to abandon the *sati* and the 'great abomination' and 'nefarious sin' of killing newborn girls. The Hindu community reacted by petitioning Qulij Khan to enact the immediate expropriation of the Jesuit properties in Lahore on the grounds that they were wrongly taken from their previous owner, a Hindu named Pauseri. The *subadar* initially sided with the Hindus and

<sup>128</sup> ARSI, Goa 46, "Manuel Pinheiro to Claudio Acquaviva, Lahore, 9 September 1612", f. 45r.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., ff. 45r, 46r.

<sup>130</sup> Doc. 3, "Carta do Padre Manuel Pinheiro para o Padre Manuel da Veiga, Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia (Lahore, 12/08/1605)", *DUP*, vol. III, p. 40.

supported a series of anti-Christian measures that were intended to limit the activities of the mission and undermine the stipulations of the *firmans*.

The disputes between the Jesuits and the *subadar* would be solved by a *nishan* signed on behalf of Akbar by the rehabilitated Salim in 1604. The document instructed Qulij Khan to restore the Jesuit estate. In spite of the imperial orders, Pinheiro's report of 1605 mentioned that Qulij Khan and a Hindu faction planned the massacre of the entire Christian community of Lahore.131 The killings, which was to take place on a Friday, 15 September, were abruptly cancelled after the defeats of the Mughal army led by Qulij Khan's son in the Deccan.<sup>132</sup>

The connection between the alleged conspiracy and the Mughal campaigns in the Deccan indicates that more than Qulij Khan's religious orthodoxy and personal agenda, the frequent acts of intimidation against the Christian community of Lahore could also be connected to the recurrent clashes between Portuguese and Mughal geopolitical interests. At the same time that Qulij Khan supported anti-Jesuit actions, in 1603 two ships and 50 Portuguese were arrested again in Khambhat. The captives were sent to Agra and released through the mediation of Jerónimo Xavier, who negotiated with Akbar, Salim and 'Aziz Koka.133 Qulij Khan's efforts to inhibit the Lahore Christian community—which was closely associated with the *Estado* via the Jesuit mission—seemed thus to have been influenced by these Mughal attempts to curb Portuguese influence in the Indian Ocean.

#### VII

In 1599, there were hopes that the Mughal ambitions in the Deccan and the Estado would fade away after the defeat of the Mughal army in Bir and the death of Prince Murad, the commander of the Deccan campaign. Murad's death was seen in Goa as an eventual turning point that could hamper Akbar's plans. Viceroy Francisco da Gama, in a letter to Philip III, stated that the disappearance of the Mughal prince was probably 'the

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., p. 39. <sup>132</sup> Ibid., p. 40. <sup>133</sup> Jorge Flores, *Unwanted Neighbours*, p. 86. best thing to happen' for the *Estado*'s immediate interests.<sup>134</sup> Gama's enthusiasm has led Sanjay Subrahmanyam to suggest that the viceroy was probably behind Murad's death. Indeed, as Jorge Flores has argued, the thesis of a Portuguese involvement in the death of the Mughal prince is plausible.<sup>135</sup>

Rather than causing instability in the Mughal court or forcing the abandonment of the expansionist ambitions in the Deccan, Murad's death led Akbar to personally supervise the Mughal offensive in the region. Between 1600 and 1601, the emperor led a successful campaign that would culminate with the conquest of Khandesh and most of the Sultanate of Ahmadnagar. After these series of victories that consolidated the Mughal presence in the region, on 29 March 1601 Akbar signed a *firman* addressed to Viceroy Aires de Saldanha and announcing that the Mughal emperor was sending an embassy to Goa led by one Cogetqui Soldan Hama (Khwâjgî Sultân Ahmad), accompanied by Padre Bento de Góis, to acquire 'rare pieces' from Europe, as well as recruit 'skilled craftsmen'.

The Mughal embassy seemed to have been both a gesture to demonstrate Akbar's apparent goodwill towards the *firangis*, by fomenting a cultural exchange between Goa and Agra, and an attempt to negotiate an arrangement with the Portuguese regarding the borders of the *Estado* and Mughal seafaring activities. Indeed, the *firman* the Akbar was concerned with the freedom of navigation in the 'seas of Hindustan' and was probably seeking an agreement with the Portuguese. The *firman* sent to Aires de Saldanha mentions that Khwâjgî Sultân Ahmad would inform the viceroy on 'other matters by word of mouth'. These matters were probably related to the Mughal campaigns in the Deccan and the Jesuit mission. Indeed, at the same time that Akbar sent an ambassador to Goa, there were three other Mughal embassies to Bijapur, Golconda and Bidar with the aim of securing their obedience after the conquest of the Deccan.<sup>136</sup>

Although Góis travelled with the status of ambassador, after arriving in Goa his Jesuit superiors instructed him to 'religiously withdraw' from

<sup>134</sup> BDP – Reservados, cod. 1976, f. 99; see also: Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Explorations in Connected Histories: Mughals and Franks* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 71–103.

<sup>135</sup> Flores, *Nas Margens do Hindustão*, pp. 216–217.

<sup>136</sup> Flores and Saldanha, *The Firangis in the Mughal Chancellery*, p. 45.

the lavish public reception and ceremonies related to the embassy. As Nicolau Pimenta commented in the 1601 annual letter, the reception of the Mughal embassy was surrounded by 'great pomp' (*grande aparato*), which probably clashed with the desired image of austerity promoted by the Jesuits. Góis' discreet retreat from the splendorous ceremonies staged in honour of the Mughal ambassador also had the advantage of not exposing the role of the Jesuit missionaries as mediators between Akbar and the *Estado* too much, a position that started to raise questions about the proximity of the *padres* to the Mughal polity.137

Indeed, Aires de Saldanha's predecessor, Francisco da Gama, interpreted the new Mughal embassy as another manoeuvre by Akbar to distract and manipulate the *Estado*. The former viceroy saw the Mughal emperor as 'a sagacious and skilful' man who was capable of many 'machinations and plots', and accused Akbar of being a master of dissimulation who was on friendly terms with the Estado and the Portuguese Crown to hide 'his thoughts and desires, which are focused on seeking all the ways to cause harm to this State'. To support his thesis, Gama mentioned the information obtained by the Jesuits who had reported that Akbar and Salim 'often talk about this Island of Goa, and make questions about its particularities with great curiosity, being understood that they have an insatiable desire to take it'.<sup>138</sup>

As Jorge Flores noted, the words of Francisco da Gama reveal the existence of two distinct visions of Akbar. While the Jesuit missionaries presented the emperor's interest in Portugal and Goa as the result of a genuine curiosity in distant places and peoples, described from time to time as an expression of a true affection for Portugal, Gama's letters described the Timurid ruler as a rather Machiavellian and dissimulative character who pretended at friendship with the *Estado* to gain time, and manipulated the missionaries to obtain privileged information.139 Although privileged and reliable informers of the Portuguese authorities, the positive perception of Akbar presented by the Jesuit missionaries seemed to have been heavily influenced by the emperor's religious policy, which it was believed could result in his conversion to Christianity. In

<sup>139</sup> Flores, *Nas Margens do Hindustão*, p. 229.

<sup>137</sup> Henry Hosten, "Eulogy of Father Jerome Xavier, SJ, a Missionary in Mogor (1549– 1617)", *Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal,* 23 (1927), p. 88.

<sup>138</sup> BNP – Reservados, cod. 1976, f. 184–185.

other words, the *padres*' role as courtiers and the personal ties they established with Akbar and other key figures of the imperial apparatus led them to develop a more sympathetic image of the Mughal emperor.<sup>140</sup> Francisco da Gama and other Portuguese officials based their perceptions of Akbar on a wide range of informative sources provided by a myriad of agents—spies, merchants, renegades and diplomats—who had no significant personal ties to Timurid political actors and observed the evolution of the Mughal Empire through a political lens that did not contemplate the possibility of an imminent conversion of Akbar to Catholicism.

However, the Jesuits were far from being naïve observers of Mughal India. Missionaries such as Antoni Montserrat, Jerónimo Xavier and Manuel Pinheiro were often suspicious of Akbar's true intentions towards Goa and ready to become involved in court politics to protect or promote Portuguese interests. As early as 1595, Xavier commented that the missionaries were particularly cautious while dealing with Akbar:

We are very careful with this king because we do not understand him. On one hand he shows his devotion and desire to become a Christian, as I have mentioned before. But at the same time, he worships the sun.<sup>141</sup>

Xavier's worries reveal a clear perception that the relation between the Mughal emperor and the Jesuits involved an element of mutual dissimulation. Xavier's collaboration with Akbar's ideological projects or Pinheiro's 'Mughalisation' echoed the recommendations of calculated politeness and discretion recommended by Castiglione's *Il Cortegiano* and Della Casa's *Il Galateo* regarding daily social interaction at an early modern court. The fortunes of the courtier, as Castiglione noted, relied on his capacity to be discreet and conceal his thoughts and interests, in order to surpass other courtiers and gain the favour, praise and recognition of the prince. To achieve these aims the *padres*, like the ideal type of the courtier, needed to possess or develop the adequate social and intellectual skills to operate in a courtly environment. For example, Lorenzo Forero, a Jesuit who operated in Bavaria, stressed the importance of sending clever and skillful missionaries who could 'secretly instil the mysteries of the Catholic faith'

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., pp. 228–229.

<sup>141</sup> Real Academia de Historia (RAH), 9-3669/141, "Suma de una carta del Padre Hieronimo Xavier, de Lahore a diz de Jullio de mil y quinientos y nouenta y cincos años", f. 488r.

to royal courts.142 As the courtier, the missionary should be a clever but honest dissimulator, someone who had the prudence, discretion and realism to use the art of 'civil conversation' for a greater good.143

The careful approach adopted by Jerónimo Xavier and the other members of the third mission reveals thus the changing perception of the Society of Jesus regarding the nature and possible outcomes of the Mughal mission. The debacle of the two previous missions derived from the expectation of Akbar's immediate conversion, a perception based on the limited information in Goa about the sociopolitical reality of the Mughal Empire. The experiences of 1580–1583 and 1591–1592 revealed that the emperor's conversion was not certain and that his interest in Christianity derived from his diplomatic and ideological agenda. To secure the continuity and success of the mission, the *padres* needed thus to be useful to the emperor's projects and establish partnerships with different agents of the Mughal polity. Xavier's scholarly endeavours and Pinheiro's 'Mughalisation' were thus part of a long-term strategy that sought to normalise the presence of Christian missionaries by making themselves useful to the Mughal polity and an integral part of the Mughal political and intellectual structures.

<sup>142</sup> Adriano Prosperi, "The Missionary" in *Baroque Personae* ed. Rosario Villari (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), pp. 182, 193.

<sup>143</sup> Jon Snyder, *Dissimulation and the Culture of Early Modern Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), p. 29.

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### The English *Fulano*

'We were living times of tranquillity and peace (*paz e quietação*)', wrote Jerónimo Xavier around 1603. The head of the Jesuit mission at the Mughal court had been encouraged by recent gestures made by the Akbar, and his son Prince Selim, who 'were showing us favour', and the 'enemies of the faith and all strangers were giving us peace'.<sup>1</sup> This favourable state of affairs suddenly changed, and Father Xavier was unexpectedly 'dragged into such a fight that I have felt so tired (…) and so dishonoured and insulted (…) bearing the weight of the battle like the greatest enemy and the main culprit'.<sup>2</sup>

The source of Jerónimo Xavier's problems was one 'heretic Englishman', who was inciting an unnamed Portuguese man to spread rumours about the deviant and scandalous behaviour of the Jesuit missionaries, especially towards women. Although the Englishman alerted Xavier and the other missionaries of the growing rumours about their conduct, the Jesuits discovered that he was bribing the Portuguese man and spreading more rumours among the Armenian community, with some success. One Armenian told Xavier that the stories circulated by this *fulano* (fellow) a rather depreciative word that reveals the Jesuit's animosity—forced the

<sup>1</sup> Doc. 2, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o Padre Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia (Agra, 6/09/1604)", *DUP*, vol. III, p. 15. <sup>2</sup> Ibid.

© The Author(s) 2022

107

J. V. Melo, *Jesuit and English Experiences at the Mughal Court, c. 1580–1615*, New Transculturalisms, 1400–1800, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96588-4\_4

Armenian community to decide to stop frequenting the church and not send their 'wives and daughters' until everything was clarified.

The impact of the rumours among the Armenians of Agra was such that Xavier was advised to seek Akbar's intervention to avoid serious damage to the reputation of the *padres* at the Mughal court.3 The reaction of the Armenians of Agra to the rumours about the *padres* constituted a serious setback, since Jesuit proselytising and charity often relied on donations from the Armenians settled in Agra, Lahore or Surat.

The unnamed English *fulano* who troubled Jerónimo Xavier was the rather obscure and roguish John Mildenhall, a merchant who had been previously involved in the Levant trade. Around 1600, he was contemplating the possibility of travelling to Cairo from Aleppo but he rapidly changed his plans and decided to travel to Lahore, probably influenced by the news of the establishment of the EIC. John Mildenhall's days at the Mughal court were not only some of the primordial moments of the English presence in India, but also an important and neglected episode in the complex interactions between the Iberian Crowns and the Great Mughal. The Englishman arrived in Agra at a delicate moment when the Mughal expansionist campaigns in the Deccan and the Portuguese attempts to enforce a monopoly in the Indian Ocean raised tensions on both sides. Mildenhall's exploits in Agra also coincided with the more dynamic period of the Jesuit mission at the Mughal. The clash between the English *fulano* and the *padres* is not only one among many episodes of Anglo-Iberian rivalry outside Europe, but an illustrative case of the improvisational nature of early modern diplomacy and the pivotal role of non-state actors4 in diplomatic exchanges, especially outside the increasingly formalised diplomatic structures that were slowly emerging in Europe.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>4</sup> 'Non-state actors' have recently generated attention from several historians, especially those who study the early modern Mediterranean and the Ottoman Empire. Two relevant examples are Natalie Rothmans' monograph *Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects Between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011) and the special issue of the *Journal of Early Modern History* edited by Maartje van Gelder and Tijana Krsti´c: "Cross-Confessional Diplomacy and Diplomatic Intermediaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean", *Journal of Early Modern History* 19:2–3 (2015).

I

In 1599, Mildenhall and other English merchants based in the Levant received news of the safe return of a Dutch fleet sent to the East Indies led by Jacob Corneliszoon van Neck. The Dutch exploits generated considerable apprehension in the English merchants involved in the Levant trade. William Aldrich, for example, expressed to James Sanderson his fears that the new competition posed by the 'Flemings' could have a devastating impact on the Levant Company: 'if spices be not brought from Aleppo, as in time past, into England, but the place be otherwise served, our Company shall not be able to defray half their charges'.<sup>5</sup> Alarmed by the new threat posed by the Dutch, between 24 and 25 September 1599 an 'assembly' of London merchants willing to explore the East Indies trade decided to request Elizabeth I and her Privy Council to grant them a charter to form a trading company 'in a joint and united stock'.<sup>6</sup>

The circulation of the news related to Van Neck's fleet and the movements in London that would lead to the foundation of the EIC coincided with Mildenhall's sudden decision to travel to Lahore and suggests that the English merchant sought to collect relevant knowledge about the Mughal Empire and establish contacts with the Timurid authorities in the hope of obtaining a reward for his good services. Indeed, some years later, after returning to England, Mildenhall petitioned the EIC as well as the English Crown and wrote a long letter to Richard Staper, a prominent and well-connected London merchant who was behind the foundation of the Levant Company and the EIC.

Staper was behind the establishment of the Turkey Company in 1581 and was also one of the promoters of the first English commercial expedition to South Asia. In 1583, around the same time that Rodolfo Acquaviva returned to Goa, three English merchants named John Newberry, Ralph Fitch, John Eldred, the jeweller William Leedes and the painter James Story embarked on the *Tiger* bound to Tripoli.

<sup>5</sup> "William Aldrich to James Sanderson, 28 December 1599" in *The Travels Of John Sanderson in the Levant (1584–1602)* ed. William Foster (London: Hakluyt Society, 1931), p. 190.

<sup>6</sup> "At an assemblie of the Comitties or ye directors of the viage the XXVth of Septemr 1599" in *The Dawn of British Trade to the East Indies as Recorded in the Court Minutes of the East India Company* ed. Henry Stevens (London, 1886), p. 8.

As Richard Hakluyt duly noted in *The Principal Navigation*, this expedition was a direct consequence of the 'great charges and speciall industrie of the worshipfull and worthy Citizens, Sir Edward Osborne Knight, M. Richard Staper, and M. William Hareborne'.<sup>7</sup>

The mission headed by John Newberry was thus one of information gathering or, in Hakluyt's words, an enterprise of 'wonderfull trauailes' that aimed to explore 'ouer land and by riuer through Aleppo, Birrha, Babylon and Balsara, and downe the Persian gulfe to Ormuz, and thence by the Ocean sea to Goa, and againe ouer-land to Bisnagar, Cambaia, Orixa, Bengala, Aracan, Pegu, Malacca, Siam, the Iangomes, Quicheu, and euen to the Frontiers of the Empire of China'.8 All these markets were still relatively unknown to English merchants. The Portuguese monopoly of the maritime route from Europe to the 'seas of India' was, throughout most of the sixteenth century, an almost impossible obstacle to overcome for English and other European merchants. The alternative overland routes such as the Northeast Passage from Europe to China sought by English merchants required an unprecedented mobilisation of logistical and financial resources that were not available.

As in the case of Harbourne's mission to Istanbul, Newberry and his companions carried a letter from Elizabeth I addressed to Akbar and the Emperor of China. Previous experiences with the Ottoman Empire and Morocco revealed that royal letters often allowed English emissaries to gain direct access to rulers and avoid dealing with complex foreign bureaucratic machineries. Unlike the correspondence with Murad or the Moroccan ruler, which were based on previous English and European experiences with Levantine Islamic rulers, Elizabeth's letter to Akbar was loosely based on the rhetoric of Moroccan and Ottoman correspondence and presented Newberry's visit not as a royal legation but as a part of a private undertaking that offered the opportunity to establish diplomatic contacts between England and the Timurid court:

Elizabeth by the grace of God, &c. To the most inuincible, and most mightie prince, lord Zelabdim Echebar king of Cambaya. Inuincible

<sup>7</sup> Richard Hakluyt, "To the Right Honourable Sir Robert Cecil" in *The principal nauigations, voyages, traffiques and discoueries of the English nation*, vol. II, ed. Richard Hakluyt (London, 1599; STC 12626a), sig. 3v; Nandini Das, *Sir Thomas Roe Eyewitness to a Changing World* (London: The Hakluyt Society 2018), p. 202.

<sup>8</sup> Hakluyt, "To the Right Honourable Sir Robert Cecil", sig. 3v.

Emperor, &c. The great affection which our Subiects haue, to visit the most distant places of the world, not without good will and intention to introduce the trade of marchandize of al nations whatsoeuer they can, by which meanes the mutual and friendly trafique of marchandize on both sides may come, is the cause that the bearer of this letter Iohn Newbery, ioyntly with those that be in his company, with a curteous and honest boldnesse, doe repaire to the borders and countreys of your Empire, we doubt not but that your imperial Maiestie through your royal grace, will fauourably and friendly accept him. And that you would doe it the rather for our sake, to make vs greatly beholding to your Maiestie; wee should more earnestly, and with more wordes require it, if wee did think it needful. But by the singular report that is of your imperial Maiesties humanitie in these vttermost parts of the world, we are greatly eased of that burden, and therefore we vse the fewer and lesse words: onely we request that because they are our subiects, they may be honestly intreated and receiued. And that in respect of the hard iourney which they haue vndertaken to places so far distant, it would please your Maiestie with some libertie and securitie of voiage to gratifie it, with such priuileges as to you shall seeme good: which curtesie if your Imperiall maiestie shall do to our subiects at our requests performe, wee, according to our royall honour, wil recompence the same with as many deserts as we can. And herewith we bid your Imperial Maiestie to farewel.<sup>9</sup>

While Elizabeth counted on the experiences of agents like William Harbourne to adapt the style, presentation and format of her letters to ensure a positive reception at the Ottoman or Moroccan courts, for the Mughal Empire there was a profound lack of information about its ruler, political organisation and territorial extension. The little available knowledge about Akbar and his empire forced the English queen to adopt a neutral tone loosely based on the Levantine correspondence, which, through the proposal of reciprocal friendship, aimed to attenuate any eventual embarrassing faux pas.

Although Newberry and his companions presented a letter from Elizabeth I, Akbar seemed to have overlooked them. The *Akbarnama*, for example, does not have any reference to the meeting between the

<sup>9</sup> "A letter written from the Queenes Maiestie, to Zelabdim Echebar King of Cambaia, and sent by Iohn Newbery. In February Anno 1583" in *The principal nauigations, voyages, traffiques and discoueries of the English nation*, vol. II, ed. Richard Hakluyt (London, 1599; STC 12626a), p. 245.

Englishman and Akbar. The absence of detailed description of Mughal-European encounters in Timurid courtly literature is a recurrent theme of discussion. Works such as the *Akbarnama* or even the more critical *Muntakhabu-ut-Tawarikh* were written for a courtly and elite readership that was more interested in the figure of the emperor and his interventions in the Indo-Persian and Central Asian world. This does not mean that the Mughals neglected the *firangis* or considered them irrelevant. The presence of Jesuit missionaries and the diplomatic exchanges between Akbar and the *Estado da Índia* were occurrences that both Abu'l Fazl and Badaoni considered relevant enough to be mentioned in their works due to their implication in Mughal foreign and religious policy.

Ralph Fitch's account of his travels in Asia are also rather laconic regarding his experience at the Mughal court. He does not tell much about how the court was organised, the presence of other Europeans or his audiences with Akbar. The Mughal emperor is depicted as an apparently austere ruler 'apparelled in a white cabic [i.e. Muslim tunic] made like a shirt tied with strings on the one side, and a little cloth on his head coloured oftentimes with red or yellow'.10 It is important to note that Fitch was a merchant and his main mission was to gather relevant information about the Asian markets and trade routes. His account was, indeed, more concerned in enlisting the products available across South and Southeast Asia, mentioning the logistics behind the trade routes or how marketplaces were organised. Like other sixteenth-century merchants who travelled across Asia, Fitch also included in his account some ethnographic observations on local religious and social practices, an always valuable information to prepare merchants who wished to establish commercial exchanges with unfamiliar regions and peoples. The contact with Akbar was an important part of the expedition to India and Southeast Asia, but the main objective of Fitch and his companions was to evaluate the English possibilities of penetrating into markets where the Portuguese and Spanish had already consolidated their presence. In other words, the four Englishmen only had to present a letter from Elizabeth to Akbar and respond accordingly to the emperor's interest on the terms proposed to him. The unenthusiastic reaction from the 'King of Cambaya' corresponded thus with Fitch's laconic lines.

<sup>10</sup> "Ralph Fitch, 1583–91" in *Early Travels in India, 1583–1619* ed. William Foster (London: Humphrey Milford, 1921), p. 18.

Another reason for the few lines describing the encounter between Akbar and the English merchants is that 1585 was also the year when the Mughal court was transferred to Lahore. The news from Afghanistan and Abdullah Khan's successful expeditions in the Safavid territories forced Akbar to move to the Punjabi city to monitor the situation closely and support the activities of the army led by Raj Man Singh—the Rajput Raja of Amer and one of the closest aids of the emperor—who was sent to Kabul to impose Mughal authority across Afghanistan.11 Arriving at Agra while the transfer of the imperial court was being planned was hardly the ideal moment for Fitch and his companions to open negotiations with Akbar.

The Englishmen's brief presence at the imperial court was far from being of immediate importance to Mughal political and commercial interest in the 1580s. At the time that Newberry presented Elizabeth's letter, Akbar's immediate concerns lay in the political convulsion troubling Safavid Persia, the expansion of the Uzbek Empire and the turmoil in Afghanistan after Mirza Hakim's death. 1585, the year when Fitch and his companions reached Agra, was also the year of the death of the Afghan ruler and Akbar's half-brother.

English knowledge about Mughal India was, in fact, limited. Around the same time that Mildenhall travelled to Lahore, on 10 March 1600, Sir Fulke Greville presented Sir Robert Cecil and the Privy Council with a brief report on the 'Names of such kings as are absolute in the East, and either have war or traffic with the King of Spain'.<sup>12</sup> This list of the natural resources, ports and military capacity of the rulers and potentates from Morocco to the Philippines who had friendly or hostile relations with the Portuguese and Spanish Crowns, apart from a vague reference to Gujarat, which is identified as the 'Kingdom of Cambaia, the most fruitful of all India',<sup>13</sup> does not mention Akbar or the Mughal Empire.

Before leaving Aleppo, Mildenhall met John Cartwright, an English Protestant minister and curious traveller who wished to visit Persia and India. In his account of his travels, Cartwright mentions that he and Mildenhall obtained the 'leaue of the Consull and Merchants, with a

<sup>11</sup> John F. Richards, *The Mughal Empire*, p. 49.

<sup>12</sup> Doc. 266, "Foulke Grevil to Sec. Sir Robert Cecil, 10 March 1600, London" in *Calendar of State Papers: Colonial Series (East Indies, China and Japan), Vol. I: 1513–1616* ed. W. Noël Sainsbury (London, 1862), pp. 104–105.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 104.

full intent and purpose to trauell vnto the great City Lahor, in the great Mogors Countrey in the East Indies'.<sup>14</sup> This reference to a 'leaue' issued by the English consul at Aleppo, Richard Coulthrust, suggests that Mildenhall's plan to travel to the Mughal court was known and approved by some members of the Levant Company, although the existing sources on Mildenhall's exploits in India do not make any reference to an official appointment as an English envoy. It is very likely that Coulthrust issued a license not for a diplomatic mission, but for a trading expedition with the aim of identifying the main cities, ports, markets and routes of the territories under Safavid and Timurid rule.

Mildenhall arrived in Lahore in 1603 and immediately presented himself as an emissary from Elizabeth I, requesting 'free leave' and an audience with Akbar to 'treat of such businesse as I had to doe with him from my Prince'.<sup>15</sup> After being informed of the presence of an English emissary, Akbar instructed the *nawab* of Lahore to treat Mildenhall 'with all honour and courtesie' and arrange 'a guard of horse and foote' to escort him to Agra.<sup>16</sup>

Mildenhall's claim to be an envoy from Elizabeth I was a bold statement that sought to exploit the different notions of ambassadorship that predominated in the Ottoman Empire, Safavid Persia and Mughal India, which favoured temporary missions and granted a limited and transitory juridico-political status to diplomatic agents. The differences between the increasingly formalised European diplomatic practices, structured on the model of the resident ambassador, and the Indo-Persian approaches to ambassadorship were often noted by European observers. John Chardin, for example, explained to his readers that 'the *Persians* make no distinctions between Embassadours, Envoys, Agents, Residents, &c. but still make use of the word *Heltchi*, which comprehends all'.<sup>17</sup> This perception that a laissez-faire or informal diplomatic modus operandi that did not make any clear distinction between different categories of diplomatic agents and missions prevailed in the Islamicate and Asian powers prompted Mildenhall to present himself as an envoy despite not having

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> John Cartwright, *The preachers trauels* (London, 1611; STC 4705), p. 10.

<sup>15</sup> "John Mildenhall, 1599–1606" in *Early Travels in India*, p. 54.

<sup>17</sup> John Chardin, *The Travels of Sir John Chardin into Persia and the East-Indies* (London, 1681; Wing C2043), p. 73.

any valid credentials to support his supposed identity as an official diplomatic agent. This strategy was also adopted by other adventurous freelance diplomats from the Islamicate world. Jahangir in his memoirs mentions the case of one 'Transoxanian named Aqam Hajji' who claimed to be an Ottoman ambassador, although he 'had credentials of unknown authorship'. The Mughal emperor and most courtiers had serious doubts about Aqam Hajji's true identity but offered him 'generous treatment' because 'neither has anyone come on behalf of the Ottomans nor have they sent an ambassador'. Only after some months, following the erratic behaviour of the supposed Ottoman envoy and his inability to provide valid credentials, did Jahangir dismiss him from the court.18

Probably aware of the problems surrounding his freelancing diplomatic enterprise, which could raise questions about his true intentions, in his letter to Richard Staper, the English *fulano* laid out a careful narrative of his exploits that suggested that he was an altruistic patriot and loyal subject who, moved by a profound sense of duty, successfully projected a prestigious image of England and Elizabeth I in a foreign court at significant personal cost—a strategy that aimed to attenuate eventual criticisms of the fact that Mildenhall decided to act as royal emissary without permission. While narrating his first audience with Akbar, for example, Mildenhall boasts that he offered the emperor a lavish gift of 'nine and twenty great horses, very faire and good, such as were hardly found better in those parts (some of them cost me fiftie or threescore pounds an horse), with diverse jewels, rings, and earing to his great liking'.19

Mildenhall's gift suggested his intention or commitment to advance English interests in the East Indies, but it was, above all, an investment that served both personal and national aspirations. A gift of luxurious commodities such as horses and jewellery could help to enhance the reputation of a mysterious foreign emissary who came from a distant and unknown country, not to mention support future claims for a substantial financial reward due to his expenses at the service of the English Crown. At the same time, an exhibition of English profligacy could catch Akbar's attention and persuade the emperor to establish an alliance with England. Indeed, Mildenhall believed that his gift had opened the doors of the

<sup>18</sup> *The Jahangirnama: Memoirs of Jahangir, Emperor of India* ed. Wheeler M. Thackston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 95.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

Mughal court to him and boasted in his letter that after his first audience with Akbar he made 'a great man my friend'.<sup>20</sup>

Following the Mughal protocol, on the day following the audience, Mildenhall had another audience with the emperor to present and discuss his 'businesse'. After presenting himself again, Mildenhall made a brief declaration where he stated that Akbar's 'renowned kindnesse unto Christians' had reached the court Elizabeth I of England, 'who desired to have friendship with him and, as the Portugals and other Christians had trade with His Majestie [Akbar], so her Subjects also might have the same, with the like favours'. Besides offering a commercial partnership between England and the Mughal Empire, Mildenhall informed Akbar of the ongoing conflict between the Iberian Crowns and England and proposed that if any Portuguese ship or port was attacked by English forces the emperor 'would not take it in evill part, but suffer us to enjoy them to the use of our Queenes Majestie'.<sup>21</sup>

Mildenhall based his proposals on a simplistic, but nonetheless correct, interpretation of the main strategic goals of Elizabethan foreign policy visà-vis other Islamic power such as the Ottoman Empire and the Sultanate of Morocco, and which were probably known by the English merchant during his time in Istanbul and Aleppo: the expansion of English trade to the Asian markets; and an intention to challenge the Iberian colonial expansion in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Indeed, Mildenhall was anticipating the first EIC voyage, which was authorised by Elizabeth I to 'apprehend, and take the shippes, goodes, & merchandizes of the Kinge of Spaine, or any of his subjects wheresoever upon the seas'.<sup>22</sup>

#### II

In spite of his lack of valid credentials, Mildenhall's gift respected the Indo-Persian diplomatic protocol. Furthermore, the delicate matter of his proposed 'business'—to negotiate the establishment of trade relations and an Anglo-Mughal alliance against the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*—suited

<sup>20</sup> "John Mildenhall, 1599–1606", p. 55.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> "A Coppie of a tre of Reprisall for the East Indian Marchaunte" in *The First Letter Book of the East India Company, 1600–1619* eds. George Birdwood and William Foster (London, 1893), p. 192.

the strategic interests of Akbar's foreign policy. From a Mughal perspective, the concession of trading privilege to new *firangi* merchants and the establishment of an Anglo-Mughal alliance against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean were interesting proposals that coincided with Akbar's intentions to increase the traffic of the Mughal ports and increase the prestige of the Timurid polity in Europe.

Mildenhall arrived in Lahore at the precise moment when Luso-Mughal relations were at an impasse. The correspondence between the Portuguese viceroys and the royal officials at Lisbon and Madrid reveal continual concern with the Mughal expansionist movements in the Deccan. After the Mughal conquest of the Sultanate of Berar, the Portuguese authorities feared that Akbar would 'extend his forces, and become the lord of all these lands, and even challenge the Portuguese and end their power and dominion'.<sup>23</sup>

Akbar's plans, however, faced a sudden setback in 1599. The defeat of the Mughal army in Bir and the death of Prince Murad, who was leading the campaign in the Deccan, forced the emperor to delay his plans visà-vis the *Estado da Índia*. In a letter to Philip III, Viceroy Francisco da Gama celebrated Murad's death as 'the best thing to happen', an event that would end the Mughal expansion in the region and cause instability at the Timurid court over the succession of Akbar. A close witness of the impact of the news of Murad's death in Agra, Jerónimo Xavier told Claudio Acquaviva with some relief that when Akbar 'had lost his hope of having a victory when the Deccani [*sic*] rebuffed his troops, he slackened us'.<sup>24</sup> Rather than causing instability in the Timurid court or forcing the abandonment of the expansionist ambitions in the Deccan, Murad's death led Akbar to personally supervise the Mughal offensive in the region. Between 1600 and 1601, the emperor led a successful campaign that culminated in the conquest of the Khandesh and most of the Sultanate of Ahmadnagar.

By 1601, the Mughal emperor was still seeking an agreement with the Portuguese *Estado da Índia* regarding the Mughal ships in the 'seas of Hindustan', but the 'other matters' mentioned in the *firman* were probably related to the Mughal campaigns in the Deccan and the Jesuit mission. Indeed, at the same time that Akbar sent an ambassador to Goa,

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 833.

<sup>23</sup> Quoted from Jorge Flores, *Nas Margens do Hindustão*, p. 211.

three other Mughal embassies were sent to the Deccani rulers of Bijapur, Golconda and Bidar with the aim of securing their obedience.<sup>25</sup> The Mughal embassy seemed thus to have been both a gesture to demonstrate Akbar's apparent goodwill towards the *Estado da Índia*, by fomenting a cultural exchange between Goa and Agra, and to evaluate the Portuguese reaction to the *Pax Mogolica* in the Deccan.

Mildenhall, a supposed emissary from another European power who was hostile to Portuguese interests in the Indian Ocean, notwithstanding his dubious credentials, offered Akbar an interesting opportunity to redefine his foreign policy and exert more pressure on the *Estado da Índia.* According to Jerónimo Xavier, after Akbar's audience with the English emissary rumours instantly started to circulate that the emperor had accepted Mildenhall's requests and was ready to issue a *firman* granting permission 'for his people to come to the King's ports' and 'end all contacts with the Portuguese'.26 Mildenhall's proposals received the support of some factions of the Mughal court who, in the words of the Jesuit missionary, together with the English *fulano* plotted 'a thousand things to be made against us and the Christian religion to favour these Englishmen'.<sup>27</sup>

The English *fulano*'s close association with some Mughal courtly factions posed some risks. According to Xavier, Akbar discovered a conspiracy led by a group of courtiers who had been bribed by Mildenhall and 'decided to give up on all the arrangements he had made with the Englishman, who fell in disgrace, and the King destroyed the paper he had secretly signed in front of us'.28 By associating Mildenhall's sudden fall with his involvement in Mughal court intrigues, Xavier implied that Akbar feared that the English *fulano* could rapidly become a disruptive element that would instigate more division between the different court factions surrounding the Mughal princes, especially Salim, the future emperor Jahangir.

Salim's accession to the imperial throne was carefully prepared. The prince built efficient networks of support and alliances with influential

<sup>25</sup> Jorge Flores and António Vasconcelos de Saldanha, *The Firangis in the Mughal Chancellery*, p. 45.

<sup>26</sup> Doc. 2, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o Padre Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia (Agra, 6/09/1604)", *DUP*, vol. III, p. 19.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

members of the court and the administrative and military apparatus.29 He also sought to establish regular communication with other regional actors, including the Portuguese via the Jesuit missionaries, establishing a parallel political centre that competed and disturbed his father's state and courtly apparatus. The emergence of Salim as a strong alternative to Akbar and his brother led the emperor to make a systematic effort to thwart Salim's imperial claims by undermining his networks of supporters. This could involve subtle manoeuvres such as arranging marriages between daughters of Salim's supporters and influential courtiers and officials who were loyal to the emperor, as well as less subtle actions such as the public humiliation and ostracism of his son's supporters.30

Indeed, Mildenhall's account reveals an extreme difficulty in accessing the emperor following his two audiences and the discovery, according to Xavier, of his alleged involvement with a group of Mughal courtiers. After being informed of Akbar's decision to change the conditions of the *firman*, Mildenhall sought to arrange a new audience. 'Every day', he wrote, 'I went to the court, and in every eighteene or twentie days I put up *Ars* [*sic*] or petitions; and still he put mee off with good words and promised that this day and tomorrow I should have them'.31 After a month without a definitive answer from the Mughal authorities, and almost without enough funds to maintain his lavish persona, Mildenhall sought an alternative strategy: to leave the court in the hope that his absence would be noticed. The plan seemed to have worked. Surprised by the Englishman's absence, Akbar called him to his presence. Mildenhall complained about the constant delays in obtaining a *firman*, 'which was wholly for his [Akbar's] profit and nothing of his losse'.32 The emperor promised a speedy resolution and, in a gesture of goodwill, offered Mildenhall garments 'of the Christian fashion very rich and good'.33

Although a potentially disruptive presence, Mildenhall had some utility to Akbar. The Jesuit hostility towards the English *fulano* and his request

<sup>29</sup> Munis D. Faruqui, *Princes of the Mughal Empire, 1504–1719* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 144.

<sup>31</sup> "John Mildenhall, 1599–1606", p. 56.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., pp. 158–160.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

to establish an Anglo-Mughal alliance against the Portuguese suggested that Mildenhall could be used by the emperor to gain some leverage over the *Estado da Índia* by suggesting that the Mughals were ready to welcome and support the rivals of the Iberian monarchies. Akbar could not have been ready to open hostilities with the Portuguese, as his initial rejection of Mildenhall's proposal indicates, but the presence of the Englishman at the court and the Jesuit reaction offered the Mughals interesting opportunities to frustrate the strategies of the *Estado*.

While Mildenhall sought to obtain his *firman*, the Portuguese Padre Bento de Góis informed Goa that Akbar instructed his armies to move to positions close to the Portuguese cities of Bassein and Chaul.34 These movements coincided with two Mughal embassies to the Sultanate of Bijapur, a long-standing rival of the *Estado da Índia* in the Deccan, to negotiate a marriage between one of Akbar's sons, Daniyal, and a daughter of Sultan Ibrahim II. A matrimonial alliance between Mughals and Bijapuris was seen in Goa and Madrid as a serious threat to the *Estado*. After being informed of the contacts between Akbar and Ibrahim II, Philip III instructed Viceroy Aires de Saldanha to 'use all the possible ways' to thwart the negotiations. The viceroy, in spite of the attempts made by Portuguese emissaries sent to Bijapur, was unable to impede Daniyal's marriage in 1604. Akbar's alliance with Bijapur was an important diplomatic coup that allowed the emperor to cement the Mughal presence in the Deccan and have all the necessary conditions to attack the *Estado da Índia*, as many in Goa, Lisbon and Madrid feared. Against this backdrop, from a Portuguese and Jesuit standpoint, Mildenhall's presence at the Timurid court was a sign that Akbar was willing to explore all possible avenues to find partners to form an anti-Portuguese alliance.

Despite the encouraging promises made by Akbar, the signature of the *firman* was yet to be confirmed, a setback that the English *fulano* attributed to Xavier and Corsi, who 'day and night sought how to work my displeasure'.<sup>35</sup> Mildenhall presented the Jesuit missionaries, 'who lived there in great honour and credit', as a serious obstacle for English interests.36 The presence and alleged influence of a group of Catholic missionaries sponsored by the king of Portugal and Spain offered a

<sup>34</sup> Jorge Flores, *Nas Margens do Hindustão*, p. 223. <sup>35</sup> "John Mildenhall, 1599–1606", p. 57. <sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

plausible explanation for Mildenhall's successes and failures, as well as suited the concerns of a corporation whose 'leading members were pious Protestants nostalgic for the days of frank hostility with Spain'.<sup>37</sup>

In a last attempt to obtain a *firman*, Mildenhall hired a Persian schoolmaster 'and in my house day and night, I so studied the Persian tongue that in sixe monethes space I could speake it something reasonably'.<sup>38</sup> Without the need for an interpreter, Mildenhall requested an audience with Akbar and presented, once again, his requests and complaints. 'Mooved' by Mildenhall's words, Akbar decided to call an audience to confront the Englishman with the Jesuits. Mildenhall refuted the accusations made by the missionaries and claimed that, as the presence of an English resident ambassador in Istanbul demonstrated, Elizabeth's intentions towards Akbar were friendly and respectful, and highlighted the fact that the Mughal court never received a temporary embassy from Lisbon or Goa:

Know you all that Her Majestie hath her ambassadour leiger in Constantinople, and everie three yeares most commonly doth send a new and call home the old; and at the first comming of every ambassadour slice sendeth not them emptie, but with a great and princely present; according where unto Her Highnesse intent is to deale with Your Majestie. This profit of rich presents and honour like to redound to Your Majestic by having league of amitie and entercourse with Christian Princes, and to have their ambassadours leigers in your court, these men by their craftie practices would deprive you of.<sup>39</sup>

This short speech praising English diplomatic practices based on the model of the resident ambassador aimed to seduce the Mughal emperor to forge an alliance with England, promising an uninterrupted flow of presents and communication that would increase Mughal wealth and political prestige in Europe and Asia. But Mildenhall's words also suggested something else: the failure of the Portuguese and Spanish authorities to recognise or respect the power and authority of the Great Mughal. Whereas England promised to send a royal ambassador and to establish a resident embassy at the Mughal court as sign of friendship,

<sup>37</sup> Barbour, "The Jacobean East India Company", p. 11. <sup>38</sup> "John Mildenhall, 1599–1606", p. 57. <sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 58.

goodwill and deference, the Portuguese Crown, who had established diplomatic contacts with the Timurids in the 1570s, had never demonstrated such intentions, conducting its diplomatic dealings with Akbar through the employment of informal emissaries or agents such as the Jesuit missionaries.

These two different approaches suggested not only different levels of deference towards the Mughal Empire, but of diplomatic sophistication and *savoir faire*. Mildenhall presented England as a friendly power who recognised the prominence of the Mughal Empire and knew how to establish a diplomatic relationship according to Akbar's status. In contrast, the lack of a Portuguese resident ambassador, or the fact that the Mughal court never received a royal ambassador from Lisbon or Goa, suggested that the Portuguese Crown deliberately failed to recognise the prestige and power of the Timurid ruler. The modus operadi adopted by the *Estado da Índia*, as Mildenhall sought to suggest, could be easily interpreted as a sign of hostility and diminution of the Mughal Empire, as well as a demonstration of the lack of political sophistication of the Portuguese authorities vis-à-vis England and the Mughals.

Mildenhall's brief speech not only raised doubts on the Portuguese diplomatic approach to the Mughal Empire, but also questioned the role of the Jesuit missionaries in the Timurid court, revealing their ambiguous triple role as clergymen, Mughal courtiers and informal Portuguese diplomatic agents who employed 'craftie practices'. These arguments seemed to have impressed Akbar and Prince Selim in particular, who stated that it 'was most true that in an eleven or twelve yeares not one came, either upon ambassage or upon any other profit unto His Majestie'.40

Jerónimo Xavier does not mention the tripartite audience in his correspondence, but confirms that Mildenhall continued to lobby the Mughal authorities during his time in Agra. 'The Englishman', he wrote, 'diligently works in a thousand ways with large bribes to have *firmans* and dispatches from the king allowing his people to come to the king's ports (…) For more than two years that he is working on this, but I trust in God Our Lord that it will pass many more years in which the Englishman will not get what he wants, and it is not a small service to Our Lord to impede such a harmful thing to the *Estado* and the religion'.41

#### III

In spite of his apparent triumph, Mildenhall is rather laconic about what happened next. In his letter to Richard Staper, he mentions only that after his audience with Akbar, Selim and the Jesuits he promised the emperor and his son that he would 'not onely procure an ambassador but also a present at my safe returne againe into your countrie'.

Mildenhall left Agra sometime in 1605 or 1606, a turbulent period shaped by Akbar's death, Salim's accession to the imperial throne as Jahangir, the 'seizer of the world', and the conflict between the new emperor and his son, Khusrau. Jerónimo Xavier described 1605 as the year when 'the world went upside down with the death of King Akbar'.<sup>42</sup> Jahangir's accession was behind profound changes in the composition of the Mughal court and nobility. As Jerónimo Xavier noted, with 'the change of king, the court changed, those who were elevated were brought down, and those who had been lowered were raised'.<sup>43</sup> The Jesuits often aided those who were neglected or relegated after the accession of Jahangir. Jerónimo Xavier mentions that the

servants of the old king suffered many necessities: [Jahangir] did not pay them anything and after the transfer of the court to Lahore they had follow him (…) and without any remedy they left their destitute wives and children in Agra. The Father who went to Lahore had to help them during their journey and in Lahore until they obtained what was theirs from the king; and the father who stayed in Agra helps their wives and children and if it was not for him, as well as the Christians, it would not be humanly possible for them to survive.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Doc. 2, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o Padre Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia (Agra, 6/09/1604)", *DUP*, vol. III, p. 20.

<sup>42</sup> Doc. 6, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o Padre Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia (Lahore, 25/09/1606)", *DUP*, vol. III, p. 62.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 86.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 67.

Before his accession, Jahangir and his entourage insinuated to Xavier and other missionaries that he was a crypto-Christian, giving hope for a 'great conversion'.45 The hopes of this soon dissipated after the emperor, immediately after his accession, had 'sworn to obey the law of Mohammad to win and keep the support of the Moors'.<sup>46</sup> Although the Jesuit claims of an imminent conversion of Jahangir were exaggerated, and should be read as an attempt to justify the ups and downs of the mission, Xavier and his companions feared that the emperor's proximity to the Sunni orthodox factions would place the missionaries in the group of those who lost out due to the recomposition of the Mughal court. Indeed, Xavier noted that after his accession, Jahangir 'acts as if he does not known us, and does not make any attention'.47 Such an attitude of apparent indifference towards the Jesuits seemed to have been related to Khusrau's rebellion. The recomposition of the Timurid court instigated the emperor's son, who was seen by dissatisfied factions as a viable alternative to Jahangir, to rebel and suggested a prolonged period of instability. As Xavier bitterly noted, the rebellion and the need to control the Mughal governmental apparatus forced Jahangir 'to give himself to government' and neglect the 'things of letters and debates' that the missionaries participated in during Akbar's reign.

In the same way that the Jesuits became secondary figures during the change of regime at the Mughal court, Mildenhall seemed to have been unable to maintain his position and keep the support of those who were keen to promote his interests. Mildenhall's proposals were far from being a priority to the new regime. Immediately after succeeding his father, Jahangir launched a series of unsuccessful campaigns against the Sultanate of Ahmadnagar in the Deccan, which would last until 1616. At the same time, Shah Abbas' ambitions in Kandahar indicated an imminent conflict with the Safavids that would eventually pause the Mughal expansionist campaigns in the Deccan. Against this backdrop, Jahangir sought to guarantee the *Estado*'s neutrality and informed the Jesuits of his intention to send an embassy to Lisbon and Madrid, which would be headed by Naqib Khan, a relevant courtier described by Xavier as 'not hostile towards the

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 67. <sup>46</sup> Ibid. <sup>47</sup> Ibid.

Portuguese'.<sup>48</sup> Without reliable interlocutors at the court, and also probably confronted with Jahangir's investment in the diplomatic exchanges with the *Estado da Índia*, Mildenhall opted to return to England in the hope of obtaining support for his project.

On his way to England, Mildenhall apparently spent some time at the Safavid court. In 1608, his name appears in a letter from Dom Fr. Aleixo de Menezes, the Archbishop of Goa, to Philip III reporting Shah Abbas' decision to send Robert Shirley on an embassy to Europe. The archbishop mentions that Shirley would be joined by one 'Joan de Mendenel who came to India during the time of Queen Elizabeth with some letters from her to the Mughal, and he is very well regarded by the Shah'.<sup>49</sup> Menezes' words suggest that, in spite of the lack of valid credentials and the many doubts surrounding his real status, Mildenhall's claims to be an English emissary were cautiously assumed to be legitimate by the Portuguese authorities at Goa. The use of informal emissaries was a welltested and common practice of the *Estado*'s diplomatic repertoire often used to establish initial contact and pave the way for formal exchanges.<sup>50</sup>

Another interesting point in the archbishop's letter is the mention of the supposed letters from Elizabeth I to Akbar. Although Mildenhall had no document from the English queen to her Mughal counterpart, the fact that he presented himself as an emissary from the English Crown suggested that, as was expected from royal envoys, he brought letters from the monarch. Indeed, in other English diplomatic dealings with the Moroccan and Ottoman courts, the emissaries representing Elizabeth I carried with them a letter signed by the queen. Menezes' reference to the supposed letters transmitted thus the incomplete information that arrived in Goa, as well as the assumption that diplomatic exchanges between royal courts followed more or less standardised procedures. In fact, the information received by the archbishop suggested that Mildenhall was part

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>50</sup> See, for example, Stefan Halikowski-Smith, "'The Friendship of Kings Was in the Ambassadors': Portuguese Diplomatic Embassies in Asia and Africa During the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", *Portuguese Studies,* 22:1 (2006), pp. 101–134; Zoltan Biedermann, "Portuguese Diplomacy in Asia in the Sixteenth Century: A Preliminary Overview", *Itinerario,* 29:2 (2005), pp. 13–37.

<sup>49</sup> Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Secretarias Provinciales, Lib. 1479, "Relaçion de lo que escrive el Arcobispo de Goa en carta escrita en cifra a 20 de Novre de 608", f. 447r.

of a planned or concentrated English effort to forge partnerships with the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal polities. In 1587, a concerned Viceroy Duarte de Menezes reported that intelligence gathered from the Ottoman territories indicated that the Turk granted to the English 'many favours, and it is said that all Frenchmen are gone from those lands'.<sup>51</sup>

Little is known of Mildenhall's exploits in Persia and how he travelled from Isfahan to London. However, around the summer of 1608 he was already in England. His name appears in a petition to the administrators of the EIC dated 21 June 1608. In this document, Mildenhall requests to be paid £1,800 as a reward for his services and the supposed privileges he obtained from the Mughal emperor. On 30 May 1609, the directors decided to set up a special committee to analyse his demands.<sup>52</sup> Meanwhile, on 27 July 1609, Mildenhall petitioned James I, requesting a reward for the commercial privileges he had obtained from Akbar at the cost of £3,000 for 'the discovery of a rich trade in the dominions of the Great Mogul, and praying that he and his coadventurers may be permitted to enjoy the privileges he had obtained there'.53 Before taking a decision, the Lord Treasurer decided to consult the EIC first. On 20 October 1609, the EIC toyed with the idea of sending Mildenhall to India as factor, but one month later, on 18 November 1609, the company removed the appointment and deliberated that Mildenhall's petition was 'not thought fit to be engaged',<sup>54</sup> a decision that could be explained by the expectations raised by the company's third voyage to India in which William Hawkins was assigned to present a letter from James I to Jahangir.55 More importantly, Mildenhall's project clashed with the monopolistic ambitions of the EIC. The proclamation of 1609 confirming the company's monopoly on pepper imports, as K. N. Chaudhuri noted, aimed 'not only to exclude non-members from trading with the Indies

<sup>51</sup> AGS, SSP, Lib.1551, "Carta do Viso Rei Dom Duarte de Meneses a 28 de Novembro de 1587", f. 43r.

<sup>52</sup> "Committee to Confer with John Midnall Concerning His Demands and Project for Going to "Mawgoule" in the East Indies, 30 May 1609" in *Calendar of State Papers Colonial: East Indies, China and Japan*, vol. II, 1513–1616, ed. W. Noel Sainsbury (London, 1862), p. 185.

<sup>53</sup> "Petition of John Midnall to the King, 27 July 1609", *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. II, p. 190.

<sup>54</sup> "16–30 November 1609", *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. II, pp. 197–198. <sup>55</sup> "18 November 1609",*Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. II, p. 198.

but also to prevent them from any trading at all in commodities of the Indies'.<sup>56</sup>

Mildenhall, nevertheless, travelled to Persia in 1611 charged with the mission of selling a quantity of goods belonging to a group of merchants led by Richard Staper. Apparently Mildenhall decided to seize all the merchandise and sell it in India, but he was detained by two other merchants, Richard Steel and Richard Newman, and forced to return the goods and a sum of £9,000.<sup>57</sup> Mildenhall continued his journey to India. At Lahore, he Mildenhall fell ill but was able to travel to Ajmer, where Jahangir had temporarily based his court. He would die in June 1614 and was buried at the Catholic cemetery of Agra.

According to Thomas Kerridge, who met Mildenhall 'at the point of death', the English *fulano* was now on good terms with his former nemesis, 'being lodged by the Jesuits in the house of a Frenchman that is here in the king's service'.58 The proximity between Mildenhall and the *padres* is also corroborated by Robert Coverte, another Englishman who visited the Mughal court in 1609. In his account, Coverte mentioned that Jerónimo Xavier, the 'chiefe friar', secured a series of safe conducts and letters of recommendation for Coverte and his companions. One of these letters was destined for John Mildenhall. However, when Coverte arrived at London, Mildenhall was already en route to Persia. The letter was delivered to the deputy governor of the EIC.<sup>59</sup> Mildenhall's apparent conversion to Catholicism and reconciliation with the *padres*, more than an unexpected twist in the plot, seems to have been yet another attempt by the English *fulano* to ensure a connection with the Mughal court. The archival sources do not tell us much about the rapprochement between Mildenhall and the Jesuits, but their capacity to reinvent their relation and articulate their interests suggest that the *firangi* at the Mughal court, in

<sup>56</sup> K. N. Chaudhuri, *The English East India Company: The Study of an early Joint-Stock Company, 1600–1640* (London: F. Cass, 1965), p. 28; *Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, 1485–1714* ed. R. Steele (Oxford, 1910), No. 1087.

<sup>57</sup> "John Mildenhall, 1599–1606", p. 51.

<sup>58</sup> Doc. 165, "Thomas Kerridge to the East India Company, Agemere, the 20th September, 1614" in *Letters Received by the East India Company from Its Servants in the East*, vol. II, ed. William Foster (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1897), p. 105. Hereafter *LR*.

<sup>59</sup> Robert Coverte, *A True and Almost Incredible Report of an Englishman* (London, 1612), p. 42.

spite of their rivalries, were able to redefine their positions and collaborate whenever it was necessary for their benefit.

A rather roguish individual motivated by his personal interests, John Mildenhall is an illustrative case of the improvisational nature of early modern diplomacy and the pivotal role of non-state actors in diplomatic exchanges, especially outside the increasingly formalised diplomatic structures that were slowly emerging in Europe.<sup>60</sup> In settings where there was an apparent absence of formalised or immediately recognised rules for diplomatic exchanges, these were often guaranteed by a myriad of informal agents who operated outside official state apparatus merchants, interpreters, missionaries, mercenaries, doctors, scholars or renegades—and who were able to facilitate contacts and maintain regular communication between different polities outside the formal structures of state diplomacy, thanks to their personal network of contacts and capacity to move between different social and cultural contexts. Mildenhall's political agency and legitimacy as a diplomatic agent resulted not from being an official delegate of the English monarch, but from his immediate usefulness to Mughal geopolitical goals at a specific moment when Akbar sought to pressure the *Estado da Índia*. Although, Mildenhall was not an official representative of the English Crown, his position was far from constituting a problem for the Mughal authorities, as long as he acknowledged the superior status of the Timurid polity and was able to cooperate and serve the immediate interests of Akbar's foreign policy. Jerónimo Xavier's complaints about Mildenhall's surprising ability to manoeuvre in the Mughal court by establishing friendships with relevant courtiers was a recognition of the ability of the English *fulano* not only to engage with local actors according to their own forms of social interactions, but also to adapt to Mughal commercial and political interests.

From an English perspective, Mildenhall was a more problematic figure who lacked the necessary conditions to serve as a viable intermediary between the English authorities and the Great Mughal, despite his ability to gain access to the Timurid court and initiate a negotiation process with Akbar. The fact that he acted outside the official English diplomatic apparatus—and followed a personal agenda that escaped the control of the Crown and the EIC—led him to be deliberately marginalised. Another important reason, and perhaps the more decisive one, for the

<sup>60</sup> See, for example, Natalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects Between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

clash between Mildenhall and the English authorities was the absence of a palpable outcome from the English *fulano*'s exploits at the Mughal court. A *firman* or a letter from Akbar to the English monarch would, perhaps, have forced the Crown and the directors of the EIC to redefine their plans for Mughal India and include Mildenhall in them. Indeed, the success of non-state actors relied on their capacity to produce immediate outcomes that served the interests of different sides.

Mildenhall and Xavier's accounts also reveal how Akbar and later Jahangir sought to use them according to their geo-strategic interests. The fact that the Mughal chronicles rarely mentioned European agents— Mildenhall, for example, is not mentioned in the *Akbarnama* and there is no reference to Sir Thomas Roe's embassy in the *Jahangirnama*—has contributed to a widespread perception that the *firangis* were 'utterly incidental'<sup>61</sup> to the Timurids. For the courtly readership targeted by the authors of the imperial chronicles, the *firangis* were superfluous figures in a historical narrative focused on the lives and deeds of emperors and relevant courtiers; but in the field of realpolitik, Europeans were far from being irrelevant to the process of consolidation of Mughal power in the subcontinent. The story of the dispute between Mildenhall and the Jesuit missionaries, however, reveals a clear Mughal interest in the potential commercial, military and even artistic advantages offered by European agents. When assessing the correspondence of John Mildenhall and Jerónimo Xavier, a Mughal voice that exposes how Akbar, Jahangir and other relevant Mughal political actors actively sought to manipulate and influence the behaviour of the *firangi* and frustrated their agendas in order to protect Mughal commercial and geopolitical interests emerges.

<sup>61</sup> Richmond Barbour, *Before Orientalism: London's Theatre of the East, 1576–1626* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 146.

#### 130 J. V. MELO

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### The English *Chan* and the Mughal *Dom*

The 1606 annual letter of the Mughal mission reported that Jahangir was planning to send an embassy to Lisbon and Madrid that would be headed by Naqib Khan, a courtier 'who is not hostile towards the Portuguese'.1 Despite the emperor's friendly overtures, the Portuguese authorities remained suspicious. On 18 January 1607, Philip III instructed Viceroy Martim Afonso de Castro to continue the improvements works of the fortress and wall of Daman due to the city's proximity 'to bellicose enemies like the Mughals'.2 Lisbon and Madrid also feared eventual Mughal ambitions in Ceylon. On 12 January 1607, Philip III informed the viceroy that he had received intelligence reports suggesting that Jahangir 'now has his eyes set on occupying Ceylon when there is an occasion'.3

In December 1607, Jerónimo Xavier informed Claudio Acquaviva that Jahangir wanted 'to establish friendship with the Lord Viceroy and

<sup>1</sup> ARSI, Goa 33 I–II, "Annual Letter of 1606", f. 188v.

<sup>2</sup> Doc. 25, "Philip III to Viceroy Martim Afonso de Castro (18/01/1607)" in *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das Monções* (*DRI* ), vol. I, ed. Raymundo António de Bulhão Pato (Lisbon: Academia Real das Sciencias, 1880), p. 94.

<sup>3</sup> Doc. 18, "Philip III to Viceroy Martim Afonso de Castro, 12 January 1607", *DRI* , vol. I, p. 58.

© The Author(s) 2022

J. V. Melo, *Jesuit and English Experiences at the Mughal Court, c. 1580–1615*, New Transculturalisms, 1400–1800, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96588-4\_5

131

acquire curious things that could be found among the Portuguese'.4 The mission to the capital of the *Estado da Índia* would be led by Muqarrab Khan, the emperor's 'great favourite (*privado*)' and a rising figure in the Mughal polity.5 Also known as Shaik Hasan Hass¯u, he started his career at the Mughal court around 1596 as an assistant to his father, Shaik Bh¯ına, a highly reputed surgeon. He served as his father's assistant and seemed to have gained access to the court after helping his father in bleeding Akbar.6 By the end of the Akbari years, Shaik Hasan was among a group of Indian Muslims (*Shaikhzadars*) who had joined the inner circle of Prince Selim. After Jahangir's accession, Shaik Hasan benefited from the emperor's strategy of promoting trustworthy *Shaikhzadars* within the imperial elites and apparatus.7 He received the title of Muqarrab Khan, 'Royal Confidant', a designation that reflected his proximity to the emperor, and in 1608 was appointed *mutasaddi* (governor) of Surat.

Jahangir's decision to appoint his 'Royal Confidant' to head a diplomatic mission to Goa and administer Khambhat at the same time reveals an intention to entrust the development of Mughal maritime activities in the Western Indian Ocean to a trustworthy agent. The possession of Surat and Khambhat made Gujarat a painful point for Mughal trade and geopolitics. The Gujarati ports were a gateway that allowed the empire to access the maritime routes of the Indian Ocean that linked the subcontinent with the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Swahili Coast. Muqarrab Khan's task was thus to find an equilibrium between Portuguese and Mughal interests that could enhance the Gujarat as the main commercial hub in the western coast of India.

To ensure a balanced exchange between the two sides and facilitate communication between the Mughal ambassador and Portuguese officials, the emperor wanted Muqarrab Khan to be accompanied by a member of the Jesuit mission. The Jesuits opted for Manuel Pinheiro, a choice celebrated by Jahangir who, according to Xavier, 'knows and

<sup>4</sup> Doc. 8, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o Padre Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia (Agra, 24,709/1608)", *DUP*, vol. III, p. 111.

<sup>5</sup> ARSI, Goa 46-I, "Jerónimo Xavier to Claudio Acquaviva, 13/12/1607", f. 68.

<sup>6</sup> Syed Ali Nadee Rezavi, "An Aristocratic Surgeon of Mughal India: Muqarrab Khan" in *Medieval India: Researches in the History of India* ed. Irfan Habib (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 154.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, M. Athar Ali, *The Apparatus of Empire* (New Delhi, 1985); Shah Nawaz Khan, *The Maathr al-Umak* (New Delhi, 1995), pp. 616–617.

loves him for many years'.<sup>8</sup> Xavier's references to the proximity between Manuel Pinheiro and Jahangir indicate that the emperor regarded the missionary as a reliable agent who could safeguard his interests.

Shortly after being appointed to the embassy, Pinheiro travelled to Khambhat to join Muqarrab Khan. His departure from Lahore was regarded as a setback for the mission. In one letter from 1608, Jerónimo Xavier mentioned that Pinheiro's absence 'caused many sorrows among the Christians, because he was most known in Lahore and he raised those who lived there'.9 While at Khambhat, Manuel Pinheiro continued his proselytising activities. Following the modus operandi developed in Lahore, he used a painting of the wise kings sent from Rome as a gift to Jahangir to attract large crowds of curious Muslims and Hindus. According to Du Jarric, throughout thirteen days around 13,000 persons visited the Jesuit church at Khambhat to see the painting. Pinheiro also organised a private display for Muqarrab Khan and his family.<sup>10</sup>

This private session seemed to have forged a friendship between the Jesuit and the Mughal nobleman. According to the Jesuit sources, their friendship evolved after Pinheiro cured Muqarrab Khan's adoptive son, Masih-i-Kairanawi, from a mysterious illness. Omitting the fact that Jahangir's protégé was a reputed physician, Fernão Guerreiro's *Relaçam* mentions that a desperate Muqarrab Khan asked the Jesuit to 'give some remedy' after the frustrated attempts of local physicians and 'sorcerers who applied to the boy some ceremonies of their superstitions'.11 Pinheiro read the Gospel of St Mark and exhibited a 'cross with relics'. The exposure to Christian symbols and words immediately improved Masih's feverish state, and after a few days he was fully recovered. Impressed by Pinheiro's intervention, Muqarrab Khan decided to baptise his adoptive son. Fernão Guerreiro's account follows the tropes of many edifying Jesuit narratives in which a non-Christian begins a path

<sup>8</sup> Doc. 8, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o Padre Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia (Lahore, 24/09/1608)", *DUP*, vol. III, p. 111; ARSI, Goa 46-I, "Jeronimo Xavier to Claudio Acquaviva, Lahore, 3/12/1607", f. 68r.

<sup>9</sup> Doc. 8, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o Padre Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia (Agra, 24/09/16089)", *DUP*, vol. III, p. 112.

<sup>10</sup> Fernão Guerreiro, *Relação anual das coisas que fizeram os Padres da Companhia de Jesus nas suas Missões*, vol. III, ed. Arthur Viegas (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1942), p. 21.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

towards his conversion through miraculous acts performed by missionaries. Pinheiro emerges thus as a vehicle of divine intervention. His agency not only cured a seriously ill child, but above all, through a direct comparison with the previously failed attempts of Muslim physicians and Hindu healers, exposed the errors of Islam and Hinduism. This edifying story allowed Guerreiro to vindicate Muqarrab Khan's sympathetic overtures towards the *Estado da Índia*, as well as justify Pinheiro's activities as a diplomatic agent.

Muqarrab Khan's interest in Christianity and apparent pro-Portuguese stance should be analysed with care. Like other members of the Mughal elites, the new *mutasaddi* of Surat frequently combined administrative duties with mercantile activities. Muqarrab Khan owned vessels and established strategic commercial partnerships with wealthy and wellconnected Gujarati merchants such as Khwaja Nizam.12 Besides, as mutasaddi of Surat, Muqarrab Khan competed with other Mughal ports to attract merchants and increase revenues from the overseas trade. Manuel Pinheiro had thus the potential to be a valuable partner who could help Muqarrab Khan to induce Goa-based merchants to trade in Surat or to participate in the Royal Confidant's own private ventures. The conversion of the Royal Confidant's adoptive son emerged as a gesture that aimed to establish a permanent point of contact with the Jesuits and suggests an inclination towards the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*. Masih-i-Kairanawi's conversion seemed also to have created a partnership between Muqarrab Khan and Manuel Pinheiro.

I

It was during this precise moment, when Jahangir prepared Muqarrab Khan's embassy to Goa, that on 24 August 1608 the *Hector* reached Surat. This was the first English ship to land in an Indian port. Encouraged by the successful first two voyages led by Sir James Lancaster (1601) and Sir Henry Middleton (1604), which allowed the setting up of a trading post in Bantam, the EIC prepared a third voyage with the intention of opening factories in the Red Sea, Cambaya, Sumatra and the Moluccas. In Surat, the ambitious plan designed by the London

<sup>12</sup> Jorge Flores, "The Sea and the World of the *Mutasaddi:* A Profile of Port Officials from Mughal Gujarat (c. 1600–1650)", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 21 (2011), p. 60.

merchants was to be executed by the captain of the *Hector*, William Hawkins. His previous experiences in the Levant trade led the EIC to employ him in the hope of using Hawkins' knowledge of Turkish—one of the languages spoken in the Mughal Empire—to promote English trade in the Red Sea and on the West Coast of India. In one set of court minutes, the EIC states that Hawkins, 'on account of his experience and language', had been instructed 'to deliver His Majesty's letters to the princes and governors of Cambaya'.<sup>13</sup> To ensure that Hawkins would perform his role as an envoy of James I with the required dignity, the company ordered 'scarlet and violet apparel' and a cloak 'lined with taffeta with silver lace' that the captain of the *Hector* should use in his audiences with South Asian rulers.14

Although he was not a royal ambassador, Hawkins acted as if he was one. Immediately after arriving at Surat, he instructed one of the merchants sailing with him, Francis Buck, to head a small party of three messengers to inform the governor of Surat 'that the King of England had sent me as his Embassadour vnto his King, with his Letter and Present'. This stratagem worked and the Mughal official sent three messengers as well to meet Hawkins and arrange an audience. Throughout his first contact with a Mughal official, Hawkins imitated the behaviour and habitus of a European diplomat. He staged a public entry 'accompanied with my merchants, and others, in the best manner I could, befitting for the honour of my other King and Country'.<sup>15</sup> Hawkins' account does not dwell much on how he performed the rituals and bureaucratic formulas of Mughal diplomacy, which are laconically described as 'barbarous manner[s]', but he stressed that he was 'kindly received'.16

The scarce information he provides is explained by Hawkins, who mentions that before arriving at the governor's residence he was informed that the aged governor was indisposed and unapproachable for being 'rather drunke with affion or opion'. Unable to meet the governor,

<sup>13</sup> Doc. 361, Jan. 27–30, "East Indies: January 1607", *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. II, pp. 145–148.

<sup>14</sup> Doc. 362, Feb. 3–27, "East Indies: February 1607", *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. II, pp. 148–150.

<sup>15</sup> William Hawkins, "Captaine William Havvkins, His Relations of the Occurrents Which Happened in the Time of His Residence in India, in the County of the Great Mogoll" in *Purchas His Pilgrimes* ed. Samuel Purchas (London, 1625), p. 207.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

Hawkins had a brief audience with the 'chiefe Customer' who was 'the onely man that Sea-faring causes belonged unto'. This meeting, however, was rather unproductive. The chief-customer was a junior official who directed the English envoy to Muqarrab Khan, identified as the governor or 'Viceroy of Cambaya'. Despite this apparent failure, Hawkins stated that he attracted 'multitudes of people' who followed his retinue 'desirous to see a new come people, much nominated, but neuer came in their parts'.17

The heavy rains of the monsoon forced Hawkins to wait twenty days for Muqarrab Khan's reply. The 'Viceroy of Cambaya' allowed Hawkins and his companions to trade in Surat, but also stated that the establishment of a factory and the future conditions of English trade in the region could only be granted by Jahangir. Hawkins mentioned that Muqarrab Khan suggested that if he travelled to the Mughal court, the emperor would favourably accept the requests made by James I and the EIC. After receiving Muqarrab Khan's reply, Hawkins decided to call a 'Councell' to discuss the next steps. All present concluded that there was no one more suitable than Hawkins 'for the effecting of these weighty affaires' given his language skills and past experiences in the Levant. Besides, as Hawkins vehemently emphasised, 'I was knowne to all to be the man that was sent as Embassadour about these affaires'.18 Meanwhile, Hawkins' presence in Agra was also necessary to reduce the growing pressures of several tradesmen based in Surat. Hawkins mentions that Muqarrab Khan's decision to allow the English merchants to 'buy and sell' was 'against the will of all the Merchants in the Towne, whose grumbling was very much'.<sup>19</sup>

The pressures of the Gujarati merchants coincided with a Portuguese offensive against the EIC and Mughal ships in the region. The arrest of an EIC ship by a small Portuguese fleet led Hawkins, as would be expected from an ambassador, to write a letter of complaint to an unidentified *capitão-maior*, probably the governor of Daman, evoking the peace treaty signed by Philip III and James I in 1604. The reply from the Portuguese official was, according to Hawkins, nothing other than provocative, 'most vilely abusing his Majestie, terming him King of Fishermen, and of an

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. <sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 208. <sup>19</sup> Ibid.

Island of no import'.<sup>20</sup> Meanwhile, the *capitão-maior* instructed the captain of the *Estado*'s fleet to demand the immediate arrest of Hawkins and the other EIC men by the Mughal authorities of Surat, under the pretext that they were Dutch. The presence of the Portuguese captain in Surat offered Hawkins another opportunity to act as an English diplomat. In a meeting arranged by the Mughal authorities, Hawkins confronted the Portuguese captain and accused the *Estado da Índia* of breaching the terms of the Treaty of London, suggesting that the arrest of any ship or employee of the EIC was an act of treason against the authority of Philip III. Hawkins claimed that his public shaming of the Portuguese captain impressed the Mughal authorities and forced the captain to leave the palace. Two hours later, the captain met privately with the English emissary and promised him that he would seek the release of the English ship, her crew and goods. However, despite these promises, the arrested men and goods were sent to Goa.21

Muqarrab Khan and Manuel Pinheiro emerge as Hawkins' nemeses, two sinister figures that sought the destruction of the English ambassador. Before leaving Surat, Hawkins had an audience with Muqarrab Khan to receive the safe conduct that would allow him to travel to Agra. The meeting was tense. Despite receiving a gift from Hawkins, the Royal Confidant was reticent to release the confiscated goods from the *Hector*. Manuel Pinheiro, who according to Hawkins was also present, sought to provoke the Englishman with 'vile speaches made by him of our King and Nation'.22 The Mughal official and the Jesuit missionary haunted every step made by the English ambassador. Hawkins accused Muqarrab Khan and Pinheiro of hiring three men to assassinate him while he attended a feast at Surat organised by a Mughal grandee. This failed attempt was followed by an assault on Hawkins' house led by 'a Friar, [and] some thirty of fortie of them'. After escaping from this attack, the Englishman was told by two sympathetic Mughal officials that Pinheiro offered Muqarrab Khan a bribe of 40,000 rials to ensure his capture.

Hawkins departed to Agra, as Finch noted in his journal, on 1 February 1609 'with fiftie peons [footmen] and certaine horsemen'.<sup>23</sup> Hawkins

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 209.

<sup>23</sup> William Finch, "William Finch, 1608–1611" in *Early Travels in India*, p. 130.

claimed that he had to overcome a series of conspiracies and traps engendered by Muqarrab Khan and Pinheiro on his journey from Surat to Agra. For instance, after leaving Surat, the Englishman discovered that his coachman and broker were hired by the Mughal official and Pinheiro to poison him.

On 16 April 1609, Hawkins finally arrived at Agra 'in a very secret manner'. Jahangir, however, had been informed of the arrival of an English envoy and instructed his 'horsemen and footmen' to find Hawkins and escort him to the royal palace.24 Apparently, Hawkins was not expecting to be called into the presence of the emperor immediately after his arrival, confessing that he 'could scarce obtayne time to apparel my selfe in my best attyre'. After parading the streets of Agra 'with great State (…) as an Embassadour of a King ought to be'.25 Indeed, the annual letter sent by the Jesuit missionaries in 1610 reported Hawkins' 'splendid and magnificent' entry to Agra under the title of English ambassador *(Legati Anglicani*).26 Another Jesuit report mentioned that Hawkins arrived in Agra 'in a lavish way, richly dressed, and under the title of his King's ambassador, carrying a letter written in Spanish'.27 Unlike his nonofficial predecessor, John Mildenhall, the Jesuits duly noted that Hawkins presented a letter certified by James I's seal and signature. The document requested Jahangir's 'permission for the English ships to visit and trade in his ports'.28

Jahangir requested the presence of Jerónimo Xavier to translate the letter from James I. To the *padre*'s surprise, the English envoy was also fluent in Turkish—one of the languages mastered by Jahangir. If Mildenhall relied on interpreters to overcome the language barrier, Hawkins was able to negotiate and converse with Jahangir and other Mughal luminaries without a mediator.<sup>29</sup> This not only posed a problem for the Jesuits to monitor the activities of an agent from a rival power, but also had the potential to disturb their proselytising activities. As the letter from Agra reported, one of the first things that the English emissary did in his

<sup>29</sup> ARSI, Goa 33 I–II, "Annual Letter of 1610", f. 303v.

<sup>24</sup> William Hawkins, "Captaine William Havvkins", p. 210.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> ARSI, Goa 33 I–II, "Annual letter of 1610", f. 303v.

<sup>27</sup> BA, Cod. 49-V-18, "Da Missam do Mogor", f. 331.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

first audience with the emperor was to chastise the Catholic Church and praise the Protestant doctrine of the Anglican Church. Indeed, following his conversations with the Jesuit missionaries and the theological debates staged at the court, Jahangir questioned Hawkins about the doctrine of transubstantiation and the Englishman replied, according to the Jesuits, in the manner of 'a great Heretic'.

This abrupt mention of the Reformation—an event that was relatively unknown at the Mughal court—was a serious challenge to the work of the Jesuit missionaries, who promoted a perception of Christianity as a homogenous religious system presided over by the Pope. Indeed, the effects of the Reformation were still unknown in Mughal India, and the Jesuits preferred to present Europe as a part of a relatively united Christendom under the spiritual guidance of the Pope. The political and spiritual role of the head of the Catholic Church was of particular interest to Akbar and Jahangir, who considered the Pope as a potential model to support the religious authority of the Mughal emperors. Hawkins' negative remarks had an obvious damaging effect for the prestige of the Jesuits at the Mughal court.<sup>30</sup> Hakwins' anti-Catholic, anti-Jesuit and anti-Iberian stances at the Mughal court were in line with the approach made by the EIC men in Japan who, in order to undermine local favourable perceptions of Catholicism and Iberian interests, invested in an aggressive anti-Papist propaganda that highlighted English independence from the Church of Rome and the links between the expansion of Catholicism and Iberian imperialism.31

Another moment of tension during this first meeting between Hawkins and Jahangir was Xavier's remarks about the poor style of the letter Hawkins' had brought, noting that Jahangir was addressed as *Vestra* without *Majestad*. Hawkins replied that the comments made by the Jesuit came from an enemy of the English Crown and asked Jahangir if the letter was poorly written if James was asking a favour to the Mughal emperor. Deliberately or not, Hawkins' reply positioned the English as foreign supplicants who relied on Mughal imperial favour and protection. By posing as an emissary from a subordinated foreign policy, Hawkins' presence and requests fitted into the Mughal imperial project of universal

<sup>30</sup> BA, Cod. 49-V-18, 'Da Missam do Mogor', f. 331v.

<sup>31</sup> See, for example, Timon Screech, "The English and the Control of Christianity in the Early Edo Period", *Japan Review* 24 (2012), pp. 3–40.

rule. Besides, Hawkins' knowledge of Turkish also allowed him to insinuate himself as a useful and reliable intermediary between Jahangir and the English authorities.

After this first audience, the English emissary received instructions to have a 'daily conference' with Jahangir. 'Both night and day', wrote Hawkins, 'his delight was very much to talke with mee, both of the Affaires of England and other Countries, as also many demands of the West Indies'.32 Like the Jesuit missionaries, Hawkins was regarded by Jahangir as both an envoy from a foreign distant ruler and a privileged informer on the world outside the Mughal Empire. Hawkins' warm reception also coincided with yet another tense moment between the *Estado da Índia* and the Mughals caused by the Portuguese efforts to enforce the *cartaz* system. At the same time that Hawkins left Surat, the Mughal authorities had to deal with the arrest by a Portuguese fleet of a ship bound for Mocha owned by Jahangir's mother. According to William Finch's journal, the ship was sailing without a *cartaz* and would only be released after the payment of 20,000 reais and 'divers presents which the Mogolls were faine to give them'.33 This episode of Portuguese maritime violence, which sought to impose the *Estado*'s maritime monopoly on Mughal ships, should also be taken into account in the willingness demonstrated by the *padshah* and some relevant courtiers to listen to Hawkins' propositions.

Hawkins interpreted Jahangir's interest in him as a sign of favouritism and decided to petition the emperor for a *firman* conceding trade privileges to the EIC, including permission to establish a factory. Jahangir replied that he was planning to send an ambassador to England, and that Hawkins should remain at the Mughal court until the arrival of a new English ambassador following the conclusion of the planned Mughal embassy to James I. Jahangir guaranteed that Hawkins' presence 'would be highly for the benefit of thy Nation (…) swearing by his Fathers Soule that if I would remayne with him, he would grant me Articles for our Factorie to my hearts desire'.<sup>34</sup> To persuade the English emissary to accept his proposition, Jahangir offered him a *mansabdar* of £3,200 per year and 400 horses. Hawkins presented this sudden promotion to

<sup>32</sup> William Hawkins, "Captaine William Havvkins", p. 211.

<sup>33</sup> "William Finch, 1608–1611" in *Early Travels in India*, pp. 129–130.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 211.

the Mughal nobility as a courteous gesture from Jahangir to 'doe service both to my naturall King and him' that was difficult to refuse since the emperor's promises were 'beneficiall both to my Nation and myself'.<sup>35</sup> According to the Jesuits, Hawkins' *mansabdar* involved a 'grand gift' of a precious stone estimated to be worth 20,000 cruzados, which seemed to have convinced the emperor to favour the Englishman.<sup>36</sup>

#### III

The rapid rise of the 'English Chan' (*sic*), an honourable title that Hawkins proudly explained was the Persian equivalent of a duke, was viewed by the Jesuits with suspicion, as well as by a group identified by Hawkins as the 'principall Mahometans', who apparently resented the growing influence of a Christian foreigner. The Englishman's rise could be problematic to some sections of the Mughal court. The rebellion led by Prince Kushrau encouraged Jahangir to pursue his intention to redefine the composition of the Mughal elites through the inclusion of new elements that guaranteed the emperor's control of the Timurid polity. The decision to grant a *mansabdar* to Hawkins should therefore be considered bearing in mind the emperor's domestic and foreign policies.

Hawkins' integration into the *mansabdari* system was both part of the ongoing structural transformations of the Mughal elite and an attempt to establish new channels of communication with Europe. According to Norbert Elias' model, Jahangir used the courtly 'economy of honour' to manipulate Hawkins according to the emperor's foreign and courtly policies.37 The rise of the English Chan was integrated into a strategy that sought to develop a cosmopolitan and diversified Mughal nobility that could secure political alliances between Jahangir and the different ethnic and religious communities under Timurid rule. During the first years of his reign, and following the policies adopted by Akbar, Jahangir promoted the integration of members of different ethnic and religious groups, including those regarded as hostile to Mughal rule, such as the

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> BA, Cod. 49-V-18, 'Da Missam do Mogor', f. 331.

<sup>37</sup> See, for example, Norbert Elias, *The Court Society* (New York: Patheon, 1983); Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The Development of Manners. Changes in the Code of Conduct and Feeling in Early Modern Times* (New York: Urizen Books, 1978).

Afghans and the Rajputs.38 The Mughal harem, for example, included women from the Persian, Rajput and Indo-Muslim elites who were recruited to confirm political allegiances.<sup>39</sup> Mughal diplomatic practices also sought to incorporate foreign ambassadors into the Mughal imperial apparatus. The intention was to prolong the presence of foreign diplomats both as a demonstration of Mughal grandeur and power, but also to convert the delegates of foreign rulers into Mughal agents, acting as de facto double agents.40 The cosmopolitan element also included individuals from outside Mughal India, especially Persians and Central Asians. Hawkins was thus another case of a foreigner incorporated by the emperor into the Mughal nobility to cement his political authority.

In the same way that the Jesuit *padres* at the Mughal court held the dual role of *mullah*-like figures and intermediaries between the *padshah* and the Portuguese Crown, the English Chan was both a Mughal *mansabdar* and a useful mediator between Jahangir and another *firangi* ruler. There was also another significant advantage. Hawkins' presence and the eventual concession of trading privileges to the English had the potential to destabilise the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*. Jahangir used the English Chan to pressure the Portuguese authorities to conform to Mughal interests.

The *mansubdar* was also a solution that established a political bond between Hawkins and Jahangir, one that enhanced the Englishman's status but also secured his subservience to the Mughal *padshah*. As the anonymous Jesuit author of the Ajuda manuscript noted, Hawkins' rise had a price. The *mansabdar* meant that he would be 'so attached to the King's service that he was not allowed to return to England without his permission'.41 The career of the English Chan would thus be reliant on his ability to balance Mughal and English interests.

Another example of Jahangir's interest in incorporating Hawkins into the Mughal courtly milieu was the emperor's plan to arrange a marriage between the English Chan and one of the 'white Mayden' of the Mughal court. The marriage sought to provide an appropriate household for the

<sup>38</sup> For an overview of Jahangir's strategy, see Corinne Lefèvre, *Pouvoir imperial et élites dans l'Inde moghole de Jahangir* (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2017), pp. 189–248.

<sup>40</sup> Colin Mitchell, *Sir Thomas Roe and the Mughal Empire* (Karachi: Mehran Printers, 2000), p. 165.

<sup>41</sup> BA, Cod. 49-V-18, 'Da Missam do Mogor', f. 331.

<sup>39</sup> Jeroen Duindam, "The Court as a Meeting Point", p. 77.

new member of the imperial court. Hawkins' wife would be accompanied by 'all things necessary, with slaves', ensuring a domestic structure that would allow Hawkins to dissipate his fears of being poisoned by the Jesuits or other rivals. As he noted in his account, his new wife and slaves meant that 'my meates and drinkes should be looked unto by them, and I should live without fear'.<sup>42</sup> Although tempted by Jahangir's proposal, Hawkins feared that his matrimonial options would be reduced to Muslim women, a prospect that could raise some questions about the political and religious allegiances of the English Chan. After informing the emperor that he could marry a Christian woman, Jahangir suggested Mariam Khan, the daughter of Mubarak Khan, a recently deceased Armenian courtier who had a *mansabdar* of 1000 horses. Mariam Khan's connections to the Mughal imperial apparatus and Christian pedigree as an Armenian, or as Hawkins' would put it '[a member] of the Race of the most ancient Christians', made her a suitable choice.43 As Karen Robertson noted, the marriage with Mariam Khan not only had the advantages of preserving Hawkins' Christian credentials, but also allowed him to engage with the Armenian community and its mercantile networks.44 This possibility might also have been behind Jahangir's suggestion. By sponsoring the matrimonial union between the representative of a new group of *firangi* tradesmen and a relevant figure of the Armenian community, Jahangir could foster the articulation between two different commercial structures and thus develop new avenues to expand Mughal overseas trade.

Hawkins seemed to have been aware of the emperor's intentions to integrate him into the Mughal courtly milieu and rapidly adopted an Indo-Persian habitus in an attempt to be fully integrated and accepted in the Timurid court. According to the Jesuit sources, Hawkins started to wear Mughal clothes 'although he publicly claimed that he dressed liked a Moor, but he did not follow their religion'.45 Such remarks hinted at Hawkins' predisposition to change religious and political allegiances.

<sup>42</sup> William Hawkins, "Captaine William Havvkins", p. 212.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Karen Robertson, "A Stranger Bride: Mariam Khan and the East India Company" in *Travel and Travail: Early Modern Women, English Drama, and the Wider World* eds. Patricia Akhimie and Bernadette Andrea (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2019), p. 45.

<sup>45</sup> BA, Cod. 49-V-18, "Da Missam do Mogor", f. 331.

Dress is an important external marker of identity and a part of a 'collective fashioning' regulated by specific social norms and codes of civility. As Fernand Braudel noted, many early modern Europeans perceived dress to reflect 'the energies, possibilities, demands and joie de vivre of a given society, economy, and civilisation'.46 This perception echoes the observations made some centuries later by a long line of sociologists and anthropologists such as Terence S. Turner who examined the ways in which individuals use dress to form a 'social skin' that constructs personal and social identities.47 By adopting Mughal dress, Hawkins sought to alter his 'social skin' to reflect his new status conferred by the *mansabdar*, but also to promote his integration into the Mughal courtly milieu and enhance his position by conforming to local mores.

This was also a strategy developed by other English agents who operated in the Levant, a region where the English Chan worked before travelling to India. In the Ottoman Empire, English merchants and diplomats often adopted Ottoman garb to facilitate their activities by camouflaging a potentially problematic Christian and European identity. Fynes Morrisson, for example, noted that, like his French and Venetian counterparts, the English ambassador at Istanbul 'wore a loose Turkish garment' during his public appearances.48

Another interesting example, and perhaps closer to Hawkins' case, is that of Robert Shirley, the English aristocrat and adventurer employed by Shah Abbas as a diplomatic agent between 1608 and 1628. As Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass noted, Shirley's adoption of Persian dress annulled his Englishness and certified his incorporation into the Persian body politic and courtly milieu.49 By appearing in public in full Safavid attire, which included a robe of honour offered by Shah Abbas, Shirley was able to insinuate himself as a legitimate representative of the Persian ruler, an ambassador who emulated his prince. Shirley's agency

<sup>46</sup> Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Vol. I: The Structure of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 323.

<sup>47</sup> Terence S. Turner, "The Social Skin" in *Not Work Alone: A Cross-Cultural View of Activities Superfluous to Survival* eds. Jeremy Cherfas and Roger Lewin (London: Temple Smith, 1980), pp. 112–140.

<sup>48</sup> Fynes Morrisson, *Shakespeare's Europe: Unpublished Chapters of Fynes Moryson's Itinerary* ed. Charles Hughes (London: Sherratt & Hughes, 1903), p. 27.

<sup>49</sup> Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass, *Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 55–57.

relied on his turban and robes of honour. As Thomas Fuller noted, Shirley was 'much affected to appear in foreign Vestes, and as if his Clothes were his limbes, accounted himself never ready till he had something of the Persian Habit about him'.50 Shirley's Persianate persona, however, often incorporated Western or Christian elements that showed his aristocratic status and Catholicism. For example, after being granted the title of Count Palatine by Pope Paul V, Shirley wore a gold chain to stress his membership to the papal nobility. His turban was also topped by a gold crucifix that stressed his Christianity. Such strategies of hybridisation sought to make Shirley a reliable interlocutor between the European powers and Safavid Persia, someone who was able to efficiently connect two different political, cultural and religious worlds.

His hybrid persona, however, could also be problematic. Shirley's 'Persian Habit' questioned his Englishness and thus his credibility, even if it suggested a taste for extravagance. James I, for example, was suspicious of Shirley's real political allegiances. The fact that he was an Englishman employed by a foreign ruler cast a shadow over Shirley's trustworthiness in promoting English interests. Indeed, during his first audience with the king, Shirley asked for James' forgiveness for being at the service of Shah Abbas. Although he was pardoned, his reluctance to wear English dress maintained the suspicions.

As in the case of Robert Shirley, Hawkins' adoption of Mughal dress seemed to be part of an attempt to develop a fluid identity that articulated his Englishness with a membership to the Mughal imperial apparatus. The cases of Hawkins and Shirley can also be analysed as examples of 'physical capital', the notion developed by Chris Shillings to examine the ways in which the specific value attributed to bodily features within given social fields can be used as a resource to obtain rewards or exhibit status.51 Physical capital can be converted into economic capital (money, estates), cultural capital (i.e., accumulated cultural knowledge) or social capital (i.e. interpersonal networks). As Nick Crossley noted, 'agents create and mould their bodies in accordance with the fields in which they

<sup>50</sup> Thomas Fuller, *The History of the Worthies of England* (London, 1662), p. 108.

<sup>51</sup> Chris Shilling, "Educating the Body: Physical Capital and the Production of Social Inequalities", *Sociology*, 25:4 (1991), pp. 653–672; Chris Shilling, "Physical Capital and Situated Action: A New Directio*n f* or Corporeal Sociology", *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 25:4 (2010), pp. 473–487.

are involved and the demands of those specific fields'.52 In other words, as the holder of a *mansabdar*, Hawkins adopted local garb to embody his status as a member of the imperial apparatus and display his obedience to Jahangir, imitating thus the other members of the Mughal courtly milieu to facilitate his interactions and improve his position.

The apparent success of Hakwins' Mughal persona led the Jesuits to depict him as an ambitious arriviste with roguish behaviour: 'an enemy of the Estado da Índia, who has no faith and does not care about the afterlife, but only on this one and the privileges he receives from this infidel King'.53 The Jesuits accused the English heretic of taking advantage of the emperor's favours to carry out insolent acts against the missionaries. Although the Ajuda manuscript is rather laconic in its description of Hawkins' hostile behaviour towards the Jesuits, there are mentions of acts of 'haughtiness' (*sobranceria*) intended to undermine Jesuit proselytising activities by repeatedly exposing the division between Catholics and Protestants. More worryingly, Jahangir discussed the possibility of English involvement in a Mughal attack against the Portuguese fortress of Diu with Hawkins, calculating that 'four English vessels would be enough to take Diu by force'.<sup>54</sup>

Despite his attempts to discredit the Jesuits and undermine Portuguese interests, Hawkins sought to be associated with the missionaries. A first attempt to establish a connection was when Hawkins asked Jerónimo Xavier to bury one of his English servants in the Catholic cemetery of Agra—a request immediately rejected by the *padre* due to the servant's religious affiliation. Although the Jesuits mentioned that 'the Heretic was very resented',<sup>55</sup> Hawkins made a second overture to the missionaries when he asked them to celebrate his marriage with Mariam Khan. The missionaries mentioned that the Englishman made this 'a case of honour' and 'sought all the possible means to get what he wanted'.56 The solution found by the Jesuits to avoid a reprimand from Jahangir was to celebrate the wedding 'with the condition that he would publicly confess in front of

<sup>52</sup> Nick Crossley, *The Social Body Habit, Identity and Desire* (London: SAGE, 2001), p. 102.

<sup>53</sup> BA, Cod. 49-V-18, "Da Missam do Mogor", f. 331v.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Fernão Guerreiro, *Relação anual*, p. 22.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

everyone that the Pope is the head of the Universal Church'.<sup>57</sup> The terms proposed by the missionaries were rejected, and Hawkins was married by Nicholas Ufflet.

The members of the EIC that remained in Surat received the letters sent by Hawkins with news of his success at the Mughal court with enthusiasm. Troubled by deadly diseases and with no real prospects of trade due to Portuguese pressures, many merchants were considering the possibility of returning to England. An unidentified English merchant confessed that he was contemplating the possibility 'to take some course to get me home, as likewise the rest which are here'. Other EIC men were also making plans to travel to Goa 'to take passage in the Portugal fleet'. Pressured by these merchants, the anonymous authors decided to send 'a man to Goa with a letter to the Fathers, and a petition to the Vice Roy to give them licence'. Even if the Portuguese authorities were not receptive to issuing a safe conduct, the English merchants were 'determined to go'.58

Before this bleak scenario could occur, the sudden promotion of Captain Hawkins to the Mughal nobility generated some enthusiasm. On 12 July 1609, William Finch wrote to Hawkins celebrating the 'further honours done you by the King', which were considered a great achievement given 'the small means and helps that your Worship hath had for the procuring of such and so great favours from so mighty a prince'.59 This unexpected success was seen by Finch as an act of 'God's great providence and your Worship's wise and discreet carriage in the managing of so weighty a matter'.<sup>60</sup> Such admiring words reveal both a genuine surprise, but also a special concern in keeping Hawkins close to the EIC. Indeed, the meteoric rise of the English Chan posed some questions regarding his reliability. Although he was still regarded as a trustworthy representative of English interests due to his regular correspondence with the EIC men in Surat, his new status as a Mughal courtier suggested that Hawkins enjoyed a new degree of agency that allowed him to actively pursue his own personal interests rather than those of the company. Despite this risk, the activities of the EIC on the Western coast of India relied on

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Doc. 13, "An English Merchant to Another at Agra, or Some Inland Factory Surat the 27th of October, 1609", *LR*, vol. I, p. 40.

<sup>59</sup> Doc. 10, "William Finch to Captains Hawkins, Surat 12 July 1609", *LRI* , vol. I, p. 23.

Hawkins' exploits and inside knowledge of the Mughal court and many believed that he had the ability to resolve the precarious situation faced by the English merchants in Surat. The abovementioned unidentified English merchant noted, for example, that the EIC figure in charge in Surat, William Finch, 'will not do anything without order from Captain Hawkins'.<sup>61</sup>

#### IV

If Jahangir hoped that Hawkins would cause some anxiety in the *Estado da Índia*, the English Chan performed his role with satisfaction. The news of the arrival of an emissary from James I at the Mughal court and the reports of Jahangir's receptivity to conceding trade privileges to the English alarmed the Portuguese authorities. In an attempt to pressure Jahangir, the Estado's interim governor, André Furtado de Mendonça, decided to cancel the embassy on the grounds that the negotiations to establish an English factory in Surat annulled all the previous treaties between the *Estado da Índia* and the Mughal Empire.<sup>62</sup> The governor instructed Pinheiro to return immediately to Goa, and issued an edict banning all trading activities between Portuguese and Mughal ports. The boycott was followed by a series of skirmishes between Portuguese and Mughal troops near Daman.<sup>63</sup>

The suspension of Luso-Mughal commercial and diplomatic exchanges instigated many Gujarat-based merchants to pressure both sides to restore contacts.<sup>64</sup> The Portuguese boycott on Mughal ports also prompted some violent reactions against English tradesmen in Surat. Finch mentioned in his journal that he 'had no small adoe with the townsmen of Surat' after a mob seized eight crewmembers of the *Ascension* instigated by the locals 'fearing the Portugalls'.65 To make things worse, a Portuguese fleet was awaiting the *Ascension*. The ship cast off and, according to William Finch, the 70 members of the crew had no

<sup>61</sup> Doc. 13, "[An English Merchant to Another at Agra, or Some Inland Factory] Surat the 27th of October, 1609", *LR*, vol. I, p. 40.

<sup>62</sup> Fernão Guerreiro, *Relação anual*, p. 23.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> "William Finch" in *Early Travels in India*, p. 132.

option but to 'lye without amongst the trees and tombes' to avoid the hostility of the inhabitants of Surat.66 Finch sought to negotiate with the local authorities. Despite possessing 'letters from the King himselfe', Finch's approaches had no effect. He blamed the Mughal's 'slavish awe of the Portugalls' and two unnamed Jesuits stationed in Surat who dissuaded the local merchants from contacting the EIC men by 'threatening fire, faggot, and utter desolation, if they received any more English thither'.<sup>67</sup> Unable to remain in Surat, the survivors of the *Ascension* survivors scattered into separate groups, each exploring different routes by which return to England. One group, led by the commander of the *Ascension*, Alexander Sharpey, and which included Robert Coverte, opted to travel to Agra. As Coverte explained, the intention was to obtain Jahangir's aid and 'certifie him of our great distresse and misfortunes'.68

According to Robert Coverte, the great obstacle to solve the problems of the survivors of the *Ascension* was the *mutasaddi* of Surat, Muqarrab Khan, who had been bribed by the Portuguese and told that the English 'were a kind of turbulent people that would make mutinies, and sow civil dissension in the Town'.<sup>69</sup> Coverte's comments on the bribes received by the *mutasaddi* were probably alluding to the gifts (*sagoates*) usually offered by the *Estado* to the representatives of South Asian polities during diplomatic exchanges. Indeed, Muqarrab Khan was involved in negotiations with the *Estado da Índia* regarding the end of the Luso-Mughal conflict in Gujarat.

Fears of a rapid escalation of the conflict into a full-scale war prompted Furtado de Mendonça to instruct Manuel Pinheiro to return to Khambhat and negotiate a reconciliation with Muqarrab Khan. The Jesuit missionary was vested 'with powers to discuss war and peace' and, in what was meant to be a gesture to express Portuguese goodwill towards the Mughals, also received orders to make announcements across Gujarat that the *Estado*'s boycott on Mughal trade was being ended.<sup>70</sup> According to Fernão Guerreiro, Pinheiro received an ecstatic reception in

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> BA, Cod. 49-V-18, "Da Missam do Mogor", f. 332r.

<sup>68</sup> Robert Coverte, *A True and Almost Incredible Report*, p. 26.

the main Gujarati port cities, being 'applauded by Muslims and Hindus who thanked him for bringing news of peace'.<sup>71</sup>

During the negotiations with Manuel Pinheiro, Muqarrab Khan reported to Jahangir that the Portuguese would again refuse to receive the Mughal embassy if the emperor opted not to annul the concession of trading privileges to the EIC. The reports from the *mutassadi* seemed to have persuaded the emperor to accept the conditions of the *Estado da Índia*. Jahangir's apparent plans to send an embassy to the Iberian Peninsula were a part of a strategy that aimed to enhance Mughal international prestige, but above all sought to ensure the Estado's neutrality in the Deccan at the precise moment that Mughal troops sought to annexe Ahmadnagar. Thus, Jahangir preferred to gain some time. The emperor decided to cancel the *firman*, but he retained William Hawkins at the Mughal court with his *mansabdar* of 400 horses and a rent of 30,000 rupees, guaranteeing a channel of communication with the EIC.<sup>72</sup>

Robert Coverte, who arrived at Agra on 8 December 1609, highlighted the privileged status of the English Chan and his proximity to Jahangir, as well as Hawkins' role as a mediator between the English and the Mughal authorities. According to Coverte, Hawkins introduced the *Ascension* survivors to the emperor, ensuring that the EIC men followed the 'the custom and manner of the Country. For no stranger must stay above twenty-four hours before he be brought before the King to know what he is, and wherefore he cometh'.<sup>73</sup> Although Hawkins sought to perform his role as a representative of English interests at the Mughal court, he seemed to not be able to obtain the safe conducts necessary to facilitate the return of his compatriots to England. Apart from mentioning Hawkins' role in arranging an audience with Jahangir, Coverte does not allude to any démarche made by the English Chan to facilitate the safe conducts sought by his group. Indeed, in his account, Coverte mentions another meeting with Jahangir where the emperor invited him and two other *Ascension* crewmembers, Joseph Salebancke and John Frencham, to serve in the Mughal army 'offering us what maintenance we would ask of him'.74 Although the three Englishmen refused the proposal, Jahangir

<sup>71</sup> Guerreiro, *Relação Anual*, p. 24.

<sup>72</sup> William Hawkins, "Captaine William Havvkins", pp. 83, 212.

<sup>73</sup> Robert Coverte, *A True and Almost Incredible Report*, p. 36.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

granted them the necessary safe conducts to travel across all Mughal territories all signed 'under his hand and great Seale'.<sup>75</sup> Coverte mentions that the Jesuits also helped the *Ascension* survivors. After contacting Jerónimo Xavier, described as 'the chief Friar' and 'a man of great Credit there, and greatly esteemed and well known in other Kingdoms',<sup>76</sup> Coverte and his companions obtained a series of letters addressed to the rulers, senior officials and clergymen of the territories that would be crossed by the three Englishmen. According to Coverte, Xavier granted all these letters 'most willingly'.77

Besides the charitable obligations of the *padres'* ministry, there were also other reasons behind the readiness of the Chief Friar to help Coverte and his companions. The presence of more Englishmen at the Mughal court, especially during a moment of crisis in Luso-Mughal relations triggered by the EIC exploits in Surat, could encourage Jahangir to endorse English trading activities and promote further diplomatic contacts with James I. By facilitating the return of the *Ascension* crewmembers to the British Isles, the Jesuits were able to eliminate the exposure of the Mughal court to English interests. At the same time, despite their commitment to promote the interest of the united Iberian Crowns, the Jesuit missionaries were equally zealous in developing a role as representatives of Christendom and the different *firangis* living in Mughal territories. While Hawkins and Mildenhall adopted a hostile approach, undermining the status of the *padres* by questioning their religious and diplomatic agenda, the *Ascension* crewmembers did not publicly challenge the Jesuits and actively sought to establish a rapport with Xavier and other missionaries to further their possibilities of obtaining safe conducts for their travels. Indeed, throughout the pages dedicated to his experiences in Agra, Coverte mentions several friendly conversations with the 'Christian Friars'. By acknowledging the status of the Jesuits as de facto representatives of the *firangis,* Coverte's group generated a perception that they did not pose a threat to Xavier and the other missionaries. The sojourn of the *Ascension* crewmembers in Agra reveals, thus, a possibility of collaboration based on a tacit recognition of the *padres'* prominent status and a certain degree of acceptance of Iberian interests. In other words, as long

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. <sup>76</sup> Ibid., p. 42. <sup>77</sup> Ibid.

as other *firangis*, including those from rival nations of the Iberian Union such as Robert Coverte, did not actively undermine Jesuit activities at the Mughal court, the *padres* were willing to assist them.

By helping the *Ascension* survivors, Xavier was able to affirm the prominent status enjoyed by the Jesuits at the Mughal court and among the *firangi* vis-à-vis the emergence of the rival English Chan. As Coverte discreetly insinuates, the Jesuits seemed to have been more effective than Hawkins in this mediating role. Indeed, Coverte is rather laconic about Hawkins' démarches at the Mughal court. His final remarks about Agra, although dedicated to the English Chan, do not mention any relevant interference on behalf of the *Ascension* crewmembers, but highlight his *mansabdar* and proximity to Jahangir and some prominent courtiers:

Captain Hawkins, whom we left therein great credit with the King, being allowed one hundredth Ruckées a day which is ten pound sterling, and is intituled [*sic*] by the name of a Can, which is a Knight, and kept company with the greatest Noble men belonging to the King: and he seemed very willing to do his Country good. And this is as much as I can say concerning him.78

Apart from this brief mention to an apparent willingness 'to do his Country good', Hawkins does not emerge in Coverte's account as a crucial actor in assisting the *Ascension* survivors, as it was probably expected from an EIC emissary who had a privileged position at a foreign court. In fact, Coverte's perception of Hawkins is that of an Englishman who had be fully incorporated into a foreign polity and, thanks to his *mansabdar*, enjoyed a new degree of agency that allowed him to act autonomously from the EIC. The English Chan's willingness to promote English interests relied thus on his ability to navigate the Mughal courtly milieu, but also, as Coverte tacitly suggests, on the articulation between Hawkins' personal agenda and the goals of the EIC.

#### V

One of the possible reasons for the apparent lack of attention given to the *Ascension* crewmembers by the English Chan was the news of the negotiations between the *Estado* and the Mughals. After learning about

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

the end of the hostilities between Portuguese and Mughals, in January 1610, Hawkins summoned William Finch to join him in Agra to help him pressure different Mughal officials to obtain a *firman*. On 4 April 1610, Finch arrived at Agra and on the same day, during the afternoon, the English Chan presented him to Jahangir.79 At Agra, Finch not only joined Hawkins but also met another Englishman, the mercenary Thomas Boys, who was accompanied by three French soldiers, a Dutch engineer and a Venetian merchant who had travelled to Agra with his son and one servant.<sup>80</sup> This entourage enhanced Hawkins' role as a secular representative of different *firangi* at the imperial court, one that, unlike the Jesuits, was independent from the *Estado da Índia*.

Hawkins' manoeuvres to restore the confiscated goods and undermine Muqarrab Khan seemed to have influenced the latter's sudden downfall. After concluding the negotiations with Pinheiro, Muqarrab Khan presented himself in Agra in March 1610 carrying several European commodities and curiosities, as well as some goods prohibited by the Portuguese *cartazes* such as Persian horses and East African slaves. The return of the Royal Confidant to the court, however, was extremely troubled. During the summer months of 1610, Muqarrab Khan suddenly fell from grace. According to the *Jahangirnama*, one of the *mutasaddi*'s servants kidnapped a 'Baniya' girl. The abduction and eventual death of the girl instigated Jahangir to punish the Royal Confidant, reducing his *mansdab* by one half.81

The story of the abduction of the 'Banyia' girl, however, seemed to offer an acceptable pretext—one with moralist overtones—for the sudden downfall of one of the emperor's closest aides. Jahangir's decision to punish Muqarrab Khan coincides with Hawkins demands to be compensated for the confiscation of his goods by the Gujarati authorities, which instigated Jahangir to reprimand Muqarrab Khan for his hostile behaviour towards the EIC. Hawkins was not the only one to present complaints about the 'tyrannical injustice' of the Royal Confidant. Muqarrab Khan's interference in the Gujarat mercantile scene damaged the interests of several merchants. As Hawkins noted, besides him, 'many

<sup>79</sup> 'William Finch' in *Early Travels in India*, p. 146.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> *The Jahangirnama*, p. 111.

a man being undone by him (…) petitioned to the King for Justice'.<sup>82</sup> The reduced status and brief imprisonment of the Royal Confidant, as Hawkins suggests in his account, offered an opportunity to push English interests at the Mughal court, although this favourable scenario would only last for some weeks.

While Muqarrab Khan had a troubled return to the Mughal court, Manuel Pinheiro continued his diplomatic activities. According *Da Missam do Mogor*, an anonymous Jesuit manuscript account on the Jesuit mission at the Mughal court for 1610–1611 held at the Biblioteca Ajuda, Jahangir wrote to the missionary to thank him 'for pacifying his lands, with many words of gratitude, and asked him with urgency to go to the court where the emperor was anxiously awaiting him due to the very important businesses which he needed to discuss with him'.<sup>83</sup> The words chosen by the anonymous author of the manuscript to summarise the contents of Jahangir's letter suggest again a Mughal perception of Pinheiro as a 'Mughalised' agent who, although serving the *Estado da Índia*, also acted on behalf of the emperor's interests.

Before travelling to Agra, Pinheiro returned to Goa carrying a letter and present from Jahangir. After some time at the capital of the *Estado da Índia*, by July 1610, Pinheiro returned to the Mughal court with a letter and a gift from Viceroy Rui Lourenço de Távora. Jahangir 'celebrated greatly' the viceroy's gift and revealed a particular enthusiasm for a collection of Iberian hats offered by Pinheiro. The emperor, according to the Jesuits, 'removed his turban and put one of the hats on, and wore it for some hours, asking for a mirror to see how he looked'.84 As Jorge Flores has argued, these acts of appropriation of foreign identities and material cultures performed by emperors such as Akbar and Jahangir often sought to express Mughal superiority, acting as a symbolic incorporation of other polities into the Mughal imperial imagintion.85 In contrast, European agents and writers often tended to see these acts as a sympathetic gesture that demonstrated a special inclination towards their interests.

Apart from appreciating the gifts from Goa, Jahangir had several conversations with Manuel Pinheiro to discuss 'the great travails which

<sup>82</sup> William Hawkins, "Captaine William Havvkins", p. 212.

<sup>83</sup> BA, Cod. 49-V-18, "Da Missam do Mogor", f. 333r.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., f. 336r.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

he [Pinheiro] had to endure on the king's behalf'. Again, the Ajuda manuscript presents Pinheiro as a 'Mughalised' agent who integrated into the emperor's inner circle. Pinheiro received public and 'extraordinary demonstrations of his love and familiarity' from Jahangir, leaving many Mughal courtiers and officials 'stunned and amazed' (*attonitos e pasmados*).<sup>86</sup> The favourable and friendly treatment conceded by the emperor to the missionary was another suggestion of an apparent proximity to the *Estado da Índia*. Indeed, following Pinheiro's return to Agra, Jahangir performed two symbolic overtures towards the Portuguese.

Muqarrab Khan was probably one the subjects of the conversations between Jahangir and Pinheiro. The Jesuit seemed to have successfully persuaded the emperor to rehabilitate the Royal Confidant. His reintegration into the emperor's inner circle is patent in a painting attributed to Manohar depicting Jahangir receiving one of his sons, Prince Parviz, surrounded by a restricted group of courtiers that included Muqarrab Khan. It was precisely during Pinheiro's presence at Agra that Jahangir appointed Muqarrab Khan to head a new embassy to Goa. Indeed, his hostility towards the EIC, Christian sympathies and apparent alignment with Portuguese commercial and geopolitical interests made the *mutasaddi*, in the eyes of the Portuguese authorities, the preferred interlocutor to discuss Luso-Mughal affairs.

The rehabilitation of the Royal Confidant sought thus to ensure a Portuguese willingness to extend the diplomatic exchanges with Jahangir to direct contacts with Philip III. Besides ensuring that the embassy would be led by someone well regarded in Goa, Jahangir made a powerful symbolic gesture of proximity by allowing the conversion to Catholicism of his nephews, the three sons of Prince Daniyal—Thamuras, Baysungjar and Hoshang—who were under the tutelage of Francesco Corsi and Jerónimo Xavier.

The Ajuda manuscript insinuates that Jahangir decided to baptise his nephews after being impressed by a farewell gift offered by Pinheiro before his departure to Goa. The emperor was 'grateful' (*penhorado*) for the lavish present of a basket with silk flowers ornated with 'artfully crafted' gold threads. Taking advantage of the impact of his gift on Jahangir, Pinheiro requested the 'privilege' (*mercê*) of allowing him to baptise the three princes upon his return from Goa. To add a slightly dramatic tone to the request, the Ajuda manuscript mentions that if the emperor approved this request, Pinheiro promised to be an 'eternal captive' of Jahangir, a statement that exposed and reinforced the incorporation of the missionary into the Mughal polity. Jerónimo Xavier, who was also present at the audience, observed that Jahangir's intention to baptise his nephews had already been reported to Goa, and if this promise never materialised the emperor's word and reputation would be discredited in India. Jahangir replied 'with his mouth full of laughter' giving his permission to baptise his nephews immediately.87

For the Jesuit missionaries, the conversion and baptism of three members of the Mughal royal family represented a coup that equated their mission in Agra to the more successful Jesuit exploits in China, Japan and Ethiopia. It was a much-welcomed achievement that ensured the continuity of a mission deemed as 'fruitless' and enhanced the triumphal narrative of Catholic global expansion promoted by the Jesuit propaganda.88

For the *padres*, the baptism of the Mughal princes was a crucial symbolic event with the potential to improve the social status of Christians in Mughal India. A rather anecdotal example of the lobbying made by the *padres* is the permission given by Jahangir in 1609 allowing the Jesuits to celebrate the conversion of new Christians in public with the same honorary privileges granted to those who converted to Islam. The story behind this privilege reveals, however, the subaltern position of the Jesuit missionaries at the Mughal court. The request to surround Christian converts with the same elements of distinction conferred to Muslim converts derived from the honours granted by Jahangir to an Armenian Christian who converted to Islam in 1609. The emperor allowed the Armenian convert to parade the streets of Agra riding an elephant with great pomp. Aware of the implications of the symbolic dimension of the public honours granted to someone who converted from Christianity to Islam could have on the local Christian communities, Xavier asked the emperor for a similar privilege to those who decided to convert to Christianity. Jahangir accepted the proposal, but only under the condition that the convert should ride an ass, imitating the triumphal entry of Jesus

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., f. 338r.

<sup>88</sup> Luke Classey, *Salvation and Globalization in the Early Jesuit Missions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

in Jerusalem. Xavier noted that in Europe this could be considered as a humiliation. Jahangir reconsidered and allowed Christian converts to be carried by elephants, but only if the *padres* rode an ass, a condition accepted by the *padres*. The anecdotal story of the Jesuits and the ass thus reveals Jahangir's intention to expose the subservience and dependence of the Jesuit missionaries. By forcing the *padres* to participate in a ceremony that involved elements that had negative connotations in the European symbolic repertoire, Jahangir stressed the fragile position of the Jesuit missionaries as figures that were utterly dependent on the goodwill and needs of the Mughal authorities.89 Indeed, when on 5 September 1610 the three Mughal princes were baptised, they were transported by elephants to visit the Jesuit church on holy days.

Jahangir conceived of the baptism of the three princes not only as manoeuvre to undermine the ambitions of potential rival factions, but also as a public event in which the *firangi* and Christian communities were able to demonstrate their incorporation into the Mughal sociopolitical apparatus and submission to the emperor's authority. The description made by William Finch of the lavish ceremonies staged by Jahangir and the Jesuits reveals a clear Mughal intention to use the baptism ceremony to expose the obedience of the *firangi*. Although Finch presented the baptism of Jahangir's nephews as an act of 'dissimulation', his description highlighted William Hawkins' prominent role in the ceremonies as a demonstration of the privileged position of the English nation at the Mughal court:

But to returne to this dissimulation (as since it hath to the world appeared) those three Princes were Christened solemnly, conducted to Church by all the Christians of the Citie, to the number of some sixtie horse, Captaine *Hawkins* being in the head of them, with S. *Georges* colours carried before him, to the honour of the *English* Nation, letting them flie in the Court before *Sha Selim* himselfe.<sup>90</sup>

If Finch interpreted Hawkins' prominent role as an illustration of the successful advancement of English interests at Jahangir's court, a Mughal

<sup>89</sup> ARSI, Goa, 33-I, "Annual Letter 1610", f. 307v. See also: Arnulf Camps, *Jerome Xavier and the Muslims of Mogul Empire*, p. 188.

<sup>90</sup> William Finch, "Obseruations of William Finch, Merchant, Taken Out of His Large Iournall" in *Purchas His Pilgrimes*, p. 429.

audience would probably read the presence of the English Chan in a different manner. He was, after all, a European who had recently received a *mansabdar*. His distinguished position in a parade of the Christian community of Agra represented thus his relevant status among the *firangi*, but not in the Mughal court or polity. Hawkins' *mansabdar* made him a secular agent who was able to represent the *firangi* at the court, a 'Mughalised' Frank fully incorporated into the Mughal imperial apparatus. More than representing the English nation in the baptism of the three princes, Hawkins demonstrated the submission of the Franks to Mughal sovereignty.

Jahangir's decision reanimated the hopes of the emperor's conversion and the formation of a Luso-Mughal entente. The enthusiastic reports sent by the Jesuit missionaries in Agra are also mirrored in the correspondence of Viceroy Ruy Lourenço de Távora with Philip III. In one letter dated 29 December 1610, the viceroy reported the baptism of the three princes, baptised as Carlos, Henrique and Filipe—the names of the previous and current monarchs of Portugal and Spain. The connection with the Iberian Crowns was reinforced by Jahangir's wish to have Philip III act as the godfather of his homonymous nephew. Távora believed that this was a unique opportunity to enhance the prestige and influence of the Iberian monarchy. The viceroy urged Philip III to be the godfather of the three boys, instead of just one, and send to them 'velvets and clothes, so they could dress according to Spanish fashion, as well as black and coloured hats with plumes, and also swords'.91 More than symbolic tokens from their godfather, these were gifts that would transform them into true representatives of Catholicism and Iberian culture. As Távora explained, the goal was to 'make each of their bodies appear [Iberian] and for them to esteem these [gifts], not because they use them, but because they were sent by Your Majesty'.<sup>92</sup>

The conversion of Jahangir's nephews was probably one of the most embarrassing misunderstandings of the Jesuit missionaries. Although Francesco Corsi and Jerónimo Xavier were initially apprehensive on the real intentions of the Mughal princes, their baptism in a public ceremony suggested a potential breakthrough to the mission. However, after a few

<sup>91</sup> ANTT, Miscelâneas Manuscritas do Convento da Graça, tomo 3 (cx. 2), "Lourenço de Távora to Philip III, Goa, 29 December 1610", f. 361v.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

years, the three sons of Prince Daniyal reverted to Islam. The Jesuits explained this setback as another case of Muslim untrustworthiness, but the meteoric conversion and defection of the three princes seemed to have been influenced by complex and subtle political manoeuvres that Corsi and Xavier were unable to grasp.

Jahangir's surprising decision to allow his nephews to convert to Christianity should be analysed as a simultaneous attempt to thwart a rival faction of the imperial family and make a friendly overture to the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*, the patron of the Jesuit mission. According to William Hawkins, Jahangir's interest in baptising the princes was not motivated by the emperor's apparent growing Christian inclinations, 'but upon the prophecy of certain learned Gentiles, who told him, that the sons of his body should be disinherited, and the children of his brother should reign'. The objective was thus to alienate three potential rivals to the Mughal throne by altering their religious affiliation and exploring the hostility of the Sunni orthodox faction towards Christianity. As Hawkins explained, Jahangir wanted to 'make these children hateful to all Moors, as Christians are odious in their sight: and that they being once Christians, when any such matter should happen, they should find no subjects'. Some years later, while commenting on the conversion of Prince Dainyial's sons in his *Remonstratie*, Francisco Pelsaert corroborated this perception, stressing that the emperor's motivations were not based on his interest in Christianity but on pure political calculations:

He did so not because he thought well of or was attached to that religion, but in order to turn away the affections of everyone from them. He did not wish that they should enjoy the support of the great nobles for their father's sake, who was much loved by everyone.<sup>93</sup>

In fact, Jahangir had already previously taken even more aggressive measures against potential rivals. Mirza Hakim's sons and grandsons were incarcerated, purged, and their status downgraded. Prince Khusrau, Jahangir's son, was imprisoned and then blinded following his involvement in several plots to overthrow his father.94 Although the Jesuits were aware of Jahangir's violent treatment of his rivals, they often related

<sup>93</sup> Francisco Pelsaert, *A Dutch Chronicle of Mughal India* ed. and trans. B. Narain and S. R. Sharma (Lahore, repr, 1978), p. 74.

<sup>94</sup> Munis Faruqui, *Princes*, p. 34.

this to a demonstration of royal authority and failed to detect a rather coherent strategy or behaviour that aimed to quash the political influence and ambitions of different branches of the Mughal royal family.95

#### VI

It was with an atmosphere of enthusiasm that the Mughal embassy was received in Goa. The prospect of Jahangir's conversion and the formation of a Luso-Mughal alliance encouraged Viceroy Rui Lourenço de Távora to prepare a sumptuous reception to Muqarrab Khan. The first meeting between the viceroy and the Mughal ambassador was attended by 'all the nobility of Goa' and culminated with a banquet that left 'the ambassador and his Gujaratis in awe after seeing the style and ceremony in which the Portuguese nobility are served, because the pages were all lavishly dressed, the cutlery and plates (*baixela*) were the finest one could find in India, the delicacies the most delightful, and the sweets unbeatable'.96 Muqarrab Khan's presence in Goa served as pretext to stage a lavish celebration in honour of the baptism of the three princes, which included a *jogo de canas* performed by the member of the Goan elite.97

Apart from formal and informal meetings with the viceroy, Muqarrab Khan's days in Goa involved a good deal of exploring opportunities for his own private business. His contacts and trading ventures with local merchants and luminaries sought to expand his commercial network, but also to boost the activities of the Gujarati ports. One of the associates of the Royal Confidant was Dom Estevão de Ataíde, an aristocrat and high-ranking official of the *Estado* involved in the Portuguese expansionist campaigns in Mozambique and Monomotapa. This partnership, which reflects a Mughal interest in exploring the trade routes linking West India to East Africa, led the Mughal ambassador to present a petition to the viceroy requesting a pardon to one António Monteiro, the captain of a trade ship sent by Dom Estevão to Mozambique and Khambhat.<sup>98</sup> Muqarrab Khan's petition was approved by Ruy Lourenço de Távora, probably as a gesture of goodwill towards the representative

 Ibid., pp. 33–34. BA, Cod. 49-V-18, "Da Missam do Mogor", f. 344v. Ibid., ff. 344v–345r. BA, Cod. 51-VIII-21, f. 116r.

of the Mughal emperor, but in Lisbon and Madrid the involvement of a Mughal grandee in the East African trade was alarming enough to launch an inquiry.99

Muqarrab Khan's successful diplomatic and commercial dealings in Goa derived mostly from his secret conversion to Catholicism. Although the Mughal sources and the records of the English and Dutch East India companies do not mention the decision of the Royal Confidant to embrace Christianity, the Portuguese and Jesuit records, such as the Ajuda manuscript, have several references to what was perceived as a remarkable diplomatic and missionary achievement.

The ambassador's move towards conversion was initiated in 1608 after Manuel Pinheiro's intervention in the cure of his adoptive son, Masihi-Kairanawi. According to the Jesuit documentation, Muqarrab Khan contacted the Jesuit hierarchy expressing his intention to baptise Maish in Goa. Initially, Viceroy Ruy Lourenço de Távora attributed the ambassador's desire to baptise his adoptive son not to a genuine spiritual transformation, but to a symbolic gesture in which the Royal Confidant was expressing his proximity to the emperor by imitating Jahangir's decision to convert his nephews to Catholicism.

Masih, however, due to his poor health and the *saudades* (profound melancholy, nostalgy) of his mother, would not travel to Goa. To ensure the conversion of his son, Muqarrab Khan asked the Jesuit superiors to send to Khambhat a Christian woman to 'teach his wife the doctrine and how to dress in the Portuguese fashion'. The request was approved and a Japanese woman, probably a slave, 'educated among the Portuguese', was sent to Gujarat. The choice of a Japanese convert sought to exhibit a non-European dimension of Catholicism and promote what was still considered to be one of the success stories of the Jesuit overseas missions.<sup>100</sup> Besides, the Jesuits missionaries in Japan had successfully employed local women as informal catechisers to guarantee a continuous indoctrination of families or converts in more secluded or private domestic spaces.101 The choice of a Japanese Christian woman was thus a

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., f. 116r.

<sup>100</sup> Andrew C. Ross, *A Vision Betrayed: The Jesuits in Japan and China 1542–1742* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1994).

<sup>101</sup> Haruko Nawata Ward, "Jesuits, Too: Jesuits, Women Catechists, and Jezebels in Christian-Century Japan," in *The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1773*, vol. well-tested solution that ensured that Muqarrab Khan's family would be correctly introduced to Christianity and Portuguese manners.

While in Goa, Muqarrab Khan continued his flirtation with the Jesuits. He visited the Jesuit Church and the College of St Paul several times. During these visits, the ambassador was, according to the Ajuda manuscript, 'impressed with the Catholic ways and divine cult, temples and their majesty'.<sup>102</sup> For the Jesuits, this continuous exposure to Christianity encouraged Muqarrab Khan to convert. After one of his visits, the Royal Confidant asked Manuel Pinheiro to discreetly communicate to the Jesuit visitor, Nicolau Pimenta, his decision to be baptised. The ceremony needed to be performed in absolute secrecy. Muqarrab Khan feared that the news of his conversion would cause an upheaval at the Mughal court and Khambhat, instigating the hostility 'of some Mughal lords who would take it badly'.<sup>103</sup> Secrecy was required to protect the career and status of the Royal Confidant, but also to ensure that he would be able 'to help Christians and encourage others to follow his example'.104 In other words, Muqarrab Khan proposed acting as an undercover Christian agent who would use his status, wealth and political influence at the service of the Jesuit mission.

After consulting the viceroy, 'who celebrated the conversion', Nicolau Pimenta arranged a baptism ceremony 'with absolute secrecy and dissimulation'.<sup>105</sup> During a meeting with the viceroy at the Jesuit headquarters, Muqarrab Khan was asked by Ruy Lourenço de Távora 'to discuss confidential business in secrecy'. Then, he was taken to a chapel and baptised in a ceremony performed by Nicolau Pimenta, assisted by Manuel Pinheiro, who served as an interpreter. The ceremony was also attended by the viceroy who acted as Muqarrab Khan's godfather and could not avoid 'many tears of joy' for witnessing the conversion of a Muslim.106

Muqarrab Khan chose João for his Christian name as a homage to João III, the monarch who promoted the Jesuit missions in the *Estado*

<sup>102</sup> BA, Cod. 49-V-18, "Da Missam do Mogor", f. 346v.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., f. 347r.

II ed. John W. O'Malley, Gauvin Alexander Bailey, Steven J. Harris and T. Frank Kennedy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), pp. 638–657.

*da Índia*, and to St John the Baptist, 'for the esteem that the Moors have for this saint'.<sup>107</sup> He also adopted the surname Távora to honour his godfather, Viceroy Ruy Lourenço de Távora. Due to his status as the Royal Confidant, both Portuguese and Jesuit sources identified the new convert with the honourable title of Dom, a mark of distinction intended to relate Muqarrab Khan to the Portuguese nobility. Dom João de Távora's choice of names reflects a Jesuit intention to use Muqarrab Khan as a propaganda coup, but also the Mughal ambassador's ability to manipulate familiar Christian elements such as the veneration for St John the Baptist, who is also one of the main Islamic prophets, and use his conversion to create an intimate link and forge a partnership with the viceroy.

For the Jesuits this was a genuine conversion. During the baptism ceremony, the Mughal ambassador expressed his inner desire to remain in Goa and join the Society of Jesus. After being baptised, he attended Mass every day in secret and 'with much devotion'. He also ended his embassy with a favourable agreement for the *Estado da Índia* that established 'perpetual peace and friendship' with the Mughal Empire and obliged Jahangir to ban Dutch and English trade in Mughal ports. Besides his ability to protect Portuguese interests, upon his return to Khambhat, Dom João de Távora sought to enhance the status of the Jesuit missionaries. When Nicolau Pimenta visited Khambhat, Dom João honoured the Jesuits by 'taking the Fathers around the city, which is very big, on elephants covered in gold and richly ornated'.108 Some years after Muqarrab Khan's baptism, in a letter to António Mascarenhas, Manuel Pinheiro praised 'Dom João, the ambassador who became Christian in Goa' for lobbying Jahangir to subsidise the acquisition of a Jesuit house.<sup>109</sup>

More importantly, the metamorphosis of Muqarrab Khan into Dom João de Távora had Jahangir's approval. The Ajuda manuscript mentions that upon his return to Agra, Manuel Pinheiro discreetly reported to the emperor that Muqarrab Khan had been baptised in Goa. Jahangir reacted positively, 'saying in secret that he wished to be there, and that everything has its time'.110 In another conversation with Pinheiro, Jahangir

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., f. 348v.

<sup>109</sup> ARSI, Goa 46-I, "Manuel Pinheiro to António Mascarenhas, 24 December 1613". f. 77r.

<sup>110</sup> BA, Cod. 49-V-18, "Da Missam do Mogor", f. 353r.

suggested that he was delaying his conversion for fear of 'riots and mutinies', and implied that the baptism of his nephews sought to evaluate the reactions of the different Muslim factions at court. The emperor even voiced his desire to be baptised by Pinheiro.<sup>111</sup> However, the expectations of the secular authorities of Goa regarding Dom João de Távora dissipated quickly. In December 1611, the viceroy complained about the behaviour of Muqarrab Khan, describing him as a 'a crooked Muslim' (*mouro velhaco*), who promptly reverted to Islam and used his conversion to trick the Portuguese.<sup>112</sup>

#### VII

Muqarrab Khan's rehabilitation seemed to have kickstarted the deterioration of Hawkins' position at the Mughal court. The destiny of the English Chan seemed to have been linked to the outcome of the Mughal embassy to Goa. Jahangir's decision to send an embassy to the capital of the *Estado da Índia*, according to Hawkins' account, emerged after the arrival of 'a Present of many rare things' and a letter from the Portuguese viceroy. The contents of the letter dealt with two matters. The first was to remind Jahangir that the concession of trading privileges to the English would force Philip III to reconsider the 'ancient amitie' with the Mughal Empire. The other was to report the presence in Goa of a merchant who wanted to sell 'a very faire ballace Ruby, weighing three hundred and fiftie Rotties'. The warning made by Viceroy Ruy Lourenço de Távora prompted Hakwins' three nemeses (Muqarrab Khan, Manuel Pinheiro and Abdul Hasan) to arrange a meeting between the emperor and a group of Surat-based merchants to persuade the emperor of the disadvantages of allowing the EIC to operate in Gujarat. Besides the emergence of a new competitor, many in Surat feared that the presence of English merchants posed a serious risk of a prolonged naval blockade by the Portuguese armada, which would inevitably impede local tradesmen involved in the maritime routes of the Indian Ocean. Jahangir, according to Hawkins, agreed with this perception and like the Surat merchants shared the fears that 'hereafter any toy could [not] come into this country, because the Portugal was so strong at sea, and would not suffer them to goe in

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., f. 347v. <sup>112</sup> BNP, Reservados, Cod. 1975, f. 208v. or out of their Ports'.<sup>113</sup> Hawkins thus presents this Mughal volte-face as a combination of a foreign policy dictated by flexible tacticism and Jahangir's obsession for 'toys'. Indeed, besides the negative impact of a prolonged conflict with the *Estado*, Hawkins suggested that the emperor was swayed in his decision to revoke the concession of a *firman* to the EIC by his desire to acquire the rare ruby reported by Lourenço de Távora, as well as by more 'promises by the Fathers of rare things'.114

The courtly modus operandi and the emperor's eagerness for 'toys' implied, as Hakwins noted, that 'there is no man that commeth to make petition, who commeth emptie-handed'.<sup>115</sup> Perceiving the emperor's decision-making to be motivated by materialistic interests, Hawkins sought thus to anticipate the gifts that would arrive from Goa. Immediately after the departure of Muqarrab Khan and Manuel Pinheiro, the English Chan invested in a gift-giving campaign that targeted Jahangir and relevant courtiers, including those hostile to English interests. Despite the lack of support of many courtiers who, according to Hawkins, 'had eaten of me many Presents', the gift offered to Jahangir had a persuasive effect. In a gesture of appreciation for the gift, the emperor reaffirmed his intention to grant trading privileges to the EIC and 'commanded that no man should open his mouth to the contrary: for it was his pleasure that the English should come into his Ports'.<sup>116</sup> Hawkins' paraphrase of Jahangir repeated the idea that the emperor's predisposition to support the EIC was frustrated by the persistent opposition of influential actors who were able to manipulate the emperor. However, more than seeking to reassure Hawkins, Jahangir's declaration of his 'pleasure' to have the EIC operating in Mughal ports was aimed at Goa. The timing of the emperor's statement, while an embassy was en route to Goa, had the potential to pressure the Portuguese authorities to reach a quick and favourable agreement under the threat of a possible Anglo-Mughal entente.

Soon after Hawkins had his meeting with Jahangir, members of the imperial inner circle informed the Jesuits about the new *firman* and the

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> William Hawkins, "Captaine William Havvkins", p. 214.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

news eventually reached Muqarrab Khan and Pinheiro. The two emissaries wrote to Jahangir and Abdul Hasan advising against the *firman* mentioning that, like in 1609, the Portuguese would not receive the embassy and possibly reject further negotiations. The letter persuaded Jahangir to annul the *firman* and frustrated Hawkins, who accused the emperor of inconstancy and frivolity for going against 'his word, esteeming a few toyes which the Fathers had promised him, more than his honour'.<sup>117</sup> Hawkins made a final attempt and mobilised some of his supporters to press Jahangir to reconsider his decision, but with no effect. According to the emperor, the progress made by the Mughal embassy in Goa meant that the concession of trading privileges to the EIC no longer served 'my affaires in my Ports in Guzerat'.

Despite this final volte-face, Jahangir sought to maintain the English Chan at the Mughal court, albeit in conditions that Hawkins considered to be inadequate to his status serving in a post located 'in places where Out-lawes raigned'. After being informed of the arrival of a new English fleet at Surat, Hawkins made a last attempt to regain a privileged position at court and presented another petition to Jahangir with 'great hope, that the King would performe former grants, in hope of rare things that should come from England'. This manoeuvre, however, failed. The emperor directed Hawkins to Abdul Hasan, who informed the English Chan of the decision to remove his *mansabdar* and bar him from the red rayles, the restricted space of the Mughal court thatred, as Hawkins explained, was 'a place of honour, where all my time I was placed very neere unto the King, in which place there were but fiue men in the Kingdome before me'.<sup>118</sup>

If Hawkins presented his ostracism from the Mughal court as the result of the machinations of his rivals and Jahangir's flexible tactics, one English witness of his downfall, John Jourdain, described the demotion of the English Chan as the inevitable outcome of a series of miscalculations and erratic behaviour. Jourdain arrived at Agra on 16 February 1611, after being instructed by Hawkins to bring to Agra the monies obtained from the sale of all the lead transported from England to Surat. In his journal, Jourdain mentions that after his arrival at the Mughal capital he received the information that Hawkins 'was in some disgrace'. Apart

<sup>117</sup> Ibid. <sup>118</sup> Ibid. from his clashes with Muqarrab Khan, Manuel Pinheiro and Abdul Hasan, the English Chan was involved in two problematic episodes that caused irreparable damages to his reputation. The first was a diplomatic incident caused by William Finch, who provoked the ire of Jahangir's mother, Maryam-uz-Zamani, after outbidding one of her agents for a considerable amount of indigo. Maryam-uz-Zamani complained to Jahangir and accused Hawkins of trying to 'buye up all the indico' against the interests of the imperial family.119 Finch's aggressive business approach suggested that the English were not willing to act as subordinated supplicants of the Mughal Empire, but as competitors ready to thwart Mughal trading activities.

This was probably one of the reasons for the problems faced by Finch in Lahore, when he tried to sell the indigo with no success. Frustrated by these difficulties and Jahangir's decision to cancel the *firman* granted to the EIC, he informed Hawkins of his intention to sell the indigo in Aleppo and then return to England. Believing that Finch's real intention was to 'runne away', Hawkins discreetly sent a letter of power of attorney to a Jesuit missionary in Lahore authorising him to seize all goods carried by Finch. To avoid suggestions that he allowed the Jesuits to interfere in the company's affairs, Hawkins also instructed Nicholas Ufflet to travel to Lahore to collect the indigo.120

There was, however, another faux pas that triggered the end of Hawkins' career at the Mughal court. In 1611, Jahangir instructed his courtiers to refrain from the consumption of wine. One day, however, Hawkins appeared at the emperor's quarters with signs of 'stronge drinke' being reprimanded by Jahangir 'in presence of the whole courte'.121 Although, Jourdain noted that this incident had the mark of one of Hawkins' rivals, Abdul Hasan, who knew that the English Chan was a 'great drinker',122 the failure to follow Jahangir's order revealed an absence of self-control that damaged the public image of the EIC emissary and ended his privileged access to the restricted spaces of the court. Indeed, the price for not conforming to the emperor's code of conduct

<sup>119</sup> John Jourdain, *The Journal of John Jourdain, 1608–1617: Describing His Experiences in Arabia, India, and the Malay Archipelago* ed. William Foster (Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1904), p. 156.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., pp. 157–158.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., p. 156.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

was that Hawkins 'could not be suffered to come into his accustomed place neere the Kinge'.<sup>123</sup> Without direct access to Jahangir, the English Chan lost his capacity to influence imperial decision-making or interact with key actors in the imperial apparatus. This inability forced Hawkins to reduce his presence at the court and to contemplate a return to England.

After obtaining leave from the Mughal court, Hawkins mentions that he had no option but to 'currie fauour with the Iesuites' in order to obtain a safe conduct that would allow him and his wife to travel to Goa, where they would then embark for Europe. This initial plan, however, changed. Before leaving Agra, the family of Hawkins' wife persuaded him to settle in Goa. Although Mariam Khan wanted to travel with his husband to Europe, Hawkins contemplated the possibility of living in the *Estado* and negotiated with the Jesuits for the concession of two safe conducts:

one concerning my quiet being, and ftee libertie of conscience in Goa, and to bee as a Portugall in all Tradings and Commerce in Goa: (this was to shew my Wifes Parents.) The other was an absolute grant for free passage into Portugall, and so for England, with my Wife and Goods, without any disturbances of any of my Wiues friends: and what agreements I made with them to be void and of none effect, but I should stay or goe, when I pleased with free libertie of conscience for my selfe.<sup>124</sup>

This apparent dissimulative approach towards Mariam Khan's family sought to dissipate suspicions of an intention to decamp to the *Estado da Índia*. However, according to Jourdain, Hawkins incessantly pressured him to travel to Goa as well, being 'very desirous to have mee staye with him to goe (…) with his wife and familie'.<sup>125</sup> These pressures included promises of 'greate wages'. Jourdain refused and doubted the veracity of Hawkins' promises, a man that 'was very fickle in his resolucion, as alsoe in his religion'. Indeed, making a connection with the promises of financial rewards in Goa, Jourdain mentioned that Hawkins' had embraced Muslim and South Asian customs: 'for in his howse he used altogether the custome of the Moores or Mahometans, both in his meate and drinke and other customes, and would seeme to bee discontent if

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> William Hawkins, "Captaine William Havvkins", p. 215.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., p. 161.

all men did not the like'.126 Indeed, Hawkins not only embraced local garb, but throughout his time at the Mughal court he also adopted a Indo-Persian habitus, a set of social practices that could facilitate his integration. Such a strategy of accommodation can be related to the processes termed by Irving Hallowell as 'transculturalization', where 'individuals under a variety of circumstances are temporarily or permanently detached from one group, enter the web of social relations that constitute another society, and come under the influence of its customs, ideas, and values to a greater or lesser degree'.127 These processes often allowed individuals to play a dual role as effectives member of different sociocultural realities, and thus able to serve as efficient mediators. By adopting an Indo-Persian habitus, the English Chan sought to become a more familiar and reliable figure to the Mughal courtiers, and thus improve his chances of success.

To Jourdain's eyes, however, Hawkins had an unstable identity and was on the verge of apostasy, a renegade in the making. Indeed, his remarks reflect European anxieties about the prolonged effects of exposure to Islamic practices and the alluring promises of social mobility and material prosperity offered by Islamic polities.128 'Renegade' or 'Renegadoe' entered the English lexicon in the early 1580s, coinciding with the intensification of English commercial and diplomatic exchanges with the Ottoman Empire and the Sultanate of Morocco. In 1583, for example, Richard Hakluyt's *Principal Navigations* explained that a 'renegade' was someone who 'was first a Christian, and afterwards becommeth a Turke'.129

The adoption of alien Islamicate customs by the English Chan raised questions about his adherence to Christianity and thus to the English national church headed by James I. Besides, Hawkins' *mansabdar* aggravated these suspicions since his incorporation into the Mughal imperial apparatus implied an allegiance to Jahangir. Jourdain's remarks on the

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> A. Irving Hallowell, "American Indians, White and Black: The Phenomenon of Transculturalization", *Current Anthropology*, 4 (1963), p. 523.

<sup>128</sup> Nabil Matar, "The Renegade in English Seventeenth-Century Imagination", *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900*, 33:3 (1993), pp. 489–505 (491)); Barbara Fuchs, "Faithless Empires: Pirates, Renegadoes, and the English Nation", *ELH*, 67:1 (2000).

<sup>129</sup> Thomas Sanders, "The Voyage Made to Tripolis in Barbarie, in the Veere 1583" in *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, vol. II, p. 186.

'fickleness' of his compatriot also sought to warn the EIC hierarchy about how Hawkins' exploits at the Mughal court allowed him to enjoy a considerable degree of individual agency, which allowed him to pursue different avenues to achieve his goal and escape the control of the English authorities. Indeed, the *mansabdar* changed Hawkins' status, offering him an autonomy that meant that his interests would not necessarily be the same as those pursued by the EIC. This conflict of interests is patent in the alleged negotiations between Hawkins and the Jesuits regarding his move to Goa. Jourdain's reference to the 'great wages' offered by Hawkins indicates that the English Chan contemplated the possibility of collaborating with the Portuguese authorities.

At the same time that the safe conducts provided by the Jesuits arrived in Hawkins' hands, Jahangir appointed Abu'l Hasan to the post of *souba* of the Deccan.130 The new *diwan-i-kul* was Mirza Ghiyas Beg, also known by his title of I'timad-ud-Daulah, the father of Jahangir's new wife, Nur Jahan. Ghiyas Beg's son and Nur Jahan's brother, Abu'l Hasan, the future Asaf Khan, was also promoted to the title of Itiqad Khan (Lord of Confidence). These changes in the courtly apparatus prompted by Jahangir's marriage with Nur Jahan were duly noted by Hawkins and perceived as a window of opportunity. Ghiyas Beg and Itiqad Khan were among the courtiers who supported the English Chan's petitions. If the rising Itiqad Khan was one of his 'great friends, he hauing beene often at my house', his father 'was alwayes willing to please me, when I had occasion to use him'. This apparent relation of proximity with two key figures of a Mughal court undergoing a process of reconfiguration or 'alteration', as Hawkins put it,131 together with the news of the imminent arrival of an English fleet, prompted a final attempt to persuade the emperor to grant a *firman* and rehabilitate Hawkins. The plan involved the offer of lavish gifts to Ghiyas Beg, Itiqad Khan, Nur Jahan and Jahangir. First, Hawkins contacted the new *diwan-i-kul* and his son. Apparently persuaded by the gifts, the two men successfully lobbied Jahangir to grant another audience to the English Chan. The audience was apparently a success. The emperor agreed to issue a *firman* allowing the EIC to establish a factory 'and that the English come and freely trade for Surat'.132 More than the sumptuous

<sup>130</sup> *The Jahangirnama*, p. 126.

<sup>131</sup> William Hawkins, "Captaine William Havvkins", p. 215.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., p. 216.

gifts offered by Hawkins, the Mughal predisposition to reconsider English petitions coincided not only with the news of the arrival of an EIC fleet at Surat, but also with Jahangir's dissatisfaction with the progress made by the Mughal embassy to Goa. Indeed, as Hawkins mentioned, Muqarrab Khan 'had not his full content as he expected of the Portugals'.

The emperor's decision to restore the concession of trading privileges to the EIC seemed to be yet another attempt to pressure the *Estado da Índia* to conform to Mughal exigencies. This strategy, however, would be halted once again by the pro-Portuguese faction led by Muqarrab Khan and Abu'l Hasan. According to Hawkins, during his audience with Jahangir, one of the members of this faction, an unnamed courtier identified as 'a great Nobleman and neerest Fauourite of the King', alerted Jahangir to the risks that acting against the agreement made with the *Estado* posed to the emperor's 'honour' and Mughal maritime trade.133 The speech made by the unnamed courtier suggested that the timing of Hawkins' *firman* was not ideal and that an open conflict with the Portuguese should be avoided until all possibilities of negotiation were explored. Indeed, the success of the Deccan campaigns relied on the noninterference of potential rivals with interests in the region such as the Portuguese and the Safavids. Although the *Estado* far from matched the military capacity of the Mughal Empire, the Portuguese could provide logistical support to the Deccani rulers.

The audience ended in another fiasco for Hawkins. The arguments presented by the unnamed courtier convinced the emperor of the 'inconuenience' of allowing English merchants in Gujarat. Nonetheless, Jahangir was willing to rehabilitate the English Chan and restore his privileges if he wanted to continue at the Mughal court.134 The solution presented by the emperor sought to maintain Hawkins as an intermediary with the EIC, as well as an element that allowed the Mughals to pressure the *Estado da Índia*. The events of 1609 and 1610 revealed a Portuguese anxiety with the prospect of Mughal support to the activities of European rivals. This was, indeed, a very real threat, which Jahangir was willing to explore to reach a suitable arrangement with the *Estado*. Hawkins' continuity at the Mughal court indicated thus the emperor's readiness to collaborate with the enemies of the Iberian Crowns.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid. <sup>134</sup> Ibid.

For Hawkins, however, this solution was no longer viable. His chaotic exploits and the difficulties in obtaining a *firman* significantly damaged the initial benevolent perception that the EIC had of its emissary. The doubts cast by John Jourdain regarding Hawkins' 'fickleness' are an indicator of how the English Chan's conduct raised questions among his colleagues. Without the confirmation of a valid *firman* granting trade privileges to the EIC, Hawkins' continuity at the Mughal court as an Englishman employed by a foreign ruler had the potential to raise further questions as to his allegiances and trustworthiness in promoting English interests. As he explained to Jahangir, his presence was impossible 'unless the English should come unto his Ports according to promise, and as for my particular maintenance, my King would not see me want'. Albeit this 'patriotic' explanation is given in a carefully constructed narrative presented in an account that validated the actions of its author, Hawkins' words reveal an assessment that his autonomy and career at the Mughal court and the EIC relied on his ability to produce palpable results for both sides. Without a *firman*, Hawkins would become a minor actor of the Mughal courtly apparatus, a low ranked *mansabdar* with limited agency, utterly reliant on imperial goodwill, and unprotected from the vicissitudes of courtly rivalries. On 2 November 1611, the English Chan left Agra to join the fleet of Sir Henry Middleton, which was anchored near Khambhat on 18 January 1612.135

The Jesuit documents are rather laconic about Hawkins' departure. One letter from Jerónimo Xavier to the Jesuit provincial in Goa published in the *Raguagli d'alcune missioni* (1615) mentioned the disturbing presence of 'some heretics (…) who tried to disturb the happy progress of the Catholic faith, but when the King became aware of their perfidy, he ordered them to be banished from the country, as their evil deeds deserved'.136 The 1611 annual letter from the Mughal mission also noted that Jahangir banned English merchants from Mughal ports, a decision that was connected to the concession of privileges to the Jesuit mission at Surat.<sup>137</sup>

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., pp. 216–217.

<sup>137</sup> ARSI, Goa 33 I–II, "Annual Letter 1612", f. 389r.

<sup>136</sup> Anonymous, *Raguagli d'alcune missioni fatte dalli padri della Compagnia di Giesu nell'Indie orientali, cioè nelle prouincie di Goa, e Coccinno, e nell'Africa in Capo verde* (Rome, 1615), p. 28.

#### VIII

Apart from the narrative on his days at the Mughal court, Hawkins also wrote 'A briefe discourse of the strength, wealth of the Great Mogol'. Like the texts produced by his Jesuit rivals, Hawkins' sought to provide a detailed assessment of the political and economic structures of the Mughal polity based on his observations and exchanges with relevant actors close to Jahangir, vaguely described as 'his chiefe Officers, and Ouer-seers of all his Estate'.<sup>138</sup>

Hawkins' perception of the Mughal court is shaped by an understanding that Eurasian courtly milieus were organised along similar structural tenets. As in Europe, the Mughal elite was formed by a variety of titles ranked according to different degrees of status and wealth, as were their European counterparts. As Hawkins explained:

As Christian Princes use their degrees by Titles, so they have their Degrees and Titles by their number of Horses: unless it be those that the King most favored, whom he honored with the Title of Chan, and Immirza. None have the Title of Sultan but his Sons. Chan in the Persian Language is as much as a Duke, Immirza is the Title for the Kings Brothers Children.139

The correlation established by Hawkins between European and Mughal nobile titles allowed him to frequently refer to European terminology while presenting his own census of a Mughal elite formed by 'dukes', 'marquesses', 'earles', 'viscounts', 'knights', 'esquires', 'gentlemen' and 'yeomen'. The adoption of this terminology also had the advantage of facilitating the analysis of his readers by providing a familiar outline. However, Hawkins highlighted that all members of the Mughal elite were 'called *Mansibdars*, or men of Liuings, or Lordships'.<sup>140</sup>

Hawkins also presented a list of the main *mansabdars*, ordering them according to their *zat* ranks. The list, as M. Athar Ali has noted, has several inaccuracies, such as including Jahangir and his mother as holders of *mansabs*, which suggests that Hawkins followed unreliable sources

<sup>138</sup> William Hawkins, "Captaine William Havvkins", p. 217.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

or his own impressions on the hierarchisation of the imperial elite.141 Nonetheless, such effort to identify and rank prominent members of the Mughal nobility reveal a concern to inform the English authorities about other actors who, due to their political influence and proximity to the emperor, might be approached to promote English interests and successfully lobby Jahangir.

Another concern of the 'discourse' was to evaluate the revenues and resources at the disposal of the Mughal emperor. From the precious stones and silver stored in the imperial treasury to the variety of 'beasts' of the emperor's menagerie, the 'discourse' presents Jahangir as the ruler of a vast and wealthy empire who took full advantage of the natural and fiscal resources provided by the different territories, as well as of the commercial routes that linked Mughal cities with the rest of the world and made India 'rich in silver'.<sup>142</sup> As Hawkins noted, Jahangir embodied the wealth of his empire:

He is exceeding rich in Diamonds, and all other precious stones, and usually wears every day a faire Diamant of great price, and that which he wears this day, till his time be come about to wear it again, he wears not the same: that is to say, all his faire Jewels are divided into a certain quantity or proportion, to wear every day. He also wears a chain of Pearle, very faire and great, and another chain of Emeralds, and ballace Rubies. He hath another Jewell, that comes round about his Turban, full of faire Diamonds and Rubies. It is not much to bee wondered, that he is so rich in Jewels, and in Gold and Silver, when he hath heaped together the Treasure and Jewels of so many Kings, as his forefathers have conquered, who likewise were a long time in gathering them together: and all came to his hands.<sup>143</sup>

Another important source for the spectacular wealth at Jahangir's disposal was the non-hereditary and temporary nature of the *mansabdars*, which allowed the emperor 'to take possession of his Noblemens Treasure when

<sup>141</sup> M. Athar Ali, *The Apparatus of Empire: Awards of Ranks, Offices and Titles to the Mughal Nobility, 1574–1658,* p. xii (Hawkins' List, pp. 90–91).

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., p. 224.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.

they dye, and to bestow on his Children what he pleaseth'.<sup>144</sup> Anticipating the analysis made by François Bernier of the Mughal political system as 'despotic' structure that disregarded the principle of private property, Hawkins' observations on the vulnerable position of the Mughal nobility presents Jahangir as a truly absolute ruler with ample powers to interfere in every sphere of Mughal life. The political organisation of the Mughal Empire depicted by Hawkins was thus, to paraphrase Stephen Blake, grounded on a 'patrimonial-bureaucratic' model that conceived the empire as an extension of the imperial household, a notion that subordinated all subjects to the emperor.<sup>145</sup>

Despite Jahangir's extraordinary wealth and powers, the Mughal Empire had a good deal of internal problems which weakened imperial authority. As Hawkins explained to his readers, the Mughal Empire was formed of five kingdoms covering most of the subcontinent: Punjab, Bengal, Malwa, Gujarat and the Deccan. Jahangir's authority over all these territories, however, faced several challenges posed by 'three Archenemies or Rebels'.<sup>146</sup> In the Deccan, although not a Mughal subject, Malik Ambar—identified by Hawkins as 'Amberry Chapu', a derivation from his original Ethiopian name, Chapu, and *umra-yi Habshi*, the title conferred in Ahmadnagar to commanders of African origin147 threatened Jahangir's expansionist ambitions in the region and launched several attacks in Mughal territories. In Gujarat, the son of the deposed sultan Muzaffar Shah, Bahadur, instigated the local populations to rebel. Another threat was Amar Singh, the ruler of Mewar, who opposed Mughal sovereignty in modern-day Rajasthan. The three 'arch-enemies' identified by the 'Discourse' reveal the difficulties faced by Jahangir to impose Mughal sovereignty in different territories. The scenario presented by Hawkins is indeed one of an empire troubled by the spectre of revolt and dissent in most of its provinces: 'There are many risen at Kandahar,

<sup>144</sup> William Hawkins, "Captaine William Havvkins", p. 219.

<sup>145</sup> Stephen P. Blake, "The Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 39:1 (1979), pp. 77–94.

<sup>146</sup> William Hawkins, "Captaine William Havvkins", p. 218.

<sup>147</sup> See Richard Eaton, *Social History of the Deccan, 1300–1761: Eight Indian Lives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 126–127.

Kabul, Multan, and Sindh, and in the Kingdome of Baloch; Bengal likewise, Deccan, and Gujarat are full [of rebels]'.148 Mobility across different cities was thus deeply affected. The unrest in many Mughal provinces also affected the circulation of persons and goods, an element of most importance to the EIC operations in India. The inability to affirm imperial authority increasingly exposed the routes linking the main Mughal commercial hubs to marauding groups. As Hawkins reported, Mughal roads were 'so full of outlaws, and thieves, that almost a man cannot stirre out of doors, throughout all his Dominions, without great forces for they are all become Rebels'.

As in the Jesuit reports, Hawkins also included more or less detailed descriptions of Jahangir's daily and ritual routine, highlighting the *jharoka-i darshan* (viewing window) and the daily open audiences. Regarding the latter, Hawkins noted the importance of the 'red Rayle' as an element that defined the status of the different courtiers and their proximity to the emperor.<sup>149</sup> The rites performed during Nawroz and the emperor's birthday are also described as celebrations of imperial power where Jahangir exposed his wealth and demonstrated his authority by receiving 'toyes and rare things' from Mughal nobles.<sup>150</sup> Hawkins also dedicates a paragraph to the rites involving the audiences granted by the emperor to Mughal officials serving in posts outside the imperial court. All this information on the rites and ceremonies of Jahangir's court, besides demonstrating Hawkins' observational skills and successful incorporation in the Mughal courtly milieu, could be used to prepare future English emissaries to navigate the protocol and etiquette of a foreign court.

One of Hawkins' probable sources of information were the Jesuit missionaries who, one year before the English Chan penned his 'Discourse', also produced a detailed survey of the Mughal court and imperial household. Written around 1610, the *Tratado da Corte e Caza de Iamguir Pachá* provided relevant information on the emperor and his family, the organisation of the court, the political rituals surrounding the figure of Jahangir, the economic organisation of the empire and its

<sup>148</sup> William Hawkins, "Captaine William Havvkins", p. 224.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., p. 225.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p. 226.

military power. The Spanish versions of the *Tratado* includes a brief reference to a conversation about Agra between the *padres* and Hawkins, 'a well-travelled English captain, who had been to Constantinople'.<sup>151</sup>

Like the 'Discourse', the Jesuit *Tratado* lists the Mughal provinces, estimates imperial revenues and expenses, explains the organisation of the imperial elites, and presents the members of the imperial family, updating the information on the Mughal polity gathered since the first Jesuit mission in the early 1580s. While the Portuguese were more familiar with the Mughals, the *Tratado* seeks to expand Iberian knowledge on the political culture that shaped the functioning of the Mughal state, a concern that cannot be disassociated from the potential intensification of Luso-Mughal relations suggested by Muqarrab Khan's embassy to Goa and Jahangir's plans to send an embassy to the Iberian Peninsula. Besides assessing Jahangir's power and wealth, the *Tratado* also delves into the ideological apparatus of the Mughal polity, describing in detail the rituals that promoted the sacralisation of the emperor and claims of Mughal universal rule. There was an intention to provide information on the ways in which the Mughal polity presented itself, offering elements that could aid Iberian officials to approach the symbolic representations of Mughal imperial power.

Composed five years after Jahangir's accession, and coinciding with Muqarrab Khan's embassy to the *Estado da Índia*, the *Tratado* offered officials in Goa, Lisbon and Madrid an assessment of the Mughal court under a new regime. The document thus followed the instruction given by Philip II to Viceroy Dom Francisco da Gama in 1598 that the Jesuit mission 'should inform about everything related to the Mughal king and how it is done'.152 The fact that there are four known versions of the *Tratado* in Portuguese and Spanish, located in Lisbon (one at the Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo) and Madrid (one at the Biblioteca Nacional de España and two at the Real Academia de Historia), suggests that this report had reasonable circulation within the political and intellectual circles of the Iberian Union.153

<sup>151</sup> RAH, 9-3716/8, "Breue Relacion de las tierras, poder y casa del Gran Mogor, enviada por los Padres de la Compañía", f. 103r.

<sup>152</sup> "Philip II to viceroy Dom Francisco da Gama, Lisbon, 21 November 1598", in *Archivo Portuguez Oriental*, Fasc. 3 ed. J. H. Cunha Rivara (New Delhi, 1992), p. 919.

<sup>153</sup> Jorge Flores, *The Mughal Padshah: A Jesuit Treatise on Emperor Jahangir's Court and Household* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), p. 27.

While two versions of the treatise ignore the question of authorship, the other existing versions suggest that one of Jerónimo Xavier or Manuel Pinheiro was behind the text. It is also possible, as Jorge Flores has suggested, that the *Tratado* was a composite text supervised by Xavier with contributions from other members of the mission such as Manuel Pinheiro, António Machado, Francesco Corsi and Giuseppe di Castro.154 Questions of authorship aside, the author(s) of the *Tratado* had access to a specific type of information that circulated through the channels of the Mughal bureaucratic apparatus and was accessible to those who were at the imperial court, either in written form or through oral accounts provided by other courtiers or officials. Indeed, some of the contents of the *Tratado* are very similar to topics covered by Abu'l Fazl's *A'ini Akbari* (c. 1595), such as the emperor's household, the treasuries, the harem, the imperial menagerie, the *mansabdars* and the imperial finances and administration, which suggests an influence of local sources in the contents and presentation of the information provided.

Unlike Antoni Montserrat, who provided a psychological and physical portrait of Akbar, the author(s) of the *Tratado* preferred to give a political portrait of Jahangir, which depicted an authoritarian and arrogant ruler whose religious affiliation was ambiguous, a man,

who no one can say if he is a Muslim, a Gentile or a Christian, because he does not firmly believe in any religion, he is a barbarian who lives according to chance, following his appetites, full of pride and the vainglory of the world, behaving like he is the lord of everything, and he is very cruel and vindictive, having no mercy.<sup>155</sup>

Such a negative portrayal reveals a Jesuit frustration with the emperor's ambiguous attitude towards Christianity and the increasing tensions caused by the antagonist interests of the *Estado* and the Mughal authorities in Gujarat and the Deccan.

Jahangir's incredible wealth derived from the conquests made by his predecessors who 'conquered prosperous and wealthy Kingdoms'. The Mughal authorities were, therefore, able to 'collect many treasures and

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>155</sup> Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo (ANTT), Casa Real, no. 7240, cap. 897, "Tratado da Corte, e Caza de Iamguir Pachá Rey dos Mogores", f. 6v.

expand their revenues through taxation'.156 The imperial treasury was also expanded through the confiscation of the estates of the deceased *mansabdars*, a custom presented by Xavier as an act of tyranny. Anticipating the negative comments of François Bernier on the absence of private property in the Mughal Empire, the *Tratado* mentions that Jahangir confiscated the assets of deceased Mughal noblemen. The emperor's fabulous wealth was therefore based on 'the sweat of his subjects' and obtained 'through one hundred thousand powers and insolences (…) taking all their wealth, leaving their sons and wives disinherited, with little more than nothing'.157

The *Tratado* also sought to provide a meticulous account of the daily routine and rituals surrounding Jahangir, which are presented as an integral part of an effort of centralisation and affirmation of imperial authority. The Mughal emperor established 'a prominent style of state (…) in order to show that his subjects serve him with such punctuality and respect, that all grandees and the common people are so dedicated to serve him in a way that no other king in the world is served'.<sup>158</sup> The ritual life of the Mughal court also contributed to sacralising Jahangir, inciting his subjects to 'worship him like a God'.<sup>159</sup> This effort of sacralisation are detected, for example, in Jahangir's salutations to the sun—a rite inaugurated by Akbar that explored Hindu, Jain and Zoroastrian traditions of sun worship. Another important element was the daily performance of the *jharoka-i darshan*, a ceremony consisting of a public appearance of the emperor at sunrise that, inspired by Indo-Persian kingship traditions, sought to exalt the emperor by making him visually accessible to all subjects.160 These public appearances, as Azfar Moin noted, surrounded the emperor with a sacred aura, connecting his personal rites 'to that of a deity venerated in a temple'.161

The *Tratado* estimated that Jahangir had 500 wives 'with whom he is married according to their custom'. These women were usually the

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., f. 17.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., f. 8.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., f. 7.

<sup>159</sup> ANTT, Casa Real, no. 7240, cap. 897, "Tratado", f. 7.

<sup>160</sup> Ebba Koch, *Mughal Art and Imperial Ideology*, p. 133.

<sup>161</sup> A. Azfar Moin, *The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 219.

daughters of *mansabdars* and vassal Hindu rulers, revealing the political function of the harem as an instrument that allowed the emperor to forge matrimonial alliance to consolidate political, ethnic and diplomatic partnerships. Although Jahangir appreciated the political utility of the harem, the emperor was also obsessed in collecting women. Among his 500 wives were 'persons of little standing and worth from their blood, with whom he only marries because of their beauty'.<sup>162</sup> According to the *Tratado*, 'whenever the king knows that there is some extremely beautiful woman, the people offer her to him as a gift, and then he takes her as his wife, making the daughter of a low caste a queen, sharing the same status as the other wives'.163 The seraglio was also organised according to a rigid hierarchy. The women for whom the emperor had more affection were the 'superior and heads' enjoying a special jurisdiction. Despite this apparently rigid order, the *seraglio* was often disturbed by conflicts among various factions, which often forced Jahangir to intervene164—an indicator of the harem as an arena of political competition formed by actors who, besides following their own agendas, were related to the different interest groups that constituted the Mughal courtly milieu.

Both the 'Discourse' and the *Tratado* sought to provide a systematic quantification of Jahangir's court and the Mughal nobility. Although the Jesuit *Tratado* and Hawkins' 'Discourse' share a similar analytic scope, the two works reflect distinct processes of apprenticeship of Mughal India. While Hawkins penned his 'Discourse' as someone involved in the first direct exchanges between the EIC and the South Asian world, the *Tratado* was a text produced by agents at the service of political and religious structures with accumulated experience in the South Asian geopolitical arena. English knowledge on Mughal India, as the letters sent by Elizabeth I and James I revealed, was scarce and inaccurate. The title of Robert Coverte's account of his travels, for example, claimed the 'Discovery of a Great Emperour Called the Great Mogoll, a Prince Not till Now Knowne to Our English Nation', revealing the lack of information on Mughal lands. Indeed, Hawkins' account seeks to provide detailed but concise information on a key but unfamiliar geopolitical actor. The concern in enumerating the extension of the Mughal imperial treasury

<sup>162</sup> ANTT, Casa Real, no. 7240, cap. 897, "Tratado", f. 10. <sup>163</sup> Ibid., ff. 10–11. <sup>164</sup> Ibid., f. 11.

and the organisation of the imperial elites sought to thus support the definition of English commercial and diplomatic strategies based on valuable first-hand experience and observations.

There was also another difference. The 'Discourse' was an account produced by someone whose exploits at the Mughal court raised some doubts. Hawkins not only failed to persuade Jahangir to concede trading privileges to the EIC, but also his adoption of a Mughal habitus became increasingly associated with political and religious 'fickleness'. The 'Discourse' thus served two aims. The first was to inform the strategies delineated by the EIC and the English Crown vis-à-vis the Mughals. The second was to validate Hawkins' exploits as a successful attempt to gather relevant knowledge on a non-European power with the capacity to support or block English interests.

By presenting himself as a relevant informer about Jahangir and his empire, Hawkins intended to alter the negative perceptions of his alleged 'Mughalisation', suggesting that his adoption of local customs was part of a dissimulative strategy. Indeed, th interconnected stories of Muqarrab Khan and William Hawkins offer an interesting glimpse into the different forms of dissimulation and 'transculturalization' explored by European and South Asian agents involved in cross-cultural exchanges.

Hawkins' adoption of Mughal mores is very similar to the strategy adopted by his nemesis, Muqarrab Khan, regarding the Portuguese. Throughout his career, the Royal Confidant cultivated a useful religious ambiguity that, through the manipulation of different religious habitus, allowed him to successfully navigate within the Mughal polity while establishing a rapport with the religious and ideological apparatus of the *Estado da Índia*

The transformation of Muqarrab Khan into Dom João de Távora seemed not to be purely spiritual, but the result of a careful analysis of costs and benefits, a case study for the application of rational choice theory to religious adherence and belonging.<sup>165</sup> Indeed, Muqarrab Khan's attitude towards Catholicism seems to be an example of 'subjective conversion', the concept proposed by Jason Wollschleger and Lindsey Beach to describe cases of individuals who adhere or belong to a religious faith without necessarily believing in its belief systems. In most of these

<sup>165</sup> Rodney Stark, "Micro Foundations of Religion: A Revised Theory", *Sociological Theory* 17:3 (1999), pp. 264–289; John Goldthorpe, "Rational Action Theory for Sociology", *British Journal of Sociology*, 49:2 (1998), pp. 167–192.

cases, converts opt to be 'subjectively hypocritical' to ensure short-term gains and then leave the religious group when they perceive that their adherence is no longer useful or is too perilous.166 'Subjective conversion' is not far from Muqarrab Khan's more familiar Islamic tradition of *taqiyya*, a doctrine primarily advocated by Shi'ite theologians (but also defended by Sunni ones) that encouraged a pious dissimulation to preserve one's religious and private identity or avoid discrimination in a hostile environment.<sup>167</sup> This correlation between Christian and Islamic notions of religious dissimulation allowed the news of Muqarrab Khan's conversion to be apparently well received by Jahangir, as well as Dom João de Távora's alleged crypto-Christian behaviour to be accepted by the Portuguese authorities and the Jesuit missionaries.

In fact, European approaches to political and religious dissimulation were also similar to *taqiyya*. <sup>168</sup> To Jesuit and Portuguese eyes, Dom João de Távora could be perceived as someone who followed a strategy that resembled the 'honest dissimulation' conceptualised by Torquato Accetto in his influential *Della dissimulatione onesta* (1641), as well as the strategy of defensive dissimulation adopted by the Jesuits in challenging mission fields such as England or Japan during the first decades of the Tokugawa shogunate.169

<sup>166</sup> Jason Wollschleger and Lindsey R. Beach. "Religious Chameleons: Exploring the Social Context for Belonging Without Believing," *Rationality and Society*, 25:2 (2013), pp. 178–197.

<sup>167</sup> See, for example, Michael Ebstein, "Absent Yet at All Times Present: Further Thoughts on Secrecy in the Shi'i Tradition and in Sunni Mysticism," *Al-Qantara: Revista de estudios árabes* 34:2 (2013), pp. 387–413; Devin J. Stewart, "Dissimulation in Sunni Islam and Morisco Taqiyya," *Al-Qantara: Revista de estudios árabes*, 34:2 (2013), pp. 439–490.

<sup>168</sup> Devin J. Stewart, "Documents and Dissimulation: Notes on the Performance of Taqiyya" in *Identidades marginales* ed. Cristina de la Puente (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2003), pp. 569–598; Devin J. Stewart, "Taqiyyah as Performance: The Travels of Baha, al-Din al- *'* Amili in the Ottoman Empire (991–993/1583–1585)," *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies*, 4 (1996), pp. 1–70.

<sup>169</sup> See, for example, Stefania Tutino, "Jesuit Accommodation, Dissimulation, Mental Reservation" in *The Oxford Handbook of the Jesuits* ed. Ines Županov (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 216–232.

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### 1612–1615

William Hawkins' sudden fall from favour at the Mughal court represented a serious setback for the EIC. The failure to obtain firm permission from the Mughal authorities to establish a factory raised questions about the future of the company's activities in India. Although the EIC would continue to invest in diplomatic contacts with Jahangir to obtain a *firman*, the events of 1609–1611 prompted a reassessment of the company's modus operandi in the West Coast of India. Perceiving that the Mughal authorities regarded the English as fragile newcomers, the EIC, adopted a strategy of maritime violence that sought to pressure Jahangir by attacking Mughal ships and divert part of the maritime traffic destined for Gujarat to other ports. Maritime violence became, as Edmond Smith<sup>1</sup> and Kirti Chaudhuri2 have argued, an instrument that allowed a supplicant such as the EIC to increase its negotiating capacity. The intention was not only to coerce, but also to persuade Jahangir that English naval strength could be useful to Mughal economic and geopolitical interests. The new strategy also had another aim: to challenge the Portuguese claims to a maritime

<sup>1</sup> Edmond Smith, "Naval Violence and Trading Privileges in Early Seventeenth-Century Asia", *International Journal of Maritime History* 25:2 (2013), pp. 147–158.

<sup>2</sup> Chaudhuri, K. N. *The English East India Company: The study of an early joint-stock company, 1600–1640* (London: F. Cass, 1965).

185

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022

J. V. Melo, *Jesuit and English Experiences at the Mughal Court, c. 1580–1615*, New Transculturalisms, 1400–1800, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96588-4\_6

monopoly in the Indian Ocean and present the EIC as a suitable partner to the Mughal efforts to frustrate the *Estado*'s maritime ambitions.

#### I

Writing shortly after the downfall of the English Chan, Nicholas Downton confessed his worries about the viability of English trade in Asia, being unable to hide his 'perplexed thoughts by present view or likelihood of the ruin'.<sup>3</sup> If the absence of a *firman* cast a shadow of doubt over the future of English trade in India, the conditions in which Hawkins abandoned the Mughal court inflicted serious damage on England's reputation in South Asia. The English Chan's failed exploits seemed to have been the final episode of an erratic enterprise that ended against all expectations with 'our King and Nation on every side in disgrace, without favour, and hopeless of future trade'.<sup>4</sup> One of Downton's worries was that Jahangir's hesitancy to grant commercial privileges to the EIC reflected a perception that England was a minor European power that lacked the status to establish a relationship of equals with the Mughal Empire. In Downton's own words, Jahangir 'in contempt disdains to answer our king's letter, as not standing with his greatness to answer every *Naccam* which is as a governor or petty king, an imputation not to be forgotten, by his people'.<sup>5</sup>

Besides noting the lack of diplomatic weight, Downton identified two other obstacles. The first was the damage inflicted by the Portuguese fleets along the Gujarati coast. The *Estado*'s warships not only impeded the circulation of English ships and tradesmen, but also dissuaded the local merchants from dealing with the EIC men.<sup>6</sup> The other obstacle was the ambivalent behaviour of most Mughal officials. Many highranking officials were engaged in trading ventures and often abused their position to increase their profits. Although in their contacts with EIC employees Mughal officials were amicable and showed an interest in supporting English trading activities, many of them 'permit no trade with

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 157.

<sup>3</sup> Doc. 82, "Nicholas Downton, his opinion, what fit to be done for the time next ensuing. Written in the Road of Dabul, February 24th 1611", *LR*, vol. I, p. 156.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 158.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

us, reserving all, both buying and selling for their own private benefits'.7 Such abuses of power also involved a 'variety of delays' related to the payment of custom duties and the definition of prices for commodities sold by English merchants. The apparent dissimulation of the Mughal authorities was interpreted as being instigated by the fear of the reaction of 'their masters, the Portugals'.8

Downton was correct in discerning the anxiety that the deterioration of Luso-Mughal relations caused in Gujarat, but his complaints also reveal a frustration with a Mughal fiscal system that mixed local taxation traditions with imperial directives. The interplay between local practices and the imperial policies relied on local officials, whom the emperor granted enough power to 'enjoy a considerable discretion and freedom of action'.<sup>9</sup> This flexibility often invited port officials to, as Downton noted, interfere for their personal advantage or in accordance with specific political and economic needs.

Downton moulds his assessment of the English activities in Gujarat according to a nationalist discourse that presents the company's setbacks at the Mughal court not as the result of an erratic diplomatic approach, but as a consequence of a concerted attack by hostile and influential European and local actors. Another important trope of Downton's report was that these attacks sought to undermine the interests and symbolic authority of the English Crown. The main target of the Portuguese and Mughal machinations was not the EIC, but James I. Despite being a mercantile corporation, the EIC was an extension of the Crown. The obstacles posed by the Mughal authorities should thus be regarded not as problem directly related to the commercial exploits of the EIC but as an act of direct hostility towards James I. This perception allowed Downton to justify the new modus operandi adopted by the EIC men in the Indian Ocean. By adopting a hostile policy, the EIC would.

inform the Moguls and others which have abused us that our nation is not to be so coarsely used, and that they can do us no wrong but that we will again right ourselves on their ships and goods, whereby we shall force

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 158.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Farhat Hasan, "The Mughal Fiscal System in Surat and the English East India Company", *Modern Asian Studies*, 27:4 (1993), p. 711.

them more to honour and better respect our nation, and will be glad if anything can procure the same to give us trade to have our friendship.<sup>10</sup>

Downton's advocacy of maritime violence clashed with the original intention of the company's board, which was to seek trading privileges through diplomatic means, a strategy that reconciled both the commercial goals of the EIC and the needs to enlarge the diplomatic partners of the English Crown. In spite of not receiving any reply from London, the EIC men immediately started to implement the new modus operandi. At the same time that Downton wrote his report, the fleet commanded by Sir Henry Middleton stationed in the Red Sea initiated a series of attacks on Arabian, Mughal and Portuguese ships.

Maritime violence brought some interesting profits from the seized commodities, but, after one year of attacks against Mughal shipping, the EIC was still unable to persuade Jahangir to grant trading privileges. A joint letter to the company's board from Thomas Aldworth, William Biddulph and Nicholas Whittington, written on 25 January 1612, expressed a concern with the possible counterproductive effect of Middleton's raids in the Red Sea. Some days before, Middleton had arrested a series of Mughal ships sailing from Mocha to Surat. The three company men feared that the arrest would provoke a violent reaction from the Mughal authorities, undermining the recent friendly overtures from local merchants and officials. As soon as the news of Middleton's new arrest reached Surat there was 'a general murmuring in the city' and the three company men confessed that they were 'doubtful of what might befall us'.<sup>11</sup>

Although they 'found the people very reasonable' and the local officials insinuated that a Mughal retaliation could be avoided if there was a restitution of the seized goods, Middleton rejected any compensation. Some days later, the general apprehend another Mughal ship. This new seizure coincided with the news of the imminent arrival of the Governor of Ahmedabad to negotiate the establishment of an English factory in Surat. The negotiations took place in Swally and were conducted by the governor and Middleton himself. After four days of talks, an agreement was reached, and the Mughals promised to issue a *firman* confirming

<sup>10</sup> Doc. 82, "Nicholas Downton, his opinion", *LR*, vol. I, p. 161.

<sup>11</sup> Doc. 102, "Tho, Aldworth, Wm. Biddulph & Nich. Withington to [the East India Company]. Surat, the 25th of January 1612", *LR*, vol. I, p. 235.

the trading privileges granted to the EIC within a period of 40 days. Middleton, however, was reticent in believing that the Mughal authorities would follow the agreement and wished to return to England, a position rejected by Thomas Aldworth, who refused to have any dealing with Middleton until the *firman* arrived.<sup>12</sup> The general's reservations and Aldworth's opposition suggest the existence of a conflict over how the EIC should act towards the Mughals. While Middleton defended the continuity of the strategy of maritime violence to pressure Jahangir, Aldworth advocated a return to peaceful negotiations.

The arrival of Best's fleet and his negotiations with the governor of Ahmedabad prompted the Portuguese viceroy, Ruy Lourenço de Távora, to send four heavily armed galleons commanded by Nuno da Cunha to Surat. The fleet from Goa also carried Paul Canning and Edward Christian, who had been captured by the Portuguese when their ship left Surat to reach Middleton's fleet. The two English prisoners were able to communicate to Best the arrival of the galleons from Goa. On 29 November 1612, around four o'clock in the afternoon, Cunha's fleet met the English ships at Swally. The battle, according to the Portuguese chronicler António Bocarro, lasted two days and was an utter disaster for the *Estado da Índia*. Although Bocarro recognised that his sources were inaccurate and that he was only able to identify 30 certified casualties among Cunha's fleet, it was widely known that 'the English killed many of our people'.13 English reports of the battle mention more than one hundred Portuguese casualties. Patrick Copland, who witnessed the battle, estimated that Cunha's fleet lost around 200 to 300 men against only four deaths among the members of Best's fleet.<sup>14</sup>

Copland described the Battle of Swally as an uneven clash between a Portuguese squadron of four heavily armed galleons of around 800 tons, which could count on the support of at least 26 frigates, against four English 'merchant ships'.15 The outcome of the battle was thus a sign of divine providence. 'Our God', wrote Copland, 'fought for us as He did

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., pp. 236–237.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> António Bocarro, *Década 13 da História da Índia* ed. Rodrigo José de Lima Felner (Lisbon: Academia Real das Sciencias, 1876), p. 25.

<sup>14</sup> Doc. 445, "Carta de P. Copland a Randaol, ministro da egreja de Santo André de Londres (24/08/1614)", *DRI* , vol. III, ed. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato (Lisbon: Academia Real das Sciências, 1885), p. 86.

for the Israelites'.16 Best's victory was thus used to stimulate a providentialist vision of English overseas exploits,<sup>17</sup> an example of divine support for a Protestant power against a powerful and hostile Catholic rival that echoed the victory over the Spanish Armada in 1588. It also allowed the EIC men in Surat to reposition themselves vis-à-vis the Mughal authorities. Cunha's defeat allowed the EIC to present itself not only as a group of merchants, but also as a useful counterweight to Portuguese naval power in the Indian Ocean.<sup>18</sup>

Indeed, the events of Swally and its aftermath were closely followed by the Mughals. Richard Croft reported to London that the battle had 'no lack of witnesses on the shore, because many people came from Surat only to see it'.<sup>19</sup> Nicholas Withington described the clash between the Portuguese and English ships as a public event followed by a large audience, 'a fight beeing before thowsands of the countrye people, whoe (to our nation's greate fame) have devulged the same farr and neare'.<sup>20</sup> Among those who spread the news was Sardar Khan, a highranking Mughal official and courtier, who was the brother of Abdullah Khan, the subahdar of Gujarat between 1611 and 1616. By the end of 1612, Sardar Khan was commanding an expedition to eliminate the activities of a group of Malabari pirates who operated in the region.<sup>21</sup> The Mughal nobleman established cordial contacts with Thomas Best. Nicholas Withington mentions that Best was 'very honourably Entertained and presented with a gallant horse and furniture'. Sardar Khan's amicable approach, reflected by his gift to Best, suggests an interest in exploring the presence of English merchants in Gujarat to serve both

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> For an overview of the evolution of English national providentialism between the late sixteenth century and the early decades of the seventeenth century, see Nicholas Guyatt, *Providence and the Invention of the United States, 1607–1876* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 14–17.

<sup>18</sup> Edmond Smith, "Naval Violence and Trading Privileges in Early Seventeenth-Century Asia", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 25:2 (2013), p. 154.

<sup>19</sup> Doc. 445, 24/08/1614, "Al Sñr Thomás Smith, governador de la compañía de las Indias Orientales, 11/01/1612", *DRI* , vol. III, p. 86.

<sup>20</sup> Nicholas Withington, "Nicholas Withington, 1612–1616" in *Early Travels in India*, p. 199.

<sup>21</sup> Thomas Best, *The Voyage of Thomas Best to the East Indies, 1612–1614* ed. William Foster (London: Hakluyt Society, 1934), p. xxix.

the economic interests of the Mughal polity and the private agenda of a member of a Mughal elite increasingly interested in being involved in overseas trade. Sardar Khan's cordiality towards Best generated among the EIC servants in Gujarat a perception that there was an opportunity to establish a partnership with a relevant member of the Mughal court.

The proximity between the English and Sardar Khan was duly noted by the Portuguese. In his *Década*, António Bocarro observed that Thomas Best's decision to prolong the clash with Nuno da Cunha to a second day was motivated by English fears 'of losing the reputation they had with a certain Mughal captain [Sardar Khan] who was besieging a fortress'.22 Upon his return to the Mughal court, Sardar Khan, according to Nicholas Withington, presented a 'large discourse' on the events of Swally, which impressed Jahangir who, until then, believed that 'there had bin noe nation comparable to the Portungale by sea'.<sup>23</sup>

#### II

The prospect of finally obtaining a *firman* prompted the EIC servants based in Surat to send another emissary to the Mughal court. Paul Canning was the man chosen to present a new letter from James I to Jahangir brought by the new fleet. Probably intended to ensure that Canning's embassy would not be a repetition of Hawkins' fiasco, the new emissary would be accompanied by Jadow, a reliable local interpreter, and two English assistants. These were Richard Temple, who had knowledge of 'the Spanish tongue', and one Edward Hunt.24 The legation also included two musicians. One was Canning's cousin, Lancelot Canning, who played the virginals, and the other was Robert Trully, a cornet player or a trumpeter.25

The composition of Canning's embassy reveals a concern to ensure that the emissary would have no problems communicating with the Hindustani and Persian-speaking Mughal courtiers, as well as with his potential nemesis, the Spanish-speaking Jesuit missionaries. In addition,

<sup>22</sup> António Bocarro, *Década 13*, p. 26.

<sup>23</sup> Withington, "Nicholas Withington, 1612–1616", p. 199.

<sup>24</sup> Doc. 117, Thomas Aldworth to the East India Company per the James. In Amadavas this 9th of November 1613--, *LR*, vol. I, p. 304.

<sup>25</sup> Best, *The Voyage of Thomas Best*, p. 34.

the presence of two other EIC employees ensured that, unlike Hawkins, Canning's behaviour would be constantly monitored and reported. The importance of this embassy is also shown by the inclusion of Lancelot Canning and Robert Trully. The use of music in English attempts to obtain trading concessions from Islamicate powers had already been used with some success by the Barbary and Levant companies in Morocco and Ottoman courts. Besides their functions as cultural emissaries, musicians could be employed by the local elites, becoming useful go-betweens in the service of both sides. Around 1599, for example, the organist Thomas Dallam performed at the Ottoman seraglio and was invited by the sultan to remain in Istanbul.26 The positive experience of the Levant Company with Dallam seemed to have influenced the EIC to use two English musicians as diplomatic gifts. The objective was not only to impress, but above all to allow the EIC to compete with the Jesuit missionaries in the introduction of European cultural products in Mughal India.

On 29 January 1613, Paul Canning initiated, in the words of Nicholas Withington, a 'tedious and hard journey' from Surat to Agra. He would only reach the Mughal court after 70 days of all sorts of travails, including an assault from a group of robbers in which the English emissary and Robert Trully were seriously injured. After this attack, Richard Temple and Edward Hunt decided to quit, leaving Canning alone with no support from EIC men. The English discreetly arrived at Agra on 9 April 1613.<sup>27</sup>

As planned, Canning presented a letter from James I to the emperor, as well as a gift that, to the frustrations of the EIC men in India, failed to impress Jahangir.28 Indeed, Canning's rendezvous with Jahangir involved some gaffes. Nicholas Withington mentioned in his account that the envoy, after presenting to the emperor a gift 'of no great value', was questioned if the present was sent by James I. Canning replied that it was actually a present from the English merchants.<sup>29</sup> Although Withington does comment further on the audience, the reference to Canning's reply indicates some diplomatic inability. In his journal, Nicholas Downton presented a different version of Canning's troubled exchanges with the

<sup>26</sup> Ian Woodfield, "The Keyboard Recital in Oriental Diplomacy, 1520–1620", *Journal of the Royal Musical Association*, 115:1 (1990), pp. 43–46.

<sup>27</sup> Withington, "Nicholas Withington, 1612–1616", p. 200.

<sup>28</sup> Doc. 117, "Thomas Aldworth to the East India Company per the James. In Amadavas this 9th of November 1613", *LR*, vol. I, p. 303.

<sup>29</sup> Withington, "Nicholas Withington, 1612–1616", p. 200.

Mughal emperor in which it was not the envoy's apparent lack of *savoir faire* but Jesuit intrigues that were responsible for his failure. Apparently, the English envoy was initially 'well respected by the Emperour, until such time as the Jesuites made knowne he was a merchant and not sent immediately from the King; but afterwards he was neglected, as himself complained'.30 This version is supported by a report from Canning's successor at the Mughal court, Thomas Kerridge, which mentioned that the Jesuit missionaries undermined the company's emissary by exploring Jahangir's 'haughtiness'.31 When asked by the emperor to read the letter brought by Canning, the missionaries explained that the document, although signed by James I, was sent on behalf of 'merchants only through desire of traffic'.32 During his audience with Canning, Jahangir only mentioned 'idle and trivial questions' and never mentioned any 'matter of business'.33

It should be noted that the accounts of Canning's exploits provided by Withington, Downton and Kerridge were written while the EIC was starting to make plans to send an English royal ambassador to the Mughal court to push for the company's interests. If for Withington Canning was the main culprit for the EIC failure to obtain trading privileges, since he lacked the required skills for an ambassadorial mission, Downton and Kerridge highlighted the Jesuit ability to influence and mislead the Mughal political elites. All, however, stressed that the EIC diplomatic maneuvers were undermined by the mercantile status of its emissaries.

Canning's problems continued when Jahangir instructed him to negotiate with Muqarrab Khan. The Royal Confidant refused the proposal to establish an English factory in Agra and imposed the condition that, if relations between the Mughal Empire and the Portuguese *Estado da Índia* were restored, no English ships would be allowed to sail to Mughal

<sup>30</sup> Nicholas Downton, *The Voyage of Nicholas Downton to the East Indies 1614–15* ed. William Foster (London, 1939), p. 7.

<sup>31</sup> Doc. 110, "Thomas Kerridge to Thomas Aldworth and Council at Surat, September 7th 1613", *LR*, vol. I, p. 282.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

ports over a period of three or four years.34 A confused Nicholas Withington angrily asked in his journal 'what satisfaction wee could make them for wrongs receaved by them from the Portungales [sic] ?'.35

Although Jahangir seemed to not be interested in discussing 'business', he revealed a surprising enthusiasm for the trumpet brought by the musicians who accompanied the English emissary. According to Kerridge, Jahangir 'put it to his mouth' and ordered copies to be made. The emperor's interest in the trumpet was rather unexpected. Without hiding his growing frustration, Kerridge mentioned that Jahangir showed no curiosity over the virginals, a more sophisticated instrument that was expected to impress the Mughal court, and sarcastically added that 'a bagpipe would have been fitter for him'.<sup>36</sup> Canning offered Robert Trully to be at the disposal of Jahangir. The trumpeter, however, failed to gain the emperor's favour. According to Kerridge, Truly stayed several nights waiting to be called by the emperor 'till midnight and not called for, and as soon as he was gone, called for, whereat the king was once exceeding angry yet never gave him anything only 50 rupees which he took so indignantly that he would scarcely play before him'.37

Trully's success prompted a quick Jesuit reaction. According to Kerridge, the *padres* approached the trumpeter to 'teach two of their servants', but Trully refused.38 Unable to hire Trully, and fearing Jahangir's interest in the trumpeter, the missionaries presented a Neapolitan juggler at the Mughal court, 'saying he was come from Portingal sent by their king to show his rare qualities to His Majesty, wherewith the king was so much delighted that he gave him 5000 rupees and many vestments'.39 The case of the Neapolitan juggler was for Kerridge the ultimate example of the Jesuit ability to influence Jahangir:

Any Christian here, if not presented by the Jesuits, hath any grace at all. Had Robert Trully been theirs he had, ere this, been a rich man, the

<sup>36</sup> Doc. 110, "Thomas Kerridge to Thomas Aldworth and Council at Surat, September 7th 1613", *LR*, vol. I, p. 282.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Withington, "Nicholas Withington, 1612–1616", p. 201.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 283.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

king exceedingly delighted to hear his cornet. A Frenchman exceeding that juggler since in the same qualities before the king yet had not a rupee given him, only fair promises, the king said, thou hast no fortune, not showing this before the other came, whereby as in all things else we may perceive what hand these dogged Jesuits have with the king &c.<sup>40</sup>

Another reason for Canning the lack of success of dealings at Agra was his problematic relation with his entourage. The envoy had doubts on the behaviour of Jadow, the company's trusted Banyan interpreter. His distrust led him to employ 'a Portingal turned Moor' named António Guerra, who was described by Kerridge as 'an enemy to these Jesuits, a sufficient, understanding man, and speaketh the Persian tongue exceeding well'.<sup>41</sup> Jadow was probably regarded by Canning as being too sympathetic to Mughal interests, while Guerra, a European with proficient knowledge of Persian and a native Portuguese speaker, emerged as a more sympathetic (and familiar) figure who offered the possibility of Canning to communicate with both Mughals and Jesuits. Kerridge supported Canning's choice and mentioned that Guerra was more efficient than Jadow, being able to 'dispatch more business in an hour than this banyan in a day'. However, Jadow's business contacts and ability to navigate the Mughal environment made him essential.42

Robert Trully's erratic behaviour also contributed to the failings of the embassy. Besides refusing to work for Jahangir, undermining the company's strategy, Kerridge accused the trumpeter of scandalising Agra and the local Christian community with his 'drunkenness and whoring', a behaviour that revealed that 'he neglected Mr. Canning in all his business'.43 After the envoy's death, Trully left Agra and tried his luck at the Deccani courts. According to Nicholas Withington, the trumpeter entered into the service of the 'Kinge of the Deccan' and converted to Islam, embracing a new religious and political identity: 'So Trullye was circumsized, and had a newe name given him and greate allowance given him by the Kinge, with whom hee continued'.<sup>44</sup> Some time after

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., pp. 284–285.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 284.

<sup>44</sup> Withington, "Nicholas Withington, 1612–1616", p. 204.

becoming a renegade, Trully returned to Surat and asked the EIC factors to be readmitted, 'shewinge himselfe verye pennytente for what hee had don, and carried himselfe in such manner that everye man pittied him'. The repentful apostate persuaded the factors and received a sum of around £40 to help him acquire commodities and sell them in England. Trully, however, opted to return to the Deccan with the monies. The case of the English trumpeter 'turn'd Turk' in the Deccan was yet another episode that seemed to confirm English anxieties about the irresistible power of Islam and the tempting material advantages offered by Islamic polities to European Christians.<sup>45</sup> Trully's apostasy also revealed a worrying inability of the EIC to maintain the political and religious allegiances of its men in India. As in the case of William Hawkins', Trully illustrated the risks of exposing the EIC men to prolonged contact with powerful and wealthy Islamic rulers.

Withington and Kerridge's references to Trully's insubordination and apostasy highlighted, above all, Canning's difficulties in performing his task as an emissary of the EIC. His lack of diplomatic *savoir faire*, the poor discipline of his entourage and the apparent impossibility of thwarting the Jesuit influence at the Mughal court and establishing a rapport with the emperor or relevant courtiers indicated that the company's envoy faced several obstacles to obtaining trading privileges from Jahangir. To make things worse, shortly after his audience with the emperor, Canning died on 27 May 1613 without receiving a reply from the Mughal emperor. Thomas Aldworth insinuated that Canning's poor health and sudden death were related to his clashes with Jadow, the company's Banyan interpreter, and his two former English assistants, Richard Temple and Edward Hunt46—a suggestion that Canning's failings were a consequence of an ill-prepared entourage.

Canning's sudden death forced the EIC men in Surat to send Thomas Kerridge to Agra to continue the company's efforts to obtain a firman, as well as 'a letter from the king of Agra in answer of our king's letter'.47 In a letter to the company's hierarchy in London, William Biddulph explained

<sup>45</sup> Nabil Matar, "The Renegade in English Seventeenth-Century Imagination", *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900*, 33:3 (1993), pp. 489–505; Barbara Fuchs, "Faithless Empires", pp. 45–69.

<sup>46</sup> Doc. 117, "Thomas Aldworth to the East India Company per the James. In Amadavas this 9th of November 1613", *LR*, vol. I, p. 304.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 303.

that Kerridge had two tasks. The first was to ensure that the EIC had a representative in Agra that could report on the 'state of that place & all commodities thereabouts fitting for our country'. The other was to refute the negative image of England propagated by the Jesuit missionaries at the Mughal court. Kerridge had 'to resolve the king [Jahangir] of all such matters these prating Jesuits put into his head'.<sup>48</sup> For Biddulph , the Jesuit missionaries emerged as the greatest obstacle found by the EIC in India. The *padres* enjoyed considerable prestige at the Mughal court, which made them able to influence Jahangir's perception of the European political theatre. A worried Biddulph alerted the EIC hierarchy that the Jesuits were persuading the emperor that 'we are a base people and dwell in a little island, and of no force'. To make things worse, the missionaries also revealed to Jahangir that the English ships did not belong to James I, but to 'a few merchants (…) our king having nothing to do with them, and that the present and letter came from the merchants and not from the king, which he partly believes, our ships coming so seldom'. The influence of the Jesuits derived from their efficient strategies of gift-giving and bribery: 'these lying Jesuits feeding the king daily with presents and strange toys so that what they desire is granted'.49

Kerridge arrived at Agra extremely ill. In a letter to Thomas Aldworth, he mentioned that he 'could not endure to sit on horseback' and that it was necessary to hire 'a catele and 4 men to have me carried to Agra'. After three days of rest, Kerridge informed the Mughal court of his arrival and health problems, being 'excused for not coming to the King, [as it was] a custom for strangers to be brought before the King at their first entrance'.50 Kerridge and Jahangir's *Kotwal* scheduled an audience for two days' time. However, while waiting to be heard by the emperor, Kerridge received the information that Jahangir had postponed the meeting due to the sudden arrival of the Persian ambassador, an emissary from a ruler of far greater relevance and prestige to the Mughal authorities than James I. Indeed, Jahangir would only grant an audience to Kerridge on the following day. Kerridge's difficulties in being seen by

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Doc. 110, "Thomas Kerridge to Thomas Aldworth and Council at Surat, September 7th 1613", *LR*, vol. I, p. 277.

<sup>48</sup> Doc. 116, "William Biddulph to the Right Worshipful Sir Thomas Smith, Knight, Governor, the Deputy and rest of the merchants trading to the East Indies. Laus Deo in Surat the 28th October 1613", *LR*, vol. I, p. 300.

the emperor reveal the marginal position of England in the geopolitical perception of the Mughal authorities. The English were a new group of firangi supplicants, newcomers who, albeit potentially useful to deter the *Estado da Índia* and expand Mughal overseas trade, lacked the capacity to guide the interests of the Mughal polity. The chaotic English diplomatic manoeuvres at the Mughal court hardly helped to change this perception.

Kerridge recognised that his business was not of immediate concern for Jahangir. Relations between the Mughal and Safavid rulers were becoming increasingly tense. Persia was apparently eager to annex Sindh, and, as Kerridge alerted Aldworth, 'it is likely that there will be war between them'. The ambassadors from Shah Abbas were a priority for the emperor. Jahangir retained them at the court in an attempt to both ensure a channel of communication and pressure the Safavid authorities by suggesting an imminent breakdown in negotiations by making two emissaries de facto hostages.51

Kerridge's first audience with Jahangir was again marked by an English inability to correspond to Mughal expectations. The emperor snubbed with some disdain the gift presented by the EIC envoy, 'a standing cup (…) weighing 18 *pisas*, fair in sight but slight'. Although Kerridge believed that Jahangir 'would have regarded it for the fashion', the cup did not fit the standards expected by the emperor, who quickly 'delivered it to an attendant, not esteeming it'.<sup>52</sup> To Kerridge's surprise, the *Kotwal* informed him that Jahangir wanted his hat, which had cost sixteen rupees. In spite of this overture, as had happened with Paul Canning, Jahangir directed Kerridge to negotiate with Muqarrab Khan, the man 'who had order for the despatch of all such businesses as we had with the King'.53 Kerridge tried to negotiate directly with Jahangir, but with no effect. After conferring with Jahangir, the *Kotwal* retorted that Kerridge had no option but to deal with Muqarrab Khan since the emperor was 'in conference with the Persian Ambassador, who stood before him, and that I had my answer to repair to Macrobocan'.<sup>54</sup>

Muqarrab Khan's dealings with Kerridge often sought to demonstrate Mughal indifference towards England and reinforce the EIC position as

 Ibid., p. 278. Ibid., p. 277. <sup>53</sup> Ibid. Ibid., p. 278. a foreign supplicant. The Royal Confidant often frustrated Kerridge's approaches, and Muqarrab Khan openly ignored the first attempt of the English emissary to start negotiations. According to Kerridge, after spending an entire morning waiting to be received by Muqarrab Khan, 'word was brought to me that I could not speak with him, being with his women'.<sup>55</sup> A meeting was only arranged after Jadow persuaded Muqarrab Khan to listen to the English emissary. The first face-to-face meeting between Kerridge and the Royal Confidant was marked again by demonstrations of indifference. Kerridge had to wait three hours to be received until he was taken by one of Muqarrab Khan's servants 'into his chamber where he sat in his bed, newly risen from sleep'.56

The presentation of the Royal Confidant as a petulant Mughal official in Kerridge's report suggested that the emissary's difficulties at the Mughal court were the result of the animosity of a relevant courtier known for his close links to the Portuguese. Muqarrab Khan's acts of symbolic hostility, however, seemed to be instigated by the Mughal intention to obtain an immediate reparation for Henry Middleton's attacks on Mughal ships. In his report to Thomas Aldworth, Kerridge mentioned that during his first meeting, Muqarrab Khan had no interest in discussing a reply to James I's letter to Jahangir or a confirmation of the conditions negotiated by Thomas Best. In fact, Muqarrab Khan reproached the English emissary, presenting him with a 'large discourse of the wrongs Sir Henry Middleton had done him in robbing their shipping and keeping the chiefs of Surratt prisoners aboard his ship at Swally'.57

Surprised by the Mughal grievances, Kerridge replied that the EIC did not approve the recourse to naval violence, but the unreliability and misleading behaviour of the local merchants and authorities instigated Middleton's campaign against Mughal ships. Kerridge also suggested that the Middleton affair would not have happened had the Mughal authorities allowed the EIC to establish a factory in Surat. This argument prompted a violent reaction from Muqarrab Khan, who retorted that the Mughal authorities had already granted permission to the EIC and that it

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. <sup>56</sup> Ibid. <sup>57</sup> Ibid. was the company's fault that a factory was not yet open, and that Middleton's actions represented a 'breach of all'.58 For Muqarrab Khan, the EIC posture was thus incomprehensible, since the English persuaded the Mughal authorities to break with the *Estado da Índia* and simultaneously attacked Mughal merchants. The only solution to avoid a breakdown in Anglo-Mughal relations was for the EIC to reimburse all the losses caused by Middleton and follow all the conditions stipulated by an eventual *firman* issued by Jahangir.

To add insult to injury, an alarmed Kerridge mentioned that the Royal Confidant stated that the EIC ships 'brought hither goods of any value to speak of from so far a country, which puts him in doubt we are not merchants, but intend evil towards them [the Mughals]'.<sup>59</sup> These words were in line with the Portuguese and Jesuit claims that the EIC was not interested in trade, but in fostering English piracy in the Indian Ocean. Aware of the proximity of Muqarrab Khan's words to the narrative fomented by the *Estado da Índia*, Kerridge assured the goodwill of the English Crown and the EIC towards the Mughal authorities. In an exercise of nationalist bravado, the English envoy refuted the Jesuit claims, arguing that 'our nation had continued thousands of years famous before we knew them, and if they denied us trade we doubted not to live as famous without it, wishing him not to believe those prattling, juggling Jesuits but credit rather the experience their own people had of us'.60 After this meeting, Kerridge sought to arrange another audience with Muqarrab Khan, but the Mughal nobleman excused himself with indispositions and the need to solve unavoidable businesses. To make things worse, every time that Kerridge sought to enter the imperial palace to arrange an audience with Jahangir, he was barred by the guards.61

The tense exchange of arguments between Kerridge and Muqarrab Khan revealed the existence of two antagonistic expectations. While the EIC believed that its demonstrations of naval power offered enough leverage to persuade Jahangir to concede trading privileges, the Mughals regarded the English as a new group of *firangi* supplicants whose presence in Gujarat relied on their submission to Mughal authority. If Best's victory

 Ibid., p. 279. <sup>59</sup> Ibid. Ibid., p. 280. Ibid., p. 281. over the Portuguese galleons in Swally indicated that Jahangir could use the EIC to frustrate the efforts of the *Estado da Índia* to impose the *cartaz* system across the Indian Ocean, the raids perpetrated by Henry Middleton against Mughal ships suggested that the EIC was inclined to imitate the Portuguese approach. The emergence of a new and aggressive European maritime actor in the region potentially threatened Mughal naval aspirations and commerce. Muqarrab Khan's insistence on a restitution of the ships seized by Henry Middleton and on the full adherence of the EIC to all the conditions stipulated by Jahangir's *firman* were thus part of a strategy that sought to ensure that the English would not constitute a threat to Mughal interests. This intention to neutralise the potential disruptive effects of the EIC presence was far from being expected by Kerridge. The reduced naval capacity of the Mughal Empire, Jahangir's interest in expanding overseas trade, and the increasing tensions between the *Estado da Índia* and the Mughal authorities generated the belief that Jahangir was ready to attend the EIC pretensions. Kerridge's difficulties in obtaining a *firman* were thus attributed by the company's men not to Mughal strategic pursuits, but to the manoeuvres of the Jesuit missionaries and the functioning of Mughal courtly and political structures.

For Kerridge, his travails at the Mughal court and tense exchanges with Muqarrab Khan could be explained by the existence of an economy of favours in which all political business relied on 'continual gifts both to the king and others'.62 To validate this observation, the emissary noted that the apparent Jesuit ability to deal with Mughal officials and shape their perceptions relied on their capacity to respond to the needs of this economy of favours:

Those Jesuits do so bewitch the king &c. with daily presents, as glasses, china dishes, varieties of wine &c., that nothing is denied them, have way to the king at all times, confer and talk with him, live at his charge, none of his Nobles have so easy access, and whom the king graceth they all dare do no other, and whom he respects not, no man regards; they shame not to say, we are a people rebelled subjects to their king, and make us and the Hollanders as one, they allege further our country and prince of no respect nor force, having only one city wherein a few merchants, and that our king hath no hand in this business, which they instanced upon an answer made by Paul Canning to the king at the delivery of the present.<sup>63</sup>

The only viable solution to counter the Jesuit influence at the Mughal court was thus to wait for the arrival of more English ships with enough power to overcome the Portuguese fleets. A demonstration of English maritime power would persuade the Mughal authorities that the EIC could replace the *Estado da Índia* as the main maritime power in the region or, in Kerridge own words, 'affright this people whom nothing but fear will make honest'.<sup>64</sup> In other words, the EIC needed to change its status from a minor supplicant to a potential partner of the Mughal Empire.

Kerridge's perception was corroborated by Thomas Aldworth. While reporting the evolution of the negotiations with the Mughal authorities, Aldworth reassured the EIC hierarchy in London that Middleton's raids on Mughal ships did not pose any risk to English interests. Evoking the impact of the Battle of Swally, Aldworth stated 'there is no cause of such fear, for that generally they [the Mughals] stand in more fear of us than of the Portingals'.65 If the demonstrations of English maritime power convinced the Mughal authorities to listen to the EIC, the commercial opportunities offered by English merchants would inevitably persuade Jahangir and other relevant figures such as Muqarrab Khan to attend the company's pretensions. As Aldworth noted, the Royal Confidant 'hath more adventures at sea than any of this country',66 and his trading activities could be seriously disturbed if the EIC opted to continue its strategy of maritime violence. Aldworth believed that it would be a question of time to persuade Muqarrab Khan to collaborate with the EIC. To pressure the emperor's favourite, Aldworth instructed Kerridge:

to signify unto him that if we should in our persons or goods suffer any detriment in these parts, that thereupon here would come enough of our ships to cover their seas insomuch that neither Moor nor Portingal should

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 282.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Doc. 117, "Thomas Aldworth to the East India Company per the James. In Amadavas this 9th of November 1613", *LR*, vol. I, p. 307.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

stir out of doors and then should he see whether our King and country were so mean as those lying Jesuits have told him.67

Kerridge's reports prompted the EIC hierarchy in London to contemplate the possibility of organising a formal royal embassy to the Mughal court. The idea discussed between September and October 1614 was to send to Agra 'an ambassador of extraordinary countenance and respect',<sup>68</sup> someone possessing the status and political savviness to navigate a courtly milieu and 'prevent the plotting of the Jesuits'. The name suggested by Thomas Smythe, the company's governor, was that of Sir Thomas Roe, a member of the gentry, knighted in 1603 by James I, whose career included involvement in the embassy of the Earl of Nottingham to the Spanish court in 1605, as well as participation in the Virginia Company's exploits in Guiana.<sup>69</sup> Smythe presented Roe as someone who fitted all the requisites for a courtly ambassador, 'a gentleman of pregnant understanding, well spoken, learned, industrious, [and] of a comely personage'.70 Around the same time that the EIC hierarchy planned to send a royal ambassador, the company's men in Surat concluded that 'whosoever should go up to the [Mughal] king under the title of a merchant should not be respected'.71 These observations echoed the view of many seventeenth-century theorists, who stressed that social status ensured an additional authority and dignity to those who performed diplomatic tasks, but they also reflect a concern in English self-presentation. In settings such as the Mughal court, where the desired projection of English political dignity was often frustrated by the lack of local knowledge about England, as well by a need to improvise or adjust to a different political

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Doc. 772, "Court Minutes of the East India Company, 7–14 October 1614" in *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series: East Indies, China and Japan, 1513–1616* ed. W. Nöel Sainsbury (London, 1862), p. 326.

<sup>69</sup> See for example, Nandini Das, Sir Thomas Roe Eyewitness to a Changing World (London: The Hakluyt Society 2018); Michael J. Brown, *Itinerant Ambassador: The Life of Sir Thomas Roe* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014).

<sup>70</sup> Doc. 765, "Court Minutes of the East India Company, 1–20 September 1614", *Calendar of State Papers*, p. 318.

<sup>71</sup> Doc. 168, "Consultation held at Swally, 15 October 1614", *LR*, vol. II (1613– 1615), ed. William Foster (London, 1897), p. 133.

culture, the reputation or quality of English agents often influenced the evaluation made by foreign polities.

#### III

The annual letter of the Mughal mission for 1613, written by Manuel Pinheiro, reported that 'the emperor treats us with love and honour, and the same all his grand captains'.72 Jahangir supported the missionaries 'very abundantly'.<sup>73</sup> The funds granted by the emperor were channelled to finance the charitable activities of the Jesuits. Mughal goodwill had also been demonstrated with the emperor's decision to build a new Jesuit church in Agra.<sup>74</sup> Despite the favours granted by the emperor, Pinheiro mentioned that Jahangir became suddenly 'cold' towards the missionaries. The emperor's drastic change of attitude was attributed to the manoeuvres of the governor of Khambhat, who persuaded a '*mestizo* [mixed-race] who is a bad man and an enemy of goodness' to write to Jahangir accusing the Jesuits of being 'enemies of the king'.<sup>75</sup>

Jerónimo Xavier related Jahangir's 'coldness' to the Jesuit refusal to bring Portuguese women to the Mughal court.<sup>76</sup> After the return of Muqarrab Khan's embassy to Agra, the emperor communicated to Manuel Pinheiro his intention to send the Jesuit missionary to the Iberian Peninsula with the task of bringing 'women to the princes, and a woman from the royal house to the Emperor'. Jahangir suggested to Pinheiro that the proposed matrimonial unions between the Iberian and Mughal dynasties would facilitate his conversion to Christianity. The *padre*, however, had serious doubts that 'would be of service to God'. The polygamic habits of the Mughal elites suggested that Jahangir, like many of his subjects, would maintain 'the inconstancy of picking various women'. Pinheiro confessed that he sought all possible means to delay the embassy, persuading the emperor that the timing of the embassy was not the most

<sup>72</sup> ARSI, Goa 46-I, "Manuel Pinheiro to António Mascarenhas, 24 December 1613", f. 77v.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., f. 77r.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., f. 77v.

<sup>76</sup> ARSI, Goa 46-I, "Jerónimo Xavier to Francisco Vieira, 25 December 1613", f. 81r.

convenient for the Iberian authorities.77 Jerónimo Xavier believed that Jahangir's project of establishing matrimonial links between the Timurids and the Iberian Habsburgs was, like the conversion of the three princes, another scheme intended 'to establish a domestic conversation with the Portuguese'.<sup>78</sup>

The dealings between the Jesuits and Jahangir were, according to Jerónimo Xavier, an exercise in dissimulation. Following the fiasco of the conversion of the three princes, the missionaries believed that the emperor used his nephews to trick the Jesuits and the *Estado*. Xavier also regarded Muqarrab Khan's conversion as another example of Mughal deception, a scheme conceived by the emperor's favourite 'to make himself trustworthy in the eyes of the Portuguese so they could give him Christian girls and women'.<sup>79</sup> To support this argument, Xavier noted that upon returning from Goa, the Royal Confidant had 'never shown any desire to be a Christian'.<sup>80</sup> The frustrated conversions of the three princes and Muqarrab Khan were thus, in Xavier's own words, two revealing episodes of Jahangir's machinations to manipulate the Portuguese and the Jesuits:

It can now be seen where this evil came from, and in the other things related to us he dissimulates and treats us as he usually does, and this is how things are: we dissimulate to avoid the end of the mission, which would be a great loss.<sup>81</sup>

Aware of the diplomatic dimension of the mission, Xavier noted that the Jesuits realised that Jahangir continued 'to dissimulate in the hope of an alliance'.<sup>82</sup> Besides revealing the dissimulative approach of the Mughal emperor, the failed conversions reinforced Jerónimo Xavier's doubts on the true intentions of the neophytes who came from Islam. Evoking the edicts that ordered the expulsion of the Morisco, Xavier stated that the

<sup>77</sup> ARSI, Goa 46-I, "Manuel Pinheiro to António Mascarenhas, 24 December 1613", f. 77v.

<sup>78</sup> ARSI, Goa 46-I, "Jerónimo Xavier to Francisco Vieira, 25 December 1613", f. 81r. <sup>79</sup> Ibid., f. 81v.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> ARSI, Goa 46-I, "Jerónimo Xavier to António Mascarenhas, 25 September 1613", f. 76r.

<sup>82</sup> ARSI, Goa 46-I, "Jerónimo Xavier to Francisco Vieira, 25 December 1613", f. 81v.

conversions of Muslims to Christianity were often dissimulative acts motivated by personal gain. Despite this problem and the discouragingly low number of conversions, the Jesuit mission in *Mogor* was necessary to support the local Christian communities formed by Armenians, Orthodox and Catholics. The functions of spiritual supervision and political representation performed by the missionaries were, according to Xavier, a guarantee that they would not convert to Islam.<sup>83</sup>

Despite Jahangir's 'coldness', the opening of the new Jesuit church of Agra attracted 'an extraordinary number of all sorts of people'.<sup>84</sup> Although Jahangir was away from the court, Pinheiro noted the presence of many courtiers, including the emperor's brothers-in-law, being one of the men responsible for the imperial treasury.85 As in other letters and reports, Pinheiro highlighted the impact of Christian images and European art on the Hindus and Muslims who visited the Jesuit churches. The Jesuit church in Agra attracted many 'Moors and Gentiles' who came to see and make offers to an image of Our Lady.<sup>86</sup> An image of a Child Jesus caused a commotion involving the *Vedor da Fazenda*, 'who could not be departed from that divine child, being prostrated on his knees praying in such manner that no one would say that he was not a Christian'.87

Pinheiro guaranteed that all 'divine feasts' performed in Agra would be 'celebrated in our churches with open doors, music and the tolling of bells as we can do in Lisbon with the same security'.<sup>88</sup> Mass was celebrated 'with solemnity and musical instruments'89 and the missionaries regularly performed 'public processions' in Agra, which sometimes included 'blood penitents' (*disciplinentes de sangue*).90 The spectacular dimension of the religious ceremonies organised by the Jesuits not only impressed Muslims and Hindus, but also had a profound impact on the local Christians. Pinheiro mentioned the case of one Greek who, while attending a

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> ARSI, Goa 46-I, "Manuel Pinheiro to António Mascarenhas, 24 December 1613", f. 77v.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., f. 78r.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid" f. 77v.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., f. 78r.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., f. 77v.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

solemn Mass, started to cry and announced his regret for 'not following the life of a Christian'.91

The apparent successful integration of the Jesuit mission into Agra's social and urban landscape fostered the English perception of the *padres* as well-established politico-religious agents at the Mughal court. However, despite the freedom to open churches and stage public processions in Mughal cities, Jerónimo Xavier believed that the never-ending tensions between the *Estado da Índia* and the Mughal authorities would eventually put an end to the mission. The persistent presence of EIC emissaries was another worrying factor. While reporting the deeds of the mission in 1613, Jerónimo Xavier expressed his concerns with Jahangir's unpredictable behaviour towards the missionaries, an attitude that had been stimulated by the arrival of new EIC men:

With the emperor we deal in the usual way, sometimes with less favour, and other times with more. These heretical Englishmen who came here and some bad Christians, and some Moors, after the arrival of the English at the emperor's ports said to him so many things that sometimes he shows coldness towards us, but he generally dissimulates, and it is not enough to avoid that someday he breaks down with us, given the multitude of enemies we have for reasons of religion and state.92

Writing on 23 September 1613, Xavier's fears derived from an event that took place a month earlier in Surat. In August 1613, Viceroy Jerónimo de Azevedo instructed the captain of the *Armada* of Diu, Luís de Brito e Melo, to block Surat and organise a series of punitive attacks against Mughal ships and the port of Porbandar.

In his *Década*, António Bocarro mentioned that the viceroy wanted to pressure the Mughal authorities 'for admitting English factors without respecting our friendship'.93 This was in line with the instructions sent from Lisbon and Madrid. On 17 March 1613, Philip III sent a dispatch

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Doc. 10, "Carta do Padre Jerónimo Xavier para o Padre Provincial da Companhia de Jesus na Índia, 23/09/1613", *DUP*, vol. III, p. 149.

<sup>93</sup> António Bocarro, *Década 13*, p. 189.

ordering Azevedo to pressure the Mughal authorities 'to not allow the English to be sheltered in his lands'.94

The reports of the EIC activities in Gujarat and the news of the Battle of Swally recommended the adoption of an aggressive strategy. While the Mughals and other local powers had to be discreetly encouraged to ban English tradesmen, Azevedo should also do his outmost to undermine the EIC across Asia: 'to the English you will openly do war against them in all places of this Estado, and those who are captured you will punish them accordingly to the laws without sending them to here nor waiting for other orders'.<sup>95</sup>

The apprehension of a set of letters dispatched by Thomas Best, Aldworth and other EIC servants stationed at Surat prompted Philip III to send a series of dispatches to Goa reaffirming the importance of pursuing an aggressive policy vis-à-vis the English. The view from Lisbon and Madrid was that the *Estado* should immediately thwart the English exploits in Gujarat, 'so this people will not throw roots, nor continue their dealings and trade, and perpetuate themselves'. Jerónimo de Azevedo ought to 'wage war against them in such way that they will be lost while entering or leaving Surat'. The proposed blockade of Surat sought to dissuade the EIC. In Philip III's words, the company's board and employees were men:

moved by merchandise and the interests and profits they expect to gain, and being a company of private merchants, it is certain that if they get these damages, they will abandon this trade. But if they obtain profits, they will not only continue their trade, but will also expand their forces and power to pursue other and bigger plans which will be necessarily inconvenient to the Estado.<sup>96</sup>

Philip's instructions to Azevedo were written before the news on the arrest of the 'ship of Mecca' reached the Iberian Peninsula. If the viceroy's decision to blockade Surat anticipated the king's suggestion, there was

<sup>96</sup> Doc. 444, "Carta Régia ao Vicerei Dom Jeronymo de Azevedo (24/03/1614)", *DRI* , vol. III, p. 69.

<sup>94</sup> Doc. 355, "Carta Régia ao Vice-Rey D. Jeronymo de Azevedo (17/03/1613)", *DRI* , vol. II, ed. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato (Lisbon: Academia Real das Sciências, 1884), p. 400.

<sup>95</sup> Doc. 300, "Carta Régia ao Vice-Rey D. Jeronymo de Azevedo (4/01/1613)", *DRI* , vol. II, p. 283.

still divergence between the king and his viceroy. Philip III and his councilors preferred a cautious posture regarding the Mughals and other local powers. The instructions sent from Lisbon and Madrid did not recommend that Jahangir and the *Reis Vizinhos* should be militarily coerced to expel the EIC, but instead persuaded through diplomatic means 'to not shelter this people [the English] in their ports'.97 The use of arms was solely destined for the English. The events of 1612 in Swally made the destruction of the EIC naval capacity in Gujarat a priority. As Philip III reminded Azevedo, the Iberian authorities needed to retaliate 'for the loss and death of many people and reputation' that occurred during the defeat at Swally.98 Azevedo's more aggressive attitude towards Jahangir was a result of the perception that the Mughal Empire had no intention to be on genuine friendly terms with the *Estado*. As he explained to Philip III, it was 'preferable' for the *Estado* to not have any communication with the Mughal authorities, whom Azevedo accused of 'damaging and discrediting' the Portuguese. Despite the presence of the Jesuit missionaries, who ensured a permanent channel of communication between Goa and the padshah, the viceroy believed that the *padres* were only useful due to their ability to 'captiously' provide intelligence, since the original goal of converting the local population was very far from being achieved.99

Among the ships captured by Brito e Melo was the *Rah¯ım¯ı*, owned by Maryam-uz-Zamani, Jahangir's mother.100 All its cargo was confiscated, and the ship burnt.101 Jerónimo de Azevedo celebrated the capture of the *Rah¯ım¯ı* as 'worthy prey that was brought, and for giving the Mughal a cause of sorrow'.<sup>102</sup>

If Jerónimo de Azevedo expected that the capture of the *Rah¯ım¯ı* would pressure Jahangir to concede to the *Estado*'s request to expell its European rivals from Mughal ports, the *padshah* used the incident to

<sup>97</sup> Doc. 445, "Carta Régia ao Vicerei Dom Jeronymo de Azevedo (24/03/1614)", *DRI* , vol. III, p. 71.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Doc 29, "Reposta da carta q. tratta dos Reis Vezinhos" in *Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina*, nº4 (1955), p. 708. Original Mss. HAG, "Reposta da carta q. tratta dos Reis Vezinhos", Livros das Monções no, 12 (1613–1617), ff. 21–24.

<sup>100</sup> Ellison B. Findly, "The Capture of Maryam-uz-Zam¯an¯ı's Ship: Mughal Women and European Traders", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 108:2 (1988), pp. 227–238.

<sup>101</sup> António Bocarro, *Década* 13, pp. 190–191.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., p. 192.

display Mughal power over the *firangi* of Goa. Indeed, the seizure and destruction of a ship owned by the 'Queen-Mother' prompted an immediate reaction from Jahangir. The attack against the *Rah¯ım¯ı* not only questioned Mughal maritime and commercial ambitions, but also invited the suggestion that the Portuguese challenged Jahangir's authority and prestige by targeting a ship owned by his mother. The absence of a reprisal would thus suggest the emperor's passivity and acceptance of Portuguese control over Mughal maritime activities. Simultaneously, Brito e Melo's attack offered an interesting *casus belli* that allowed the Mughals to resuscitate the old project of launching an expedition against the strategic Portuguese territories of Daman and Diu in Gujarat. The fact that most of the roughly 700 passengers carried by the *Rah¯ım¯ı* were pilgrims coming from Mecca offered an opportunity for the emperor to display his credentials as a champion of Islam by punishing the aggressions of the infidel *firangi*.

In his memoirs, Jahangir presented the Luso-Mughal crisis as an inevitable outcome of the persistent hostile actions undertaken by the Portuguese that breached all the previous agreements celebrated by the *Estado da Índia* and the Mughal Empire. Alluding to the Luso-Mughal negotiations of 1610–1611, Jahangir accused the *Estado da Índia* of acting 'contrary to treaty' and engaging in hostile behaviour that, in Jahangir's own words, was 'very disagreeable to my mind'.103 The capture of the *Rah¯ım¯ı* was thus a clear attack against Mughal sovereignty that targeted the figure of the emperor and the freedom of movement of his subjects in the seas of Hindustan. After being informed of Brito e Melo's exploits in Surat, Jahangir instructed Muqarrab Khan to 'to obtain compensation for this affair'.104

To pressure the *Estado da Índia*, Jahangir ordered the arrest of all the Portuguese residing in Mughal territories and the confiscation of all their property, a measure that sought to disrupt the commercial networks linking Goa to other South Asian hubs. The Jesuit missionaries were another target of Jahangir's retaliation. On 8 July 1614, the churches of Agra and Lahore were closed, and the financial support granted by the

<sup>103</sup> Jahangir, *Tazuk-i-Jahangiri or Memoirs of Jahangir* trans. A. Rogers and H. Beveridge (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1909), vol. I, p. 255.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

Mughal treasury cancelled.<sup>105</sup> To make things worse, the missionaries were ordered to leave Agra within eight days. A concerned Francesco Corsi feared that 'grievances' (*disgosti*) between the Mughals and the *Estado da Índia* would weaken and marginalise the heterogenous Christian communities of Jahangir's empire. Cast out from the court, without their residence and funds, the Jesuit missionaries faced a dire situation. The lack of regular funding from Jahangir's treasury reduced the *padres* to poverty and impeded them from maintaining their charitable works, a key instrument of Jesuit proselytising in Lahore and Agra. Besides impeding the activities of the missionaries, Jahangir's retaliation weakened a heterogenous Christian community, which suddenly lost the actors that had been able to organise the community and represent its interests at the Mughal court. As Corsi noted, the emperor's measures generated many fears among the local Christians, who 'day and night shed tears (…) for being departed from their shepherds'.<sup>106</sup> While some Christians continued to contact the missionaries and to publicly perform their religious practices, many feared that the Mughal authorities would start a wave of repression against the community. Corsi, for example, mentions that 'some merchants from Venice, Poland and Armenia discreetly closed their houses'.107

More importantly, the marginalisation of the Jesuit missionaries, the de facto legates of the *Estado da Índia* at the Mughal court, implied a total diplomatic breakdown with the Portuguese authorities. The sudden downfall of the *padres* suggested that Jahangir decided to put an end to an operation that served as a channel of direct communication between the Mughal court and Goa. To confirm the rupture, Jahangir also abandoned his attempts to establish a symbolic affiliation between the Portuguese monarchy and the Mughal imperial family. Jerónimo Xavier reported that shortly after the eruption of the Luso-Mughal crisis, the emperor forced the baptised Mughal princes to apostatise.<sup>108</sup> The return of Jahangir's nephews and Philip III's godsons to Islam was thus a symbolic gesture that not only terminated the links between the Mughal polity and the

<sup>105</sup> Doc. 4, "Letter from Jerónimo Xavier to Tomás de Ituren, Chaul, 4 December 1615" in Henry Hosten, "Eulogy of Father Jerome Xavier", p. 123.

<sup>106</sup> BL, "Letter from Francesco Corsi", Cotton Ms, Titus B VII, f. 111r.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Doc. 4, "Letter from Jerónimo Xavier to Tomás de Ituren, Chaul, 4 December 1615", p. 123.

Catholic Church, but above all materialised the collapse of Luso-Mughal relations by ending the spiritual kinship between the Mughal princes and the Iberian monarch.

Writing in 1615, António Machado presented a less bleak situation for the Jesuits and the *Estado*. Although their buildings were closed and the imperial grants frozen, the *padres* still had direct access to Jahangir. The emperor had dispatched Jerónimo Xavier to Goa to negotiate a solution to the crisis with the viceroy. Jahangir also ordered Francesco Corsi to follow him and the rest of the court to Ajmer in 1613, while Machado left Lahore to join José de Castro in Agra to help assist the local Christians.109 Machado's reports from Agra suggested thus that the emperor still regarded the missionaries as relevant intermediaries in his dealings with the 'Franks of Goa'. A similar perception can be found in the correspondence of Jerónimo Xavier. In a letter addressed to Tomás de Ituren, written on 4 December 1615, Jerónimo de Xavier recalled his involvement in the Luso-Mughal crisis, mentioning that Jahangir dispatched him to Goa, 'telling us to go and complain to the Viceroy of what he was doing against us'.110 The Navarrese missionary regarded Jahangir's retaliatory measures as part of a stratagem designed to simulate a conflict with the *Estado da Índia*, while the Jesuits discreetly mediated a solution to the conflict. In Xavier's own words, the emperor did 'a trick to make me arrange with the Viceroy about peace, and to conceal the fact that he was asking for it'.111 According to one report sent by Viceroy Jerónimo de Azevedo to Philip III, the Navarrese missionary was warmly welcomed in Surat by Muqarrab Khan with 'great demonstrations of friendship' and guarantees that there was the Mughal authorities had no intention of granting trading privileges to the EIC.112

The Mughal overtures to open talks with Goa are also mentioned in Jerónimo de Azevedo's correspondence with Philip III. The Portuguese

<sup>109</sup> BL, "Letter from António Machado", Cotton Ms, Titus B VII, f. 111r.

<sup>110</sup> Doc. 4, "Letter from Jerónimo Xavier to Tomás de Ituren, Chaul, 4 December 1615", p. 123.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 124.

<sup>112</sup> Doc. 109, "Carta do Vice-Rei da Índia, Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo para El-Rei. Paragem Das Queimadas, 31 de Dezembro de 1614", *Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina* 4 (1955), p. 755. Original Mss. HAG, Livro das Monções N.° 12, "Carta do Vice-Rei da Índia, Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo para El-Rei. Paragem Das Queimadas, 31 de Dezembro de 1614", ff. 161–167.

viceroy reported that he had been contacted by Muqarrab Khan to reach a rapid solution.113 However, these initial contacts seemed to have failed amid the increasing tensions provoked by the frequent skirmishes between Mughal and Portuguese troops near Daman in the final months of 1613. In May 1614, a Mughal army besieged Daman and raided the surrounding villages. Four months later, there was another Mughal incursion that, according to Jerónimo de Azevedo, 'was totally devastated'.<sup>114</sup> The Portuguese responded to these attacks by blocking the ports of Surat and Khambhat, and launching a series of raids, which culminated in an attack against the Mughal fortress of Broach, 'setting on fire the settlement, seventeen Moorish ships and several other ships causing considerable damages to the enemy'.115 In retaliation for these 'hard knocks', to quote Jerónimo Xavier, the Mughal authorities in Surat imprisoned Xavier and another Jesuit companion.116

According to Jerónimo Xavier, the persistent rumours that a large Portuguese fleet commanded by Viceroy Jerónimo de Azevedo himself was en route to attack Surat and expel the English from Gujarat prompted Jahangir to accelerate the negotiations in 1615. Fearing the imminent escalation of the conflict, the emperor ordered Xavier's release from confinement and dispatched the Jesuit to discuss the conditions for a peace treaty with Azevedo.<sup>117</sup>

While Xavier's version of the 1615 Luso-Mughal negotiations implied a Mughal fragility, by suggesting Jahangir was concerned not to allow the conflict to escalate to a higher and more unpredictable level, one anonymous Portuguese pamphlet described the negotiations as a Mughal triumph. Written as a fictional letter sent by a Portuguese official involved in the negotiations to his brother, the pamphlet described the talks as a performance of Mughal superiority over the *Estado* made possible by Jerónimo de Azevedo's lack of political and diplomatic savviness.

<sup>113</sup> Jorge Flores, *Nas margens do Hindustão*, p. 294.

<sup>114</sup> Doc. 109, "Carta do Vice-Rei da Índia, Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo para El-Rei. Paragem Das Queimadas, 31 de Dezembro de 1614", fls. 161–167.

<sup>115</sup> António Bocarro, *Década* 13, p. 312.

<sup>116</sup> Doc. 4, "Letter from Jerónimo Xavier to Tomás de Ituren, Chaul, 4 December 1615", p. 124.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

The narrative of the Luso-Mughal negotiations and the negative portrait of the viceroy offered by the pamphlet touched the main concerns of the Iberian authorities. Indeed, this document should be analysed against the backdrop of the reactions of Philip III to the Luso-Mughal crisis, in particular the inquiry launched against those involved in the capture of the *nau de Meca*, including Jerónimo de Azevedo. The news of the arrest of the *Rah¯ım¯ı* and Jahangir's reaction generated considerable apprehension in Lisbon and Madrid. Philip III reprimanded the viceroy for the capture of the '*nau* of Mecca' and the raid on Por since Jahangir 'was in peace and friendship with me'. The king and his councils feared that the *Rah¯ım¯ı* affair would not only undermine the efforts made since the 1580 s to establish a Luso-Mughal alliance, but also damage the reputation of the Hispanic Monarchy in South Asia and encourage other regional powers to support the *Estado*'s European rivals. As Philip III explained to Azevedo:

I cannot be more displeased with the fact that we are at war with the Mughal, a war that he [Jahangir] did not start, and it is against my service to wage war against the kings who have friendship with the Estado, not only when the Estado is less troubled by its enemies, but especially in these times when, due to this scandal, these rulers might publicly welcome the enemies of Europe in their ports.118

The damage caused by the Battle of Swally recommended thus some caution in the diplomatic dealings of the *Estado*. However, as the pamphlet suggested, Azevedo's willingness to reach a quick solution to the conflict allowed Jahangir to force the viceroy to act not as the representative of the monarch of an equal imperial polity such as the Hispanic Monarchy but as that of a subordinate, minor power. Indeed, the narration of the Luso-Mughal crisis provided by the *Jahangirnama* presents Azevedo as a weakened supplicant who, after being defeated by the English, 'fled and sent a messenger to Muqarrab Khan, the governor of the Gujarat ports, and proposed a truce, saying, "We have come for peace, not war. The English have stirred up this war"'.119

<sup>118</sup> Doc. 519, "Carta Régia ao Vicerei Dom Jeronymo de Azevedo (14/02/1615)", *DRI* , vol. III, p. 236.

<sup>119</sup> *Jahangirnama*, p. 165.

Throughout the negotiations, Azevedo allowed Muqarrab Khan to adopt a hostile attitude. The members of the legation sent to Surrat by the Portuguese viceroy, although 'brightly and distinctively dressed' (*lustrosa e vistosamente vestidos*) as a demonstration of their diplomatic dignity and the *Estado*'s prestige, were forced to disembark and stay on the outskirts of the Gujarati city.120 For around six days, the Portuguese emissaries waited for Muqarrab Khan to grant them a meeting. During this time, the *Estado*'s representatives 'lived under a tent', a lodging arrangement that overtly contradicted their dignity as diplomatic agents of the Portuguese viceroy.<sup>121</sup>

The Royal Confidant constantly presented different excuses to delay a meeting. Azevedo's emissaries had to turn to the services of Manuel Pinheiro to start the negotiations. After a meeting between the Mughal official and the Jesuit missionary, the Portuguese legation finally obtained a response. Jahangir's condition for a peace treaty was a compensation of 800,000 *cruzados* for the damages caused by the Portuguese.122 For the Mughals, this was not a negotiation between equals, but a conflict with a minor subordinate power that acted against Mughal sovereignty. Indeed, the compensation demanded by the emperor could be interpreted as a veiled form of tribute. According to the pamphlet, after Jahangir revealed the conditions for a Luso-Mughal peace treaty, Muqarrab Khan sent Viceroy Jerónimo de Azevedo an emissary carrying two baskets to be filled 'with some wine from Portugal, olives and capers'.123 This defiant act prompted Azevedo to threaten Muqarrab Khan with 'a war that would force him to beg for peace'. However, the viceroy's promise was never fulfilled. For the author of the pamphlet, the viceroy's warning was an illustrative example of his inability to protect or enhance the *Estado*'s reputation vis-à-vis the Mughals. Azevedo was accused of being 'only good to talk, and even this he does so slowly that he only starts to talk after passing many hours, and this is the ultimate proof of his utility'.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> BNP, Cod. 11,410, "Copia de hua carta q hum oficial do Secretario, escreveo a hum Irmão seu da Barra de Surrate em Fevereiro de 1615", f. 71r.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

Azevedo's inability to counter Muqarrab Khan's symbolic attacks on the *Estado*'s dignity thus exposed the viceroy's lack of political savviness. By negotiating during a moment of fragility in public through formal diplomatic channels, Azevedo allowed the Mughal authorities to downgrade the status of the *Estado da Índia*. Indeed, as the pamphlet suggests, the negotiations only progressed when the Portuguese turned to Manuel Pinheiro. The *padre*'s position as an informal diplomatic mediator ensured the necessary discretion to negotiate a treaty under unfavourable conditions without exposing the *Estado*'s powerlessness to counter Mughal geopolitical goals.

As António Bocarro mentioned in his *Década*, during the initial stages of the Luso-Mughal negotiations, Manuel Pinheiro ensured that the 'errands and messages' (*recados e mensagens*) from both sides reached their destination.<sup>124</sup> The mediating function of the *padre* seemed also to be a request from Muqarrab Khan. According to Bocarro, the Royal Confidant asked Gonçalo Pinto da Fonseca, the head of the Portuguese legation, to use only one channel of negotiation to avoid the involvement of other agents. The intention was to limit negotiations to a restricted circle of reliable interlocutors, mediated by trustworthy agents such as Manuel Pinheiro, and thus prevent a scenario in which the terms and conditions proposed by each side varied according to the different channels. Muqarrab Khan seemed not only to be concerned with the effectiveness of the negotiating process, but also in ensuring that he was able to impede the involvement of other agents with agendas that differed from his own interests.

While in the anonymous pamphlet Muqarrab Khan emerges as a hostile figure who was extremely zealous in enhancing Mughal superiority, the *Década* of António Bocarro offers a more positive portrait of the role of the Royal Confidant. For Bocarro, one of the official chroniclers of the *Estado da Índia*, the Mughal grandee was still Dom João de Távora. The letters sent from him to *Estado* officials were extremely cordial and expressed an intention to find a balanced solution to the conflict. The delays during the negotiations were apparently not caused by Mughal hostility, but by the health problems of Muqarrab Khan's wife.

In his letter to Gonçalo Pinto da Fonseca, Muqarrab Khan insinuated that his conversion to Catholicism had been genuine. The letter

<sup>124</sup> António Bocarro, *Década* 13, p. 391.

started with an evocation of Jesus Christ and an apology for what seemed dissimulative behaviour: 'Your Honour had probably considered to be scandalous that in such a serious business it seemed that I was not acting as I ought'. The letter suggested the existence of a close bond between Muqarrab Khan and the Portuguese. Pinto da Fonseca was reassured that he had in the Mughal grandee 'a friend' who would serve him 'everywhere with the same love he has for all the friends he has among the Portuguese'. Bocarro noted that all the letters sent by Muqarrab Khan to Goa 'have the name of Jesus, as well as a cross, everything according to our custom'. This 'accommodation' to Portuguese customs was attributed to the role of Jerónimo Xavier, Manuel Pinheiro and João Borges, the three Jesuits who, 'with much prudence and virtue', served as mediators during the Luso-Mughal conflict.125

The Jesuits and Muqarrab Khan concluded the negotiations with a treaty described by Xavier as 'honourable to the Portuguese'. The treaty established that the Mughal Empire would not have any commercial or diplomatic relations with England and the Dutch Republic. Indeed, the rhetoric of the first clause presented the EIC and the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC-Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie) as a common threat. The events that paved the way for the Luso-Mughal crisis 'had shown that the English and the Dutch, under the cover of merchants, came to India to settle and conquer these lands, since they live in Europe in great need and poverty'.<sup>126</sup> To deter the threat posed by the English and Dutch East Indies companies, the Mughal authorities agreed 'to not shelter them, nor to provide them provisions or give them any other help'.<sup>127</sup> Jahangir also consented that the *Estado da Índia* could intervene militarily in Gujarat to expel the members of the EIC and VOC. Similar conditions were also established by the sixth clause, which allowed

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., p. 356.

<sup>126</sup> "Capitulos das pazes que se fizeram entre os vassalos de El-Rey Jahanguir e os Portuguezes, por Nauabo Mucarreb-Khan e Gonçalo Pinto da Fonseca" in *Collecção de tratados e concertos de pazes que o estado da India portugueza fez com os reis e senhores com quem teve relações nas partes da Asia e Africa Oriental desde o principio da conquista até ao fim do seculo XVIII* ed. Júlio Firmino Biker (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1881), pp. 189–190.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., p. 190.

Portuguese ships to enter in Mughal ports to capture the 'Malabari pirates'.128

In exchange for these conditions, which interfered with Mughal imperial sovereignty, the treaty included a series of clauses that sought to benefit the commercial ventures of the Mughal imperial family. Regarding the apprehension of the *Rah¯ım¯ı*, the *Estado* agreed that Jahangir could take possession of up to 70,000 *xerafins* from the properties confiscated from Portuguese subjects as a compensation for the losses suffered by the arrest of the ship.129 The *Estado* also agreed to concede two *cartazes* to the Mughal emperor for a special period of two years for ships bond to Hormuz. The document established that all Portuguese subjects residing in Mughal territories and Mughals living in the *Estado da Índia* who had been arrested should be immediately released if they had not converted to Islam or Christianity.130

Although regarded as a 'honourable' agreement by the *Estado da Índia*, Jahangir initially refused to ratify the treaty. Indeed, the treaty limited the interactions of the Mughal Empire with other European powers and restricted Mughal overseas trade by binding it to the Portuguese *cartaz* system. Instead of affirming Mughal imperial sovereignty over the *Estado da Índia*, one of Jahangir's concerns, the treaty aligned the Mughal polity to the geopolitical interests of the Hispanic Monarchy. According to Jerónimo Xavier, the emperor wanted to review the clauses and 'asked for new conditions which the Portuguese would not agree'. To avoid an impasse, the emperor 'yielded', but the situation in Gujarat did not change. The Mughal authorities continued to allow English merchants and ships to operate in Surat and Khambhat. As one anonymous Portuguese manuscript describing Azevedo's failed campaigns in Gujarat noted, despite the peace treaty, the English ships arrived at Surrat 'as if they were in the River of London'.131

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., pp. 190–191.

<sup>131</sup> Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP), Reservados, Cod. 11,410, "Tratado do que sucedeo na Jornada do Vrey", f. 68v.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., pp. 190–191.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., p. 191.

The EIC followed the conflict between the Portuguese and Mughals attentively. William Biddulph and Thomas Aldworth reported from Surat Jahangir's retaliatory measures against the Portuguese with some enthusiasm. The report highlighted the closure of the Jesuit churches and the emperor's decision to exile '[Jerónimo] Xavier the great Jesuit, whom before he loved, to be sent down hither unto Mocrob Chan, who now layeth siege unto Damaen, to do with him as he shall see good'.132 The news of the Luso-Mughal crisis received by the EIC men suggested a profound change in the ways in which the Mughal authorities would deal with the *firangi*.

The conflict between Jahangir and the *Estado* indicated that the Portuguese would be replaced as the preferred *firangi* partners of the Mughal Empire. Biddulph and Aldworth noted that since the eruption of the Luso-Mughal crisis, the Mughal authorities adopted had a new attitude towards the English. The EIC servants had now 'as much liberty as ourselves can with reason desire, and all these people here generally much more affecting us than the Portingals, and showing us kindness in what they may'.<sup>133</sup> The Luso-Mughal crisis offered thus a unique opportunity to secure an English presence in Gujarat and other Mughal provinces. While the *Estado* and Jahangir were at odds, the EIC had a favourable situation where, as Aldworth and Biddulph noted, 'we might do great good in matter of trade'.134 The contacts between the English factory at Surat and several local luminaires indicated that the Mughal authorities were willing to support the presence of the EIC and to establish not only a commercial partnership, but also a military one: 'They all here much wish for the coming of our English ships, not only for trade but to help them, for as they say the coming of our ships will much daunt the Portingals'.135 Jahangir , as William Edwards reported to the company's board in London, seemed to be determined to expel the Portuguese from Gujarat, in spite of the Portuguese attempts to end the crisis:

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Doc. 163, "Thomas Aldworthe and William Biddulph to the East India Company. Laus Deo in Surat, the 19th of August, 1614", *LR*, vol. II, p. 96.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

Great means is made by the Portingals for a reconciliation, offering restitution of the aforesaid ship and goods, but no acceptance will be had. The Mogore his answer is: he will have all his country under his own subjection, and will be no more subject to them as heretofore.136

The language used by William Edwards is very similar to the rhetoric of the *Jahangirnama* or the *Tazuk-i-Jahangiri*, products of imperial propaganda that exalted Jahangir's authority and his deeds. Edwards had probably established contacts with Mughal officials who presented him a narrative of events that offered a perception of Mughal inflexibility towards the *Estado da Índia* and deliberately ignored the ongoing discreet démarches made by the emperor to normalise Luso-Mughal relations. The perception of an irreversible breakdown between Mughals and Portuguese insinuated that Jahangir would be willing to cooperate with the EIC or the Dutch VOC.

Among the Mughal luminaries who contacted the EIC was Muqarrab Khan. Although instructed by Jahangir to negotiate a solution with the Portuguese, the Royal Confidant actively explored the possibility of involving the English in the conflict to put more pressure on the *Estado da Índia* and obtain naval resources to hinder the Portuguese fleets in Gujarat. In a letter to the EIC board, Downton mentioned that after the arrival of the new English fleet in October 1614, Muqarrab Khan, 'our arch-enemy', gave him an unexpectedly warm welcome and proposed a partnership against the *Estado da Índia*. The Mughal authorities were ready to confirm the trading privileges promised to the EIC in exchange for naval support. Both Nicholas Downton and William Edwards mention in their reports that Muqarrab Khan wanted to use English ships to support the Mughal siege of Daman and dissuade the *Estado*'s fleets that targeted Surat and other Gujarati ports.137 The proposal made to Downton followed a series of previous contacts between Muqarrab Khan and other EIC agents. In his journal, Nicholas Downton mentions, for example, that Thomas Aldworth lobbied him to collaborate with the Mughal nobleman and 'strived to perswade me that Mocrib Can the Nabob was our friend, and that now was the best time, by reason of

<sup>136</sup> Doc. 177, "William Edwards to the East India Company. By the Hope. Received 2nd December, 1615", *LR*, vol. II, p. 150.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., p. 149.

their warres (with the Portugals), for us to obtaine good trade and all priviledges that in reason wee could demand'.138

Downton, however, refused the Mughal proposal, arguing that the commission granted by James I impeded him from being involved in foreign conflicts.139 This negative response was an attempt to gain more time to assess Muqarrab Khan's real intentions and the evolution of the Luso-Mughal crisis. Indeed, the EIC was not the only European rival of the *Estado* that received an interesting proposal for collaboration. Rumours also circulated in Surat that the Royal Confidant had contacted the Dutch factors at Masulipatnam 'promising them Damon when it is taken from the Portugals'.140 Downton feared that the offer made by Jahangir's favourite could 'bee an injurie forced by him to crosse us, and not by the direction of the King'.<sup>141</sup>

Writing from Ajmer, the new seat of Jahangir's court, Thomas Kerridge corroborated Downton's cautious approach towards Muqarrab Khan, but also stressed the need to persuade the Royal Confidant to support the EIC. Kerridge believed that the recent Mughal overtures towards the English were part of a strategy 'to bring the Portugal to a better conclusion in the restoration of their goods than in favour unto us as they pretend'.142 However, the perception that the concession of trading privileges to the EIC was imminent should also be reconsidered. The subahdar of Ahmadnagar, the main instigator of the agreement, was revealed to be 'only a deputy and not so great in respect with the king as we accounted', meaning that the agreement negotiated by Thomas Best had no practical effect. Besides, the recent death of the two Mughal officials who lobbied for the concession of a *firman* to the English forced the EIC to deal with Muqarrab Khan. Based on his experiences at the Mughal

<sup>138</sup> Nicholas Downton, "Extracts from a journal kept on board the New Year's Gift by Nicholas Downton, 1 March 1614 to 6 March 1615" in *The Voyage of Nicholas Downton*, p. 6.

<sup>139</sup> Doc. 177, "William Edwards to the East India Company. By the Hope. Received 2nd December, 1615", *LR*, vol. II, p. 149.

<sup>140</sup> Doc. 181, "Captain Nicholas Downton to the Company, Swally Road, 20 November 1614", *LR*, vol. II, p. 171.

<sup>141</sup> Nicholas Downton, "Extracts from a journal kept on board the New Year's Gift by Nicholas Downton, 1 March 1614 to 6 March 1615", p. 6.

<sup>142</sup> Doc. 186, "Thomas Keridge to Captain Downton. Received by the Hope. Agmier, November 22nd, 1614", *LR*, vol. II, p. 179.

court, Kerridge warned 'none here will take notice' of the EIC if the company was unable to find an influential interlocutor at the imperial court. Despite the previous tense exchanges with Muqarrab Khan, the fact that he was the man whom Jahangir consulted for 'matters of consequence' forced the company to use all its arguments to attract the Royal Confidant. The English envoy believed Downton should use the presence of English ships in Surat to persuade the Mughal courtier through displays of English maritime power, or by arguing the advantages of using the EIC ships to expand the Royal Confidant's involvement in overseas trade.<sup>143</sup>

Other servants of the EIC, however, believed the company should maintain a neutral position during the Luso-Mughal crisis. Thomas Elkington was aware that the company needed to establish a good rapport with Muqarrab Khan, who is again described as a key actor in Mughal politics who was able to dictate Jahangir's policies vis-à-vis the *firangi*:

Whatsoever good is to be expected from the Court must be by means of this man here, the king referring all concerning us unto him and will not do anything on our behalf but what from him he shall be advised.144

Conscious of the necessity to accept almost all the conditions stipulated by Muqarrab Khan to operate in Gujarat and other Mughal provinces, the EIC men in Surat adopted a careful approach that sought to avoid direct involvement in the conflict and distract the Royal Confidant. The EIC belatedly realised that the only way to find success was through the Royal Confidant: 'which if we had been formerly to understand so much, and so to have in some more milder sort tempered ourselves by giving way to some of his lesser requests it would have gained us much time and trouble'.<sup>145</sup> However, the intensification of the Luso-Mughal crisis, and Muqarrab Khan's pressure to include EIC ships in the Mughal campaigns against the *Estado da Índia*, suggested that the company's men needed to continue their dissimulative strategy. The objective, as Elkington noted, was to maintain English neutrality and simultaneously obtain a *firman*

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., p. 180.

<sup>144</sup> Doc. 251, "Thomas Elkington to the East India Company, 25th February, 1615" in *LR*, vol. III, ed. William Foster (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1899), p. 6.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

from Jahangir. The problem, however, resided in persuading the Mughal emperor to accept the EIC position or, as Elkington put it, 'given him some reasonable satisfaction'.146

Muqarrab Khan's contacts with the EIC served as a pretext to send another embassy to Ajmer to negotiate directly with Jahangir. Thomas Aldworth believed that the company required a resident agent at the Mughal court, 'a man of good fashion and esteem' who could actively promote English interests. The intention was to send a trustworthy EIC servant who could act as the de facto resident ambassador. The man elected was William Edwards, one of the EIC employees who came in Downton's fleet. This choice seemed to have not been motivated by Edward's 'good fashion and esteem', but by the need to avoid an internal conflict. The new emissary was initially destined to direct the EIC affairs in Surat. However, Thomas Aldworth, the man responsible for maintaining the company's operations in Surat, resisted being replaced by a newcomer, forcing a decision that would satisfy both sides, keeping Aldworth in charge of the Surat 'factory' and offering Edwards a prestigious role as the new emissary to the Mughal court.<sup>147</sup>

More important than picking a name for the embassy was the title that should be used by the EIC representative. Troubled by the previous experiences at the Mughal court, the company men understood that to send an envoy 'under the title and profession of a merchant' would hinder the negotiations and the prestige of the English in the region. To avoid the repetition of the troubles faced by Paul Canning and Thomas Kerridge, William Edwards would travel to Ajmer not as an ambassador from James I, but 'under the title of a messenger sent by our king to the Great Mogore'.<sup>148</sup>

To guarantee an adequate reception to Edwards, Aldworth instructed Thomas Kerridge, who was still at Jahangir's court, to announce the imminent arrival of another English envoy who would bring 'a letter with other great presents from our King's Majesty's own hand for the Mogul and not from the merchants as heretofore, and therefore to be respected

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> William Foster, "Introduction", *LR*, vol. II, p. xix.

<sup>148</sup> Doc. 169, "A consultation of merchants on board the New Year's Gift, the 20th October 1614 in Surat", *LR*, vol. II, pp. 136–137.

thereafter'. The presents destined for the emperor emphasised the international prestige of the Mughal Empire and the royal nature of the new English legation. Among the gifts sent from London was a portrait of Tamberlaine, the founder of the Timurids, which the EIC hoped would impress Jahangir. Another highlight was a gift that deliberately sought to establish a bond between Jahangir and James I: 'a vest royal for the king himself with the pictures of our king and queen'.<sup>149</sup>

Edwards and his entourage arrived at Ajmer around 1 February 1615. In a letter to the EIC board, Edwards mentioned that he 'was very honourably entertained' by Asaf Khan (Usseph Chan). The Mughal nobleman approached the English messenger and told him that he would be his liaison agent with Jahangir and the rest of the court. The word used by Edwards is 'Procuradore' (*sic*), a Portuguese word used to describe agents who represent a third party. Edwards presents Asaf Khan as a relevant figure within Jahangir's court, 'one of the principal respected gentlemen of the Emperor's court, brother to the chief and best-beloved queen'. This prominent status was promptly used in favour of the EIC legation. Asaf Khan, according to Edwards' letter, ensured swift communication with Jahangir and other key figures at the court, actively promoting English interests and 'furthering of our respect'. Edwards also gained the support of Mahabut Chan, 'the king's minion', who helped the company's messenger with 'many worthy offices'. The backing of these two prominent courtiers seemed to have attracted the sympathy of other Mughal noblemen and high-ranking officials. As Edwards confidently noted to his superiors, after mentioning the good services of Asaf Khan and Mahabut Khan, 'generally our cause is favoured of all'.150 Thomas Kerridge 's correspondence with the EIC board corroborated Edwards' positive reception by Jahangir. Kerridge confirmed that the emperor made 'much show of affection' when he received a letter from his English counterpart. The gifts sent by the EIC and James I also pleased the *padshah*, in particular one cloak much admired by Jahangir, 'not having seen such work before'.151 Throughout his first audience with Edwards,

<sup>149</sup> Doc. 170, "Tho. Aldworthe to Tho. Keridge at Agra. Laus Deo in Surat, the 22nd of October, 1614", *LR*, vol. II, p. 138.

<sup>150</sup> Doc. 252, "William Edwards to the East India Company in Ajmer, 26 February 1615", *LR*, vol. III, p. 14.

<sup>151</sup> Doc. 270, "Thomas Keridge to the East India Company. Laus Deo. In Agemere the 20th of March, 1614 [1615]", *LR*, vol. III, pp. 63–64.

the emperor made 'very many affectionate speeches and promises' and stated his sympathy for James I and intention to establish an alliance with England. Indeed, Edwards received the promise that Jahangir would reply to the letters from the English king and 'send him his picture with a present'.<sup>152</sup>

Edwards' warm reception at the Mughal court, however, was not solely motivated by Jahangir's fondness for James I. The day before the first audience with the English 'messenger', the emperor received a letter from Muqarrab Khan reporting Azevedo's defeat at Swally. The news of another sound defeat of the Portuguese fleets at the hands of the EIC impressed the Mughal court. Kerridge mentioned that Jahangir 'much applauded our people's resolution, saying his country was before them, to do therein whatsoever ourselves desired, speaking very despitefully and reproachfully of the Portingals'.153 While commenting on the second Battle of Swally, Jahangir, according to Thomas Mitford's report, 'did much commend the valours of the English, saying that he was endeared unto us for defending his port of Surrat (for of purpose the Portingalls came to have taken it, and so would have done if we had not been there to defend it)'.<sup>154</sup>

After describing Jahangir's reaction to the presents from the EIC, Edwards recommended sending a new set of gifts, which should include more paintings (in particular the cheap 'small creased picture[s]' that were 'little regarded' in England and 'much esteemed' in India); crossbows for Jahangir's hunting armoury; 'turkeycocks and hens' for the imperial menagerie; an ensemble of musicians 'with a sweet voice or two' and two paintings on 'the fight of '88 and our Saviour's passion'.<sup>155</sup> The inclusion of musicians and paintings in the next assemblage of English gifts to the *padshah* allowed the EIC not only to compete with the *padres*, but above all to emerge as a viable alternative to the apparently increasingly ostracised Jesuit missionaries as suppliers of European cultural novelties. The suggestion to add an image of Christ's Passion indicates an intention to play to the Mughal interest in the Christian imaginary, and eventually

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>154</sup> Doc. 273, "Thomas Mitford to the East India Company, 25 March 1615", *LR*, vol. III, p. 85.

<sup>155</sup> Doc. 252, "William Edwards to the East India Company in Ajmer, 26 February 1615", *LR*, vol. III, p. 19.

undermine the Jesuits' role as the preferred source for European religious art. Edwards seemed thus to plan an English retaliation against Portuguese and Jesuit soft and symbolic power. This intention is patent in the proposal to send a painting evoking the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, an event that evoked English superiority over the Iberian Crowns and that could be easily correlated to the English victories over Portuguese fleets at Swally witnessed by the Mughals.

Edwards faced, however, some problems. With no knowledge of Persian, Kerridge and Edwards decided to translate the letter from English to Portuguese so that an Armenian servant of Asaf Khan could render it into Persian. The contents of the letter and the quality of the Portuguese translation made by the two English agents raised some issues. The main problem was the unsuitable style in which James I addressed Jahangir. According to Kerridge, the Armenian translator 'disliking the style, altered the manner of it clean, adding to his own King's greatness, yet careful in reserving the substance of the matter, though in another form'.<sup>156</sup> The solution taken by the Armenian translator seemed to have pleased both sides. Jahangir revealed no displeasure with the contents of the letter, and the English were pleased to see that the new version had 'nothing derogating from the greatness of our King'.<sup>157</sup> Indeed, a similar problem occurred when the Mughal secretaries drafted the emperor's reply to James I. According to Edwards, the *padshah* revealed some concern with the style used to address his English counterpart: 'The King having given order for the framing of a letter to our King, after it was finished and ready for the seal the Mogul perusing the same disliked it for not sufficiently displaying the title, honour and attributes of our King, interlined the same with his own band in a more respective manner, as may appear in the said letter'.158

In his correspondence with the EIC hierarchy, Thomas Kerridge reported several problems related to Edwards' dubious behaviour. Contrary to his commission, Edwards presented himself as an ambassador throughout his time at the Mughal court, an apparent act of disobedience that the EIC messenger justified as necessary 'for the Reputation

<sup>156</sup> Doc. 270, "Thomas Keridge to the East India Company. Laus Deo. In Agemere the 20th of March, 1614 [1615]", *LR*, vol. III, p. 64.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Doc. 252, "William Edwards to the East India Company in Ajmer, 26 February 1615", *LR*, vol. III, pp. 19–20.

of our buisines'.<sup>159</sup> Fearing a repetition of the episodes involving John Mildenhall and William Hawkins, 'as his he might disgrace our King and country', Kerridge discreetly approached different Mughal courtiers and 'showed them the difference twixt an ambassador and a private messenger, which they apprehended sufficiently and were well satisfied'.<sup>160</sup> Besides usurping the status of ambassador, Edwards misappropriated monies that should have been destined for the EIC.<sup>161</sup>

The conflict between Kerridge and Edwards became public after an incident over the display of a portrait of Thomas Smith, the EIC governor. According to Kerridge, Edwards was reticent to present the portrait to Jahangir during the gift-exchange ritual performed during Norouz. Some days after the festival, Edwards finally presented the painting with an adequate frame to Jahangir, but still without mentioning the identity of the subject. Kerridge, who was present at the meeting, reported to Smith that he had to declare to the emperor 'who you were, your place etc. I estranged at this kind of proceeding, for that long before in my presence Thomas Mitforde told Mr. Edwards that your picture with a fitting present for the grace of the company and business were appointed to be delivered in your Worship's name, which had been very requisite for divers respects'.162

Kerridge's reports on Edwards' behaviour suggested that the new English emissary discreetly covered up the fact that he was a direct subordinate and a delegate from the governor of the EIC. Indeed, Edwards seemed thus to have acted with the intention to foment only direct contact between Jahangir and James I, an option that was in line with the perception that the Mughal authorities undervalued English diplomatic overtures due to the mercantile status of its emissaries. However, by disregarding the fact that the EIC hierarchy also aspired to establish a direct rapport with the *padshah*, the main reason for the inclusion of Thomas Smith's portrait, Edwards' strategy could be easily interpreted as an act of insubordination, a perception that is present in Kerridge's accusation that Edwards usurped the title of ambassador against the instructions of

<sup>159</sup> See: Thomas Roe, *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to the Court of The Great Mogul* ed. William Foster, vol. I (London: Hakluyt Society, 1899), footnote 3, pp. 99–100.

<sup>160</sup> Doc. 274, "Thomas Kerridge to Sir Thomas Smith, 26 March 1615", *LR*, vol. III, pp. 89–90.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., pp. 91–92.

his superiors. Kerridge's report also suggest the existence of a conflict over the role and range of action of the two English emissaries at the Mughal court. The tension between the two men is obvious in Kerridge's complaint to Smith regarding the way his colleague acted in an almost authoritarian way that went beyond the scope of his functions:

Mr. Edwards in his carriage here seemeth absolute, for [he] conferreth not of any business publicly nor will hear of councils, only privately with me and others for the bettering of his intelligence in things needful, which I freely advised, expecting that all of us should have been partakers of his general letter, but he of more provident experience hath only made use of my simplicity, which so long as it tendeth to the general good I may not be ashamed of my oversight.<sup>163</sup>

Kerridge's complaints are corroborated by Nicholas Withington, who also denounced Edwards for allegedly usurping the title of ambassador. Withington made an even more serious accusation, mentioning that Edwards manipulated the contents of the letters sent from the English monarch to Jahangir. Probably alluding to the problems reported by Edwards related to the translation of the letters, Withington stated in his account that the EIC messenger deliberately used the translation process to his own benefit, 'addinge and diminishing what seemed beste for his owne purpose and commoditie, either to or from yt, and soe presented his translation to the Great Mogul, with the present sente him by the marchaunts'.<sup>164</sup>

Besides the serious accusations of violating and manipulating the king's letters, Withington highlighted the inability of 'our would-be ambassador' to act as a bona fide representative of James I. Edwards was a 'mecannycal fellowe' who lacked the dignity and *savoir faire* required by the office of the ambassador. In other words, Withington accused Edwards of not only assuming a function that was not attributed to him, but also of trying to appropriate the social status associated with those appointed to ambassadorial posts. Such accusations echoed the concern of most early modern treaties dedicated to the office of the ambassador, which emphasised the importance of recruiting well-educated and politically savvy individuals with impeccable aristocratic credentials who could reflect and enhance

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., p. 92. <sup>164</sup> Withington, "Nicholas Withington, 1612–1616", p. 230. the prestige of a prince or polity.165 Due to his social background and professional trajectory, William Edwards failed the basic requirements to perform ambassadorial duties and navigate the intricate ways of a foreign court. Indeed, Withington linked the plebeian origin of the 'would-be ambassador' to his inability to efficiently represent a 'worthye and greate a prince as the Kinge of England'. Such apparent ineptitude is exemplified by an episode in which Edwards was unable to demonstrate to the imperial guards that he was an English emissary, being.

kicked and spurned by the King's porters out of the courte-gates, to the unrecoverable disgrace of our Kinge and nation, hee never speakinge to the Kinge for redresse, but carryinge those greate dishonours like a good asse, makinge himselfe and our nation a laughing stock to all people in general, to the greate rejoyeinge of the Portungales, whoe openlye divulged the disgrace of the English ambassador receaved, by letters throughout all the countrye.<sup>166</sup>

This episode is confirmed by Sir Thomas Roe, who mentioned that Edwards 'carried himselfe with such Complacency that hath bredd a low reputation of our Nation'.<sup>167</sup>

More interesting is the accusation made by Withington that Edwards used his alleged ambassadorial status to petition Jahangir 'to obtayne licence from him to inflicte justice upon all Englishmen (malefactors) in his dominions by execution to death or other bodilye punishmente, according to our English lawes; which the Mogull denyed him'.168 If successful, Edwards' petition would have established an arrangement of legal extraterritoriality similar to the one enjoyed by the Levant Company in the Ottoman Empire. The 1580 capitulations negotiated by William Harbourne established that 'if the English should have disputes one with another let their ambassador and consul decide according to their usage'. This privilege followed the principles of the charters granted by Elizabeth

<sup>165</sup> Douglas Biow, "Castiglione and the Art of Being Inconspicuously Conspicuous", *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies,* 38 (2008), pp. 35–55 (pp. 45*–*50); Daniela Frigo, "Prudence and Experience: Ambassadors and Political Culture in Early Modern Italy", *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies,* 38 (2008), pp. 15–34.

<sup>166</sup> Withington, "Nicholas Withington, 1612–1616", p. 230.

<sup>167</sup> William Foster, "Introduction" in Thomas Roe, *The Embassy of Sir Thomas*, p. xiii.

<sup>168</sup> Withington, "Nicholas Withington, 1612–1616", p. 230.

I and James I that allowed the Levant Company to exercise an extended legal authority to enact laws to govern English merchants across Ottoman lands. From an Ottoman perspective, this legal privilege was integrated into the *millet* system, the self-governance structures developed by the Ottoman polity to regulate and monitor the different religious and ethnic communities.169 This request, according to Withington, caused a maelstrom within the English delegation, which culminated with Thomas Mitford stabbing Edwards 'into the shoulder with a dagger'.<sup>170</sup>

Aware of the implications of his erratic behaviour, Edwards apparently tried to undermine the image of Sir Thomas Roe, his successor and the first English royal ambassador at the Mughal court. According to Withington, when asked about the identity and background of the new English ambassador who landed in Surat, Edwards presented Roe as 'was a man subdare [*sic*], which is a common souldier of fower horse paye, and of no reputation'. Withington's accusation is somehow odd, since the *mansabdar* was one of the highest ranks in the Mughal hierarchy. It is probable that Withington was unaware of the ranking system of the Mughal elites and used terminology unfamiliar to him and many in England to validate his allegations against Edwards. Indeed, the latter's presentation of Sir Thomas Roe as *mansabdar* was in line with the company's intention to use Roe's aristocratic pedigree to enhance English prestige at Jahangir's court.

Nicholas Withington's negative views on William Edwards should be read keeping the feud between the two men in mind. In July 1615, Edwards launched an inquiry into Withington's alleged fraudulent activities in Agra and dispatched a group of English merchants to apprehend him. In his account, Withington denied all the accusations made against him and stated that he had demonstrated his 'playne and open dealinge'.<sup>171</sup> Kerridge , however, offers a different version. In one of his letters, he describes the turbulent arrest of a heavily drunk Withington, a 'maddman' who escaped from being arrested by terrifying those sent to detain him. He would only be arrested when Withington 'fell out

<sup>171</sup> *Early travels in India*, p. 227.

<sup>169</sup> See, for example, Kate Miles, "'Uneven empires': Extraterritoriality and the early trading companies", *The Extraterritoriality of Law* (Routledge, 2019), pp. 87–103.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., p. 230.

with Magolls on the waye, that unhorste, beat, and delivered him prisoner to the Cutwall, who this morninge (to ad to our nations disgrace) hath carried him to Sarder Chan'.<sup>172</sup> Soon after this incident, Withington wrote a 'strange complayning lettre' to Kerridge pleading for his intervention with Jahangir to release him from the Mughal authorities.<sup>173</sup> Fears of Withington converting to Islam instigated Kerridge and the new EIC General in India, William Keeling, to seek his release. However, after almost two weeks of imprisonment, Withington managed to escape and in late 1616 he returned to England.

In spite of the strong suspicions that Withington was pursuing a vendetta against Edwards, his account of the behaviour and travails of the English messenger at Jahangir's court expresses a somewhat critical reflection on the limitations of the diplomatic modus operandi adopted by the EIC until then. William Edwards' faux pas provided a cautionary tale from which 'the Companye will take warninge howe they imploy such mechannick fellowes about such businesse'.174 Withington's account exposes thus the difficulties for the company's personnel in ensuring an adequate diplomatic representation in India. As in the case of Canning's legation, the mission headed by William Edwards revealed similar problems of political inexperience and indiscipline. Withington attributed these complications to the fact that the EIC representatives at the Mughal court had a lower class mercantile background which made them unsuited to perform diplomatic tasks that required the political expertise and courtly *savoir faire* possessed by aristocrats and high-ranking bureaucrats.

Another issue raised by Withington is the company's inability to monitor its employees in distant places. Edwards' usurpation of the status of ambassador and the serious conflicts afflicting the EIC men stationed at the Mughal court suggested that, once outside the range of their superiors, the company's men rapidly became involved in acts of insubordination or insolence. These cases of indiscipline often resulted from a clash between the company's interests and the personal ambitions of its employees. Indeed, the distance separating the EIC superiors stationed in Surat from their emissaries at the Mughal court allowed the latter to enjoy a considerable autonomy in a courtly milieu where, as the

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., p. 194. <sup>173</sup> Ibid. <sup>174</sup> Ibid.

case of William Hawkins suggested, foreign envoys could benefit from the symbolic and material advantages offered by the Mughal emperor. 'Mechannick fellowes' such as Edwards could thus easily explore the apparent unfamiliarity of the English state or European diplomatic procedures with the local authorities by revamping their original standing in an attempt to gain financial and symbolic rewards derived from their supposed ambassadorial status. In other words, for Withington, one of the perils of pursuing cross-cultural diplomatic exchanges without legitimate, well-trained, disciplined and socially suited diplomatic agents was the possibilities of social mobility that non-European courts offered to 'mechannick fellowes'. Instead of being focused on the goals of their mission, these unsuited agents would be more inclined to explore all possible ways to gain material or symbolic benefits that could improve their social standing.

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### Epilogue

Writing some good two centuries after the events between 1580 and 1615, Nawab Muhabbat Khan, the author of the *Akhbar-i Muhabbat*, described relations between Mughals and *firangis* as extremely troubled. During the Akbari reign, the enforcement of the Portuguese *cartaz* system encouraged the perception that it was 'beneath the royal dignity to enter into treaties with the Firingis'.<sup>1</sup> There were, however, some Mughal luminaries such as Abdur Rahim Khan-I Khanan who dealt with the *Estado da Índia* to safeguard their shipping and commercial ventures.2 The arrival of the EIC and other Europeans added a new, troubling element. Alluding to the events of 1612–1615, Nawab Muhabbat Khan described the conflict between the Portuguese and the English as one episode within a series of disturbing events among the *firangis* that required the mediation of the Mughal emperor:

When the Emperor Nuru-d din Muhammad Jahangir ascended the throne of Delhi, there existed great discord and animosity between the Christians of Portugal, France, etc. Thirsting after the blood of each other, they read together the same evil book of hatred and malice. Contrary to the manner

<sup>1</sup> Nawab Muhabbat Khan, *Akhbar-i Muhabbat*, in *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, vol. VIII, eds. Henry Miers Elliot and John Dowson (London: Trübner and Co., 1869), p. 390.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

© The Author(s) 2022

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233

in which they had been treated, the Emperor granted the English a spot in Surat for the erection of a factory. This was the first settlement which the English made on the coasts of India. Before this, they also occasionally brought their cargoes to the ports of Hindustan, and having sold them there, returned to their native country. Afterwards, they also began to establish their factories at different places in the Dakhin and Bengal.<sup>3</sup>

While noting that the events of 1612–1615 were a crucial moment for the English presence, the rhetoric of the *Akhbar-i Muhabbat* follows the model of other Mughal works that exalted the imperial authority and universal rule of the *padshah*. Indeed, Jahangir's intervention in the conflicts between the troublesome *firangis* could be read as an illuminating example of successful efforts in sociopolitical stability and economic prosperity achieved by the Mughal polity across its different territories. Nawab Muhabbat Khan's overview of the dealings between Mughals and *firangis* also reveals a process of learning about how to deal with the European powers, from an apparent posture of hostility and distrust towards the *Estado da Índia* to the receptiveness to stimulate the presence of European traders. There was, indeed, a difference from the ostensibly hostile stances of men at such as Qulij Khan or Qutb al-Din Muhammad Khan towards the *Estado da Índia*, and the readiness to forge partnerships with the Portuguese, the English and the Dutch demonstrated by Muqarrab Khan and Asaf Khan. These different approaches also reflect a generational change triggered by a combination of factors such as the religious policies of Akbar, the transformations in the composition of the Mughal elites and the increasing interest of the imperial family and other luminaries in overseas trade. The case of Muqarrab Khan's metamorphosis into Dom João de Távora is, perhaps, revealing of the ways in which after almost three decades of Luso-Mughal exchanges, a highranking member of the Mughal imperial apparatus was able to identify the symbiosis between Catholicism and the Iberian Crowns and manipulate it to enhance his personal agenda.

English and Jesuits also passed through a similar learning process, although from different starting points. The Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean began in 1498. Throughout the sixteenth century, the *Estado da Índia* not only became a part of the geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean, but was continuously exposed to the Indo-Persian political culture and familiarised with the functioning of South Asian trade.4 The EIC, however, was a newcomer. The lack of detailed knowledge in England about the commercial and political realities of the subcontinent meant that the EIC dealings with the Great Mughal required not only learning about his empire, but also the wider geopolitical reality in which the company would operate. The zeal and curiosity with which William Finch, William Hawkins and Thomas Kerridge annotated their journals regarding the troubled relations between Jahangir and the Deccani sultanates is an illuminating example of the efforts made by the EIC employees to understand the geopolitical realities of South Asia.

Both Jesuits and English scrutinised the functioning of the Mughal court and its political culture, identifying a common denominator between the *firangi* and the Mughal polities. Like their Iberian and English counterparts, the Mughals were a dynastical polity organised along similar lines to the European monarchies, with a courtly apparatus and a complex administrative machinery. Indeed, as the accounts written by Montserrat, Xavier and Hawkins suggest, the problems between Mughals and *firangis* did not derive from a clash between dissimilar or incompatible political cultures, but from the frustrated expectations caused by the negotiation process. The Portuguese and English not only sought to impose their own terms in the negotiations with a far superior power, but also expected to obtain immediate and definitive agreements. However, as Jos Gommans noted in his studies on Mughal wafare, the 'Mughal policy was usually aimed not at destroying but at incorporating the enemy, preferably by means of endless rounds of negotiations'.<sup>5</sup> This strategic principle was also present in the Mughal diplomatic approach. Akbar and Jahangir preferred to maintain permanent negotiations with the *Estado da Índia* and the EIC, rather than establishing conclusive agreements regarding the Portuguese *cartaz* system or the concession of trading privileges to English merchants. This strategy allowed a considerable degree of flexibility, which made it possible for the Mughal authorities to adjust to changing geopolitical circumstances. There was

<sup>4</sup> Jean Aubin, *Le Latin et l'Astrolabe – Recherches sur le Portugal de la Renaissance, son expansion en Asie etles relations internationals* (Paris: Gulbenkian, 1996).

<sup>5</sup> Jos Gommans, *Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and Highroads to Empire, 1500– 1700* (London: Routledge, 2002) p. 205.

also an intention to prolong the presence of foreign diplomats both as a demonstration of Mughal universal rule, insinuating the subordination of foreign polities,<sup>6</sup> as well as an intention to convert the delegates of foreign rulers into representatives of Mughal interests, acting as de facto double agents.7 This intention is patent Jahangir's decision to grant a *mansabdar* to William Hawkins, transforming the EIC emissary into a member of the Mughal nobility.

The Jesuits, who were also integrated into the Mughal courtly apparatus as clergymen and scholars, besides their role as informal diplomatic agents of the *Estado da Índia*, developed their own strategies of 'Mughalisation' to secure their place in the Mughal social and political structures. This entailed constant negotiation with local agents, which involved the performance of different functions that suited the interests of myriad actors, who had capacity to enhance the status and agency of the missionaries. In these negotiations, the Jesuits were inevitably in a position of inferiority as supplicants who asked for protection and patronage. While this strategy, as the cases of Manuel Pinheiro and Jerónimo de Azevedo reveal, facilitated the role of the *padres* as privileged mediators between the *Estado* and the Great Mughal, it also raised some doubts about the ability of the missionaries to objectively analyse Mughal démarches. Viceroys such as Francisco da Gama and Jerónimo de Azevedo often demonstrated their scepticism regarding the Jesuit views on the *Mogor*, believing that the missionaries' usual positive perception of Mughal attitudes towards the *Estado* was heavily influenced by their personal ties and dependence on the emperor and other relevant figures of the Mughal imperial apparatus.

This proximity was also noted by the EIC men. The alarming reports of William Hawkins or Thomas Kerridge on the gestures of Mughal generosity towards the missionaries contributed to a perception of an extraordinary Jesuit ability to influence the Mughal emperor and other senior figures. Although missionaries such as Jerónimo Xavier and Manuel Pinheiro knew how to navigate the intricate inner world of Mughal politics, the Jesuits perceived their position as one of immense fragility and

<sup>6</sup> Michael H. Fisher, "Diplomacy in India, 1526–1858" in *Britain's Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, c.1550–1850* eds*.* H. V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke and John G. Reid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 251.

<sup>7</sup> Colin Mitchell, *Sir Thomas Roe and the Mughal Empire* (Karachi: Mehran Printers, 2000) p. 165.

dependence, not only on the emperor's goodwill, but on the vacillations of Luso-Mughal exchanges, as the events of 1613–1615 revealed.

'Mughalisation' also raised some suspicions among the EIC men. The transformation of William Hawkins into an English Chan and his gradual adoption of an Indo-Persian habitus raised questions concerning his allegiances and identity as an Englishman. Hawkins' failed exploits, and the subsequent debacles of the embassies headed by Paul Canning and William Edwards, seemed also to have generated a perception of the alleged unsuitability of 'mechannick fellowes' to perform diplomatic tasks and ensure an adequate representation of the English polity and project political authority. This debate echoed the theoretical and juridical discussions surrounding the office of the ambassador as a representation of sovereignty, ideally performed by virtuous individuals whose physical traits, intellect, aristocratic background and moral integrity reflected and enhanced the reputation of a prince.<sup>8</sup> However, as the cases of Hawkins and Edwards reveal, the debate was also stimulated by the growing fear of the risk of allowing merchants to use diplomacy as an instrument of social mobility by exploring the opportunities offered by the Mughal court to obtain financial and symbolic rewards.9 In other words, the EIC feared that its merchant envoys would superimpose their personal interests over the company's goals. The decision to send a royal embassy headed by a member of the Jacobean court such as Thomas Roe sought thus to ensure a diplomatic representation performed by someone committed to English foreign and commercial policies. After Roe's embassy, the EIC preferred to use local and provincial mechanisms of lobbying and political petition used by Mughal subjects, acting often as an interest group fully integrated into the Mughal imperial system.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Douglas Biow, "Castiglione and the Art of Being Inconspicuously Conspicuous", pp. 35–55 (45–50); Daniela Frigo, "Prudence and Experience", pp. 15–34 (25–30).

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Diego Pirillo "Venetian Merchants as Diplomatic Agents: Family Networks and Cross-Confessional Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe" in *Early Modern Diplomacy, Theatre and Soft Power* ed. Nathalie Rivère de Carles (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 183–203.

<sup>10</sup> Guido Van Meersbergen, "The Diplomatic Repertoires of the East India Companies in Mughal South Asia, 1608–1717", *The Historical Journal,* 62:4 (2019), p. 888.

#### 238 J. V. MELO

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### Index

#### **A**

*A'in-i Akbari*, 178 Abbas, Shah, 61, 62, 98, 124, 125, 144, 145, 198 Abrãao, Coge, 74 Acquaviva, Claudio, 24, 64–66, 68, 74–77, 79, 94, 95, 117, 131 Acquaviva, Rodolfo, 24–29, 32, 34–39, 44, 45, 59, 109 Afghanistan, 35, 36, 45, 54, 60, 61, 113 Agra, 47, 80, 88, 90–92, 100, 101, 108, 113, 114, 117, 118, 122, 123, 127, 136–138, 146, 149–156, 158, 163, 166, 168, 172, 177, 192, 193, 195–197, 203, 204, 206, 207, 210–212, 230 Ahmedabad, 2, 9, 189 Ajmer, 127, 212, 221, 223, 224 Akbar, 1–3, 7, 9–20, 22–55, 57, 59–74, 77–91, 94, 97–104, 107, 108, 110–126, 128, 129, 132,

139, 141, 154, 178, 179, 234, 235 *Akbarnama*, 10–12, 17, 18, 20, 27, 37, 52, 60, 70, 71, 111, 112, 129 Albuquerque, Matias de, 72–74 Aldworth, Thomas, 188, 189, 196–199, 202, 208, 219, 220, 223 Aleppo, 89, 108–110, 113, 114, 116, 167 Ali, Hakim, 26 Ambar, Malik, 175 Armenians, 15, 62, 66, 67, 88–90, 96, 107, 108, 143, 156, 206, 226 Ataíde, Estevão de, 22, 160 Ataíde, Luís de, 21, 25, 26 Azevedo, Jerónimo de, 207–209, 212–215, 236

#### **B**

Badaoni, 13, 18, 112 Bahadur, 175

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2022 J. V. Melo, *Jesuit and English Experiences at the Mughal Court, c. 1580–1615*, New Transculturalisms, 1400–1800, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96588-4

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*Bandéis*, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20 Bassein, 10, 120 Benavides, Francisco de, 64 Bengal, 1, 2, 13–17, 19, 22, 31, 32, 45, 175, 176, 234 Berar, 87, 117 Bernier, François, 6, 175, 179 Best, Thomas, 189–191, 199, 200, 208, 221 Bharuch, 17, 37 Bh¯ına, Shaik, 132 Biddulph, William, 188, 196, 197, 219 Bijapur, 74, 101, 118, 120 Bocarro, António, 189, 191, 207, 209, 213, 216, 217 Borges, João, 217 Botelho, António, 23, 47 Boys, Thomas, 153 Brito e Melo, Luís de, 207, 209, 210 Broach, 213 Buck, Francis, 135 Butsar, 37

#### **C**

Cabral, António, 10–12 Cabral, Francisco, 73–77, 80–83, 85 Canning, Lancelot, 191, 192 Canning, Paul, 6, 7, 189, 191–196, 198, 202, 223, 231, 237 *Cartaz*, 3, 4, 10, 17, 37, 140, 153, 201, 218, 233, 235 Cartwright, John, 113, 114 Cecil, Robert, 113 Chaghatais, 32 Chardin, John (Jean), 114 China, 3, 5, 53, 56, 62, 66, 68, 86, 91, 95, 110, 156 Cochin, 14, 23, 75, 77 Cogetqui Soldan Hama (Khwâjgî Sultân Ahmad), 101

Copland, Patrick, 189 Corsi, Francesco, 89, 93, 99, 120, 155, 158, 159, 178, 211, 212 Coulthrust, Richard, 114 Couto, Diogo do, 10–12, 43 Coverte, Robert, 127, 149–152, 180 Croft, Richard, 190 Cultural capital, 145 Cunha, Nuno da, 189, 191

#### **D**

Dallam, Thomas, 192 Daman, 2, 10, 11, 17, 19, 26, 28, 36–39, 44, 53, 54, 59, 63, 72, 131, 136, 148, 210, 213, 220 Daniyal, Prince, 66, 120, 155, 159 *Darshaniyas*, 83, 84 Deccan, 2, 42, 47, 54, 72–74, 78, 87, 90, 100, 101, 108, 117, 118, 120, 124, 150, 170, 171, 175, 176, 178, 195, 196 de Guzmán, Luis, 47, 73 De la Vega, Cristóbal, 63–65, 68, 69, 71, 84 Diu, 2, 9–11, 17, 19, 38, 54, 59, 72, 146, 207, 210 Downton, Nicholas, 186–188, 192, 193, 220–223 Du Jarric, Pierre, 73, 92, 133

#### **E**

East India Company (EIC), 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 108, 109, 116, 126–129, 134–137, 139, 140, 147–153, 155, 164–167, 170–172, 176, 180, 181, 185–193, 196–203, 207–209, 212, 217, 219–228, 231, 233, 235–237 Ebadolá ('Abdullah), 16 Economic capital, 145

Edwards, William, 6, 7, 219, 220, 223–232, 237 Eldred, John, 109 Elizabeth I, 109–111, 114–116, 125, 180, 230 Elkington, Thomas, 222, 223 England, 1, 63, 109, 110, 115, 116, 121, 122, 125, 126, 135, 140, 142, 147, 149, 150, 166–168, 182, 186, 189, 196–198, 203, 217, 225, 229–231, 235 *Estado da Índia*, 2, 4–8, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22–25, 30, 34, 35, 39, 41, 43, 45, 50, 54, 55, 57, 59, 61, 62, 65, 67, 73, 74, 83, 87, 89, 97, 112, 116–118, 120, 122, 125, 128, 132, 134, 137, 140, 142, 146, 148–150, 153–155, 159, 163, 164, 168, 171, 177, 181, 189, 193, 198, 200–202, 207, 210–212, 216–218, 220, 222, 233–236 Ethiopia, 21, 29, 66, 67, 95, 156, 175 Évora, 80

#### **F**

Fatehpur Sikri, 14–16, 25, 26, 91 Fazl, Abu'l, 10–14, 17, 18, 20, 27, 29, 37, 41, 52, 60, 62, 70, 78, 85, 86, 112, 178 Finch, William, 137, 140, 147–149, 153, 157, 167, 235 *Firangis*, 1, 4, 12, 18, 42, 101, 112, 129, 151, 152, 233–235 *Firman*, 2, 9–11, 15, 23, 24, 28, 32, 33, 44, 77, 79, 87, 98–101, 117–122, 129, 140, 150, 153, 165–167, 170–172, 185, 186, 188, 189, 191, 196, 200, 201, 221, 222 Fitch, Ralph, 6, 109, 112, 113

Frencham, John, 150 Fuller, Thomas, 145 Furtado de Mendonça, André, 148, 149

#### **G**

Gama, Francisco da, 100–103, 117, 177, 236 Ghiyas Beg, Mirza, 170 Giorgio, Antonio (Jorge, António), 66, 67 Giuseppe di Castro, 178 Goa, 2, 3, 9–17, 20, 22, 23, 25, 30, 34, 35, 38, 39, 42–45, 47, 48, 57, 59, 61–68, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 80, 87, 88, 96, 100–104, 109, 110, 117, 118, 120–122, 125, 132, 134, 137, 147, 148, 154–156, 160–166, 168, 170–172, 177, 189, 205, 208–212, 217 de Góis, Bento, 75, 78, 91, 101, 102, 120 Golconda, 101, 118 Gomes, Jorge, 65, 76 Greville, Fulke, 113 Grimon, Leon, 62–64, 67 Guerra, António, 195 Gujarat, 1, 2, 4, 9–11, 17–20, 22, 35, 37, 40, 43–45, 54, 72, 80, 88–90, 96, 113, 132, 134, 136, 148, 149, 153, 160, 161, 164, 171, 175, 176, 178, 185–187, 190, 191, 200, 208–210, 213–215, 217–220, 222 Gulbadan, 37

#### **H**

Habibullah, Haji, 12, 13

Hakim, Mirza Muhammad, 31, 32, 34, 38, 40, 42, 60, 113, 159

Hakluyt, Richard, 110, 169 Harbourne, William, 110, 111, 229 Harem, 90, 142, 178, 180 Hasan, Abdul, 164, 166, 167 Hasan, Abu'l, 170, 224, 226, 234 Hawkins, William, 6, 7, 126, 135–148, 150–154, 157–159, 164–177, 180, 181, 185, 186, 191, 192, 196, 227, 232, 235–237 Henriques, Francisco, 24–26, 32, 35, 39, 45, 66 Hindus, 31, 47, 70, 82, 92, 95, 97, 99, 133, 150, 206 Honest dissimulation, 182 Hormuz, 24, 59, 72, 89, 218 Humayun, 18, 51, 61 Hunt, Edward, 191, 192, 196 Husain Quli Beg, 15

#### **I**

Iberian Union, 75, 152, 177 Ibrahim II, 120 Iskandar, 89, 90

#### **J**

Jadow, 191, 195, 196 Jahangir, 2, 4, 7, 23, 31, 47, 52, 66, 79, 90, 115, 118, 123–127, 129, 131–134, 136, 138–143, 146, 148–161, 163–182, 185, 186, 188, 189, 191–202, 204–207, 209–215, 217–231, 233–236 *Jahangirnama*, 129, 153, 170, 214, 220 Jahan, Shah, 23, 31, 47, 52, 90 Jains, 70 James I, 126, 135, 136, 138, 140, 145, 148, 151, 169, 180, 187, 191–193, 197, 199, 203, 221, 223–228, 230

James Story, 109 Japan, 21, 53, 56, 66, 86, 91, 95, 139, 156, 161, 182 *Jharoka-i-darshan*, 83, 84 Jourdain, John, 166–170, 172

#### **K**

Kabul, 31, 32, 60, 113, 176 Kandahar, 61, 124, 175 Kerridge, Thomas, 6, 7, 127, 193–203, 221–228, 230, 231, 235, 236 Khambhat (Cambay), 17, 77–79, 88, 90, 100, 132, 133, 149, 160–163, 172, 204, 213, 218 Khan, Abdullah, 60, 61, 113, 190 Khandesh, 101, 117 Khan, Genghis, 52 Khan, Mariam, 143, 146, 168 Khan, Mubarak, 143 Khan, Muqarrab (Dom João de Távora), 163, 164, 181, 182, 216, 234 Khan, Muzaffar, 43, 44, 90 Khan, Qulij, 97, 99, 100, 234 Khan, Sardar, 190, 191 Khawaja Shamsuddin Khawafi, 97 Kushrau, Prince, 141

#### **L**

Lahore, 7, 40, 61–67, 69, 71, 73, 74, 77–80, 82, 83, 85, 87–100, 108, 109, 113, 114, 117, 123, 127, 133, 167, 210–212 Leades, William, 82 Leitão, Duarte, 63–66, 68, 69 Lepanto, 61 Levant Company, 109, 114, 192, 229, 230 Lourenço de Távora, Rui, 154, 160 Loyola, Ignatius, 29

#### **M**

Machado, António, 178, 212 Malacca, 23, 110 Malwa, 175 *Mansabdari* system, 19, 31, 46, 55, 141 Martins, Pedro, 64 Maryam-uz-Zamani, 167, 209 Mascarenhas, António, 163 Masih-i-Kairanawi, 133, 134, 161 Mercurian, Everard, 27, 34, 35 Middleton, Sir Henry, 134, 172, 188, 189, 199–202 Mildenhall, John, 6, 7, 108, 109, 113–129, 138, 151, 227 Mir Ali Beg, 39 Mitford, Thomas, 225, 227, 230 Mongolicae Legationis Commentarius, 56 Montserrat, Antoni de, 23–27, 29, 32–40, 42–56, 59, 66, 67, 83, 103, 178, 235 Morrisson, Fynes, 144 Mullah 'Abdullah Sultanpuri, 18 Multan, 176 Murad, Prince, 33–35, 77, 78, 100, 101, 110, 117 Muscat, 39, 61 Muzaffar, Saiyid, 42, 43

#### **N**

Nawab Muhabbat Khan, 233, 234 Newberry, John, 82, 109–111, 113 Nizam, Khwaja, 134 Nur Jahan, 170

#### **O**

Osborne, Edward, 110 Ottoman Empire, 3, 27, 68, 69, 89, 98, 108, 110, 114, 116, 144, 169, 229

#### **P**

Paez, Pedro, 67 Patrimonial-bureaucratic model, 175 Paul V, Pope, 145 Pelsaert, Francisco, 159 Pereira, Gil Eanes, 15, 16, 63 Persia, 21, 46, 60, 67, 70, 71, 73, 84, 89, 113, 126, 127, 198 Peruschi, Giovanni Battista, 47 Philip II of Spain (I of Portugal), 30, 36, 39, 41–44, 53, 61, 66, 72–75, 177 Philip III of Spain (II of Portugal), 47, 67, 100, 117, 120, 125, 131, 136, 137, 155, 158, 164, 207–209, 211, 212, 214 Physical capital, 145 Pimenta, Nicolau, 92, 93, 102, 162, 163 Pinheiro, Manuel, 7, 75, 79, 80, 87, 88, 90–100, 103, 104, 132–134, 137, 138, 148–150, 153–156, 161–167, 178, 204, 206, 215–217, 236 Pinto da Fonseca, Gonçalo, 216, 217 Pires, Tomé, 89 Porbandar, 207 Portugal, 11, 40, 43, 72, 77, 102, 116, 147, 158, 164, 171, 187, 215, 221, 233 Princes Thamuras, Baysungjar and Hoshang, baptised as Carlos, Henrique and Filipe, 155 *Província do Norte*, 72, 74 Punjab, 113, 175

#### **Q**

Quli Khan, Isma'il, 15 Qutb al-Din Khan, 36 Qutb al-Din Muhammad Khan, 17, 19, 234

#### **R**

*Rah¯ım¯ı*, 209, 210, 214, 218 Rajputs, 54, 70, 71, 142 Rebelo, Amador, 47 Red Sea, 17, 132, 134, 135, 188 *Relaçam do Equebar, Rey dos Mogores*, 45 Renegade, 20, 98, 103, 128, 169, 196 Ribeiro, Estevão, 63–65, 69 Ricci, Bartolomeo, 66 Ricci, Matteo, 21, 25, 86 Roe, Thomas, 1, 6, 129, 203, 229, 230, 237 Roshaniyya, 60

#### **S**

Saldanha, Aires de, 101, 102, 120 Salebancke, Joseph, 150 Sande, Duarte, 14, 17 *Sati*, 99 Sebastian I of Portugal, 28 Selim, Prince, 80, 91, 99, 107, 122, 123, 132 *Shaikhzadars*, 132 Sharpey, Alexander, 149 Shihab al-Din, 37, 38 Shirley, Robert, 125, 144, 145 Sinan Pasha, Koja, 39 Sindh, 72, 77, 176, 198 Smythe, Thomas, 203 Social capital, 145 Sousa Coutinho, Manoel de, 66 Spain, 40, 41, 54, 64, 75, 113, 120, 121, 158 Spanish Armada, 190, 226 Staper, Richard, 109, 110, 115, 123, 127 Subjective conversion, 181, 182 *Sulh-i kul*, 70 Sultan Muzaffar Shah III, 9

Surat, 4, 10, 12, 17, 37, 42–44, 88, 108, 132, 134–138, 140, 147–149, 151, 164, 166, 170–172, 188–192, 196, 199, 203, 207, 208, 210, 212, 213, 218–223, 230, 231, 234 Swahili Coast, 17, 61, 132 Swally, 188–191, 199, 201, 202, 208, 209, 214, 225, 226

#### **T**

Tahmasp, Shah, 61 *Taqiyya*, 182 *Tarikh-i-Alfi*, 52 Tavares, Pedro, 13–16, 22 Távora e Brito, Henrique de, 23, 24, 28 *Tazuk-i-Jahangiri*, 220 Temple, Richard, 191, 192, 196 Timur, 6, 19, 22, 31, 32, 51, 52, 59, 66, 70, 73, 79, 84, 102, 103, 109, 110, 112, 114, 117, 120, 122, 124, 128, 129, 141, 143, 205, 224 Timurid, 79 Transculturalization, 169, 181 *Tratado da Corte e Caza de Iamguir Pachá*, 176 Trully, Robert, 191, 192, 194–196

#### **U**

Ufflet, Nicholas, 147, 167 Uzbekistan, 2, 35, 40, 51, 54, 60, 61, 89, 97, 113

#### **V**

Valignano, Alessandro, 52, 53, 66, 75, 86 van Neck, Jacob Corneliszoon, 109

Vicente, Ruy, 22, 24–26, 28, 32, 35, 44, 48 Viceroy D. António de Noronha, 10, 12 VOC—Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie, 217

#### **W**

Whittington, Nicholas, 188

#### **X**

Xavier, Jerónimo, 7, 23, 47, 64, 75–87, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97, 100,

103, 104, 107, 108, 117, 118, 120, 122–124, 127–129, 131–133, 138, 139, 146, 151, 152, 155–159, 172, 178, 179, 204–207, 211–213, 217–219, 235, 236 Xavier, St Francis, 75, 77

#### **Z**

*Zakat*, 94 Zoroastrians, 179 Zulqarnain, Mirza, 90